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Abstract 
Kuwait's leaders from 1961-77 maintained a foreign policy that reflected the country's territorial 
vulnerabilities. They sought to discretely cultivate an Anglo-American defence relationship 
without fatally compromising an ideological fealty to at least the slogans of Arabism. The thesis 
emphasises Kuwait's essential need to offset its international "hard" security component with, as 
far as practicable, a regional non-alignment posture and adherence to Arab policy norrns. In the 
process neo-realist and constructivist theory are used to bring out the duality at the heart of the 
amirate's foreign policy. 
Differences between key Al-Sabah over foreign policy were differences of emphasis, while 
domestic security concerns did not so much determine policy as emphasise Kuwait's regional 
challenges, against which the amirate chose to deploy ideology. Arabism inevitably had 
contradictions as a tool of Kuwait foreign policy, and was often more about the cash subventions 
that accompanied policy stances, than the value of the stances themselves. However deploying 
ideology was indicative of the ruling Al-Sabah's desire to strike the right tone for external and 
domestic consumption; a desire to accommodate or befriend key regional players without, it 
hoped, alienating others. 
The inherent contradictions of Kuwait's foreign policy were born of the country's relative 
weakness, save its one precious asset, oil. In the 1980s Kuwait's strategically vital location and 
key resource would see the amirate forced to abandon its sometimes illusory regional non- 
alignment; after 1990 it maintained an overt US alliance. Events post- 1977 therefore emphasised 
what had been the fragility of Kuwait's foreign policy since independence. The country's limited 
ability to act to prevent these crises only underscored what had been the limits of the amirate's 
policy options. 
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Introduction 
This thesis is an exploration of the determinants, objectives and outcomes of Kuwait's foreign 
policy, from independence in June 1961 until December 1977. From the beginning of sovereign 
decision-making in the amirate, key trends and events in the shaping of foreign policy are 
explored in the period up until Shaikh Jabr Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah's accession, and as Egypt, 
traditionally a key policy influence upon Kuwait, began its pursuit of bilateral relations with 
Israel 
Primary source material in the form of interviews conducted by the author with Kuwaiti and 
western officials from the period, and secondary source material largely consisting of embassy 
communications at the time, have enabled consideration of what the priorities of Kuwaiti 
decision-makers were during the 1961-77 period. The thesis is therefore able to examine the 
internal, regional and international context for the making of foreign policy, and to conclude that 
the essential consideration was the preservation of the amirate's external security. The primary 
responses that Kuwait adopted in the pursuit of this were, to a significant extent, contradictory: an 
attachment to an international defence alliance, first with the UK and then to seek to secure one 
with the US; and in regional terms to project an Arabist ideological fealty but on a non-aligned 
basis, a position important to maximising key Arab friendships and maintaining, as far as 
possible, positive relations with Iran. In exploring these two key themes, I utilised the essentially 
neo-realist approach to understanding Middle Eastern inter-state relations of Stephen Walt' and 
the constructivist analysis of Michael Bamett2 . Kuwait's foreign policy is explored in terms of the 
internal, regional and international inputs into decision-making, and the stances that were adopted 
as a response. This thesis takes Walt's emphasis on identifying the primary security threat, and 
examines a policy response that combined international defence guarantees with an ideological 
"construct". Essentially, this meant expressing loyalty to Arabist norms, including the goal of 
political unity and the pivotal cause of Palestine. 
The year 1961 is an instructive point at which to begin a consideration of the bases of Kuwaiti 
foreign policy. Almost as soon as the amirate's leadership became formally responsible for 
external relations, Kuwait was thrown into an apparent security crisis involving its northern 
' Stephen M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances (New York; Cornell University Press, 1990) 
2 See in particular Michael N. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New 
York; Columbia University Press, 1998), and Michael N Barnett and Jack S Levy, "Domestic Sources of 
Alliances and Alignments - The Case of Egypt 1962-73", International Organisation ILV (1991) p369-395. 
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neighbour Iraq. A territorial claim by General Qassirn on the oil-rich amirate compounded an 
external threat perception established by prior Iraqi claims on the amirate in 1938 and 1958, the 
latter after Kuwait rejected Iraq's invitation to join its Hashemite Union with Jordan. While 
subsequent evidence shows that there was no direct military threat from Iraq in 1961, the event 
and its immediate aftermath shaped the guiding preoccupation and tools of Kuwait's foreign 
policy: the maintenance of external security against, principally, a perceived Iraqi threat. This was 
offset by what became the two main, albeit contradictory, props of Kuwaiti foreign policy: 
international, or extra-regional, defence relations, and policies designed to express Arab 
solidarity. The arrival of a UK military detachment in 1961, was followed three months later by 
an Arab League Security Force (ALSF). Despite Kuwait's desire to base its "hard" security on the 
UK, the amirate achieved some ideological legitimacy with the subsequent departure of the 
British troops. This in turn was quickly followed by support from the leading Arab countries, 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for the amirate's independence. 
Walt's neo-realist interpretation of regional relations between 1955 and 1979 provides a useful 
basis on which to consider how the key threat perception behind the arnirate's regional policies 
motivated its decision-making. Walt assessed that international alliances did not affect Middle 
East states' central focus on the regional "balance of threat". This, he said, was typically about 
proximate dangers, wh i le the "threat" itself was not just defined, as realists would see it, in terms 
of military power, but on the past practice of neighbouring states: whether they had threatened a 
particular state before, and what claims or ambitions they articulated. If Walt's "balance of 
threats" analysis is applied, then Iraq can be seen as Kuwait's greatest, but not exclusive, external 
security concern, and the amirate's foreign policy would therefore be deemed to be largely 
orientated toward offsetting this threat. While the rationale behind threat assessments has 
applicability to Kuwait, the amirate did not conform to the assumptions of regional alliance 
policy that Walt's argument suggests. In fact this thesis shows that, in the period from 1961 to 
1977, Kuwait was for the most part only loosely associated with regional alliances, and that its 
non-alignment was part and parcel of an ideational construct that formed a key part of its foreign 
policy toward the Arab world. The inadmissibility for Kuwait of allying with Iran cannot be 
explained by Walt's "balance of threat" concept, given the apparent logic of allying with Iran to 
balance against Iraq in the 1960s and, arguably, of "bandwagoning" with Iran in the immediate 
aftermath of the departure of the British from the Gulf in 1971. 
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Kuwait did not always avoid alliances, however, as we shall see in Chapter 3 with the forming of 
the ALSF which aligned Kuwait against Iraq. Interestingly, this provides the only reference Walt 
makes to Kuwait, albeit in passing, when, following the sending of British military forces in 1961 
to deter an apparent Iraqi threat, Saudi Arabia and Jordan are described as "band-wagoning" with 
the more powerful state Egypt, against Iraq, by sending troops to the amirate as part of the ALSF. 
Conversely, two years later it can be argued that Kuwait's direct pursuit of Iraqi recognition, 
without particular regard for the opinion of the UK, or for that of Egypt, its key Arab "ally" in the 
events of 1961 , is bandwagoning, in so much as wider Arab mediation was disregarded and the 
determining issue was ultimately how much the amirate was prepared to pay Baghdad. However 
this, and the former pro-Kuwaiti Arab alliance, were exceptions that proved the rule of Kuwaiti 
foreign policy. The alliance had proven unwieldy and the key player, Egypt, knew that it was 
mistrusted by Kuwait. With its more pressing security concerns regarding Syria, Egypt proved to 
be a half-hearted participant in the ALSF. Regional non-alignment, in a Middle East characterised 
by shifting alliances, made sense for a comparatively weak power such as Kuwait. Iraq was to an 
extent bandwagoned by Kuwait in order to secure Soviet diplomatic recognition. In the event, the 
backdrop of Moscow's eventual recognition of Kuwait, which opened the door to UN 
membership, made an unstable regime in Baghdad far more amenable to the amirate's financial 
inducements. 
Kuwait, in confon-nity to what Walt noted is the likely tendency of weaker states, preferred an 
extra-regional alliance with the UK that would have only limited impact on its domestic and 
foreign policy, especially in the form that the amirate insisted on after 1961. Kuwait also 
understood and valued the prop to security in the wider Gulf that the UK's military presence in 
the southern Gulf provided, hence its private discomfort with the UK's announcement in 1968 
that it was pulling out in three years time. Kuwait's regional non-alignment enabled it to exercise 
some autonomy from the constraints of a power structure that in the 1960s could be characterised 
as the "Arab cold war', 3 . However, Kuwait's regional vulnerability meant that 
it could not escape 
the need to assert its Arabism - expressed through rhetorical and practical expressions of 
solidarity with key causes. This created the impression among conservative Arab states that 
Kuwait was effectively aligned with Egypt. Throughout much of the 1961-67 period, the 
amirate's Arabism took on a decidedly Arab nationalist hue as the anti-colonialist language, and 
'Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War - Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 195 8-70 (London; Oxford 
University Press, 1971). The international alignments of leading Arab states Egypt and Saudi Arabia did 
not so much shape regional structure, but, as Kerr, Walt and others have shown, reflect it. 
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opposition to British interests expressed elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula, was adopted by 
Kuwait. Adopting such stances also overlapped with strategic realities as the amirate had every 
reason to maintain good relations with an Egypt that it hoped would continue to counter Iraq. 
Post- 1967, Egypt could no longer project itself as the citadel of Arab nationalism, despite its brief 
revival as the leader of such sentiment in the aftermath of the 1973 war. However, encouraged by 
the fact that radical Arab nationalists had assumed power in Iraq and Libya, Kuwait's ideational 
construct would still retain radical tinges, even as a more conservative, Islamic, assertion of 
Arabism, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, also began to be articulated by Kuwait. 
Michael Barnett has assessed how the vagaries of Arabism drove the foreign policy and alliances 
of Arab states from the late 1950s onwards, through to 1991 (which, he suggests, is the point at 
which Arab state sovereignty was established as an inter-state norm 4) . Kuwait largely avoided 
alliances but was mindful of the need to ascribe to Arab policy nonns, seeing its external security 
as bound up in the need for both regional acceptance and, paradoxically, extra-regional defence 
partner(s). Constructivism helps illuminate how ideational factors were part of Kuwait's search 
for regional legitimacy and therefore security in the Arab world. Both Walt and Barnett share a 
conception that ideology can serve as a tool of larger states' foreign policy, creating obligations 
for weaker states in particular. However their assumptions about the key factors determining 
foreign policy differ, in part because of the differing weight they attach to ideology, and 
specifically to Arabism. For Barnett ideational factors can shape the identity and interests of 
foreign policy-makers and not just the responses; for Walt ideology is more a device to legitimise 
the foreign policy ambitions of more powerful Arab states. Barnett sees ideology as about more 
than external power plays and argues that the policy norms of Arabism can constitute a threat to 
internal and external security. This thesis will argue that the ability of more powerful states to 
deploy the "Arab card" was primarily a regional threat to Kuwait, and that the most important 
function of the amirate's emphasis on its Arab identity was as a tool of external security policy. 
The symbols of Arabism functioned as a counter to the ideological cloak in which Iraq pursued its 
territorial claims on Kuwait, and to offset the image created by the amirate's attachment to an 
extra-regional security partnership. 
' Michael Barnett has argued that the outcome of the 1967 war began a decline in the potency of Arab 
nationalism, but that this was not fully realised until its previous co-existence with state sovereignty from 
the mid- I 960s was undermined by the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990. Michael N. Barnett, "Identity 
and Alliances in the Middle East", Peter J Katzenstein (Ed. ) The Culture of National Security - Norms and 
Identity in World Politics (Columbia; Columbia University Press, 1996). A residue of it survives however, 
as do some territorial disputes or tensions for example between Iraq and Kuwait, that, prior to 1990, were 
more likely to be dressed up in pan-Arabist rhetoric. 
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While I have given equal attention to the internal context, as well as that of the regional and 
international, for Kuwaiti decision-making during this period, this thesis will emphasise that 
foreign policy was not primarily driven by internal factors. At certain points, such as the political 
clampdown begun in 1966 (see Chapter 2), Kuwait develops greater room for manoeuvre in 
managing its international relations. There are also occasions when senior Al-Sabah consciously 
project contrasting foreign policy "images" toward the UK as part of their domestic competition 
with each other. However, their differing "values and images" ' did not determine the bases of 
foreign policy so much as affect its presentation. Kuwait displayed Arabist fealty primarily as a 
means to counter external pressure, in particular the efforts at de-legitimising Kuwait made by 
Iraq. In fact, enforcing internal constraint, not least at the expense of those Arab nationalists, 
domestic and foreign, supported, and to some extent funded, by Egypt, was made all the more 
possible by Kuwait's maintenance of Arab nationalist norms in its foreign policy. Tellingly, a few 
years earlier, the leader of Kuwait's Arab Nationalist Movement, Jassim Qitami, was appointed 
as foreign ministry under-secretary and given lead responsibility for negotiating what became a 
mutual recognition agreement with Iraq in 1963. This did not make these crucial negotiations 
beholden to the amirate's pro-Egyptian Arab Nationalists, rather it emphasised the strength of 
Kuwait's internal position that such a figure was trusted to manage the country's primary foreign 
policy issue. 
In assessing the internal political dimension for foreign policy decision-making, I was drawn to 
the field of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), and specifically those who have applied it to the 
Middle East, emphasising how the domestic context shapes policy. Some illumination was 
provided for how a number of the factors typically seen as pre-eminent in the making of foreign 
policy in more institutionally-based polities had a relatively minor role in Kuwait. Adeed 
Dawisha's work on foreign policy making in Middle East states and specifically in Egypt' 
provides a useful typology of three levels of political authority key to decision-making. These are, 
in order of importance: the "principal decision-maker", a "chief executive" who typically has 
charismatic authority; the ruling elite, those often few key individuals who influence the principal 
decision-maker; and the political elite, usually operative within relatively powerless parliaments 
' Part of the framework adopted by Al Dawisha is assessing the factors shaping Egypt's foreign policy. 
Egypt in the Arab World - The Elements of Foreign Policy (London; Macmillan, 1976) 
6 A. I. Dawisha, " The Middle East", Christopher Clapham (Ed. ), Foreign Policy Making in Developing 
States: A Comparative Approach (Teakfield; Saxon House, 1975); and Ibid. 
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or political parties. For most of the period under consideration in this thesis, Kuwait lacked a 
single, pre-eminent, much less charismatic, decision-maker, as could, in contrast, be said of 
Shaikh Abdullah Salim Al-Sabah. However, in keeping with the patterns identified elsewhere in 
the region by Dawisha, key authority over foreign policy in Kuwait did not lay with the council of 
ministers (cabinet) or with the national assembly. Rather, in Kuwait, foreign policy was a matter 
of consensus among a handful of senior Al-Sabah members, the principle decision-makers, with 
whom a few other ruling family and technocratic non Al-Sabah officials were influential. 
Informal decision-making 
Egypt's President Nasser, notes Dawisha, created rival bodies to the cabinet in order to maximise 
his authority, even though the government was essentially like-minded; the Kuwaiti ruling family 
held the key posts in cabinet and determined the rest, but more important discussion on foreign 
policy, on the few occasions that it was held to be necessary, would take place in the Al-Sabah 
family council. In considering the making of foreign policy in Middle East states, Fred Halliday 
emphasises how key foreign policy decisions by, for example, Egypt's President Sadat, and by 
Iraqi leaders, were taken in a highly secretive manner by essentially one man'. This, says 
Dawisha, is the virtue of foreign policy decision-making in most Middle East states. Decisions 
affecting war, key alliances, and peace-making would have been far more complex, and far less 
decisive, he writes, in polities subject to more institutional constraints. The kind of bureaucratic 
bargaining identified in the government decision-making model of Graham Allison', for example, 
is unrecognisable in Kuwait or the wider Arab world. However Kuwait for the most part also 
tended to avoid dramatic decision-making of the kind more typical of stronger regional actors. 
Although its ability to doggedly pursue the mutual recognition agreement with Iraq in 1963 (see 
Chapter 3) showed the utility of a decision-making system that revolved around only a few key 
players. In general though, Kuwaiti foreign policy operated on broad and largely uncontested 
consensual lines that were understood, regardless of the occasional discussion of a pressing 
external issue within the semi-formal context of the, only occasionally convened, Al-Sabah 
family council, or more routine exchanges in weekly cabinet meetings. Foreign minister Sabah 
7 Fred Halliday, "The Middle East in International Relations" (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 
2005), 
' Graham Allison and Phillip Zelikow, Essence of Decision - Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New 
York; Longman, 1999) 
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Al-Ahmed would give expression to the central assumptions of a policy initially directed by Amir 
Abdullah Salim, but which, for the greater part of the period in question, were managed by the 
lead political actor, Crown Prince Jabr AI-Ahmed, in close consultation with the interior and 
defence minister Saad Abdullah, and Amir Sabah Salim. Kuwaiti foreign policy would display 
presentational differences between Jabr Al-Ahmed and Amir Sabah Salim, but in essentials there 
was clear consensus. In this sense Kuwaiti foreign policy fitted with characteristics identified by 
some writers of the FPA school who essentially had western polities in mind. The "non- 
decisional mainsprings of foreign policy action" referred to by Michael Clarke9, for example, in 
identifying the lack of analysis and ongoing routine "outputs", can be applied to Kuwait, along 
with many other very different and diffuse political systems. While mindful of the broad 
parameters of acceptable foreign policy in the eyes of domestic religious and political opinion", 
Kuwait's policy-makers, often unreflectedly, maintained a set of stances that were rarely re- 
examined. This was aided by a relative detachment from domestic factors that owed no small part 
to Kuwait's ability to draw on a key domestic resource, oil, which, as well as facilitating regional 
acceptance, enabled the co-option of merchants who had previously been a key foreign policy 
input (see Chapter 2). Archie Lamb, who was British ambassador in the mid-1970s, identifies a 
policy-making "process" in Kuwait that could often be characterised as the unquestioning 
maintenance of key assumptions among a tiny coterie of leaders (see Chapter 5). 
While Kuwaiti leaders may not have systematically reassessed their policy assumptions, they did 
try to project an identity in regional affairs that was more than a kind of Arabist political 
correctness. The Kuwaitis sought to give expression to Arab solidarity, not just by stances and 
finance, but also by seeking to mediate in Arab and wider regional disputes. While fully opening 
the "black box" of decision-making in a small and often informal process proved difficult in the 
writing of this thesis, the empirical material I obtained suggested that Kuwaiti policy makers' 
identification of themselves and of the country was an important part of the ideational construct 
within which policy was presented. Kuwaiti efforts at mediation were often unsuccessful, or 
failed to even get off the ground as in the case of Iraq and Iran in the early 1970s. Thus Kuwait 
had limited "agency" and could not alter the structure of regional relations in which it felt 
9 Michael Clarke, "The Foreign Policy System", Michael Clarke and Brian White (Ed. ), An Introduction to 
Foreign Policy Analysis: The Foreign Policy System (Ormskirk; GW&A Hesketh, 1981). 
10 See for example Michael Smith, "Comparing Foreign Policies: Circumstances, Processes and 
Performances", in Clarke and White (Ed. ) Ibid., p. 59-60; Dawisha, "Egypt in the Arab World", op. cit. p89- 
91; and Halliday, op. cit., p. 56-59. 
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vulnerable to security threats. However role theory" helps explain how mediation was bound up 
in a strong Kuwaiti foreign policy sel f-identi fi cation with a non-aligned Arabism and, to a lesser 
but increasing extent in the 1970s, wider Islamic links. Personal political preferences were also of 
relevance here. Amir Sabah Salim, who ruled from 1965-77, was the most enthused of the senior 
Al-Sabah leaders about Kuwaiti mediation. However, from the mid- I 970s, the amirate's efforts in 
this regard were led with particular attention to south Yemen and Oman by foreign minister 
Sabah Al-Ahmed. Amir Sabah Salim, like his nephew Saad Abdullah, defence and interior 
minister (1962-78), was more sympathetic to the British connection, and, as prime minister 
(1963-65), Sabah Salim bemoaned Egyptian influence over foreign policy. This encouraged 
Sabah Salim's desire to try to mediate in inter-Arab disputes in order to give greater credibility to 
Kuwait's professed non-aligned credentials, despite the Nasserite connotation of the phrase (see 
Chapter 3). 
The failures of Kuwaiti mediation during the period covered by this thesis, with the partial 
exception noted in Chapter 6 of its efforts to enable Iran to effectively abandon its claims to 
Bahrain, should not detract from the essential success of the amirate's foreign policy. In 
combining an international alliance with a projection of Arab fealty, Kuwait was able to improve 
its security, at least over the first part of this thesis, up until 1968. After Britain's withdrawal 
announcement that year, however, Kuwait was obliged to rely more firmly on ideological 
constructs, even as the influence of Arab nationalism weakened in the aftermath of Egypt's defeat 
in the 1967 war, a factor that was to gradually lessen the importance to Kuwaiti security of 
Cairo's political support. In this new environment, a professed non-alignment in the Gulf became 
unsustainable, and the beginning of armed conflict between Iraq and Iran in 1969 obliged Kuwait 
to support Iraq. Iraq had just begun incursions into Kuwait, helping to encourage the amirate's 
political support for Baghdad. At the same time Kuwait's reliance on Arabism as a tool of foreign 
policy would have made band-wagoning with Iran, which was stronger than Iraq militarily, 
unthinkable. Balance of threat analysis also suggests that balancing Iran by aiding the weaker 
power, Iraq, would have been strategically rational, although this was not what drove Kuwaiti 
policy. In practice the amirate's policy-makers in this period felt that the country was being 
coerced by Iraq and compelled, by dint of Arab expectations, to express solidarity. However the 
limits to any emergent alliance would soon be revealed in the events at Al-Samita (1973). The 
" KJ Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy" in Stephen Walker (Ed. ), Role 
Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (Durham (NC); Duke University Press, 1987). 
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amirate's need to continue to engage Iran, as the pre-eminent Gulf military power, as well as 
Saudi Arabia, would prove beneficial in offsetting Iraqi pressure. 
Kuwait did not abandon the desire for extra-regional defence support; it turned to the US and 
gradually achieved closer cooperation. However this relationship was not to develop the strategic 
importance or provide the balance in Kuwaiti foreign policy that the UK relationship earlier had. 
Kuwait's leading role in the embargo against oil sales to the US, UK and Holland in 1973-74 
suggests that ideological assertions had become the primary focus of foreign policy, or at least 
confirmed the absence of other options. Kuwait's participation in economic action far more 
punitive than in 1967 would have been difficult to sustain if the amirate's defence relationship 
with the UK had still been in place, or if Kuwait's desire that Britain's role be superseded by the 
US had been fulfilled. However, unlike the ostensible objective of mediation, Kuwait was 
confirming it was "on-message"; it was not seeking agency, rather, as one official argues (see 
Chapter 6), it was intent on "sharing the pain". 
By 1977 there was ongoing concern in Kuwait at Iraqi territorial incursions, while tensions arose 
with Saudi Arabia, which had become the amirate's key Arab state relationship as Egyptian 
influence collapsed in the wake of President Sadat's initiation of relations with Israel. The Arab 
solidarity on display during the 1973-4 oil embargo had proven practically non-existent toward 
Kuwait in the face of further Iraqi incursions. Despite this, Kuwait's security did not appear to be 
fundamentally at stake, a situation that its ability to project an Arabist foreign policy helped to 
ensure. 
The Kuwaiti case from 1961 until 1977 is an interesting exploration of how a relatively weak, but 
oil-rich, country seeks to adopt foreign policies that can offset its security vulnerability. There 
are, however, clearly limits to the autonomy and influence of Kuwait's policies. Its manipulation 
of ideology and the presentation of itself as a funder and facilitator of Arab solidarity - in line 
with the amorphous shibboleth of Arab unity - emphasises that regional structure alone cannot 
explain Kuwaiti foreign policy. Yet at the same time the ideological construct of Kuwait's foreign 
policy took account of the weight of Egyptian influence in the region and the need to deflect 
ideological assertions by Iraq and other states that questioned the legitimacy of the amirate's 
existence. In examining the factors shaping Kuwaiti foreign policy, there is a need to utilise 
theories that combine structural understanding in terms of regional power dimensions, with how a 
relatively weak state may seek to project a politically acceptable identity and role as an 
14 
alternative to the expected pattern of alliances. Walt's argument that decision-makers make 
judgements based on the behaviour and past practice of neighbours, as opposed to the simple 
military power determinism of realist thinking, has suggested to Gregory Gause'2 a way of 
combining it with constructivist thinking in order to create an "aggregate of threats" (see Chapters 
3 and 6). Walt accepts that ideology forms part of alliance considerations in the Middle East, 
suggesting that, at the height of pan-Arabism at least, ideology formed part of a threats-based 
analysis, preventing, or causing, the break up of alliances. For constructivists like Barnett, the 
making of foreign policy reflects identities among decision makers whose importance can be a 
response to external or internal efforts to delegitimise a regime. In weighing up the relative 
threats from Iraq and Iran, the "aggregate threat" plainly was greater from Iraq. Iraq's utilisation 
of pan-Arabist rhetoric was periodically used to bolster its denial of Kuwaiti legitimacy. Ideology 
therefore informed part of Kuwait's external threat perception, even before incursions in 1969 
had strengthened the existent belief that Iraq was more of a specific threat to Kuwaiti sovereignty, 
despite Iran's greater military strength. 
Kuwait was not a passive recipient of ideological pressure, but sought to make itself ideologically 
acceptable. For Syria or Iraq, their apparent ideological commitment to Arab wahda (union) 
13 
served as a defence against the ability of Egypt to de-legitimise them internally . In the Kuwaiti 
case ideology was similarly a pro-active tool, but the amirate was self-evidentlY not competing in 
the Arab hegemony stakes that characterise much of Walt's analysis. Kuwait's talk of unionist 
projects conformed to the conventions of the period, but it principally deployed Arabism to create 
regional acceptability, in turn providing greater autonomy from domestic structure. Constructivist 
literature emphasises how developing countries can be vulnerable to accusations that their 
internal polities or external policies are not conforining to acceptable standards 14 . For Kuwait, 
Arab nationalism was primarily a construct that it sought to deflect as an external ideological 
threat that could ultimately undermine the rationale for the amirate's separate existence. Foreign 
policy expectations of the kind identified by Barnett as being upheld by a common Arab identity" 
were mediated by the more powerful Arab states, one of which was a direct military threat to 
Kuwait. Thus ideology could easily be deployed against the amirate's international defence 
relations if they were not offset ideologically. Domestic opinion could not of course be 
12 Gregory F Gause 111, "Balancing What? Threat Perceptions and Alliance Choice in the Gulf', Security 
Studies, Winter 2003-04. 
13 Kerr, op. cit. 
14 For example Stephen R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment", World Politics Volume 43, Issue 
2, p233-256. 
15 Barnett, "Identity and Alliances", gp. cit 
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disregarded in a polity whose periodic authoritarianism did not extinguish its essentially 
pluralistic traditions. However the country's narrow band of decision-makers did not feel under 
pressure from internal factors in their consideration of foreign policy. The realities of Kuwait's 
military vulnerability necessitated the utilisation of its economic strengths for both foreign policy 
and internal legitimacy, advantages not enjoyed by many developing states. Furthermore, 
Kuwait's external threats and active domestic political life required a tailoring of foreign policy in 
ideological terms that would not upset these relations. Kuwait was not a fractured and unstable 
entity seeking external support to maintain a remote ruling elite in power. 
This study shows that analysis of foreign policy detenninants in a Middle East prone to security 
challenges and ideological pressure, particularly in the period with which this thesis is concerned, 
needs to consider structural constraints on weaker states at the internal, regional and international 
level, and how countries can try to minimise them. International relations theory confined to 
alliance analysis cannot explain the role of ideology or national identity in the case of weaker 
states that recognise they have little prospect of leading opinion, but who seek to utilise constructs 
to legitimise their place in the region, or at least deflect pressure from those who would question 
it. On the other hand, theoretical analysis needs to be cognisant of the calculations made by 
decision-makers of their country's strategic position and whether a full embrace of "correct" 
stances, including the termination of international alliances that attract regional and domestic 
criticism, would leave their country at the mercy of shifting political fortunes and regional 
alignments. This thesis shows how the loss of a firm defence commitment from the UK left 
Kuwait more vulnerable to regional developments that ideology could not provide sufficient 
cover for, just as solidarity and financial generosity could not resolve its dispute with Iraq. 
However, by the end of 1977 at least, there was little that Kuwaiti foreign policy-makers could 
have done to have offset the threat to the country's security caused by regional developments in 
the years ahead. This clearly has implications when considering what policies Kuwait could have 
adopted to avoid the temporary termination of its existence as an independent country in the 
course of the Iraqi occupation in 1990. 
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Chapter One 
Literature on Kuwait 
In writing this thesis I was struck by the paucity of books and journal articles relevant to the 
inputs, outputs, or consequences of Kuwaiti foreign policy in the period under examination 
(1961-77). Much of the little that has been published exclusively on Kuwait, and that is of some 
relevance to a study of this topic, is available in English, however, whether it was originally 
written by Arab or non-Arab writers. The limitations on useful published material emphasises the 
value for this thesis of the personal interviews conducted with former Kuwaiti, UK and US 
officials, and of the extensive utilisation of British and US government archives. While partiality 
and political calculation needed to be carefully bome in mind when considering either 
retrospective reflections or edited embassy accounts of conversations with Kuwaitis, the fact that 
there is no Kuwaiti government archive covering this period, nor any formal decision-making 
process', makes such sources invaluable. The importance of external assessments in analysing 
Kuwaiti foreign policy is further bome out by the amirate's reliance on UK assessments of events 
in Iraq (see Chapter 7). 
Of those books and journal articles that have been written either exclusively or largely about 
Kuwait, most are either historical narratives or present a largely compartmental ised vision of the 
northern Gulf state in terms of its founding history, oil wealth, the ruling Al-Sabah family, and 
foreign policy'. The treatment of foreign policy usually lacks any theoretical examination in 
terms of either internal or external structural constraints. Nor is there usually any suggestion that 
the distinct aspects of Kuwaiti society and politics could have a relationship to its foreign policy. 
' Nor could there be, given the events of 1990-91, when the government's private records were largely 
destroyed. 
2 See the assessment of Kuwaiti decision-making by former British ambassador Sir Archie Lamb contained 
in Chapter 5. 
3 For example, Peter Mansfield, Kuwait: Vanguard of the Gulf (London; Hutchinson Press, 1990). 
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Political economy 
There is a considerable body of literature that applies an analysis based on political economy to 
state formation and legitimacy in the Arab world; and several writers have looked at Kuwait in 
particular. Among the latter there is a coalescence of views that the arrival of oil enabled the 
Kuwaiti state to largely escape the political constraints of dependence on internal political 
compacts, but replaced it with dependence on the vagaries of the international oil market. Thus, 
as rulers of an oil-based "rentier state", the Al-Sabah enjoyed autonomy of internal decision- 
making, but at the price of a new kind of external dependency. Mary Ann Utreault' has described 
this process in terms of how Kuwait moved from dependence on the British with the granting of 
formal independence in 1961, to subjection to "the new patron", oil. In this way a small state like 
Kuwait is economically dependent, despite owning a precious national resource that has provided 
considerable advantage over the kind of states more typically addressed by dependency theorists. 
Jacqueline Ismael' has carefully dissected the political economy of Kuwait as a rentier state, 
assessing the way in which, with the advance of the oil sector after 1945, the ruler, Abdullah 
Salim AI-Sabah, became the disburser of a national largesse. This enabled the ruling family to 
combine the powers of capital ownership with almost exclusive control over the levers of state 
power to patronise and co-opt key constituencies and virtually the whole population of Kuwaiti 
nationals, especially following nationalisation in 1975, by which time nearly 80% of nationals 
were employed by the state 6. 
The impact of local and international economic structure on an essentially dependent state like 
Kuwait leaves little room, or indeed interest, on the part of Ismael or Tdtreault, for an assessment 
what shapes a rentier state's foreign policy. In essence foreign policy, according to this analysis, 
can only be a reflection of oil dependence. However, what this means in terms of ideological or 
strategic orientation for example, is far from adequately explored in analysis that adopts 
dependency theory, or the rentier state model, to look at Kuwait and countries like it. 
4 Mary Ann T6treault, Autonomy, necessity, and the small state: ruling Kuwait in the twentieth centu! y, 
International Organisation 45,4, Autumn 1991 
5 Jacqueline Ismael, Kuwait: Social Change in Historical Perspective (Syracuse; Syracuse University Press, 
1982) 
6 Abdel-Karim Al-Dekhayel, Kuwait - Oil State and Political Legitimation (Reading; Ithaca Press, 2000) 
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Kuwait did not in fact escape dependence on external allies, even if it had become formally 
independent. Indeed the oil wealth that enabled the ruling Al-Sabah to develop what Jill Crystal' 
has described as a political compact with the merchant class - the latter's abstention from active 
politics in exchange for maintenance of their economic livelihood with property and contracts - 
served to increase the attractiveness of Kuwait's resources to external countries, principally Iraq. 
Regional security concerns are mentioned by Crystal as one of the "additional reasons" why this 
domestic compact survived, whilst Tdtreault and Ismael give it little or no attention. 
However these writers' class-based analyses provide good insights, especially in the case of 
Crystal', into the internal consequences of ownership of an internationally marketable resource. 
This influenced the development of the state's institutions, in particular the ruling Al-Sabah 
family, and in the process internal stability was seemingly assured. However, Crystal believes 
that state formation in Kuwait is not inherently stable. She argues that if the state does not 
guarantee merchants continued high levels of economic reward, then local merchants do not 
always play by the rules of the informal political understanding9. Crystal sees evidence for this in 
the political agitation for restoration of the national assembly in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
although she could equally have mentioned the subtler events surrounding the elite political 
fallout of 1969-71, which are detailed in Chapter 5 of this thesis. However Crystal's analysis 
usefully sets the context for an internal political sphere in Kuwait in which, for the period covered 
here at least, the ruling family made judgements about foreign policy very largely without regard 
for what the merchant elites thought. 
National Assembly and merchants 
This is not to suggest, as Crystal implies, that the merchants are necessarily a politically 
homogenous group, or indeed a non-political group for as long as their economic interests were 
being satisfied. In her assessment, Kuwait's national assembly was a largely cynical creation by a 
ruling family seeking to manage local political debate and offset regional opposition, rather than 
enabling genuinely democratic and civil structures to be established. However, for the greater part 
of the period covered herein, the national assembly, while manipulated, and at one point illegally 
7 Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf - Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
8 Jill Crystal, Kuwait - The Transformation of an Oil State (Boulder; Westview Press, 1992) 
9 Crystal, op. cit. 
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suspended, saw lively debate that influenced the government's oil and finance considerations and 
therefore aspects, at least, of its foreign policy. Through the assembly, merchants and other 
sections of society have contributed to the political process, even if leading merchant families 
tended to remain detached from assembly politicking, and generally preferred to attend to their 
business interests rather than suffer the constitutional ly-obl igated financial compromises that are 
required to join the government. In something of a crisis in 1964/5, the Kuwaiti cabinet, which 
included wealthier merchants who had not forsworn their business interests, was rejected by an 
assembly majority of less wealthy merchants and Arab nationalists, egged on by a leading Al- 
Sabah (see Chapter 2). 
The Kuwaiti parliament has thus tended to provide a more assertive political platform than rentier 
state and dependency theory would expect of an oil-rich hereditary amirate. For her part at least, 
Ismael concedes that the elected National Assembly was not a "rubber stamp for policies set forth 
by the ruling class"". Following Kuwait's first elections in April 1963, twelve of the fifty elected 
MPs who supported the Kuwaiti branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement (KMAN) called for 
Kuwait to join the putative Arab Union of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The mutual recognition 
agreement Kuwait signed with Iraq a few months later reflected the strength of regional and 
internal ideological pressure when it committed the two countries to seeking union in the future 
(see Chapter 3). Radical posturing in the assembly also meant that leading merchants have at 
times lacked enthusiasm to defend it, as seen between 1975-76 when the active part played by 
KMAN MPs in the parliament compromised perceived national interests and the assembly was 
suspended with relative ease (see Chapter 5). 
An unpublished thesis authored by a Kuwaiti, Abdul-Latif Al-Rumaihi", lays out a template for 
examining the factors that determined the amirate's foreign policy, from its inception to 1983. 
After establishing the different spheres feeding into the deliberations of the Kuwaiti "decision- 
making unit", and exploring some of the theoretical literature relevant to the domestic, regional 
and international environment, Al-Rurnaihi gives varying degrees of credence to a wide-ranging 
set of foreign policy inputs. Ultimately, however, he avoids making decisive judgements about 
where the balance of influence on policy lay, although the objective of external security is 
implicitly a key factor. Inevitably there is a difficulty for any writer in making definitive 
10 Ibid., p. 86. 
Abdul-Latif Hassan AI-Rumaihi, "The Dynamics of Kuwaiti Foreign Policy"(Exeter; Exeter University, 
1983). 
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judgements on what and who was determining policy in the absence of the equivalent of, for 
example, the records of cabinet conversations. Curiously he also explicitly avoids exploring 
whether Kuwait could have accepted military support from Iran, or the wider suitability of 
founding an alliance with Tehran. In fact the role of alliances in Kuwaiti foreign policy is not 
assessed, aside from general assumptions that the professed non-alignment held true in practice. 
Al-Rumaihi does, however, gives considerable weight to the formal players - the amir, cabinet, 
national assembly and ministry of foreign affairs - that together make-up his notion of the 
"decision-making unit". Thus, for example, the national assembly is held to be influential because 
some stances it adopted became government policy; the ministry of foreign affairs is simply "the 
engineer" of foreign policy, a notion at odds with evidence explored by this author that the 
minister himself was not a pivotal decision-maker and that his ministry was more the executor of 
some policy details within the understood policy framework. In general, a relatively open 
domestic political environment is believed to encourage the convictions of those sitting within the 
different components of the decision-making unit who remain firmly attached to a pro-Palestinian 
policy line whilst somehow seeking to find a "balance" between the dominant regional and 
superpower actors. Precisely how and where a foreign policy was determined that reflected 
traditional attachments, domestic dynamics, and the desire to offset external pressures is less 
clear, however. 
Other writers on Kuwait, such as Peter Mansfield 12 , and those writing more broadly on the Arab 
world, have emphasised the amirate's civil sphere represented by professional associations, 
including the leading bodies of the middle class and merchants such as chambers of commerce, 
clubs (nadwas) and diwaniyyas (loosely translateable as "associations"), where political matters 
are often debated. The professional associations proliferated throughout the 1960s and 1970s and, 
like the nadwas and diwaniyyas, could be involved in political activity by holding debates, 
sometimes with foreign Arab contributors, and could be identified with defined viewpoints. 
Nadwas and more importantly diwaniyyas are important ways to let off steam, not least in the 
absence of legal, formal, political parties The diwanijyas remain aligned on family and factional 
grounds, and enable opposition MPs and leading shaikhs to rally, or to hear, opinion. Thus, in the 
Kuwaiti context, it can be argued that internal stability was not merely a matter of having 
sufficient oil largesse to buy off the merchants and other powerful interest groups. The country 
had a degree of civil life that underpinned the political order. The closing of the Assembly in 
1976 and 1986 by an amir using extra-constitutional powers, saw the diwaniyyas assert the 
12 Ibid. 
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constitutional right of Kuwaitis to be represented by an elected assembly. This was a civil sphere 
that could not easily be disregarded, while the elected national assembly itself, despite periodic 
closure, has clearly proven its institutional resilience. 
Kuwait does not suffer from many of the fundamental weaknesses of the state in the Arab 
world", and, in the opinion of one writer, of the small Gulf Arab states in particular". The cross- 
cutting allegiances that have weakened state formation in the post-colonial environment are less 
of a factor in Kuwait than, for example, in neighbouring Iraq or Lebanon. In some Arab countries, 
minorities or even majorities have been denied adequate political power and have thus helped to 
weaken state allegiance or even threatened its very existence. In fact it has been argued by some 
historians of Kuwait" that for more than 250 years the country has enjoyed legitimacy as a 
distinct entity. This began with the voluntary commitment of the bani Al-Utub tribal alliance 
from Najd in central Arabia, who migrated to the northern Gulf port then known as Kut, where 
they consented to the rule of the Al-Sabah. This has become translated into political myth, not to 
mention propaganda in terms of the country's supposed claim to have established a rudimentary 
desert democracy. However, the attachment of, in effect, the state founders to forming a settled 
community within the then small port town, laid the groundwork for what would evolve into a 
separate country. Aside from the Al-Sabah, the leading families of Kuwait today are the merchant 
traders directly descended from the families of the bani Al-Utub who made the original political 
compact that brought Al-Sabah rule, and the beginnings of a separate and distinct entity that in 
1961 became the state of Kuwait. 
Crystal is right to argue that the contemporary state of Kuwait still lacks many of the embedded 
institutions that would make for greater internal security. However, whatever Kuwait's internal 
vulnerabilities, they do not fundamentally come from cross-border allegiances undermining the 
central rationale of the state. Kuwait does not suffer from the ethnic or religious vulnerabilities of 
other Arab states. Its one key minority was (and remains) the approximate one-quarter of the 
national population who are Shia MUSliMS16. In the period with which this thesis is concerned, the 
13 Giacomo Luciani (ed. ) The Arab State (London; Routledge, 1980) 
14 Nazih Arubi, "Arab Bureaucracies", in Luciani (ed. ) op. cit. 
" See for example, Ahmad Mustafa Abu-Hakima The Modem HistoEy of Kuwait (1759-1965) (London; 
Luzac and Co., 1983) 
16 In the early 1960s the UK embassy gave a figure of 22% (see Chapter 2). Sourcing work written in the 
late 1970s, Joseph Kostiner gives a figure of 24%. Joseph Kostiner, "Shi'i Unrest in the Gulf', Shi'ism, 
Resistance and Revolution, Martin Kramer (Ed. ) (Boulder; Westview Press, 1987). For her part, Crystal 
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Shia were seen warily by the Sunni Arab majority, especially after the departure of the British in 
1971, given the proximity of Kuwait's large neighbour, majority Shia Iran. A visit from the Shah 
in November 1968, prompted many Kuwaiti Shia to line the streets, thereby causing some 
concern among the majority Sunni population. However, it was not until the Iranian Revolution in 
1978/9 that the Shia were seen, largely erroneously, by the Kuwaiti authorities as a potential 
dissident minority. The Shia were represented within the national assembly, often enjoyed 
significant state patronage, and, as Mansfield points out, were among the most loyal of the elected 
representatives. 
This thesis argues that the key foreign policy driver for Kuwait was its external threat perception, 
rather than internal pressures. In the period concerned, as well as subsequently, Kuwait's 
consciousness of the "balance of threat" 17 from Iraq and the need to accommodate Egypt, 
coincided with the presence of large numbers of Palestinians, Iraqis, Egyptians and Syrians in the 
population. In the opinion of the A]-Sabah, according to Crystal and a number of British and 
American officials at the time, these foreign Arab populations were seen as particularly prone to 
Arab nationalist sentiment, and possibly agitation. While Kuwait did not suffer the weakness 
caused by cross-border fractures in the very identity and legitimacy of the state, its development 
of an independent machinery of government, and the huge financial surpluses that its economy 
generated, required the absorption of foreign labour. Comparatively poor Arab nationals would 
largely fill the gap. 
The significant role of Palestinians in the public sector extended to a number of senior advisory 
and diplomatic posts. The extent to which Palestinians could influence foreign policy, by being 
positioned at such an elite level, is not explored in the literature but will be examined in this 
thesis. Walid Kazziha 18 has explored the historic development of the Palestinian-dominated 
Nasserite, Arab Nationalist Movement (MAN) and its hybrids, touching on their relationship to 
Kuwait among other states in the region in the 1950s and 1960s. This included leading Kuwaiti 
oppositionist and MP, Dr Ahmed Khateeb. However, there is little evidence that the Palestinian 
political presence in Kuwait, going back to the founding of the pro-Egyptian Fatah around 1958 
suggests the number of Shia range from 10-25% Ibid. In common with neighbouring countries, such data is 
not provided in Kuwait's official "Statistical Abstract" 
" Stephen M Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1987). 
18 Walid W. Kazziha, Revolutionary Transformation in the Arab World - Habash and his Comrades from 
Nationalism to Marxism (London; Charles Knight, 1975) 
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under Yasser Arafat, then an exiled oil engineer, had any active relationship to Kuwait's political 
opposition inside parliament. 
Kuwaiti academic, Abdel-Reda Assiri, who has written the only book to exclusively address 
Kuwait's foreign policy'9, is also one of the few writers on Kuwait to give scope in their analysis 
to the role of the leading Al-Sabah in Kuwaiti decision-making and to their relations with the 
National Assembly. This is not, however, explored in much detail, nor very usefully in terms of 
considering differing foreign policy perspectives among the key actors (some of whom remained 
in leading positions until recently). Assiri talks of the "personalisation of foreign policy" under 
Sabah Al-Ahmed (foreign minister from 1965-2003 and amir since February 2006), while another 
Kuwaiti academic, Hussein Ali Al-Ebraheem, extended the analysis of the importance of key 
figures to talk of the "personalised state"20 . Undoubtedly, key decisions on foreign and domestic 
policy were being made by only a few Al-Sabah, but how, and with what degree of consultation 
on the part of the amir, crown prince, foreign minister and defence minister, is not clear from the 
literary sources. However, through interviews and embassy material, this thesis is able to 
establish differences of emphasis among the senior players, which for the period concerned 
suggests rather less weight being exercised on the part of Sabah Al-Ahmed, for example, than is 
suggested by Assiri. More importantly, this thesis argues that differences on foreign policy 
among the senior Al-Sabah were, and are, largely about style rather than substance, given the 
external and internal limitations on foreign policy options. However, the tendency for books that 
do include commentary on the Al-Sabah is to avoid trying to penetrate the inner-family policy 
process and to ignore potential policy differences, apparent in the domestic domain at least. This 
is partly because material is relatively hard to come by. However it is also because those writing 
on this subject - Kuwaitis or those close to the country - often have to be careful about 
commenting on what in Kuwait, and throughout the region, is a sensitive subjecel. 
This thesis argues that Kuwait was more mindful of external threats than internal constraints or 
imperatives, however these factors cannot be entirely separated. As Crystal shows, throughout the 
1970s Kuwaiti public opinion emphasised a distinct Kuwaiti and Gulf state identity, but also 
19 Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait's Foreign Policy - City State in World Politics (San Francisco; Westview 
Press, 1990). The only, partial, exception would be the very limited number of memoirs published in 
Arabic by former Kuwaiti officials. 
20 Hassan Ali Al-Ebraheem, Kuwait and The Gulf (London; Croom Helm, 1984). 
21 Two books are notable for mentioning individual Al-Sabah in relation to foreign policy but also for 
foreswearing speculation on policy differences. Assiri op. cit. and Robert L Jarman, Sabah Al-Salim Al- 
Sabah, Amir of Kuwait 1965-77 -A Political Biography (London; London Centre of Arab Studies, 2002). 
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stressed the importance of the country as an Arab state, while its younger nationals gave the 
greatest priority to their own identification with IslaM22. As shall be seen in Chapter 6, the ruling 
family would increasingly present its foreign policy in Islamic as well as Arab terms as the 
decade wore on, mindful of shifting trends throughout the region. Kuwait was undoubtedly a 
country with strong internal constituencies and identifiers, where allegiance to the ruling Al- 
Sabah could be subject to financial considerations and compromised by, seemingly contradictory, 
ideological alignments. However, Crystal's conception is that the state in Kuwait is a potentially 
fragile entity, albeit one that has accommodated differing class and other interests within its 
structures. The state in Kuwait and other Gulf Arab countries, she argues, does not conform to the 
stark dichotomy presented by Marxists who see the state as subject to an emergent bourgeoisie, or 
those who view the state as a (post-colonial) entity able to overcome class forces and build its 
own legitimising institutions. The state in Kuwait is, in Crystal's view, dangerously independent 
of institutional links with the more powerful class forces, whilst sub ect to new class interests j 
where the old merchants are able to use the machinery of the state to serve their own patronage 
interests. This does not sound like such a fragile entity, however, especially given her view that it 
is the growth of the Kuwait state and of its patronage power that has given rise to these new class 
interests. 
Interestingly, when specifically addressing foreign policy in just a single chapter of one of her 
two otherwise comprehensive books on Kuwait, Crystal emphasises that Kuwait is, in her view, 
an externally weak state conceiving of itself as militarily vulnerable, and that for this reason alone 
it has to pursue ameliorative and non-aligned policies. Crystal makes no theoretical link in her 
examination of foreign policy to her strong emphasis elsewhere on internal vulnerability and her 
conception, when looking at foreign policy, that regional insecurity motivated a desire to 
"balance" regional threats. Nor does she, or other writers who have looked at the identity and 
political orientation of Gulf Arab states, give particular attention to Kuwait's combination, for 
example, of the use of aid for regional influence, with strong stances on the Palestine question. In 
1967 and 1973 this even saw symbolic Kuwaiti troop contributions to the Egyptian and Syrian 
war effort. Kuwait was also keen to publicly oppose US military engagement in the Gulf, at least 
until Kuwaiti oil exports began being threatened by Iran from 1986. Stances patently more Arab 
nationalist than that of its Gulf Arab allies suggest that foreign policy dynamics in Kuwait went 
22 Crystal, Transformation, op. cit. in which she draws on the work of Kuwaiti researchers, Tawfiq Farah 
and Faisal Al-Salem, among others, to show how Kuwaiti middle school students in 1976 stressed Islam as 
their primary form of identification (p. 66). 
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beyond the internal legitimacy perspective favoured by many western academics when looking at 
the amirate's policies in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Hussein Ali A]-EbraheeM23 emphasises that, as a small state, Kuwait was well advised to 
combine its oil wealth with the distribution of monies via such official state bodies as the Kuwait 
Fund for Arab Economic Development. The Fund was founded in 1961 in order to win friends in 
the Arab and, after the oil price hikes of 1973-4, throughout the wider Muslim and developing 
world. This, said Al-Ebraheem, could be combined with efforts to mediate where there were 
tensions in the Gulf, and the wider Middle East and Islamic world. This theme is also taken up by 
Assiri. However, Assiri's book, in common with all other books on, or related to, Kuwaiti foreign 
policy, lacks a theoretical context and presents a largely narrative account, albeit one that usefully 
emphasises the regional factors that prompted Kuwait, as a small and ostensibly powerless "city 
state", to accommodate more powerful Gulf countries where possible. Assiri, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, puts greater emphasis on the supposed achievements of Kuwaiti mediation than 
non-Kuwaiti observers. In reality such mediation was of limited impact, at the most Kuwait can 
be said to have played a part in encouraging Iranian acceptance of a UN consultation in Bahrain 
over the island's future status. However, his book does at least acknowledge the role of Kuwait's 
wealth in foreign policy terms. 
However, there is very little material in Assiri's book, or among what is more generally available, 
that addresses Kuwait's foreign policy in terms of the importance of the amirate's ideological 
image, both internally and regionally. Nor is there any analysis of how the use of ideology had to 
accommodate the maintenance of good relations with all the key regional players, including non- 
Arab Iran. Kuwaiti non-alignment in the region, as Crystal rightly points out, was not entirely 
neutral and was not above using aid as a nuanced tool of foreign policy, including seeking to 
financially penalise or incentivise Iraq. 
International relations 
There is little in the available literature that seeks to explore Anglo-Kuwaiti or American-Kuwaiti 
relations with reference to threat perceptions, much less to any theoretical context. Crystal states 
the importance of the US-Kuwaiti relationship prior to Washington's agreement in 1987 to re-flag 
23 AI-Ebraheem, op-cit. 
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Kuwaiti oil tankers, but does not explore this in any depth. In contrast to the approach of Crystal, 
J. B. Kelly takes a largely jaundiced and highly personalised aim at what he views as the 
perfidious policies of the Gulf Arabs in general towards Britain in particular, but without 
remotely exploring what may have been motivating Kuwait's regionally non-aligned position for 
24 example 
The only book that specifically seeks to explore Kuwait's relations with both the UK and the US 
throughout this period is by Miriam Joyce". To its credit, and in the absence of any other 
literature of which I am aware on this specific subject, it gives a detailed historical account of 
relations from 1945 to 1968. However its coverage of the subsequent period, despite the book's 
title suggesting otherwise, is quite scant, partly reflecting the limitations of analysis very largely 
reliant on trawling through publicly available British and American government records. This, 
and a narrative-based political biography of Amir Sabah Sal iM26 , do not set Kuwait's relations 
with what were the key powers in the period, in any regional and/or theoretical context. Joyce's 
analysis also suffers from a lack of assessment of what the importance was of the internal context 
for Kuwait's or its neighbours' foreign policy 27 .A number of historical memoirs provide a useful 
28 
set of impressions of leading British officials in the region, pre-Kuwait's independence . 
However these largely provide background material only, rather than any insights into the making 
and shaping of Kuwaiti foreign policy. 
Michael Palmer traces the history of the evolution of the US's security role in the Gulf'. In the 
process he displays a good feel for the regional context created by the US's relative strategic 
detachment, which would oblige Kuwait to emphasise regional relations and Arabist policy 
stances. Two books provide an account of the Soviet Union and China's relations with Kuwait. 
One, by Stephen Page 30 , is a wider dissection of Moscow's policy in the Arabian Peninsula, while 
24 J. B. Kelly, Arabia, The Gulf, and the West (Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1980) 
25 Miriam Joyce, Kuwait 1945-1996 - An Anglo American Assessment (Frank Cass, London, 1998) 
26 Jarman, ibid. 
27 In a subsequent case study approach to analysing all the smaller Gulf Arab states' relations with Britain 
from 1960-69, Miriam Joyce gives an account is given of Bahrain's fears of (Shia majority) Iran without 
actually mentioning that Sunni-ruled Bahrain is majority Shia. Miriam Joyce, Ruling Sheikhs and Her 
Maiesty's Government, 1960-69 (London; Frank Cass, 2003). 
28 For example Bernard Burrows, Footnotes in the Sand, and Ralph Hewins, A Golden Dream (London; 
WH Allen, 1963) 
29 Michael A. Palmer, Guardians of the Gul (New York; Free Press, 1992). 
30 Stephen Page, The USSR and Arabia - The Development of Soviet Policies and Attitudes Towards the 
Countries of the Arabian Peninsula (London; Central Asian Research Centre, 1971). 
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the other, by Hashim Behbehani3l, provides a series of case studies of Peking's relations with 
very different Arab states. Page's account concentrates on the evolution of Soviet ideology 
toward Arabian Peninsula countries in response to calculations of potential receptiveness to the 
USSR's influence. The region is seen, rightly, by Moscow as largely unsympathetic, but 
periodically provides perceived opportunities for increasing influence. By definition this tells us 
little of the views held by Kuwait or her neighbours toward relations with the USSR. Behbehani's 
book on China similarly provides a useful account of the historical evolution of its relations with 
Kuwait, which are covered in the comprehensive manner that his case study approach affords. 
Unlike Page, he provides an assessment of the relationship from both sides, and in doing so 
illuminates the relatively limited expectations and objectives that Kuwait had in pursuing 
relations with Peking. 
Kuwait's international relations, and in particular its relations with the UK, with whom it was 
aligned in a defence agreement from 1961-68, and the US, who Kuwait sought privately to 
involve in Kuwaiti and Gulf security from as early as 1965, are central to any analysis of the 
amirate's foreign policy priorities and motivations. However there is little in the literature that 
assesses Kuwait's international relations in this wider perspective. One very recent addition by 
Chookiat Panaspornprasit" does examine the amirate's relations with the US and includes a 
chapter on the 1961-77 period. Panaspornprasit, however, views the motivation behind Kuwait's 
differences with the US over the latter's policy in the region in fairly narrow, domestic terms. 
In conclusion, the available literature on Kuwait's political economy, and its relationship to 
internal societal forces and the governance of the country, was highly useful in providing context 
for the examination of the foreign policy-making process. However the relationship between 
these factors and, what this thesis will argue was, the primary foreign policy driver, that of 
external threat perceptions, is not adequately covered, whether in the work of those who adopt a 
class-orientated model of state development in Kuwait, or a more narrative-based approach 
encompassing internal developments or foreign relations. Hopefully this thesis will fill a gap in 
much writing about Kuwait specifically, as well as provide additional insights to those found in 
strategic overviews of regional alliances that lack adequate consideration of the ideational factors 
that help to shape foreign policy in the Middle East. 
31 Hashim S. H. Behbehani, China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World (1955-75) - Three Case Studies 
(London; KPI, 1985) 
32 Chookiat Panaspornprasit, US-Kuwaiti Relations - An Uneasy Relationship (Abingdon; Routledge, 
2005) 
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Chapter 2 
Internal dimensions 1961-67 
Kuwait's foreign policy from 1961 to 1977 was driven primarily by external threat perceptions. 
However, the way in which Kuwait sought to maximise its security in the region has to be 
examined in light of the political and economic context inside Kuwait. Normative factors, such as 
Arab nationalist ideology, were as prevalent internally as externally, while Kuwait's focus on 
countering external threats would draw on the leadership's projection of the country's national 
identity and national role', bolstered by the judicious distribution abroad as well as home of its oil 
wealth. Domestic economic patronage provided political autonomy for the Al-Sabah to focus on 
external concerns, even as internal political life in Kuwait proved more assertive than rentier 
theorists looking at Kuwait have assumed (see Chapter 1). In this way, internal political forces, 
including those whose ideas ran counter to state sovereignty, were managed so that they did not 
threaten Kuwait from the inside, as Iraq and others appeared to from the outside. 
In many instances Kuwait's use of Arab nationalist ideology, and its rulers' projected foreign 
policy identity, overlap with pragmatic calculations of where the amirate's best interests in the 
pursuit of its national security lie. This meant that absorption into the cold war-influenced 
regional alignments that characterised inter-state relations in the Middle East was largely avoided. 
However, periodically Kuwait's policy-makers could not avoid at least partial regional 
alignments, while they were far from oblivious to the dangers that hostile regional alliances could 
pose. For this reason, Kuwait valued the defence agreement with the UK that in 1961 replaced the 
1899 Treaty of Protection, and sought to encourage the US to step into the vacuum that followed 
Britain's announcement in 1968 of its departure from the Gulf. 
This chapter will consider internal political dimensions in Kuwait from 1961 until the immediate 
aftermath of the 1967 war. Kuwait's primary foreign policy consideration was how to deal with 
perceived external threats, and the alliance with the UK that it maintained, and the ideological 
constructs it utilised, were deployed with this primarily in mind. A constructivist approach would 
1 Stephen Walker (Ed. ), Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (Durham (NQ; Duke University Press, 
1987). 
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view Kuwait's foreign policy as mainly a reflection of its identity'. The amirate's decision- 
makers undoubtedly had a definite conception of the country, shared to a significant extent by the 
public, which they tried to project abroad. Arabism ran deep in the internal life of Kuwait, and 
informed the norms to which foreign policy had to be seen to subscribe. However this also helped 
its decision-makers to exercise domestic autonomy in the pursuit of a foreign policy that largely 
functioned as a defensive tool against external threats. 
As this chapter will explore, the domestic drivers in Kuwait's foreign policy decision-making 
were largely a matter of consensus among senior Al-Sabah who were not bound or conditioned 
by internal governmental constraints or political vulnerabilities, and, in a pattern recognisable in 
foreign policy making in other Arab states, policy could be directed from on high with particular 
attention to the wider, regional environment3 . Prior to the annulment of the Treaty of Protection, 
the ruling family, the Al-Sabah, exercised exclusive responsibility for Kuwait's domestic affairs. 
However, under the 1899 Treaty, Britain had effective control over Kuwait's foreign relations as 
the ruler of Kuwait could not enter into any additional treaty or commitment with a foreign 
power, nor concede to another country rights over land, without the approval of Britain 4. The quid 
pro quo was that Kuwait's protection was guaranteed by Britain. By the late 1950s, the mutual 
desire on the part of both the British government and Amir Abdullah Salim Al-Sabah, who ruled 
Kuwait from 1950-65, for this treaty arrangement to be annulled and for Kuwait to be granted 
independence reflected regional and internal pressures (see also Chapters 3 and 4) that would 
subsequently shape the amirate's foreign policy-making. The Al-Sabah leadership had sought to 
manage these elements in order to maximise their decision-making autonomy and ensure that 
Kuwait retained a separate existence. The fact that in 1956 British and French troops, together 
with Israel, invaded Egypt, provoked outrage and unrest in Kuwait and throughout the region. 
The enormous propaganda victory that accrued to the Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser 
from the political failure of Britain and France, whose forces, along with those of Israel, were 
eventually obliged, under US pressure, to retreat, helped inspire the overthrowing of the British- 
2 Michael N. Barnett, "Identity and Alliances in the Middle East", Peter J Katzenstein (Ed. ) The Culture ol 
National Security - Norms and Identity in World Politics (Columbia; Columbia University Press, 1996). ' A. I. Dawisha, " The Middle East", Christopher Clapham (Ed. ), Foreign Policy Making in Developing 
States: A Comparative Approach (Teakfield; Saxon House, 1975); and A. I. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab 
World - The Elements of Foreign Policy (London; Macmillan, 
1976) 
4 The treaty of 23 rd January 1899 bound Shaikh Mubarak Al-Sabah Al-Sabah "... (and) his heirs and 
successors not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage or give for occupation or for any other purpose any portion of 
his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of her 
Majesty's Government for these purposes. " Richard Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and 
Territorial Disputes (London; Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), p. 17 
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backed Hashemite monarchy in Iraq in 1958. This presented a sense of the inevitability and 
desirability of Kuwaiti independence on the part of London and of British officials on the ground 
in Kuwait, as well as in the view of Amir Abdullah Salim. However it also created dangers that 
the Amir and the British were acutely aware of, hereditary rule by the Al-Sabah, and, 
conceivably, the separate identity of Kuwait, could be ended as a consequence. 
The Majlis Movement 
Kuwait's merchant class contributed to civil and political life in the amirate to the extent that the 
country had an identity that, for its residents and neighbours alike, went beyond the leading 
family. Assertions of authority by leading non Al-Sabah merchants in the early part of the 20'h 
century had found expression in the short-lived 1921 consultative council, the elected 
municipality in 1930, and the 1938-9 "Majlis Movement". However, bad management of the 
growing regional wave of Arab nationalism could have put Kuwait's separate identity in peril, 
especially as historically some of the leading Kuwaiti merchants had not strongly identified with 
the Al-Sabah and had proven sympathetic in some instances to Iraq and, after, 1952, Egypt. 
The Treaty of Protection had been terminated by the "Exchange of Letters", which, however, 
maintained Britain's defence commitment to Kuwait5 . As a result, the authority already being 
exercised by the hereditary ruler would be extended to foreign affairs (see Chapters 3 and 4). In 
Kuwait the leading non Al-Sabah families, the elite merchants who dominated business life, the 
Al-Ghanem, the AI-Sagr, and the Al-Khaled, among others, had a strong conception that 
Kuwait's political direction was something that they had, if not an equal right over with the ruling 
family, certainly a significant role in, whether they held formal public office or not. It could even 
be argued that the non-Al-Sabah merchant tribes had the upper hand in that the power of the 
leading family had depended on a consensual process', with the implication that this consent 
could be taken away. 
5 Paragraph "d" stated: "Nothing in these conclusions shall affect the readiness of Her Majesty's 
Government to assist the government of Kuwait if the latter required such assistance" Quoted in a Foreign 
Office telegram to British Embassy, Kuwait, 27h March, 1968 (FCO 8/102). 
6 Ahmed Mustafa Abu-Hakima, The Modem History of Kuwait 1750-1965 (London; Luzac, 1983); and 
personal interview with Dr Abdul-Reda Assiri, professor of political science, Kuwait University, Kuwait 
City, January 2003. 
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Both the ruler, Shaikh Ahmed Al-Jabr (r. 1921-50), and the British government became concerned 
that the majlis movement was being supported by Iraqi Arab nationalists and a Hashemite Iraqi 
regime that saw it as a vehicle to advance their claims to Kuwait (see Appendix 1). In the event, 
only a relatively small number of the leading Kuwaiti families represented in the majlis, or 
council, backed Iraqi annexation. However, the fact that some majlis members had privately 
called on Iraq's King Ghazi, who was asserting his country's claim, to annex Kuwait, while many 
had economic interests in their northern neighbour, and, especially as they came under pressure 
from the Kuwaiti authorities, travelled or were exiled there, caused fears that that a body, whose 
domestic policy focus was reaching uncomfortable heights, was overlapping with unwelcome 
foreign interests. Over Palestine this could severely embarrass Kuwait and its UK ally, while, in 
the context of Iraqi claims, it might, plausibly, threaten the survival of Kuwait altogether. The 
Majlis Movement proved highly influential among both merchants and their allies among the Al- 
Sabah in shaping expectations of the political direction the country should take following 
independence. Unprecedented throughout Arabia, the events of 1938-9, finally wrapped up when 
Shaikh Ahmed decided to disband the majlis by force, had seen a young Abdullah Salim, and 
those close to him within the Al-Sabah, lend legitimacy to the notion of inter-family partnership 
in the rule of the country. Furthermore, the events had shown how external Arab criticism of the 
Al-Sabah could overlap with domestic political commitment to wider Arab causes, and the 
making of Kuwaiti foreign policy in the future would be mindful of this. 
When Kuwait received its independence in 1961, these factors did not necessarily mean that, as 
amir, Abdullah Salim would automatically introduce some form of elected assembly. However, 
he was encouraged to do so by the apparent threat to Kuwait that followed within days of its 
independence. Iraq's General Qassirn re-ignited territorial claims that had been largely dormant 
since the Iraqi agitation at the time of the Majlis Movement. Amir Abdullah believed that 
broadening political participation in the amirate would be the best way to strengthen elite 
merchant and wider allegiance to Al-Sabah rule, and thus the coherence and security of Kuwait as 
a national entity; it also played to the strong merchant sympathy that his earlier position had 
elicited. However the amir's decision was taken mindful that elite, and less privileged, merchants 
overwhelmingly identified with Kuwait, which the dispersion of oil largesse had helped to secure, 
as it had a less overt political profile on the part of the merchants. The internal integrity of Kuwait 
had been shown when General Qassim made his territorial claim to Kuwait in June 1961, 
something that careful economic and political management by Amir Abdullah had helped 
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encourage 7. T erefore, when the ruler decided to invite the British to operationalise their defence 
commitment (see Chapter 4), he was looking to a perceived external threat, and was not being 
intemally pressured by any acute support for Iraq. 
Partners in power? 
During the crisis of June-July 1961 Kuwait successfully asserted and deepened a sense of identity 
beyond the rule of a single family. After the defence commitment of the British was symbolised 
by a major troop presence in the country, the leading merchants were the key constituency the 
Amir turned to in order to consolidate his internal authority. As amir, his formal title following 
independence, Abdullah Salim set up an advisory council consisting of Al-Sabah and merchant 
family representatives. The council laid down the rules for the constituent assembly founded in 
1962 that largely consisted of merchant representatives. The constituent assembly agreed a 
constitution that included provision for an elected national assembly. Passed on II th November 
1962, it affirms that Kuwait is a hereditary amirate and that executive power is exercised by the 
Amir as well as the cabinet and ministers who are collectively responsible to him'. It also states 
that legislative power is exercised both by the amir and the national assembly. At the same time 
the political system in Kuwait is described as democratic and one where sovereignty lies with the 
people. 
The question of who can articulate or represent the sovereignty of the people - the amir or the 
national assembly - is left undefined. To an extent it therefore embodies the ambiguous 
partnership that leading merchant families have with the Al-Sabah. The limitations on the 
authority of the merchants are reflected in a political system in which the Al-Sabah dominate the 
executive and manipulate the legislature, and, on two occasions, has unconstitutionally suspended 
it. However, the historic assertion of political authority by the merchants was written into the 
political fabric of the Kuwaiti body politic in 1962 with the forming of the constituent assembly, 
reflecting the sense that the merchant families have of an inherent right of partnership in the 
' This view was also expressed by Suleiman Majid Al-Shaheen, who served in the Kuwaiti foreign ministry 
from 1963 to 1999. Personal interview January 2003, Kuwait. Contrastingly, Jill Crystal judges the 
founding of the assembly as a device to offset pro-Iraqi and wider Arab nationalist sentiment at home, and 
external criticism of Kuwait in the region. Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf - Rulers and Merchants 
in Kuwait and Qata (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
The text of the constitution can be found at www. kuwaitinformationcenter. org 
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political process 9. Furthermore, they believe that there should be checks on Al-Sabah power, a 
view that saw strong merchant reaction against the dissolution of the assembly in 1986 and in 
favour of its restoration in 1991. However, influential merchants largely coalesced in the 
assembly's closure in 1976 (see Chapter 5). 
Individuals from leading merchant families took positions within the first cabinet and within the 
machinery of the nascent state, often filling the post of ambassador to leading western and Arab 
countries, as well as to the UN and the Arab League, occasionally on a multiple basis. The 
leading merchants usually had a superior education and possessed more practical skills than many 
of the Al-Sabah. The first two cabinets and sessions of the National Assembly by no means 
excluded representation of merchants either. In fact, as a British ambassador to Kuwait later 
observed, it is hard to find a Kuwait national who is not in some way involved in tradelo. The 
non-Al-Sabah represented in cabinet from 1961 fluctuated at around just under half of the 15 or 
16 seat cabinet. From 1963, of the 50 elected members of the assembly (MPs), at least 21 either 
had major business interests of their own or came from families that did". However the only 
representative of the leading families in the parliament was the assembly president, or speaker, 
Abdul-Aziz Al-Sagr, who had headed the council of shaikhs and merchants set up to advise on 
the formation of the constituent assembly. As the president of the Kuwaiti Chamber of 
Commerce, his pivotal position in the assembly suggested that a watching brief would be 
attempted, not just over the legislature, but over the government itself. That said, many of the top 
merchants considered public service, whether as cabinet members, ambassadors, or MPs, as a 
distraction from the business of being merchants and not, as might perhaps have been expected, 
as the essential means to advance such interests. While positions such as minister of commerce 
held an attraction, for the most part during this period the leading merchants did not consider a 
role in government or within the national assembly as essential. Furthermore, the constitutional 
bar on maintaining business interests and serving in cabinet acted as a deterrent. This clause 
appeared to simultaneously embody democratic values while serving an Al-Sabah interest in 
constraining senior merchants from exercising a direct role in government. Many of the top 
families did not see the need to intervene or have a role in the political process unless their 
interests were directly at stake, especially as the chamber of commerce had significant influence 
9 Personal interview with Faisal Al-Mutawaa, head of Al-Bayan Investments, and a leading figure in the 
contemporary "liberal" political grouping, National Democratic Forum, Kuwait City, January 2003. 
10 Sir John Graham, UK ambassador to Kuwait, 1966-68. Personal interview, UK, August 2000. 
" Author's calculation, based on profile of MPs contained in US embassy telegram to State Department, 
July 15'h, 1965 (A-13). 
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on the domestic decisions of the government as the Al-Sabah struggled with the realities of state 
building. 
Cabinet crisis 
The 1964-5 cabinet crisis, in which relatively conservative, and less wealthy, merchant MPs 
mobilised against a proposed cabinet that contained a number of senior merchants keen to offset 
KMAN influence, had the result of deepening the leading merchants' detachment from formal 
political life. Al-Sagr resigned as speaker, and the vice-president of the assembly, Saud Abdul- 
Razzaq, the leading voice of the so-called "lesser merchants", took his place. It could be argued 
that this proves that the rentier economy had enabled oil to become the new "patron" in Kuwait12, 
after Britain's former promotion of political and economic "cliency". The ruler of an otherwise 
small and potentially internally vulnerable state could enjoy autonomy of political operation from 
those who were also benefiting from the wealth that it facilitated, whatever the political setbacks 
to certain leading merchants' ambitions. Kuwait's use of ideology, and its developing conception 
of a national role that pro-actively promoted regional non-alignment, was being developed for 
external legitimacy, not to appease internal opinion.. 
The KMAN deputies had positioned themselves during the crisis as something akin to "His 
Highness's loyal opposition", emphasising their need to have a government in place that they 
could then oppose. With further upheaval later in 1965 in the form of KMAN-inspired 
demonstrations on school campuses and against visiting Tunisian President Bourguiba", the 
challenge of the assembly contributed to a desire on the part of the government to assert greater 
authority. The setback to the KMAN deputies within the assembly represented by the 
conservative-led parliamentary "revolt", and division among their own number, made it easier for 
the government to act more freely and a succession of measures were introduced to tighten up on 
the relative freedom of the press and of nadwas (or clubs) that in some instances were Arab 
nationalist meeting places, but more frequently provided opportunities for young men to talk 
sports. 
" Mary Ann Tetreault, "Autonomy, necessity and the small state: ruling Kuwait in the twentieth century", 
International Organisation 45,4: Autumn 1991. 
13 The Tunisian president had stepped outside of the UAR-led Arab League consensus by advocating co- 
existence with Israel in return for a comprehensive political settlement. 
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The press and the wide variety of professional bodies as well as nadwas were central to the civil 
life of Kuwait and were part of what marked the amirate out from the rest of the Gulf Frequently 
there would be an overlap between these organisations, with press titles serving as outlets for 
defined interests that were akin to pressure groups 14 . The independence of professional bodies 
and newspapers was partly compromised by financial support from the government and/or Al- 
Sabah family members, however, despite this, they genuinely represented part of the pluralism of 
Kuwaiti society. Unlike the clampdown that followed the 1967 war, the government on this 
occasion was not intent on targeting a wide range of newspapers and groups, and chose to direct 
its measures against KMAN only. In protest, eight of those KMAN MPs who still represented a 
coherent bloc, resigned from the assembly, having not actually opposed the measures when 
introduced in the parliament in the first place. The government's domestic restraint of KMAN did 
not have a major impact on official foreign policies that had encouraged some leading merchants 
to join the cabinet in opposition to perceived radicalism (see Appendix 4), although their desire 
for the government ease its flirtation with communist countries (see Chapters 3 and 4) was 
realised. Within the parliament, posturing with communist states was not just the preserve of 
KMAN, however, and for a while included some of the wealthier and more elite merchants 
themselves, whose support for Arab nationalism even saw them express superficially socialist 
sentiments. 
Official Arabism 
The Kuwaiti constitution set out in its preamble that the ruler has "faith in the role of this country 
in furthering Arab nationalism". Amir Abdullah Salim (r. 1950-65) recognised that Arab 
nationalism of the kind espoused by Egypt's President Nasser was the sea in which the Arab 
countries had to swim. He was also, as evidenced by his dissenting position against majority Al- 
Sabah opinion in 1938-9, able to recognise that this trend needed incorporating within Kuwaiti 
domestic political life, and that these internal as well as regional factors needed reflecting in the 
country's foreign PoliCY15 . The "regional sea" was made all the more challenging 
because of the 
potency of these ideas within Kuwait. However, by the time of the country's independence, its 
14 Unpublished thesis by Abdul-Latif Hassan Al-Rumaihi, "The Dynamics of Kuwaiti Foreign 
Policy"(Exeter, U. K.; Exeter UniversIty, 1983), p-371. 
15 According to the then leading Arab nationalist MP, Dr Ahmed Khateeb, the Kuwaiti amir even offered to 
fund KMAN. Such was Abdullah Salim's willingness to incorporate this trend, given the significant 
regional weight and local sympathy for pan-Arabism, that at a meeting in Egypt in the early 1960s, 
President Nasser asked Khateeb rhetorically, "Who is this shaikh? " Khateeb, op. cit. 
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foreign policy construct was not seen as a reaction to a perceived external vulnerability cross- 
cutting with internal weakness. Foreign policy needed to embrace this ideational construct in 
order that, as a weak power, Kuwait could offset Iraq's deployment of Arab nationalist 
propaganda against the amirate, maintain broad support among militarily stronger Arab 
neighbours, and prevent any domestic disquiet. This meant treading a potentially difficult path of 
articulating pan-Arabist ideas and pursuing policies that broadly reflected them, without being 
internally undermined by concepts that sat awkwardly with hereditary rule, especially by a ruling 
family that in part relied for its external security on a British defence guarantee. 
Michael Barnett writes, ".... Arab leaders often needed Arab nationalism to provide a basis for 
their actions, yet its logical conclusion threatened to undermine their basis of power" ". In the 
period with which this thesis is concerned, there were undoubted constraints on the ability of 
Arab states to emphasise state sovereignty as a foreign policy construct, rather than Arab 
nationalism. However the Kuwaiti case is less that of the leadership riding the tiger of Arab 
nationalism as an internal threat, than skilfully utilising what Barnett rightly identifies as a key 
construct in Arab states' foreign policy identification in order to legitimise its place in what he 
calls the "Arab state system". Arab nationalism's popularity among Kuwaiti nationals went far 
beyond the minority support that KMAN accrued. Respect for Arab nationalism's leading 
embodiment, President Gamal Abdul Nasser of Egypt, was especially strong during this period, 
not least because of a perceived indebtedness for his role in "defending" Kuwait during the 
perceived Iraqi threat in 1961". Arab nationalist impulses ran through a wide range of the 
political trends represented in the national assembly and the Kuwaiti press, whose stances, often 
authored by foreign Arab nationals and in particular by Palestinians, was paid attention to by the 
Kuwaiti leadership". However the Kuwaiti leadership's determination of policy was not being 
led by popular opinion; and, partly out of acknowledgement of the sensitivity of foreign relations, 
the government would prove keen, through a combination of manipulation and legal and extra 
legal measures, to keep assembly and press opinion within manageable boundaries. 
Arab nationalism could however have de-legitimised the Kuwaiti ruling family if its precepts had 
been directly contradicted by the amirate's foreign policy, just as closeness to Britain had 
16 Michael N. Barnett, "Sovereignty, Nationalism and the Regional Order in the Arab State System", 
Thomas J Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (Ed. ), State Sovereignty as a Social Construct, (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
" Al-Rumaihi, op. cit., p. 350. 
18 Al-Rumaihi argues that the Kuwaiti press would encourage a tougher, perceptibly Arab nationalist, 
policy stance. Ibid. p. 368. 
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undermined the Iraqi monarchy in the second half of the 1950s. Kuwait was not under significant 
internal threat, nor was its use of Arab nationalist rhetoric and policy advocacy primarily a 
response to such fears. However pan-Arabism represented a potent regional force that, if 
mishandled, could bring governments down due to internal pressure, as was seen in Iraq and 
Syria throughout the 1960s. 
The Kuwaiti constitution does not clearly provide for the functioning of political parties. As a 
result political trends had to be careful to organise on a fairly infon-nal basis as "associations", a 
status under which they could legally register but which still rendered their legality ambiguous. 
This intentionally made it hard for KMAN, whose beliefs, theoretically at least, were 
incompatible with AI-Sabah rule, to mobilise support outside of the assembly, or to present more 
coherent demands for extensive assembly representation in the cabinet. It made it easier for the 
authorities to clamp down and manipulate the electoral prospects of political trends whose 
organisational status was questionable. On the other hand, to this day there is still strong 
opposition among many senior merchants as well as the Al-Sabah to, as they see it, importing the 
party politics of neighbouring countries, regardless of the almost total lack of support among 
Kuwaitis, then, or now, for the Ba'ath parties of Iraq or Syria. Despite the relative clampdown, 
political debate would continue to be active as many professional bodies, clubs and press titles 
remained active, frequently providing outlets for sentiment in tune with the pervasive Arabism of 
the time. Mindful of the popularity within the region and no less within Kuwait of Arab moves 
toward political unity, Amir Abdullah would be careful to embrace the broad principle whilst 
keeping some distance from the practical realities of projects that, if they included Kuwait, could 
have neutralised its distinct identity. 
KMAN presented a parliamentary motion on April 8", 1963 in support of the newly announced 
United Arab Republic (UAR) of Egypt, Syria and Iraq, and urging that Kuwait should declare its 
willingness to join a federation of all four countries as soon as possible. This was within weeks of 
the Assembly opening, and less than two years after the apparent threat from Iraq, albeit under a 
different regime, had led to the UK military intervention. The 12-man KMAN bloc in the 50 
member national assembly were persuaded to drop their motion, but not before Amir Abdullah 
Salim had issued a statement affirming that the widest possible unification of the Arab world was 
indeed Kuwait's aspiration, if this was the express wish of the Kuwait people. However he was 
careful to add that this would not be possible until five years, the minimum period required for 
any changes to the constitution, had expired. Just as during the events of 1956, Abdullah Salim 
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was not prepared to do anything that would enable Egypt to gain undue influence over Kuwait, or 
encourage antagonism with Cairo either. The Kuwaiti ruler's Arab nationalism was always a 
matter of practical statecraft. Couching his response with reference to the will of the Kuwaiti 
people was precisely in tune with what, in addition to support for Arab nationalism, had been 
written into the constitution, thereby also associating Kuwait with the norms of state sovereignty 
and creating practical distance from the realities, if not the rhetoric, of pan-Arab union projects. 
Political opposition 
In Kuwait, the majority of the population in this period were non-Kuwaiti Arabs, who lacked the 
vote, and were, for the most part, kept separate from political life with the connivance of KMAN, 
who, for example, voted in the Assembly in support of preserving the legal right to trade union 
membership as an exclusively Kuwaiti national prerogative. (This did not prevent KMAN from 
organising clandestinely among foreign workers, however). By definition there was hardly any 
such thing as a Kuwaiti working class, with manual work largely the preserve of immigrant, 
mostly, Arab workers, of whom Palestinians, Iraqis and Egyptians were by far the most 
populous19. Among Kuwait nationals there were less well-off members of the middle class, and it 
was in the neighbourhoods where they predominated, such as the Kaifan constituency near 
Kuwait city, where the KMAN attracted most support. The evolution of the political ideology of 
the KMAN into something akin to that of the Arab Socialist Union that Nasser had established in 
Egypt in 1966, brought use of socialist as well as Arab nationalist rhetoric; this had a genuinely 
widespread, but not majority, appeal in Kuwait. In particular KMAN were supported by some of 
the less wealthy among the private sector merchant elite, and some of the emerging "new class" 
of public sector bureaucrats whose rapid expansion as a source of oil wealth distribution would 
soon see them become the majority of the workforce of Kuwaiti nationals, and whose vested 
interest in more social spending KMAN, as well as conservative MPs, would articulate. However 
there were non-KMAN trends among the business and public sector elites, with two small 
political groupings providing a focus of both moderate Arab nationalism and of more 
19 In 1965, Kuwaiti non-nationals represented 76.7% of the workforce and 52.9% of the total population of 
the amirate, while non-Kuwaiti Arabs were 76% (187,923) of the total foreign population (247,280). Onn 
Winckler, Demographic Developments and Population Policies in Kuwait (Tel Aviv; Moshe Dayan Center 
for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1988). In 1964, of the non-Kuwaiti Arabs, 65,000 were estimated 
by the US to be Palestinian in origin. US Embassy to State Department, February 13th 1964 (A 167). 
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conservative opinion that would be dubbed "Kuwait first". These tendencies included only a 
small number of MPs, but were connected with a leading member of the Al-Sabah, Jabr Al-Ali, 
the minister for guidance and Islamic affairs (1965-68), and drew significant merchant support. 
With the passing of Amir Abdullah at the end of 1965, the new crown prince and prime minister, 
Jabr Al-Ahmed, would come to espouse "Kuwait First" policies too. 
The only example of a genuine appeal by KMAN to those who could be considered outside of a 
mainstream that had vested interests in preserving the status quo, were the Kuwaiti bedouin oil 
workers organised in the KMAN-controlled union'o. Overwhelmingly, however, the bedouin 
were settling in urban areas and increasingly in the 1960s and 1970s were being given nationality, 
and therefore enfranchised, as a way of countering support for the KMAN. They did not embrace 
Arab nationalist ideas but focused instead on the particular interests of their tribe. Bedouin MPs 
to this day ally with conservative forces in the Assembly, and, as the 1964/5 cabinet crisis had 
shown, these could mobilise against senior merchant families without the support of the Arab 
nationalists. 
KMAN heads foreign ministry 
In 1962 KMAN leader Jassim Qitami became the first director-general of the newly-founded 
ministry of foreign affairs. It is not clear if the initiative for this came from Sabah Salim, the then 
foreign minister (1962-3), or from Amir Abdullah Salim (1950-65) himself. By political instinct, 
Abdullah Salim would not have opposed the decision, while Sabah Salim, despite being more 
conservative in instinct than a number of senior Al-Sabah colleagues, and strongly supportive of 
the Anglo-Kuwaiti relationship, was happy to reappoint his former deputy at Kuwait's police 
department. Sabah Salim was a believer in drawing KMAN MPs into the cabinet (see Appendix 6 
and also Chapter 6). Furthermore, Qitami's political connections in the Arab world, reflecting his 
pan-Arabist beliefs, were extensive, something that drew appreciation from British officials too. 
The fact that the leader of what was considered by both British and US officials in Kuwait at the 
time to be a potentially de-stabilising pro-Egyptian political force, was entrusted with negotiating 
with Iraq the terms of its recognition of Kuwait in October 1963, suggested that senior KMAN 
officials were not only not considered a threat, at least not under Amir Abdullah Salim, but that 
these Arab nationalist politicians were seen, by their high profile role, as potentially providing 
20 Dispatch from US Embassy to State Department, 7 th June 1965 (A320). 
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Kuwait with greater acceptance in the Arab world precisely because of their political allegiances. 
Some two years after Kuwait's independence and Iraq's apparent threat to invade, Baghdad's 
recognition of the amirate held the key to Kuwait's acceptance in the Arab world following the 
ending of the Soviet veto on UN membership in May 1963. Thus, in Kuwaiti eyes, the country 
was developing international and regional legitimacy, and, as a result, a potential security equal to 
that provided by the British defence guarantee. This was therefore no small responsibility to give 
the KMAN leader. 
The Al-Sabah and Arab nationalism 
Until his failing health began to be more marked from 1964, Amir Abdullah Salim, had taken 
care to court Arab nationalist support at home, as well as abroad. This had been the case with 
Sabah Salim too, but was particular pronounced on the part of the aspirant heir apparent, finance 
minister Jabr Al-Ahmed, and his half-brother, foreign minister Sabah Al-Ahmed (1963-2003). 
The Al-Ahmed brothers were sons of Ahmed Jabr (r. 1921-50), who, while concerned about 
political impressions, had, as ruler, shown little patience with Arab nationalist merchants. Britain, 
however, was concerned that Amir Abdullah Salim, who had been mistrusted by the British over 
the MaJlis Movement, might nominate Jabr Al-Ahmed, who was perceived as pro-Egyptian in 
orientation, as crown prince instead of Sabah Salim. However the latter was named heir in 
October 1962 and was shortly confirmed as prime minister by the amir, who preferred to 
constrain the younger Jabr Al-Ahmed's ambition for the time being, despite the break this 
represented with the pattern of alternation as ruler between the dominant Al-Jabr and Al-Salim 
sides of the ruling family. As the half-brother of the ruling amir, Abdullah Salim, and son of the 
former amir Salim Sabah (r. 1917-21), Sabah Salim had sought to utilise his "pro-British" 
credentials in meetings in London, believing that would aid his chances of acceding. It was 
evident that in the domestic jockeying for position among the most senior Al-Sabah under Amir 
Abdullah Salim, that Jabr Al-Ahmed was willing to play the Arab nationalist card more than 
Sabah Salim, or than the other up and coming contenders for senior positions: Jabr's second 
cousins from the Al-Salim line: Saad Abdullah (interior minister 1962-77; defence 1965-77) and 
Jabr Al-Ali (minister of information and Islamic guidance 1965-69). The latter two Al-Salim first 
cousins were no less concerned to compete with the Al-Ahmed brothers, but preferred to play to 
more conservative sympathies and, in the case of Shaikh Saad, to assert his responsibility over 
security matters as the amir's health waned. 
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As ruler, Abdullah Salim had ensured a careful balancing in senior positions of both the AI-Jabr 
and Al-Salim lines of the family2 1 as he had been determined to avoid the damaging approach of 
his second cousin, the former ruler, Ahmed Jabr, to intra-Sabah politics. This approach was to be 
continued, following the death of Amir Abdullah in November 1965, under the more collegiate 
style of leadership exercised by Sabah Salim, whose marriage to one of Jabr Al-Ahmed's sisters, 
and the fact that his own sister was Shaikh Jabr's mother, was symptomatic of the ruling family's 
desire to minimise intra-Sabah tension. Furthen-nore it was understood that, once Sabah Salim 
acceded as ruler, Jabr would become crown prince. As amir, Sabah Salim was keen, as he had 
been as crown prince, to distance himself from everyday domestic politics. Under his tutelage, 
governmental authority was more disbursed and responsibilities became more clearly defined. 
This, and his forceful personality, enabled Jabr Al-Ahmed to exercise much greater authority as 
crown prince and prime minister than Sabah Salim had, and to much more effectively carry out 
the role of head of government that is formally ascribed to the premier in the constitution. This 
did not mean, however, that Sabah Salim was disconnected from foreign policy, nor that he 
wished to be. 
Sabah Salim was to confide in a British diplomat shortly after Kuwait was admitted to the UN in 
1963 that the "old system was working fine", whereby Kuwait (under the terms of the treaty of 
protection with Britain) was independent except for foreign policy, but that now its foreign policy 
"was determined somewhere else , 22 . This strong implication that Egyptian 
influence over 
Kuwait's foreign policy was less preferable than British direction, speaks to an Arab nationalist 
motivation in foreign policy that sat less easily with the older, more conservative, Sabah Salim 
who, while privately not enamoured with Nasser, was well aware of the constraints on Kuwait's 
foreign policy options. As amir, Sabah Salim would continue to prove sympathetic to the British 
relationship, unlike Jabr Al-Ahmed. However, in practice, and given the regional realities that 
Abdullah Salim too had striven to accommodate, there was little substantive difference in foreign 
policy between Sabah Salim and Jabr Al-Ahmed. 
2' By tradition the descendents of the first two sons of Shaikh Mubarrak ("the Great") Al-Sabah (r. 1896- 
1915), Jabr and Salim, have provided the rulers and most senior figures among the Al-Sabah leadership. 
However the constitution only prescribes that the amir should be a descendent of one of the (five) sons of 
Shaikh Mubarrak. 
22 G. Noel Jackson to UK Ministry of Defence, 14'h December 1965 (DEFE 11/616). 
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In the last 18 months or so of his rule, Abdullah Salim had been increasingly less and less in 
command of the day to day direction of the country, and was spending most of his time out of the 
country convalescing. A "stand-to" of Kuwaiti forces in September 1964 against an Iraqi 
mobilisation close to the border had been initiated without the approval of the amir and without 
any discussion with the British, an event unthinkable a year or two earlier. The decision was the 
initiative of the amir's son, interior minister (1962-65) Saad Abdullah Salim. Saad had also 
backed the beginning of a domestic clampdown initiated by his first cousin, Jabr Al-Ali, minister 
of culture and Islamic guidance, which in particular had intended to target the Arab nationalist, 
Istiqlal Club. The pair, fellow members of the Al-Salim branch of the Al-Sabah, took a more 
cautious, indeed repressive, approach to the management of relations with KMAN, than that of 
their uncle, the increasingly absent amir. 
Coup speculation 
During this time the UK and the US embassies were becoming increasingly preoccupied with 
what they considered was the possibility of an Egyptian or Iraqi-authored coup in Kuwait. The 
Iraqis were the largest non-Kuwaiti national group in the armed forces, where their presence was 
most pronounced among relatively low-ranking officers, but were easily outnumbered by 
Kuwaitis (see Chapter 5). There were in fact few plausible Kuwaiti partners for a coup plot. Some 
private criticism of the ruling family was likely among non-Al-Sabah senior officers. However 
there was little likelihood of a concerted plan to overthrow the ruling family, which would have 
mobilised the traditionally loyal and generally apolitical bedouin troops in response. Notably, 
there were hardly any Baathist Kuwaiti nationals, in the military or generally, and the tiny 
number that could be found were much more likely to be pro-Syrian rather than pro-Iraqi. 
Prospective coup plotters would have been more likely to have been sympathetic with Egypt. 
This fact, and the latter's improved relationship with Iraq, which sparked such speculation in the 
UK and US embassies, meant that Egypt would have needed to have allowed Iraq to "assist"; 
given that it would be the latter's troops who would intervene in defence of any "Nasserite 
uprising". This is unlikely to have been an outcome favoured by any Arab state, save possibly the 
Iraqis themselves. It is notable that Sawt Al-Arab (Voice of the Arabs), the Cairo radio station 
dreaded among the leaders of Kuwait's Gulf amirate neighbours as well as by the ruling family in 
Saudi Arabia, would not usually directly target Kuwait with its onslaughts against "feudal 
reactionary regimes", commonly portrayed as "in league with Britain". Kuwait's foreign policy 
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was partly constructed in order to avoid being the target of such accusations, as was the 
orientation of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (see Chapter 4). In addition, the 
presence of a large number of Egyptian nationals throughout the education sector, and, to a lesser 
extent, other government services, helped to mitigate Cairo's vitri 0123. 
Kuwait First 
While Kuwait's political relations with communist bloc countries had been partly adjusted, there 
was little discernible inter-relation between domestic constraint on KMAN, and the pan-Arab 
presentation of Kuwaiti foreign policy, even if its rhetorical expression showed signs of easing. 
Shaikh Jabr AI-Ali had earlier asked US officials "not to be offended if we call you bad names" 
as this is merely our way of "fending off our real enemies, as Nasser is doing". " For his part, the 
new crown prince and prime minister, Jabr Al-Ahmed, began to focus on what he defined as 
Kuwaiti interests at home and abroad. Impatient with domestic radicalism and what was 
perceived among many senior AI-Sabah to be a lack of Arab understanding for Kuwait's desire to 
avoid regional aligninent (see Chapter 3), Jabr Al-Ahmed would deploy a markedly different 
policy style from what he displayed under Amir Abdullah Salim. A more divided Arab world, 
evidenced in the civil war in Yemen, over Palestine, and to an extent over the Arab nationalist 
struggle in Bahrain (see Chapter 3), made Kuwait feel less obliged to continually emphasise pan- 
Arab concerns in foreign policy and more able to constrain KMAN domestically. A domestic 
initiative announced when the crown prince, as was traditional, read the Amiri speech in 1966, 
had reflected the growing "Kuwait First" trend that encompassed both the AI-Sabah and a broad 
swathe of merchant opinion, long frustrated with perceived foreign policy "excesses", including a 
number of MPs. As a result some 200 non-Kuwaiti Arabs were expelled from the country; mostly 
Egyptian and Palestinian Nasserites, but they also included the tiny handful of Palestinian pro- 
Syrian Ba'ath party members, while, more significantly, the KMAN house journal, Al-Talia was 
closed for a year. 
The outcome of the January 1967 National Assembly elections were a shock to British and 
American observers as well as to KMAN. The latter's representation had been expected to 
increase, and yet was drastically curtailed. Widespread electoral ballot rigging was alleged by 
23 Al-Shaheen (interview) lbid. 
24 State Department to US Embassy, Kuwait, January 13th, 1965 (A 165) 
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western embassies and KMAN officials alike. Key Kuwaiti public figures had failed to secure 
seats, while those that had, decided to boycott the assembly. "Kuwait First" appeared to have 
been taken to extremes and there was a definite sense among foreign officials who had previously 
urged a more cautious approach by the Al-Sabah in response to the domestic Arab nationalist 
mood, that they had gone too far. However, in the externally focussed mood that followed the 
June 1967 war, Kuwait was able to minimise any short term major political fallout at least, by 
emphasising its foreign policy commitments, not least on Palestine. 
Oil and political credibility 
The government's revenues from the UK and US-owned Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) were the 
cause of an ongoing dispute that reflected Kuwait's prioritising of regional and domestic opinion, 
especially as this could be manipulated to serve its financial interests. A deal on the 
"supplemental agreement" (see Appendix 5) became complicated by positioning by the Kuwaiti 
senior leadership in terms of Assembly and public opinion, which was united in wanting to 
improve the financial arrangements to Kuwait's advantage. (The assembly had to approve any 
deal between the government and KOC). After more than two years of delay, this eventually 
exasperated those AI-Sabah, including Jabr Al-Ahmed, who, although having played domestic 
politics with the issue on the advice of a number of Arab national ist-inclined senior finance and 
oil ministry officials, ultimately wanted an agreement. A further compromise on the terms of the 
supplemental agreement was secured, and was finally approved by what was a more 
accommodating national assembly following the 1967 elections. 
The importance of this issue was more than just Arab nationalist symbolism; government 
revenues and the funding of Kuwait's expanding public services were inextricably bound up in 
these negotiations too. As a result all sections of Kuwaiti, opinion had a vested interest in 
improving the terms for the Kuwaiti exchequer. However, for more than 12 months the Al-Sabah 
had lacked the willingness to resolve the matter. Oil was key to the ruling family's ability to 
exercise relative autonomy from merchant interests and domestic political pressure. However this 
did not prevent the ruling family from having to handle such pressures carefully and from 
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wanting to play the oil issue in ideological terms for external and domestic consumption. Kuwait 
thus defied expectations of "dependent" or "rentier" stateS25. 
Palestinian presence 
A primary identifier of what Kuwait liked to present as its Arab nationalist foreign policy was the 
commitment to the Palestinian cause. Although a differing emphasis in foreign policy was 
detectable over 1965-66, this in no way lessened the government's strong identification with 
Palestine. By end-1966 it was estimated that the Palestinian population (of largely Jordanian 
citizenship) in Kuwait could be as many as 70,00026 . 
Representing approximately 12% of the 
overall population, 28% of foreign nationals, and equivalent to 25% of the total number of 
Kuwaiti nationals, the Palestinians were by far the largest group among the foreign population in 
the country, of whom Arab nationals represented around 76% of the overall total27 . However, 
despite the US belief that KMAN had ambitions to take over the political leadership of this exiled 
group, the Palestinians themselves were not actors in the Kuwaiti political system. In addition to 
the presence of Palestinians who were leading members of the region-wide, Arab Nationalist 
Movement, the emergence of what would later become the predominant Palestinian nationalist 
group, Fatah, begun in Kuwait around 1958. Despite this sympathetic environment, the 
requirement on all Palestinians was that they keep out of local politics. This was rigorously 
enforced by the Kuwaiti authorities and understood by Palestinians, and all foreign Arabs, to be a 
red line that they could not cross. Although Palestinians, like other Arab nationals, were widely 
employed in the private sector, they were most pronounced in the public sector where, in 1965, 
they held nearly 50% of all PoStS28 . Like the 
Egyptians, the Palestinians were extensively 
employed as teachers, as well as within the health sector and other public services. There were 
also a small number of "naturalised" Palestinians, who held Kuwaiti nationality; some of whom 
occupied important posts in ministries and as ambassadors (see Appendix 5). 
25 Jacqueline Ismael acknowledges the assertiveness of an elected national assembly that, in her view, had 
been "expected to be a rubber stamp". Jacqueline S. Ismael, Kuwait: Social Change in Historical 
Perspective, (Syracuse; Syracuse University Press, 1982). 
26 US Embassy to State Department, 2 I't March 1967 (A274). Kuwaiti census figures do not break down 
non-nationals according to their nationality or Kuwaitis according to ethnicity or religion. 
27 Calculation based on the April 1965 census and on US estimates of size of national populations. "Form at 
a Glance", March 1966 (DEFE 11/616). 
28 Jill Crystal, Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State (Colorado; Westview Press, 1992), p. 130. 
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Successive Kuwaiti policy statements would open with an exposition of commitments to the Arab 
nation, chief of which was Palestine, often cast, like other Arab struggles, in anti-imperialist 
rhetoriC29 . Although some of the government's rhetoric had been adjusted since the embrace of 
"Kuwait First", this did not lead to any shifts in policy on Palestine or any other regional issue. 
Not every political decision made by the Kuwait leadership was cynical, however. The Kuwaitis, 
no less than the Saudi leadership that had long pressed the UK and US governments on the 
question, were genuinely angry at what they considered to be the injustice of the Palestinian 
situation. In the period of regional tension that led to the outbreak of the 1967 war, senior Al- 
Sabah would convey this directly to US and UK officials. On one occasion the US ability to 
equate the Israeli attack on the Jordanian West Bank village of Samu in November 1966 with the 
Palestinian attacks that preceded it, was seen as "unfathomable" by senior Al-Sabah family 
memberS30 . The US struggled to appreciate that such feelings could be genuine. One American 
embassy official, however, admitted to being able to "sense an underlying strain of conviction 
going beyond political expediency" on the question of Palestine 31 . 
Kuwaiti financial support was funnelled to the PLO, military training continued uninterrupted, 
and statements made on the issue by foreign minister Sabah Al-Ahmed were to continually cause 
discomfort among US embassy officials and oil company representatives. The head of Gulf Oil, 
which owned half of KOC, said he hoped that the US administration could help the situation by 
persuading more caution on the part of senior Al-Sabah in their comments. This brought the 
rhetorical response from a US undersecretary that he was being asked: 
"What could the US do with a small country which is well-off, has lots of money (sic), and with 
which the US does not have much leverage. He did not profess to have an answer at this time for 
Gulf (Oil)12.,, 
29 However statements always emphasised that Kuwaiti identity had to be preserved in such a context. The 
October 1964 Amid Speech opened by saying that Kuwait's foreign policy is "based on the consolidation 
of brotherly ties and solidarity between Kuwait and her sister Arab countries and cooperation in supporting 
the Arab League, its foundations and charter and supporting any tendency emanatingftom the will of the 
people forfurther solidarity between the Arab countries. " (author's emphasis). The Arab League's 
achievements were then emphasised in terms of the decision in that year's first summit to found the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation. (FCO 371/174584 106540, ). 
30 Howard Cottam, US Ambassador to Kuwait, Telegram to State Department, 6h November, 1966 (A- 
147). 
31 Dispatch A-274 from US Embassy to State Department 21" March 1967. 
32 Note of conversation between "Mr Whiteford", Chief Executive, and "Mr Davis", Vice President, of 
Gulf Oil, with "Mr Mann", Under Secretary for Near East and South Asia Affairs, US State Department, 
sent to US Embassy, Kuwait, 23 rd March 1965. 
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Egyptians raise concerns 
Egyptian workers living in Kuwait numbered 7,500 as of 1964 33 representing 9% of the total 
Kuwaiti workforce, and 13.5% of the majority foreign workforce 34 Egyptians were usually blue- 
collar workers, and as a result were mainly employed in manual positions in the private sector; 
however more than 1,000 had public sector jobs. Aside from the small number operating in an 
advisory capacity on constitutional and legal matters, Egyptian professionals were principally 
involved in teaching and the health sector. The presence of a significant number of Egyptians, 
whether in the private or public sector tended to be of greater concern to the US embassy in 
Kuwait, as well as to an extent the British, than the far larger Palestinian presence. Less attention 
was paid by western embassies to Iraqis working in Kuwait. Surprisingly, however, the Kuwaiti 
government, at least up until the late 1960s, shared this comparatively relaxed view, evidenced by 
the presence of Iraqis in the Kuwaiti armed forces. In 1965 Iraqis were the second largest Arab 
national group in the Kuwaiti population, and constituted 8.4% of the total". 
A key reason for the greater concern about Egyptians than other Arab groups was that, in the 
early years of Kuwait's independence, Egypt had a very significant diplomatic presence. 
Furthermore, their large embassy was staffed by a disproportionately large number of military 
intelligence officers compared to western embassies. Egypt would make it a condition of an 
Egyptian national's application to work in Kuwait that they would have to report regularly to the 
embassy, while Egyptian staff were well known in Kuwait for attending nadwas, especially those 
of KMAN politicians, where the political discussion was usually more extensive than at those 
clubs identified with other political trends. Through these meetings as well as more discrete 
means, Egyptian intelligence officers were known to be in regular contact with the leading 
KMAN MPs, Jassim Qitami and Dr Ahmed Khateeb. The US and UK embassies' concern was 
not about the Egyptian officials working in the government. While the latter attracted some 
resentment from Kuwaiti officials, Sabah and commoner alike", who suspected the Egyptian 
33 UK embassy to Foreign Office, undated but assume late 1964 (FO 371/174584 - 106540). Egyptians as a 
whole represented 5.3% of the total Kuwaiti population, 28% of Arab nationals, and nearly 10% of foreign 
nationals. DEFE 11/616. op. cit. 
34 According to the Kuwait census of April 1965, the non-national workforce was 69.4% of the total, 
standing at 55,586 out of 80,288. Winckler, op. cit. 
" Ibid. 
36 An indication of this suspicion of the Egyptians was that common term of abuse used privately by Al- 
Sabah ministers to refer to KMAN M[Ps, was "dog of an Egyptian spy. " 
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embassy, and ensured that Egyptian civil servants all had minderS37, they were not viewed as 
potential fifth columnists by the UK and the US. Rather, American and British security concerns, 
which from 1965 were increasingly shared with the Kuwaiti authorities, were about the 
willingness of the Egyptian embassy to encourage foreign Arabs as well as Kuwaitis to 
demonstrate, in particular over the issue of Palestine. There was concern that, in certain 
circumstances, the Egyptians might be able to manipulate the Palestinians in order to stir up 
political pressure on the Kuwaiti government. 38 
The Egyptians financed a newspaper that attracted a small circulation, while the more established 
title, the weekly Al-Talia, which was run solely by KMAN, presented pro-Egyptian views, and 
continues to this day to give a more Arab nationalist take on domestic and international affairs. 
However, these "pro-Egyptian" titles were indicative only of a slice of Kuwaiti opinion and 
would not have had the potential to galvanise mass opinion'9. Just as the Kuwaiti government 
service and administration was badly in need of foreign Arabs to staff it, so was the written and 
broadcast media. However, overtly pro-Egyptian views were kept out of the broadcast networks 
and newspaper titles, even if initially, following independence, a considerable amount of 
Egyptian newsreel was used. 
The Kuwaitis, like the British and the Americans, were periodically concerned about the large 
number of foreign Arabs, especially given the political complexion of the countries they came 
from. Western officials, however, viewed them as a latent security concern. Egyptian and 
Palestinian teachers may have helped strengthen an atmosphere unsympathetic to the policies of 
the British in the region, however this was not the main factor driving the adoption of Arab 
nationalist rhetoric or of foreign policy stances that were understandably characterised as "pro- 
Egyptian". Some other Arab governments, especially Saudi Arabia, would see Kuwaiti foreign 
and domestic policy as simply an outlet for Cairo opinion, albeit acknowledged as one likely to 
respond to whether other leading Arab states, such as Iraq and Syria, had good relations with 
Egypt. However the Kuwaiti leadership itself was cautious in its views of the benefits of 
following too close to Cairo, and had proven itself quite prepared to act against both Egyptian and 
3' FO 371/174584 - 106540 op. cit. 
3' This scenario was painted by Dayton Mak (charge d'Affaires ad interim, Kuwait, 1961-64) in a personal 
interview, Washington DC, August 2000. 
39 Al-Talia was the weekly KMAN house organ. However its sales suggested less support for KMAN Nws 
than was the case. An estimated 3,000 copies were sold per week. FO 371/174584 - 106540. op. cit. 
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other foreign Arabs accused of espionage or illegal political activity as well as against pro- 
Egyptian Kuwaiti politicians. 
The Shia and regional dynamics 
Among the Kuwaiti national population, about 22% were estimated to be Shia Muslims, of whom 
the majority were of Arab extraction 40 . The Kuwaiti Shia were plainly outside of the favoured 
circles of the Sunni Arab elite families who had founded the country and who effectively 
represented its "aristocracy". However, within the Kuwaiti Shia there was a considerable 
merchant population tied, through business, to the interests of more senior Kuwaiti circles. Some, 
most notably, Abdul-Aziz Hussein, Kuwait's first ambassador to Egypt and the UN, were 
represented in government where, like Talat Ghussein, the Kuwaiti ambassador to the US who 
was of Palestinian extraction, their expertise was held in high regard among senior decision 
makers in the amirate. Abdel-Aziz Hussein was a Shia Arab of Iranian extraction, whose Arab 
nationalist credentials made him an astute appointment to serve in Cairo. Significant numbers of 
Kuwaiti nationals who were Shia also had Persian antecedents. However the Kuwaiti authorities 
did not view the Shia, Arab or Persian, as a potentially challenging national minority, even 
though neighbouring countries and communities would sometimes suggest they had great 
influence over Kuwaiti Shia. The Shah suggested as much to the British (see Chapter 3); while, 
during a visit to Najaf and Karbala in Iraq in 1966, Amir Sabah Salim was smothered with 
affection by Iraqi Shia clerics, seemingly in order to encourage support for them from his Shia 
audience at home. 
The Kuwaiti leadership thought it prudent to take steps in the 1967 election to ensure the Shia 
were better represented in the national assembly. Generally seen as socially conservative, and 
historically inimical to Arab nationalism, the Shia were to gradually develop into a useful tool of 
the government for managing the assembly. A somewhat different issue were the around 6% of 
the overall population defined as Iranian in 1965", the third largest group of foreign nationals in 
the amirate. Kuwait would later express concerns about the increasing number of illegal Iranian 
40 A breakdown of religious fealty was not officially provided. However in 1961 the UK embassy estimated 
that Kuwaiti Shia represented 22% of the total population of Kuwaiti nationals. 
41 According to the 1957 census there were 19,919 Iranians in Kuwait, representing almost 10% of the th 
national population. (US embassy to State department, August 4,1962, FCO 
371: 156897) . The 
US 
embassy later reported that in the 1965 census, Iranians represented only 5.6% of the total population, 
i. e. 
26,2 10. "Form at a Glance", Ibid. 
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nationals working in the country, a factor brought home when the Shah visited in 1968 (see 
Chapter 6). However, the Iranian population was not seen as a particularly pronounced security 
issue as, unlike the Arab foreign workers, they were not viewed as a potential source of political 
trouble. 
In 1966 US and UK embassy representatives would inform their home capitals that the political 
mood in Kuwait was becoming less stridently Arab nationalist, and yet "Kuwait First" was not 
especially being felt in the country's foreign policy. Palestine remained Kuwait's main Arabist 
foreign policy expression, which, while mutual non-interference was maintained between the 
authorities and the Palestinian factions within Kuwait, which mainly took the fon-n of financial 
support as well as strong assertions of Palestinian rights in line with the official Arab League 
position. By deploying financial assistance to the Arab world in general through the Kuwait Fund 
for Arab Economic Development, and the operation of discrete "soft" loans direct to government 
exchequers, the Kuwait leadership was able to go beyond rhetorical expressions of solidarity. 
Thus Kuwait gave its own particular expression to the Nasserite notion of non-alignment, 
"positive neutrality". This was the phrase used by Sabah Salim to characterise what Kuwait's 
foreign policy would be when he addressed the UN upon Kuwait's awarding of membership in 
1963. 
The 1967 war and the role of ideology 
Kuwait's official commitment to the cause of Palestine would be unwavering, even if domestic 
enthusiasm would fluctuate in its intensity. One event that required careful management of this 
emblem of Kuwait's Arab nationalist attachments, was the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Angry but 
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essentially unthreatening demonstrations took place in the amirate , with the British and the 
Americans proving to be the focus for Kuwaiti as well as foreign Arab agitation. Kuwait radio 
reflected anger within Kuwait and the wider Arab world by repeating, to the infuriation of British 
officials, the popularly believed "big lie" that the UK had helped the military success of Israeli 
forces from its bases in Cyprus. Amid pressure within the region and across Kuwait society - 
whether within the ruling family, leading merchants or KMAN MPs - for a strong stance against 
42 Sir John Graham, Head of Chancellery, British Embassy, Kuwait. Personal interview, November 2000, 
London. 
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the US and the UK, the Kuwaiti leadership did not go so far as to break off diplomatic relations 
but did commit the country to an Arab-wide oil embargo. This was a classic Kuwaiti 
compromise. The fact that Kuwait had the previous year begun a clampdown on foreign and local 
Arab nationalists, and in January 1967 on KMAN and even liberal representation in parliament, 
did not reduce the government's need to accommodate regional and internal anger over the war. 
In practice, although creating diplomatic difficulties, the embargo had only minimal economic 
impact as third party oil trading between the two countries was not only unaffected but was 
positively encouraged by the Amir, while at the same time Saudi Arabia's oil exports to the UK 
were not significantly set back. The Arab oil embargo was relatively short-lived and piecemeal 
compared to the 1973-74 boycott and price hikes, whose impact would be felt internationally. The 
1967 embargo's targeting of the US and the UK exclusively for what was perceived to be their 
strong support for Israel evidenced its symbolic nature. However impractical the 1967 embargo 
would therefore prove to be, it did reflect regional and domestic pressures for Kuwait and fellow 
oil-rich Arab states to assert a foreign policy that would seek to politically exploit western 
dependence on oil. The strength of the Arab nationalist imperative regionally that had driven 
Kuwait's emphasis on the Palestine question in its foreign policy in order to bolster its position 
and its legitimacy in the Arab world, was, in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 war, to become 
more significant as an internal dynamic too. Domestic support for Palestine had always been a 
factor of course - the strength of KMAN, and the sensibilities of the merchant class on the 
Palestine question was well established. Furthermore, the willingness of senior Al-Sabah to give 
greater emphasis to the question, at various points from independence until the 1967 war, 
reflected the regional and national mood, their own convictions, and their political judgement 
about the best way to manage the issue in Kuwait's and their own interest. After the war, Crown 
Prince Jabr Al-Ahmed would adopt a particularly strident tone, in keeping with the wider Arab 
mood. 
Ultimately the foreign policy position that emerged during and after the war was one where the 
necessity for Kuwait to satisfy external and internal pressures, and make a largely symbolic 
stance, was satisfied. The fact that the embargo was robbed of its meaning in practice pleased 
Amir Sabah Salim, who made it clear to British officials that he had to satisfy this pressure with 
what was judged to be a "face saving device" that in no way affected the essentials of the Anglo- 
Kuwait relationship. Amir Sabah was also keen to stress that the personal and property interests 
of the British had been entirely safeguarded throughout what had been a tense, but essentially 
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secure, period during the war and its aftermath, in distinction to Saudi Arabia where a refinery 
had been attacked 43 . The Kuwaiti security services had been able to minimise the tensions, 
allowing a demonstration to march to the US and UK embassies. While the US and UK cultural 
centres were temporarily closed by the Kuwaiti authorities, there was never any serious threat to 
internal stability from either Kuwaitis or foreign Arabs. This suggests that the need to make a 
stand on Palestine at this time was an elite-driven reaction to regional realities and the views of an 
essentially peaceable Kuwaiti national population, rather than to the presence of the PLO or of 
foreign Arab workers. 
It is notable that Amir Abdullah Salim had been happy for senior Al-Sabah to make anti-British 
comments during the Suez war of 1956; although demonstrations were constrained by security 
forces. However, in 1967 there was not a conviction among any of the senior family members 
that Britain or the US was in cahoots with Israel, and thus the anger, on this occasion, did not 
emanate from them. Furthennore, the domestic political clampdown prior to the 1967 war did not 
lessen the need to allow Kuwaitis to let off steam about the war. Nor is there any evidence that 
the clampdown affected the tempo of demonstrations or that the government would have been the 
focus of any significant anger. Traditionally, Kuwait nationals were the only ones allowed to 
stage political demonstrations, and as a result they were rarely conducted by non-Kuwaitis, 
including Palestinians. Despite the recent constraints upon them, and their tough rhetoric in 
response, Kuwait's Arab nationalists were more tied into the political and elite life of the amirate 
than in other Arab countries (see Chapters 3 and 5), and their caution at this point partly reflected 
this. 
British embassy staff remarked that attitudes to them were different to the antagonism that could 
be found in poorer parts of the region where Arabs perceived themselves as having been under 
colonial rule. Kuwaitis recognised the enormous sway that the British had had prior to 1961 and 
the influence they exercised afterwards. However the distinction between a voluntary agreement 
to British protection in 1899 and enforced military occupation and colonial-style rule was felt 
strongly by Kuwaitis. This again emphasises that internal pressure to adopt a strongly Arab 
nationalist position, at least at the popular level, was less important in Kuwait than the 
leadership's judgement of the correct approach to the regional mood. 
43 Ambassador GG Arthur correspondence with the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 8 th June 1967, FO 
8/679,051. 
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As the decision not to back the British-authored UN Security Council Resolution 242 revealed, 
Kuwait's foreign policy needed to emphasise an Arab nationalism in tune with its majority 
expression in the region, and therefore Egypt, which backed the resolution, was by no means the 
only influencer of Kuwait's stance. Kuwait's public stance on a foreign policy issue as 
controversial in the Arab world as, effectively, the terms of an Arab peace with Israel would 
rarely produce controversy. A collective decision-making process largely confined to the amir, 
the crown prince, the defence and interior minister, and to a lesser extent, foreign minister, was 
ultimately responsible for foreign (and domestic) policy, with, typically, Shaikh Jabr Al-Ahmed 
making the running if any concrete discussions were called for. On such a highly sensitive issue 
of foreign policy as this, the instinct of Kuwaiti leaders would be to avoid a high profile and to 
work with an obtainable consensus in the Arab world. Jabr Al-Ahmed and Sabah Al-Ahmed 
would be particularly keen to say the right things in public in Arab nationalist terms, but the 
practical consequences of doing so would be carefully measured. 
Foreign policy was not a major point of contention between the senior Al-Sabah. Foreign policy 
choices, after all, were limited to points of emphasis. Differing emphases would in fact become 
more acute after 1967, as, in the wake of Britain's departure from the region, Amir Sabah Salim 
sought to encourage co-operative and relatively integrated relations between Kuwait and the 
emergent independent southern Gulf Arab states. This was more of a personal initiative, however, 
which in many respects would prove ill considered and to an extent even counter-productive. 
However, it also fitted with a pattern of "positive neutrality" intended to use financial resources to 
give expression to the rhetoric of pan-Arab fealty. 
Kuwait's internal dynamics since independence, and in the country's evolution of a consensual, 
participatory politics, had placed a high emphasis on Arab identification and promotion of Arab 
causes, of which Palestine was central. However, ideology was primarily a product of a 
conception of the Kuwaiti leadership that finding security in regional as well as international 
terms meant providing practical and political support in order to build allies, co-operation, and 
mutual support. To a lesser, but still important degree, this was extended to the wider Islamic and 
international community. The presence of significant numbers of foreign Arabs, including 
Palestinians, at both elite and mass level, was a re-enforcer of this inclination, but not its driver. 
During the 1961-67 period, and subsequently, foreign policy determination was principally 
confined to a handful of Al-Sabah, who functioned as "principle decision-makers" and whose 
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authority over foreign policy was largely free of institutional constraintS44 , despite Kuwait's lively 
political life and highly opinionated parliament. The latter proved susceptible to Al-Sabah 
manipulation and, while traditionally valued as an expression of inclusive decision-making on 
domestic questions, was not the focus of elite merchant activity, who, for the most part, 
prioritised their business interests. Ideological sympathies, among senior Al-Sabah and 
merchants, helped inform the parameters of Kuwait's Arabist identity and the notion of the 
amirate's "role"45 in the region. However Kuwaiti decision-makers enjoyed autonomy over 
foreign policy, assisted by the patronage powers that oil wealth provided, and, despite 
adjustments in some marginal respects, remained faithful to the essential elements of the 
amirate's external relations. 
44 Dawisha, Ibid. 
45 KJ Holsti "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy" in Stephen Walker (Ed. ), Role 
Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (Durham (NC); Duke University Press, 1987). 
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Chapter 3 
Regional dimensions 1961-67 
Kuwait's foreign policy in this period was, according to one former senior Kuwaiti diplomat, 
"Arabised". ' Following the amirate's independence in June 1961, Amir Abdullah Salim and his 
foreign ministers would emphasise that Kuwait's interests were rooted in those of the Arab world, 
and that it supported diplomatic solutions vis-d-vis Iraq, based on an Arab framework and, more 
broadly, in terms of UN legitimacy 
Due to his early political grounding, Abdullah Salim (r. 1950-65) was sympathetic to pan- 
Arabism, which was influential among the merchants whose political ambitions he had upheld. 
This trend had been given a populist impulse within the wider region following Gamal Abdul 
Nasser's defeating of Anglo-French "imperialist" ambitions during the 1956 war. Abdullah Salim 
was perceived by local Nasserites in the Arab Nationalist Movement as sympathising with their 
political sentimentS2 . Although more willing to defer to British counsel, and more wary of Arab 
nationalist sentiment, Amir Sabah Salim (r. 1965-77) was equally mindful of the importance of 
this trend. However, both Kuwaiti amirs also understood that "Arab nationalism", despite being 
written into the Kuwaiti constitution, remained a highly subjective notion whose theoretical 
denial of state interests could enable it to be manipulated for domestic interests by the leading 
Arab nationalist regimes'. The obligation on Kuwait to back concrete proposals for unions of 
Arab states would ease as such enthusiasms softened in the region in light of practical experience, 
and the era of summitry gave more credence to state norms. Arab nationalism, given the 
concurrent notions during this period of anti-imperialism and republicanism, was an uneasy 
' Personal interview, Abdullah Bishara, retired senior foreign ministry official, Kuwait, January 2003. 
2 Personal interview, Abdullah Neebari, leading KMAN figure in the 1970s, Kuwait, January 2003. Abdul- 
Reda Assiri, Kuwaiti academic, described Abdullah Salim as "an Arab nationalist". Personal interview, 
January 2003, Kuwait. 
3 The predominant articulation of "Arab nationalism" in the Arab world in the 1950s and 1960s was that of 
Gamal Abdul Nasser's Egypt. Arab nationalism was formally subscribed to by the Kuwaiti Arab 
Nationalist Movement (KMAN), which, like the wider MAN organisation, was supportive of Nasser. In 
Bassam Tibi's analysis, Arab nationalism in the period from Nasser's takeover in Egypt in 1952 up to the 
1967 war, underwent a phase of "pan-Arab populism" where the advocacy of a political union of all Arab 
peoples, whether made by Nasserites or their Baathist rivals, was rooted in the projection of traditional 
cultural commonalities onto the "modem model of a nation-state. " Bassam Tibi, Arab Nationalism: A 
Critical Enqui (London; Macmillan, 1981) 
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construct for Kuwait. The amirate's preferred adherence to generalised postures of solidarity was 
in line with its constitution, which expressed "faith in the role of this country in furthering Arab 
nationalism. " While Arab nationalism could serve as a pillar of a small Arab state's foreign 
policy, it could not be its source. 
The public face of Kuwaiti foreign policy - its rhetoric, its ideational cast, and its attempt to 
translate this into a regional and even extra-regional role in mediating disputes - was the politics 
of accommodation of stronger Arab states', in particular Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. In 
other words, while packaged as having a sincere ideological motivation, it was more a 
presentational sheen on the politics of national survival. Rhetorical attachments to the Arab nation 
were commonplace in Kuwait and its neighbouring Arab countries right up until the 1990 Iraqi 
occupation of the amirate and the subsequent 1991 Gulf war. Following this, Kuwaiti leaders, and 
Arab leaders generally, spoke more about their country's national interest. However, Kuwait, in 
common with many small states, lacked independent military capability to even delay the 
advance of its larger neighbours'. Its leaders, mindful of internal opinion and the rhetorical 
conventions in which many Arab states, whether small monarchies or powerful republics, would 
present their foreign policies, would also communicate policy in Arab nationalist terms. After all, 
comparatively powerful Arab states were deploying Arab nationalist ideology throughout this 
period. Egypt used it to justify its domineering leadership of the United Arab Republic (UAR) it 
founded with Syria in 1958, Syria to underscore its decision to withdraw from the same union in 
1961, and Egypt to explain its soft-pedalling over a proposed tripartite union with Syria and Iraq 
in 1963 6. As in these cases, Kuwait too had an external, as well as an internal, rationale in 
justifying its foreign policies in this way. 
Positively neutral 
Kuwait needed to accommodate more powerful Arab countries. This would be reflected in its use 
of its oil largesse to provide "soft" finance to two countries, Iraq and Egypt, that, among its 
regional neighbours, had the greatest potential to both undermine and uphold its security. Kuwait 
did not though conform to the quietistic approach that writers on small states typically expect of 
4 Off the record conversations in London with a senior member of the Al-Sabah, June 2004; and in Kuwait 
with a former KMAN NW, January 2003. 
5 One of the definitions of a small state applied in Colin Clarke and Tony Payne (Ed), Politics, Security and 
Development in Small States (London; Allen & Unwin, 1987). 
6 Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War - Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-70 (New York; 
Oxford University Press, 197 1) 
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such countries' foreign policy'. Upon Kuwait's accession to the UN in 1963, Shaikh Sabah 
Salim, the then prime minister of Kuwait, announced that the amirate would practice "positive 
neutrality" in its foreign policy. To Kuwait's detractors, and in particular among the southern 
Gulf shaikhdoms, this Nasserite phrase was seen as confirmation that the country geared its 
foreign policy toward what Cairo found appropriate. This was after all an in-vogue expression of 
the Non-Aligned Movement championed by Gamal Abdul Nasser's Egypt. However, in Kuwait's 
case, this phrase reflected a foreign policy that, while pursuing neutrality in terms of largely 
avoiding alliances in the region, saw its acceptance within a predatory environment as often best 
served by activism. Thus its use of financial support for powerful neighbours had a much broader 
and more formal application than just accommodation of Iraq or Egypt. Through the Kuwait Fund 
for Arab Economic Development, launched in December 1961, as well as more discrete 
payments, the amirate was able to build on the practical and diplomatic support being expressed 
for its independence by other Arab states. This "dinar diplomacy" was designed to provide the 
amirate with legitimacy in the Arab world and was begun with the active input of other Arab 
countries' financial advisers. By 1973 the greatest beneficiary of its predominantly soft loan 
support was Egypt. However the fact that the next largest recipients were Sudan and Tunisia 8 
reflects the economic rationale behind specific award decisions, although both Khartoum and 
Tunis had maintained good relations with Kuwait since 1961, even, in the latter case, in the face 
of domestic Kuwaiti criticism of President Bourguiba (see Chapter 2). Buoyed by the perceptible 
neutrality in the Arab world that the wide distribution of its financial largesse suggested, Kuwait, 
especially under Amir Sabah Salim, would also offer its services as a mediator in inter-Arab 
disputes. This, Kuwait believed, provided a further opportunity to legitimise its existence and, it 
hoped, in the process to lessen regional tensions that heightened its sense of vulnerability. 
In international terms, Kuwait's defence agreement with the UK meant that Kuwait was not 
neutral. This both hindered and helped Kuwait in its attempts to get international and regional 
diplomatic recognition and acceptance. Kuwait's determination to play down the public and 
7 Most of the conventional portrayals of small states' characteristics do not sit easily with Kuwait. See 
Clarke & Payne (Ed),! gp. cit. Economic wealth, much less a willingness to utilise it as a foreign policy tool, 
nor the ideological packaging of foreign policy, much less an assertive utilisation of it, to deflect physical 
vulnerability appears to be outside of a number of small states theorists' purview. David Vital has assessed 
the ability of comparatively wealthy small states to enhance their military security in hostile regions. 
However the deployment of wealth and ideology is of little relevance to his case studies. David Vital, The 
Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict (London; Oxford University Press, 
1971). 
8 Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait's Foreign Policy - City-State in World Politics (Colorado; Westview Press, 
1990) p. 26. 
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outward expressions of a historic relationship with Britain that had directly facilitated its 
emergence as a more independent entity in 1899 (see Chapter 2), was mirrored by the amirate's 
active search for accommodation within a region where distrust of Britain was widespread. 
Contradictory friendships were simultaneously maintained, most obviously in the case of Egypt, 
to which Kuwait, officially then subject to British control in the conduct of its foreign policy, had 
sent a large financial subvention in the middle of the 1956 "Suez" war 9, and had continued to 
provide official and private financial support for its military effort afterwards. In the 1961 
"Exchange of Letters", the UK government had granted Kuwait its independence and agreed to 
respond positively should a request for assistance be made (see Chapter 4). This did not lead to 
any British troop departure, for none had been present other than occasional small contingents of 
military trainers and advisors. However, within a day of Kuwait's independence it appeared that a 
testing of Kuwait's new-found status was being conducted by Iraq, whose leader General Qassim 
claimed that the amirate belonged within his country. This provided an opportunity for Britain to 
assert its declining post-Suez authority in the Middle East, against a background of poor Anglo- 
Saudi relations and the UK's suspicion of Egyptian influence in Kuwait and more widely. 
However Britain's response was somewhat disproportionate to what appeared to be almost 
exclusively rhetorical Iraqi threats against Kuwait, especially given that only three months 
previously, Iraq's military ability to occupy Kuwait had been disregarded by UK defence and 
intelligence analysts'O. 
Both Britain and the Kuwaiti amir, Abdullah Salim, were concerned to ensure that the 
underscoring of the British defence commitment could be handled in such a way as to not 
prejudice Kuwait's acceptance within the Arab fold and to encourage the prospect of the 
amirate's survival in the future. The difficulty was in marrying a request from the Kuwaiti amir 
for UK military intervention with an emergent Arab political initiative that was precisely intended 
to head off what, for most Arab countries, was a highly unwelcome scenario. The Kuwaiti request 
for assistance led to the quick mobilisation of a UK military taskforce. For some observers, its 
haste suggested that the purpose was more to head off a putative "Arab solution" than any 
imagined Iraqi military threat". The Kuwaiti amir had had little direct contact with either the 
Arab League or representatives of the two key Arab countries, Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In the 
9A sum of L2 million pounds was reportedly sent to aid the Egyptian military effort. Mustafa M. Alani, 
Operation Vantage - British MilitaEy Intervention 
in Kuwait in 1961, (Surbiton; LAAM, 1990). 
10 Richard A Mobley, "Gauging the Iraqi Threat to Kuwait in the 1960s", www. cia. gov/csi/studies/fall 
winter 200 1 /article03. html 200 1; and Alani, gp. cit. 
11 Alani, op. cit. 
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period of heightened vulnerability prior to Kuwait's membership of the UN two years later, Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia were concerned to ensure that any Iraqi coercion of Kuwait could be prevented 
by Arab means, thereby minimising the role of the British. Variations on this so-called "Arab 
solution", while having failed to prevent the rapid British military mobilisation, sought at 
minimum to end the Anglo-Kuwaiti "Exchange of Letters" in return for Iraq's acceptance of 
Kuwait's membership, as an independent state, of the Arab League and of the UN. 
Arab League puts troops on the ground 
The amir's priority, shared with the British, was to ensure that the 7,000 British army, naval and 
air force personnel, and the 3,000 support staff, of the taskforce be removed as quickly as 
possible. Kuwait did not want this to happen at the expense of the British defence commitment, 
but was keen to ensure that, as soon as possible, an Arab League Security Force (ALSF) would 
enter Kuwait to replace the British units. While, in comparative terms, militarily insignificant, the 
2,600 members of the ALSF, whose arrival three months later included the most prominent Arab 
12 states , symbolised both Kuwait's acceptance by all of its Arab neighbours and Iraq's political 
isolation. The contribution of Egyptian troops, however, was modest compared to the Saudi 
Arabian and Jordanian contingents"; the Sudanese made up a small, additional contingent. The 
fact that Egypt could not be relied on by Kuwait as an ally that could balance Iraq was 
emphasised by the departure of its troops in November 1961, as Syria's breakaway from the 
United Arab Republic (UAR) loomed. On the other hand, without Egypt's political support, no 
Arab League initiative on Kuwait, or anything else, could get off the ground. Kuwait was grateful 
to have secured UAR participation, but, like Britain, was also pleased that establishing a fairly 
broadly-based Arab force meant that neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia would effectively establish 
Kuwait as their sole protectorate; having a single and powerful Arab state present for any 
duration would not have been welcomed by the Kuwaiti leadership either. From a Kuwaiti 
perspective, the agreement on the Egyptian-sanctioned Arab League force was a necessary, if 
unusually overt, regional alliance for it to adopt. Applying Walt's "balance of threat" concept 14 , 
Kuwait's greatest danger, Iraq, needed balancing by alignment with other key Arab states. As 
Walt's analysis suggests of weaker states, Kuwait was seeking to balance an immediately 
12 Syrian troops were not a part of the ALSF. However Syria was, in effect, politically represented as 
Egyptian troops took part, albeit relatively briefly, as UAR forces. 
13 British Embassy Amman to Foreign Office, 16th November 1961 (F0371/156901) 
14 Stephen M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances (New York; Cornell University Press, 1990) 
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proximate threat with an alliance with a powerful neighbour at a greater territorial remove. 
Ultimately, Walt observed, this makes alliances with powers external to the region the most 
attractive for weaker Middle Eastern states. However local alignments were a necessary response 
to local threats and would not necessarily reflect the preference of international allies. 
In diplomatic terms Egypt was the Arab country that Kuwait primarily looked to for support of its 
aspiration for full international recognition and acceptance in the Arab world as a sovereign state. 
However Egypt, like Iraq earlier, was not a country with which Kuwait wished to pursue an overt 
alliance. An invitation from President Nasser to Kuwait to join the UAR upon its formation in 
February 1958 had not been favoured by Amir Abdullah Salim who, emerging from Britain's 
formal foreign policy veto three years later, would continue to value the alliance with Britain as 
the backdrop against which meaningful regional non-alignment could be played out. The 
invitation to Kuwait from the Hashemite monarchies of Iraq and Jordan to join the ill-fated 
federal union they had founded in response to the UAR had therefore also been rebuffed (see 
Appendix 3) 15 . 
Seeking Arab legitimacy 
In the months ahead the British would express concern about Iraqi troop mobilisations, while 
periodic rhetorical attacks would continue to make the Kuwaitis uneasy. In December 1961 
tensions were raised again as a UK naval mobilisation occurred in the northern Gulf to offset an 
apparent Iraqi threat to Kuwait despite the presence of ALSF troops. During this period Iraq's 
General Qassim was to declare that, "The road to Jerusalem lies through Kuwait. " Deploying 
Arab nationalist sentiment to link Iraq's own territorial ambitions with popular regional hostility 
to Britain, which was widely seen as Kuwait's protector and the author of all attacks on Arab 
unity, including the loss of Palestine, was a skilful assault on the amirate's Arab legitimacy. 
Kuwait would seek to garner regional acceptance however, with ideological correctness, 
widespread financial generosity, and, lacking confidence in the reliability or capability of 
particular Arab states as military allies, a regionally neutral foreign policy. With the commitment 
shown by the "radical" Arab states in the early period of the ALSF having weakened 
15 Abdullah Salim told the British Political Resident (based in Bahrain) in March 1958 that Kuwait had no 
intention of committing the amirate to either bloc. Jarman, op. cit. p. 57. Mindful of the UAR, the UK had 
initially tried to persuade the Ruler to join the proposed federal union (see Appendix 3). 
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considerably, throughout 1962 Kuwait would pro-actively engage with different would-be 
regional intermediaries in the search for a formula for Iraqi recognition. With departure of the 
remaining contingents of the ALSF over January- February 1963, this search became more 
imperative. Uncomfortable, however, with the terms being proffered, Kuwait took the 
opportunity of the short-lived Ba'ath-led takeover in Iraq from February, to pursue direct talks, 
regardless of British reservations about the manner in which this was being conducted. Kuwait 
was in a sense "band-wagoning" with its greatest perceived threat. Walt has suggested that this 
more unusual practice can occur in the case of weak states who feel especially vulnerable to 
neighbouring countries. Kuwait did not possess significant military power in terms of men or 
material, and, even in 1962 when the ALSF had still been present, remained fearful of its 
immediate neighbour, Iraq. In seeking to accommodate Iraq, Kuwait was not sidelining its 
regional friends, but its direct engagement with Baghdad reflected the fact that the symbolic 
support of the Arab states was insufficient to persuade Iraq to at least formally accept Kuwait's 
existence. Securing Iraqi recognition also held out the prospect of prompting Kuwait's admittance 
to the UN, assuming that the USSR lifted its veto. (In the end, however, Soviet recognition of 
Kuwait came before Iraq's, thereby contributing to the shift in Baghdad's policy toward Kuwait 
(see Chapter 4)). 
Iraq's diplomatic boycott of the Arab League, and of the states that had most actively supported 
Kuwait's independence, would emphasise that it had to come to terms with Iraq. At the same 
time, Egypt's half-hearted and short-lived commitment to the ALSF, and Syria's development of 
an economic pact with Iraq following the collapse of its union with Egypt in the UAR, confirmed 
to Kuwait that it could not rely on the Arab alliance that was so publicly on display in 1961 as the 
basis for its security, and that it had little choice but to deal directly with Iraq and meet its 
16 financial demands in order to secure recognition 
Saudi Arabia, the leading troop contributor to the ALSF, remained firrnly on-side. However, 
Saudi Arabia's willingness to counter Iraq partly reflected its emerging leadership role among the 
Gulf Arabs, exemplified in a proven willingness to contest British authority in the area", and the 
kingdom's fears of the consequences for its own security should Kuwait be absorbed by Iraq. In 
16 The Egyptians' early departure when the UAR collapsed and the Syrians' consequent decision to align 
with the Iraqis was noted by the US charge d'affaires Dayton Mak at the time as being key examples 
for 
Kuwait of the vulnerability of Kuwait's position. Robert Jan-nan, Sabah Salim, Amir of Kuwait 1965-77, A 
Political Biography (London; London Centre for Arab Studies, 2002), p. 84. 
17 During the crisis over the Buraimi Oasis, in 1955 Saudi policemen had been evicted by Omani tribal 
levies loyal to Britain in a bid for the control of territory also claimed by Oman and Abu Dhabi. 
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historical terms Saudi Arabia's assertion of its territorial interests in the Gulf had been exercised, 
with British connivance, primarily at Kuwait's expense; a factor that made the amirate view its 
Gulf neighbour warily and only emphasised the undesirability of relying exclusively on regional 
or international alliances. Saudi Arabia was concerned about what it saw as the danger of Kuwait 
being over-enthusiastic about securing Iraqi recognition at the expense of the amirate's long term 
independence, which Saudi Arabia feared would make itself more vulnerable to Iraqi attempts to 
destabilise it18 . The third key element of Kuwait's security considerations within the Gulf, was 
the strongest regional military power, the non-Arab Iranian monarchy. The Shah had been quick 
to recognise Kuwaiti independence in 1961, a factor that would encourage Kuwait to cultivate 
good relations with Tehran, something which became especially important given the latter's 
concerns about Kuwait's external and internal policies. Iran continued to be concerned about 
what it regarded as unwelcome foreign Arab penetration on the western shore of the Gulf, and for 
this reason tried to encourage the UK to support a UN-backed international, as opposed to Arab, 
force. The Shah also liked to refer to Kuwaiti Shia as in some sense belonging to Iran, a view that 
was dismissed by the British as "stirring" 19 . 
Triangle of interests 
Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia represented a triangle of power in the Gulf, a tripod of the key 
players, all of whom bordered Kuwait. It was imperative that the amirate did what it could to 
encourage Iran and Saudi Arabia to believe that their own interests were bound up in Kuwait's 
survival. This was complicated by Kuwait's close relationship with Egypt, which Saudi Arabia 
and Iran would continue to view with suspicion, sharing as they did the belief that Kuwaiti 
foreign policy was largely shaped in Cairo. Egypt was not a direct actor in the affairs of the Gulf. 
However it had a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula via the conflict in Yemen from 1962, was the 
pre-eminent Arab military power, and exercised considerable influence throughout the Arab 
world because of widespread popular support for President Nasser. Thus Kuwait's relationship 
with Egypt, caricatured privately by Shaikh Sabah Salim shortly after he became prime minister 
as having replaced the UK as the source of foreign policy, could undermine the amirate's 
attempts to project a regionally non-aligned stance in the eyes of its Gulf neighbours, who all 
distrusted Egypt. At the same time, while Egypt had not proven wholly reliable as a 
18 Steward Crawford, British Resident in the Gulf, to FO, 7th February 1963 (FO 371/ 103193). 
'9 UK embassy, Tehran, to FO, August I't, 1961, (FO 156897) 
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counterweight to Iraq, and was conceivably too removed physically to entirely constrain Baghdad 
in the future, Kuwait would continue to ensure that, through the amirate's financial support and 
its foreign policy stances, that it did not attract the opposition of Cairo. Ideologically, after all, 
Egypt was the primary source of legitimisation in the Arab world and its popular credibility made 
it a key consideration in Kuwait's regional poliCY20. 
However, in pursuing a bi-lateral solution with Iraq, Kuwait acted with little regard for what 
neighbouring states or the wider Arab world thought. Kuwait was making a potentially risky 
attempt to negotiate terms with Iraq, but was doing so at a time of greater internal weakness in its 
northern neighbour following the change of regime. While it is unlikely that Kuwait factored this 
into its, from a British perspective, hasty decision to seek to engage with the new Iraqi regime, it 
emphasises that this was not a case of band-wagoning along the cut and dried lines suggested by 
Walt. Furthermore, despite the formal commitment to an eventual "federal union", this was not 
seen by the Kuwaiti leadership as anything other than a short term means to an end. 
At the same time Kuwait's negotiations with Iraq were not pursued at the expense of close 
relations with Egypt, despite the poison that would soon infect relations between Cairo and 
Baghdad after an initial attempt at forging a political union (see below). Like the financial 
inducement of some 30 million Kuwaiti dinars that finally, almost literally, bought Iraqi 
recognition of Kuwait in October 1963 2 1, Kuwait-Egyptian relations also continued to have a 
strong financial element. As such Kuwait was far from conforming to the behaviour of another 
weak Arab state that at various times sought to balance or bandwagon with Iraq, Jordan 22 . The 
Hashemite Kingdom constantly flitted from alliance to alliance in the region, seeing itself as 
especially vulnerable from Iraq and Egypt in fairly equal measure. While Iraq and Egypt were 
pre-eminent in Kuwaiti considerations too, Kuwait saw Iraq as its primary security concern, but 
preferred to use a financial resource not possessed by Jordan to try to avoid overt alliances, and to 
build support among opposing countries in the region. 
Writing in 1964, the British ambassador to Kuwait, George Jackson, characterised the amirate's 
foreign policy in the Arab world as seeking, "To maintain neutrality among them..., " but added 
20 In 1966 Abdul Aziz Musa'eed, editor of the conservative daily Al-Rai Al-Amm, and subsequently an MP, 
described Egypt as Kuwait's key source of information regarding the "outside world. " 
21 This figure, at Iraq's request, was proposed as an interest-free loan from the government and thus had to 
be approved at a special session of the national assembly. Jarman, op. cit. p. 161. 
22 Walt, op. cit. 
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that this, "taxes the Amir (Abdullah Salim) considerably, although he has shown exemplary 
patience and wisdom in pursuing this as a policy, while actively using Kuwait's money to help all 
ArabS23. " 
In the period leading up to Iraqi acceptance of Kuwait along the territorial boundaries that had 
already been mutually agreed in 1936 (see Chapter 6), Iraq had sought to extract more than a 
financial price for its political about-turn. The nullification of the "Exchange of Letters" appeared 
to be the minimum Baghdad would accept, however, with federal -arrangements being floated by 
would-be Arab interlocutors. Despite the fact that some initial encouragement for its efforts 
probably came from Iraq, Syria's attempts in January 1962 to mediate came unstuck with the 
publicity they accrued. This only added to Iraqi suspicion of Syria's motives. Although, what to 
Iraq, had been an unwelcome Egyptian-Syrian partnership in the form of the UAR had ended, 
Iraq continued to view Syria as conspiring against it. The fact that an Arab initiative was being 
pursued at all was obviously of interest to Kuwait. However, in their inability to place Kuwait's 
independence at the front of a series of steps intended to resolve the dispute, the Syrians' 
proposals were an elaborate way of maximising an interest for a number of Arab powers in 
Kuwait, which, if they had progressed, would have soon negated its very existence other than as a 
collective source of oil largesse for the more powerful Arab stateS24. 
Direct talks with Iraq 
Kuwait would not entertain discussion of the terms of any political union ahead of Iraqi 
recognition of the amirate's independence, despite the objective of union being formally endorsed 
by the Kuwaiti parliament (see Chapter 2). However, to the chagrin of the UK, Kuwait was 
prepared to discuss with Iraq a phased termination of the "Exchange of Letters" over a three year 
21 
period, with the whole process seemingly cancelled should the amirate be dissatisfied . 
Ultimately, however, talks conducted on this basis did not get anywhere. Kuwait wished to 
accommodate Iraq; Shaikh Sabah Al-Ahmed (foreign minister 1963-2003) went to Baghdad and 
sent representatives on repeated initiatives where the literal price of progress was a central factor. 
However Kuwait was not prepared to place its future in Iraq's exclusive hands. British reports 
G. Jackson to British Foreign Secretary RA Butler, January 2 nd , 1964 
(FO 371/ 168728) 
24 For a detailed list of the proposed terms, see FO 371/162898, Book 1083, sourcing BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, January 2 nd , 
1962 
25 John Richmond to "AW", FO, April 7th 1963 (FO 371/168738 113253) 
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emphasised that Shaikh Jabr Al-Ahmed, finance minister (1962-65), would have been happy to 
have rescinded the "Exchange of Letters" with the British, a stance that contrasted with prime 
minister Shaikh Sabah Salim (1963-65). After the eventual agreement with Iraq, which referred to 
terminating the Exchange of Letters at a "suitable time", Sabah Salim had commented privately 
that this could be used to procrastinate indefiniteIY26 . Either way, there seemed little support 
among the ruling Al-Sabah, including Amir Abdullah Salim, who was the ultimate policy arbiter, 
for the idea of effectively swapping UK security guarantees for Iraqi recognition. The impression 
created by UK embassy correspondence is that the Amir may have been open to a deal that 
ensured Iraqi recognition of Kuwaiti independence with Arab-wide security guarantees in place 
of the Exchange of LetterS27. It seems unlikely however that the temporary alliance that had 
brought the short-lived Arab League Security Force into being in 1961 would have inspired the 
Amir to feel that this was anything other than a fortnal aspiration that was a long way from 
material isation. 
The excitement generated among Kuwaitis and more widely in the Arab world over the Egyptian- 
Syrian-Iraqi union in April 1963, following a Syrian Ba'athi coup after the earlier Iraqi one, did 
not affect the Amir's thinking, for all the strong domestic Arab nationalist impulse in Kuwait (see 
Chapter 2). The tripartite union was an extremely temporary convenience for a much stronger 
Egypt, whose domestic and foreign policy was cast in terms that obliged it to at least be seen to 
pursue unionist projects, but was enormously wary of what, for the time being, were two Baathist 
regimes. Syria and Iraq had found some benefit in keeping Nasser on-side in the face of internal 
vulnerabilities to pro-Nasserite sympathies in the military and more widely, and as a bulwark 
against each other as they sought to maintain domestic authority28. Within three months the 
putative union collapsed among mutual recrimination and manifold coups in Damascus. In the 
aftermath Egypt was especially keen to deploy ideological language to attack its former 
"brothers", reflective of Nasser's fierce rivalry with the Ba'ath which had always been unlikely 
bedfellows. Kuwait had no real interest in Arab "unity" projects that genuinely threatened to end 
state sovereignty between member countries and thus could eventually threaten the amirate's 
ability to exercise its independence. For this reason the Kuwaiti amir, Abdullah Salim, had 
confided to the British that he had been nervous about talk of Baath unity projects that had then 
extended to the proposed federation with Egypt in 1963. Kuwaiti leaders were also privately 
26 Jarman, op. cit. p. 160. 
27 UK embassy, Kuwait to FO, 14th March 1963 (FO 371/BK 103193/8) 
2' Kerr, op. cit. 
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anxious about renewed discussions in 1966 of an Egyptian-Iraqi union following their improved 
relations. 
Had the union proposed in 1963 been robust and given rise to a meaningful federal government, 
then the Amir may well have concluded that there was little choice but to throw Kuwait's future 
in with it. Kuwait's absorption into a meaningful Arab national entity could only then have been 
avoided by relying exclusively on British protection and thus undermining the rationale of its 
independence from the UK in the first place. Kuwait's emergent regional policy of appealing to 
Arab unity, while seeking accommodation with leading Arab states who had a vested interest in 
ensuring that one or the other did not absorb Kuwait too firmly into their orbit, would have been 
rendered largely meaningless. As it was, Kuwait would not be presented with a serious prospect 
of an Arab alliance that could remotely guarantee its security. 
Kuwaiti public statements about Arab unity, however, were different. One was issued jointly in 
September 1963 when Syria, at this point enjoying closer relations with its fellow Ba'ath regime 
in Iraq, initiated formal relations with Kuwait. The amirate not only sought to build support by 
giving expression to "Arabism", but, as Kuwaiti was also seeking an agreement with Iraq, it 
appeared to come close to taking its Arab nationalist stance to its logical conclusion and 
renouncing its agreement with the British. The joint Syrian-Kuwaiti declaration stated, "The two 
sides expressed their conviction that Arab power alone should undertake the mission of defending 
the Arabism of any Arab country, that circumstances have overtaken every existing agreement, so 
29 that the Arab bond is the only legitimate bond for the defence of Arabism anywhere . Syria was 
moving closer to the Iraqi orbit, while its Arabist and unionist aspiration continued to be strongly 
asserted, not least as, like the UAR, it was a frontline state with Israel. Syria was a country whose 
radical Arab politics, periodically shared with Iraq, that Kuwait, although not feeling directly 
threatened by Damascus, had to be careful to accommodate as far as possible. 
The Arabism expressed in their joint agreement was in line with the form of words that were to 
eventually underpin the agreement Kuwait signed with Iraq in October 1963, in which the Amir 
was obliged to re-affirm his commitment to the Kuwaiti National Assembly that the Exchange of 
Letters would be rescinded at the "suitable time" (see Chapter 2) and that "comprehensive Arab 
unity" would be sought30 . The mutually expressed 
fealty to Arab brotherhood was in many 
29 British embassy, Kuwait, to FO, October 7th, 1963 (F0371/168740 BK 103193/45) 
30 Ibid. 
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respects more important for popular consumption in Iraq than in Kuwait, given that the Iraqi 
demand for the cancellation of the arnirate's agreement with the British had not been realised. 
Pro-Nasserite Arab nationalists in the Kuwaiti parliament complained that the financial cost of 
the agreement was a compromise of the country's non-aligned foreign policy stance. They need 
not have worried, however, as Kuwait's band-wagoning with Iraq ended as soon as its objective, 
diplomatic recognition, had been achieved. Ambitions that had underwritten previous efforts at 
brokering an Iraqi-Kuwaiti agreement, for example a proposal for bringing piped water from the 
Shatt Al-Arab waterway to Kuwait, did not materialise; apparent territorial threats would still be 
made, and the promised demarcation of the border would be continually stalled by Iraq. In March 
1964, for example, oil drilling conducted under Kuwaiti auspices close to the Iraqi border had to 
be abandoned as a contingent of Iraqi troops arrived, claiming that the work was being conducted 
inside Iraqi territory 31 . In October 1966 Iraqi troops even placed their national 
flags on the 
Kuwaiti island of Warba, located at the strategically vital northern Gulf headwater, just south of 
the Iraqi port of Um Qasr 32 . In April 1967, Iraqi troops crossed the land border with Kuwait, 
removing a passport processing tent, while the next morning three Iraqi sorties were flown over 
the border area. Even though this incident had followed the announced reining back of the 
practical extent of the British defence commitment (see Chapters 6 and 7), the Kuwaitis were not 
that perturbed by the Iraqi action 33 . 
Amir Abdullah Salim understood that Kuwait's foreign policy within the region rested on its 
active neutrality, reflected in its non-aligned, but assertively pro-Arab, political stance. He also 
understood that this was made possible by Kuwait's relationship with its British ally. For 
example, what might have appeared a natural political affiliation with the monarchical regimes of 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan did not attract the amirate. The invitation to join the anti-Nasserite 
"Kings' Club" alliance that lasted from 1962-64 was politely declined. Membership in the 
"Kings' Alliance" with Hashemite Jordan and Iraq had similarly been declined in 1958. The Amir 
was keen to keep detached from Saudi Arabia's determination under King Faisal to build 
alliances in the Arab world against Nasser's Egypt. The Amir declared to the British Ambassador 
31 The incident to some extent foreshadowed the allegations made by Iraq prior to its invasion of Kuwait in 
1990. On February 22 nd , 
1964, Kuwait agreed to discuss with Iraq the possibility that Iraq's Rumeila oil 
nd 
field extended into Kuwait. However this did not prevent the Iraqi troop incursion occurring on March 2 
prior to which Kuwaiti -approved drilling had been conducted, seemingly without Iraqi objection. UK 
embassy correspondence with FO, February to March 1964 (F0371/174017) 
32 US embassy to State Department, 3 Is' October 1966 (A- 125). 
33 Miriam Joyce, Ruling Sheikhs and Her Majesty's Government, 1960-69 (London; Frank Cass, 2003), 
p. 88. 
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that he was not going to encourage King Faisal to "believe he could take sides with him against 
President Nasser. " The British Ambassador recorded that Amir Abdullah Salim "was careful to 
tell me several times how much importance he attached to British support and the confidence that 
its existence in the background gave him in following his Arab policies". " 
Non-alignment challenged 
When the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) was founded in Sana' in September 1962 with the direct 
intervention of Egypt, thereby replacing the Imamate, Kuwait was faced with its first key 
diplomatic challenge in the Arab world. Kuwait's subsequent decision to recognise the YAR was 
seen by Kuwait's conservative Arab neighbours, not least Saudi Arabia, which had sent troops to 
assist the royalist forces, as a reflection of the amirate's closeness to Cairo in foreign policy. 
Saudi forces had not only played a key role in asserting Arab support for Kuwaiti independence, 
but were still present when Kuwait made its decision to recognise the YAR. Notably, Saudi 
troops did not then remain much longer. However Kuwait had deliberated for nearly five months 
over a decision to recognise the YAR that also put it out of favour with Britain, which was 
assisting Saudi Arabia's attempts to offset what in Yemen was rapidly became a challenge to its 
own territorial security. The beginnings of Kuwait's innovative Yemen policy, which would later 
lead to the more controversial recognition of the Marxist south Yemeni regime in Aden, was a 
way of asserting an "Arab nationalist" foreign policy that was perceptibly anti-colonial. Thus it 
was at one with the image Kuwait liked to project elsewhere in the Arabian Peninsula, even when 
Egypt was not a player there (see Chapter 6). The recognition of the YAR also reflected internal 
opinion, not least that of Kuwaiti Arab nationalists and wider popular sentiment, which had 
exercised considerable pressure on the leadership". However Kuwait's decision, although risky 
in terms of Saudi opinion, was also at one with the amirate's inclusive, Arabist, orientation in 
foreign policy. Kuwait was wary of being seen as siding with one of emergent camps in the Arab 
world, which the Yemeni civil conflict was to quickly provide the basis for. However the YAR 
was not only supported by Egypt, but it enjoyed wider Arab support as a consequence. Kuwait 
was not by any means an enthusiast for the republican leadership of Abdullah Sallal, and financial 
34 Ambassador John Richmond to R. Walmsley, FO, 27"' August 1962 (FO 371/162899). 
35 Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait University. Personal interview, Kuwait, January 2003. 
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support was initially relatively meagre. However it would not have been in character for Kuwait 
to try to set its face against a regime already given recognition by the UN, an important factor 
given Kuwait's anxious desire to be afforded the same status, and, for that matter, the YAR had 
been recognised by the US. The amirate's foreign policy approach to the Arab world was 
generally to avoid and, where possible, to seek to overcome confrontation. Thus, as Yemen 
increasingly became a stage for Egyptian-Saudi confrontation, Kuwait would be asked by the 
Yemenis to be, and would seek to act as, a mediator between the two key Arab states, a stance 
that the amirate found more comfortable, however limited its mediation abilities would prove to 
be. 
Summitry and non-alignment 
For the Kuwaitis the era of Arab summitry was an ideal vehicle for building links across 
rancorous inter-Arab divides. The first Arab League summit, held in Cairo in January 1964, 
enabled Kuwait to take its seat as a bona fide member of the Arab club and as a UN-recognised 
state. While Egypt was clearly in the dominant position as host and leading political force, Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan also shared Kuwait's view that summitry was a suitable means to overcome 
tensions and they welcomed the chance to sit as distinct, and seemingly respected, national 
entities alongside Egypt in a common Arab forum. They hoped this would ease Egypt's support 
of hostile forces, whether within Jordan, or the republicans who had seized power in Yemen from 
an Imamate still being supported by Saudi Arabia. 
However, the principal agreement of the Arab League summit was on a unified military 
command in response to rising tension with Israel. This was less directly relevant to Kuwait, 
although the fact that it took the heat out of the Egyptian-Syrian feud, and seemed to minimise the 
danger that Syrian action could drag the states neighbouring Israel into war, was welcome as a 
sign that inter-Arab conciliation was possible. The summit also agreed the formation of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), which had been prefigured by the forming of the pro- 
Nasser Palestinian faction, Fatah, which had been founded in Kuwait (see Chapter 2). Kuwait's 
66neutrality" in Arab politics did not prevent it from taking a strong stance in defence of the 
Palestinian cause, even at the expense of Jordanian concerns. Palestine was at a safe territorial 
distance and, through statements and financial support, became a relatively low cost signifier of 
the amirate's Arab nationalist credentials. At the same time, the co-operation among the leading 
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Arab players, which was designed to minimise the danger of disunity as tensions rose with Israel, 
fitted with Kuwait's desire to accommodate key players rather than siding with one bloc within 
the Arab camp. Kuwait had not been comfortable with the logic of Arab unity projects. The era of 
Arab summitry, with its contrasting emphasis on Arab inter-state cooperation, was a welcome 
development. While Kuwait would endorse the broad principle of "wahda" (unity), clearly 
defined projects for Arab federal union could weaken the rationale for the amirate's existence as 
an independent state. In August 1964, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Kuwait signed a treaty 
binding them to establish an Arab Common Market on January I s' 1965, and to work, over a nine 
year period, toward the removal of all trade restrictions between them. However Kuwait's 
parliament never even ratified a treaty that each member state would argue over, as political 
symbolism came up against jealously guarded national sovereignty. Kuwait was also 
uncomfortable when splits placed the key Arab countries, on whose support it relied, in 
entrenched opposition to each other. Within a couple of years such developments would also 
present Kuwait with an opportunity to parade its would-be "positive neutrality" on an Arab stage 
in the cause of mediation. 
The fact that Iraq and Syria were no longer apparent Ba'athi allies, following a change of regime 
in Baghdad in November 1963 that also saw Syrian relations improve with Egypt, would not have 
caused Kuwait undue discomfort. After all, earlier signs that the Iraqi and Syrian militaries had 
been drawing closer would not have been welcome in Kuwait. However these two countries' 
internal weakness, and the fact that Egypt was unwilling or unable to promote a powerful bloc of 
the three states, helped to minimise the threat that Kuwait felt. A few months later, however, 
Iraq's internal weakness under Colonel Abdul Rahman Al-Arif, who was anti-Ba'ath and 
sympathetic to Nasser, suggested to a senior Kuwait official that Iraq may have been seeking, and 
possibly securing, Egyptian help in maintaining internal stabil ity36 . This in itself worried the 
Kuwaiti government. However it is unlikely to have suggested that Iraq might be emboldened to 
threaten Kuwait at this point, were it not for a set of reports that Iraqi troops were moving in a 
southerly direction. If there were any Egyptian troops in Iraq at all, their numbers are likely to 
have been small. However the fact that these two elements were apparently occurring in 
conjunction led to excited speculation by the Iranian government who were in communication 
over the matter with Kuwait37. 
36 M. Errock to FO, reporting on a conversation with Shaikh Jabr Al-Ali, 22 nd September 1964 
37 UK embassy, Tehran, to FO, 3 rd September 1964 (F0371/174584) 
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Iran was given to periodically informing Kuwait and the UK of what it alleged were threatening 
Iraqi, or, on this occasion, Egyptian, troop movements. Iran's relations with these radical Arab 
powers were poor, and during this period Tehran's relations with Cairo reached a particular low. 
This in turn created difficulty for Kuwait-Iranian relations, given the suspicions caused by the 
amirate's relations with Egypt and with Arab nationalists in the Gulf (see also Chapter 6). In fact 
such was the strain in Irani an-Egyptian relations that in 1964 they had been broken off As a 
result, a Kuwaiti foreign ministry official, Abdel-Rahman Ateegi, travelled to Iran to meet with 
the Shah in order to minimise the damaging impact on Kuwaiti-Iranian relations and to organise a 
visit the following year by the then prime minister, Sabah Salim, to Tehran". 
Kuwait "stands to" 
There were reports that Saudi Arabia, also worried about the apparent "developments" in Iraq, 
had moved forces to the north of the kingdom, and that this had ended the Iraqi troop 
mobilisation. In response to news of the Iraqi manoeuvres, Shaikh Saad Abdullah (interior 
minister, 1962-65) took the decision, while the rest of the senior leadership were on summer 
vacation, to instruct Kuwait troops to "stand to" (see also Chapter 2). Neither the military 
exercise, nor the apparent threat against which it was seeking to prepare, was reported to the 
British embassy. The subsequent explanation that the Kuwaitis did not wish to worry the UK 
suggested that Saad intended to signal to the British that the amirate could carry out a national 
security exercise without undue panic. It also implied that Kuwait did not feel particularly 
threatened. At the same time, Saudi Arabia's movement of troops northwards would have 
confirmed to Kuwait that at least one key Arab state was still interested in upholding the security 
of the amirate. Whatever the truth of the reports that Egyptian troops were in Iraq, this was not 
the making of an axis between the two states, nor was it seen as such in Kuwait. Egypt's apparent 
internal radicalisation, with the creation in 1965 of the Arab Socialist Union, appeared to be the 
latest incarnation of its quest for internal control and regional hegemony, with Kuwait providing 
as much financial support as the Soviet Union. None of this suggested, however, that Egypt's 
essential pragmatism in regional relations, which had clearly benefited Kuwait, was being altered. 
38 As under-secretary at the foreign ministry from 1963-67, Abdul-Rahman Ateegi had visited Iran in 1964 
to facilitate the intended visit of the then Kuwaiti prime minister Sabah Salim the following year. In 
stressing to the Kuwaiti amir and crown prince the need for his visit, "I told them our relationship is boiling 
with our neighbours .... 
I have to go and cool that. " Personal interview, Kuwait, February 2005. 
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The collaborative spirit that had been launched with the birth of Arab summitry continued 
through to a second summit in 1965, bringing unlikely regimes together in an attempted spirit of 
compromise. By the same token, efforts were made by the external protagonists in the Yemen 
civil war, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, to negotiate a solution, even in the face of resistance by the 
local leadership". The Jiddah conference in August reflected exigencies on both King Faisal and 
President Nasser's part, with the former fearing that ongoing Egyptian military intervention in 
neighbouring Yemen could see increasing pressure on the Saudi kingdom, and Nasser wanting to 
save face and extract himself from a burdensome campaign. However, neither side could force an 
agreement on their local allies. Shortly afterwards it appeared that Faisal had decided to establish 
a would-be ideological alliance of conservative "Islamic" states in an attempt to protect his flank 
against the "secular" Arabism spearheaded by Nasser's Egypt. The fact that Britain had 
announced their departure from Aden two years later, is likely to have made both Nasser and 
Faisal feel less inclined to pursue negotiated solutions over Yemen. 
Islamic alliance 
The Islamic "Pact" was launched as an association of overwhelmingly conservative governments 
from the Muslim world. Quirkily, together with the monarchies that signed up, were the secular 
Turkish and Tunisian regimes. Their membership helped to cement the impression of an alliance 
reflecting cold war divisions, and there is little doubt that, as Nasser's Egypt drew closer to, and 
more dependent on, the Soviet Union, so Faisal's Saudi Arabia was drawing closer to the 
strategic embrace of the US. However, mindful of a regional environment in which the Yemen 
war had emphasised the vulnerability of Saudi Arabia, regardless of its international alliances, 
King Faisal's primary objective is likely to have been to represent an alternative to the Egyptian- 
led, Arab-only summitry. Formally speaking, the so-called Islamic Pact was open to any Muslim 
country, as Faisal made clear. However, his high profile visits, including to the Shah's Iran, 
which was on poor terms with Egypt, and the eager signing up to the initiative by Jordan's King 
Hussein, meant that Saudi Arabia was not, as claimed, simply broadening the principle of the 
Arab League summit. While Kuwait was a conservative society in which expressions of Islamic 
fealty were the norm, there were few internal pressures to encourage foreign policy prioritisation 
of such an alliance; Islamism would not constitute a significant internal force until the late 1970s 
(see Conclusion). Kuwait did not join this alliance of mostly conservative Islamic monarchies and 
Kerr, op-cit. 
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shaikhdoms; in fact Faisal did not visit Kuwait, nor attempt to solicit its involvement. One 
interpretation could be an assessment on the Saudi king's part that Kuwait was not important 
enough a political player. By contrast, though, the Saudi king made seemingly inexplicable trips 
to two small African states, Guinea and Mali. However these "revolutionary" friends of Nasser" 
were poor, and perhaps Faisal saw room for Islamic, in addition to "socialist", patronage in west 
Africa. However, Kuwait was plainly not in need of patronage and Amir Abdullah Salim had 
already made clear his disdain for joining alliances that divided the region, a position that was 
maintained under the more collegiate leadership of Amir Sabah Salim (r. 1965-77) and Crown 
Prince Jabr Al-Ahmed, following the death of Amir Abdullah in November 1965. While this was 
not strictly true, in as much as Kuwait had been happy to see an Arab alliance against Iraq in 
1961, it would not have been expected that Kuwait would ever encourage an alliance against 
Egypt, the primary Arab power, whose support had ensured Arab recognition for the amirate's 
right to independence. 
However Kuwait appeared to see less harm in Faisal's Islamic Pact than in Nasser's threat to 
prevent Saudi Arabia attending the next Arab Summit in reprisal, or to boycott it if Saudi Arabia 
was present. In an assertion of Kuwait's view on the correct conduct of inter-Arab relations, the 
supposedly more Arab nationalist crown prince, Jabr Al-Ahmed, launched a much trailed foreign 
policy speech in June 1966. He told the national assembly that there should be no exclusions 4,, 
and rejected talk that had emanated from Cairo of a "limited Arab summit" i. e. one that excluded 
Saudi Arabia. The crown prince also complained of hostile radio broadcasts targeted at Kuwait - 
an unusual development in Cairo's treatment of the amirate. The UK believed that this was the 
start of "a foreign policy for Kuwaitis by Kuwaitis", as opposed to what they had considered 
hitherto to be Kuwait's Egyptian orientation. Additional suggestions of a new tone, UK officials 
argued, could be found in the crown prince's apparent private comment to President Nasser that, 
"Kuwait must be seen as a force in her own right and not regarded merely as a source of funds. 421g 
There was nothing in Kuwait's public statements to suggest any overt rancour with Egypt, 
however, and Jabr's speech, for which Amir Sabah Salim apologised to British officials, railed 
against "foreign bases in the peninsula. 4399 This most obviously implied Britain, but could also 
have had Egypt in mind. 
40 Ibid. p. I 10. 
41 UK embassy to FO, June 1966 (FO 371/113253. BK1022/36). 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
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Egyptian influence undoubtedly remained significant in Kuwaiti foreign policy; the decision by 
the amir to make an official visit to Iraq in 1966 was encouraged by Cairo, which enjoyed much 
improved relations with Baghdad prior to the re-establishment of a Ba'ath regime in 1968. A 
"unified political command" had even been formed between Egypt and Iraq in 1965, although it 
represented only a symbol of improved relations. The Egyptian-Iraqi relationship had both 
resulted in Egyptian encouragement to the Kuwaiti amir to visit Baghdad, but also made such 
diplomacy all the more important from Kuwait's perspective, given earlier concerns that these 
two countries' improved relationship might increase the amirate's vulnerability. Kuwait's 
ongoing financial support of Baghdad was for the most part sufficient to offset tensions during 
this period, although some territorial incursions did occur. 
By this point Kuwait was asserting what it considered its right to respect for the neutral, but 
influential, role that it considered its financial status could give it as a would-be mediator, 
uncompromised by financial or political interest. The difficulty was that Saudi Arabia, in 
common with the small southern Gulf states among which Kuwait sought a leadership role, 
viewed Kuwait as too close to Egypt. The crown prince's speech was an attempt to belie the 
impression of Kuwait being pro-Egyptian, but it would take more than this. 
Kuwait was adamant that it wished to be what the new amir, Sabah Salim, referred to as a "dove 
of peace" in the region, although, in a reflection of the arnirate's limitations, he pressed upon the 
US ambassador to facilitate such initiatives 44 . In April 1966 Kuwait 
had secured the agreement of 
Saudi Arabia's King Faisal to come to the amirate for direct dialogue with President Nasser of 
Egypt. However, to Kuwait's disappointment, Nasser refused to attend. This may have been less a 
snub to Kuwait than a disinclination to rerun the process that had failed at Jiddah a year earlier. 
Rashid Pharaoun, senior counsellor to Faisal, commented that Saudi Arabia welcomed Kuwait's 
efforts, and he had urged the US to encourage them to continue 45 . This was described 
by an 
American diplomat in Jiddah as "the only presently viable means to get Saudi-Egyptian dialogue 
resumed 46. " The then US Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Herman Eilts, however, argues that 
Kuwait was not seen in the kingdom as having a realistic chance of mediating successfully in the 
dispute. The Saudis, he said, preferred a quiet, backroom approach 47 . 
44 US Ambassador Howard Cottam, 25 th May 1966 (A282). 
45 American consulate, Dhahran, to US embassy, Kuwait, June 1966 (A282). 
46 Ibid. 
4' Ambassador Herman Eilts. Personal interview, MA, USA, September 2000. 
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However Kuwait continued to push itself forward as a potential mediator in this and other 
disputes in the Arabian Peninsula, and beyond, whether at the public or the private level. 
Concerned about the upheaval in Oman, where supporters of the Imamate, with wider Arab 
backing, continued to contest the Sultan's authority, Amir Sabah Salim hosted a representative of 
the Imamate for exploratory talks. However this attempt at diplomatic intervention failed to get 
anywhere. Kuwait's identification with opposition to the Sultan, in common at one point with 
both Saudi Arabia and Egypt, would only have undermined its efforts in the eyes of Muscat. 
Kuwait had considerable difficulty in striking a confidently neutral position on Yemen too. This 
was emphasised by the incident at Najran in March 1967 when an Egyptian attack on a Saudi 
town close to the Yemeni border threatened to develop into a direct conflict with Saudi forces. 
The Kuwaitis felt unable to condemn the incident, which for Saudi Arabia confirmed its inability 
to be an effective, but neutral, mediator. Failing to grasp what their claim to being "positively 
neutral" should mean in practice. Kuwait officials argued that maintaining the trust of either side 
required it not to take sides 48 . 
Relations with Saudi Arabia had clearly cooled, as evidenced by Kuwait's distance from the self- 
styled Islamic Pact. Efforts to negotiate over the Neutral Zone and agree the delineation of the 
administrative boundary of the oil-rich land and water mass between them, were arguably more 
important. This appeared to have been successfully concluded in mid-1965 in an agreement that 
would be officially ratified a year later. However demarcation of the land boundary, which was 
not to finally occur until 1974 (see Chapter 6), got caught up in attempts by Kuwait in 1966 to 
agree the median line maritime boundary with Iran. Kuwait came to believe that its attempted 
agreement with Iran was being undermined by Saudi Arabia's understanding with Iran over their 
own maritime boundary. This in turn had implications for applying Kuwait's agreement with 
Saudi Arabia over the maritime boundaries of the Neutral Zone further north. Kuwait had hoped 
that Saudi Arabia would support it in its negotiations with Iran, but their own, undisclosed, 
maritime boundary understandings were believed by Kuwait to be encouraging collusion against 
Kuwait's interests in the northern headwaters of the Gulf. In Kuwaiti eyes, Iran's determination to 
exclude the Kuwaiti island of Failaka from the delineation of the median line between them 
would threaten the integrity of the amirate's maritime border with Iraq, given that the three 
countries' maritime borders converged at the head of the northern Gulf (see Map, p. 241). After 
all, these talks were happening at a time when some Iraqi troops had landed on the tiny Kuwaiti 
island of Warba in the northern Gulf headwaters. Declining relations with Saudi Arabia over the 
48 UK ambassador G. Noel Jackson (FO 8/618) 
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maritime boundaries had even seen the Kuwaiti foreign minister, Sabah Al-Ahmed, 
unceremoniously evicted from the waters of the Saudi side of the Neutral Zone where he had 
been fishing49. 
Southern Gulf leadership 
The Amir's attempt to promote Kuwaiti influence in the southern Gulf Arab amirates that at this 
time were under British direct rule, suffered from the same suspicion among both the local rulers 
and the British regarding Kuwait's perceived closeness to Egypt, and from the fact that Saudi 
Arabia was the primary actor to whom the southern shaikhs would look. Kuwait was aware that 
there were already British plans to fon-n an association of the Trucial States (which later became 
the United Arab Amirates) and, with an eye to their eventual independence, wanted to gain 
influence and in the process more security. "We tried to make ourselves stronger by joining the 
Gulf area, " argues a former Kuwaiti foreign ministry official'o. However Kuwait's ideas, which 
were first presented by Amir Sabah Salim on his southern Gulf tour of 1966, were seen, at best, 
as misplaced and arrogant interference in their affairs by the local rulers, and, at worst, a front for 
Egyptian interests (see also Chapter 6). 
Kuwait's ability to present itself as a neutral mediator between Saudi Arabia and Egypt further 
suffered from its attempts to put itself forward as an alternative local leadership in the kingdom's 
"backyard". Saudi Arabia's dislike of the initiative appeared to make Qatar's opposition 
inevitable. In fact Kuwait thought Qatar was too close to Saudi Arabia to even consider 
supporting its proposals". Bahrain, which would also increasingly look to Saudi Arabia for 
support, resented Kuwait's domestic political environment for allowing what it considered free 
rein for some of Bahrain's Arab nationalist opposition. The Bahraini opposition, implicated in 
attacks on British forces stationed in Manama, was also understood by the ruling Al-Khalifa to be 
funded from within the Kuwaiti leadership52. 
49 US Embassy Kuwait to State Department, 3 I't October 1966 (A- 125) 
50 Suleiman Majid Al-Shaheen, an official in the ministry of foreign affairs from 1963-99. Personal 
interview, Kuwait, January 2003 
51G. Noel Jackson to the FO 6th April, 1967 (FO 371 B 3/14). 
52 Dennis Healey, Time of My Life (London; Penguin, 1990), p280. 
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Some of the Kuwaiti proposals presented in Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai were, on the 
face of it, entirely practical - help with police training and developing their education systems, 
for example. Where the proffered support did not encroach on Britain's interests, and could be 
provided by Kuwaiti nationals who had been trained by them, this had been encouraged by the 
UK from an early stage. Kuwait set up two specific funds to provide financial and practical 
assistance, as the amirate saw it, for the development of the Trucial StateS53 . However there was 
resistance to the operation of both of them; for example Kuwait's willingness to supply Egyptian 
teachers was seen suspiciously. Kuwait fell in line with the Egyptian position that it would not 
recognise the British-formed Trucial States Council, which had been set up to run education and 
other key services in the southern amirates. As a result, when bolder ideas such as running 
passport offices and help with intelligence work were floated by Kuwait in April 1967, these were 
complete non-starters. The UK was unfairly made the scapegoat by Kuwait and the Trucial States 
for "misunderstandings" between them over the amirate's proposals. Britain seems to have 
genuinely believed that Kuwait's proposed taking over of some of the UK's responsibilities was 
due to the influence of Nasser". Such an idea could have been spread by British representatives 
among the local rulers to stiffen their resistance; certainly Kuwaiti officialdom believed that UK 
55 officials were encouraging opposition to the amirate's aspirations . Other ideas, such as those 
suggested to the British by Crown Prince Jabr Al-Ahmed for a currency union between Kuwait 
and the Trucial states based on the Kuwaiti dinar, were non-starters on technical as well as 
diplomatic groundS56. Similarly, Kuwaiti ideas for assisting in the formation of banks and 
insurance companies were perceived as largely financially motivated 57 . 
Kuwaiti leaders, whether supposedly of a pro-British or a more Arab nationalist inclination, 
seemed to believe that the amirate's effective leadership of a southern Gulf bloc was a way of 
strengthening their own position in the region. They were prepared to support these nascent 
independent states as the latter sought, as Kuwait itself had done only a few years earlier, to 
secure Arab League and UN recognition, and Kuwait believed that additional independent Gulf 
Arab countries with a similar outlook would strengthen its regional position. Saudi Arabia 
53 Al-Shaheen, op. cit. 
54 From the vantage point of Bahrain, where Britain's Political Resident was based, Kuwait's policies were 
often seen more suspiciously. Letter to George Brown, Foreign Secretary, 13 
th May 1967. (Dispatch No. 12 
1310/59/67). 
55 Al-Shaheen, op. cit. The former Kuwaiti foreign ministry official believes that Britain was the source of 
southern Gulf resistance to co-operating with Kuwait. 
56 G. Jackson to the FO, 6h April 1967 (F0371 B 3/14). 
57 G. G. Arthur to M. Weir, 12 th October 1967 (FO 371 B3/12). 
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however had not been consulted over something that directly affected its interests. This suggested 
that Kuwait hoped, however naively, that shepherding an independent Gulf amirates federation 
could help Kuwait offset Riyadh's weight in the Gulf. Kuwait had maintained a long-standing 
friendship with Saudi Arabia, and had aligned with Jiddah in the face of the Iraqi threat in 1961. 
Yet Kuwait had historic and contemporary sensitivities to the power of Saudi Arabia which, in 
competition with Egypt, appeared to be encouraging the polarisation of the region. Kuwait saw 
little likelihood that its own position would benefit from inter-Arab division, especially one that 
had more than an undercurrent of cold war alliances that, given its own relationship with the UK, 
it wished to play down. Kuwait was seeking to actively assert its neutrality by promoting conflict 
resolution and by seeking its own sources of influence in the southern Gulf. The decision of the 
UK a year later to withdraw from the Gulf would underline the value to Kuwait of working more 
closely with its Gulf Arab neighbours, especially as there were mutual concerns about the ability 
of Iraq and Iran, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia, to exploit the vacuum. 
Kuwait appealed to the British to persuade the southern Gulf rulers to support their ideas. 
However they attempted to convince the UK on the basis that they had a mutual interest in 
constraining Egyptian influence in the area. It seems unlikely that Kuwaiti leaders really believed 
that this would be the outcome, and the strength of this pitch appeared to be undermined by 
claims that they had Nasser's assent to the southern Gulf being an area of Kuwaiti influence, 
which seemed little more than bravado 58 . Egypt, like Saudi Arabia, would have been decidedly 
cool toward Kuwaiti efforts to obtain British support for its objectives in the southern Gulf In 
fact Kuwait also suggested that this had resulted in less friendly relations with Egypt, which were 
already showing signs of tension in 1966. 
Kuwaiti efforts at regional mediation and at outreach in the southern Gulf were often 
misconceived on Kuwait's part and misconstrued on the part of neighbouring countries. Kuwait 
was unable to convince interlocutors that it was able to act from entirely neutral motives, and yet 
there is little evidence that it was seeking to advance any country's influence than its own. 
Despite its financial independence, Kuwait was not seen by the targets of its diplomatic initiatives 
as having sufficient autonomy to be credible, either as a mediator or a leader in the southern Gulf. 
Being respected for being more than a "source of funds" proved difficult for Kuwait, and yet it 
was vital if the country was to build legitimacy among the leading regional actors upon whose 
58 G Jackson, gp-cit 
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long term support Kuwait would need to rely, especially when the UK signalled the end of its 
formal commitment in 1968. 
The perception of Egyptian hands at work when Kuwait sought to "positively" promote a non- 
aligned role for itself in the region needs to be considered in light of the lengths to which the 
country went to maintain its neutrality within the Arab world, or, if this was not possible, to adopt 
a populist position on the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was firmly in evidence in the aftermath of 
the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, when, after upholding a common Arab front in the form of an 
economic embargo of the US and the UK, Kuwait continued to express its strong support of the 
Palestinian cause, in opposition to an Egyptian-backed UN Security Council attempt at a 
diplomatic resolution with Israel. 
Aligned with Palestine 
Kuwait had been a (minor) party to the formation of the United Arab Command (UAC) set up by 
the Arab League in 1964 and had interpreted this to mean that it should make a military 
contribution to Egypt as required'9. It had also strongly supported the Arab League's formation of 
the PLO, which in effect had seen Kuwait adopt an aligned position - at least against that 
advocated by Jordan, which opposed the decision on sovereignty grounds. Kuwait's identification 
with the Palestinian cause would create tensions with the US and the UK, for example over the 
Israeli incursion into Samu in the Jordanian-controlled West Bank in 1966. At the same time the 
officially monitored, and partly Al-Sabah controlled, Kuwaiti media ardently backed PLO 
guerrilla operations in Israeli territory, although the Kuwaiti leadership was judged by the US to 
be more restrained 60 . Thus, following the 
1967 war, Kuwait inevitably supported what was, 
initially at least, a common Arab League position of opposition to any accommodation with 
Israel. 
The UAC had been what Nasser thought could be a mechanism to tie Syria into a united, and thus 
more manageable and constrained, Arab front against Israel. After this had failed to prevent the 
war, the public stance among all the leading Arab states appeared as one. This did not mean that 
59 Two squadrons (24) of supersonic aircraft (undefined) were assumed 
by the US embassy to have been 
made available to the Egyptians as required and would 
be manned by Kuwaiti pilots under the United Arab 
Command commitment, 18th May 1966, US embassy, Kuwait to State Department. 
(K-Def 12/5). 
60 US embassy, Kuwait, 6hNovember 1966 (A 147). 
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there was not some tentative exploration through third parties of what the outlines of a deal might 
look like. However the popular mood on the streets of the "frontline" states and beyond was more 
militantly opposed to Israel as a consequence of the war, after which Arab land, including what 
remained of formerly British Mandate Palestine, stood occupied, and no Arab leader could afford 
to ignore it. 
As a result Kuwait firmly sided with the regional Arab mood and joined the declaration of a 
boycott of oil sales specifically to the US and the UK (see also Chapter 4). In this respect Kuwait 
was firmly aligned, but with a common Arab states' position, in symbolic opposition to the US 
and the UK who were popularly believed (a view shared among ordinary Kuwaitis) to have aided 
Israel's military success. Kuwait's amir, Sabah Salim, felt embarrassed about the measure, which, 
for all the more nationalist spin put on the Kuwaiti embargo by Shaikh Jabr Al-Ahmed, was a 
case of the amirate having to "do the right thing" when more radical neighbours, not least Iraq, 
were going to forgo their oil revenues". 
However Kuwait's siding with the rejectionist mood outlived what proved to be a short-term and 
only partially implemented economic measure. Kuwait emphasised that it was not a front for 
Egyptian (or for that matter British) interests when it rejected UN Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 242, the fruit of diplomatic efforts in which the British had played a leading part (see 
Chapter 4). Kuwait thereby showed that its Arabism could involve stances more radical than that 
of Egypt, and that an Arab nationalist identification in its foreign policy was not just a matter of 
accommodating the Egyptian line; it could even mean effectively opposing Egypt's position. This 
reflected a sense of where the wider centre of political gravity now was in the Arab world. (In the 
aftermath of President Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in 1977 and the subsequent Camp David 
agreement with Israel, it would move away from Cairo entirely). On the specific issue of 
UNSCR242, Iraq was predominantly in the rejectionist camp, along with Syria, which was a 
direct party to the conflict. Iraq had dispatched troops to the battlefield via Jordan, as they had 
done in 1948; Kuwait had sent a small number of soldiers to Syria and Egypt, where they saw 
action in the Sinai62. 
61 GG Arthur to Foreign Office, 9th June 1967 (FO 54/52). However by year's end it appeared that Iraq's 
drop in revenues related more to its dispute with the UK-owned Iraqi Petroleum Company. Frank 
Brenchley, Britain and the Middle East - An Economic Histo[y 1945-87 (London; Lester Crook, 1989), 
p. 183. 
62 Miriam Joyce, Ruling Sheikhs and Her Majesty's Government, 1960-69, (London; Frank Cass, 2003), 
P. 190. 
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Kuwait's refusal to support the post-war search at the UN Security Council for a diplomatic 
solution was mindful of opinion regionally as well as that of its domestic public. As a country not 
in a position to strike more than symbolic stances on this issue, it could maintain a radical posture 
in the expectation of widespread domestic support and mindful that radical Arab states, not least 
Iraq, opposed UNSCR242, while conservative Saudi Arabia would not publicly back the 
resolution either. Kuwait was not pleased to be taking a different stance than Egypt, which had 
signed up to it, along with Jordan and Israel. However while the arnirate publicly opposed the 
resolution, its leaders privately conceded that they wished the diplomatic efforts well, but 
explaining that it could not be heard publicly to express this point of view. 
Relative neutrality 
Kuwait's foreign policy toward its Arab neighbours in the period from independence in 1961 
through to the aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war was overwhelmingly premised on a non- 
aligned posture toward the leading players. Where possible Kuwait attempted to protect itself 
from the damage that polarisation might cause its own position by offering mediation and by 
reaching out to nascent independent states in the southern Gulf At the point of its independence 
Kuwait had little choice but to offset an overt alignment with the UK with an alliance with Arab 
allies, who in turn, like neighbouring Iran, saw little benefit in allowing Iraq to coerce its 
southern, oil-rich, neighbour. Kuwait's pursuit of good relations with Egypt and, to a lesser but 
still important degree, Saudi Arabia helped deny Iraq the opportunity to subsume it. However, 
when Egypt and Saudi Arabia were in dispute, Kuwait had to assert its autonomy, even at the risk 
of weakening its relations with them. Kuwait could not pursue an alliance with one of them at the 
expense of the other in order to secure its position in the region, nor was either country a reliable 
ally, as Kuwait witnessed with the early departure of Egyptian troops from the amirate. Kuwait's 
need to offset Iraq also necessitated good relations with Iran, a relationship, like that with Saudi 
Arabia, which could be seriously buffeted by Egypt's troubled relations with both Tehran and 
Jiddah. Kuwait's brief period of effective band-wagoning with Iraq was a means to secure 
diplomatic recognition. Kuwait was genuinely opposed to steps that appeared to promote division 
in the Arab world, whether on the part of Egypt or Saudi Arabia. In essence Kuwait was in 
nobody's camp. its military alignment with the British, once their forces had departed in favour 
of the Arab League in 1961, was to continue to be managed on a discrete basis, providing a 
reassurance but not a long term guarantee of Kuwait's survival. Against this background Kuwait 
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could project an Arab nationalist foreign policy and seek to curry favour with financial aid and 
correct political stances. It was an awkward balance and one that was not to last as external props 
faded and regional pressures grew. 
83 
Chapter 4 
International dimensions 1961-67 
The overthrow of the pro-British Hashemite regime in neighbouring Iraq in 1958 was in turn 
related to the upsurge of anti-"colonial" fervour in the region after Egypt's effective defeat of 
Anglo-French forces in the 1956 "Suez" war. Together with the move toward Egyptian-Syrian 
federal unity following the founding of the United Arab Republic (UAR), Britain's decision to 
give Kuwait independence by terminating the 1899 Treaty of Protection on the 19 th of June 1961, 
was seen by UK officials serving in Iraq and Kuwait as "almost inevitable"'. In 1957 a British 
government review of foreign policy in the Gulf had emphasised the need for "maximum 
flexibility" in ensuring that the bottom line of maintaining its responsibility for the defence of 
Gulf Arab allies be maintained, for which "temporising" moves such as, in the Kuwaiti case, 
judicial and some symbolic foreign policy responsibility, were seen as commensurate with UK 
interests. The durability of this approach to maintaining British interests in the Gulf was very 
much recognised as subject to change, of which an overthrow of the Iraqi or Saudi regime would 
make an obvious, dramatic impaCt2 . The eventual decision to enable Kuwait to exercise 
independence under British defence protection was very much a mutually desired arrangement, 
with the Kuwaiti ruler, Shaikh Abdullah Salim, adroitly sensitive, as he had been in the past, to 
internal as well as regional opinion (see also Chapter 3). The ruler had been keen to secure a 
formal defence treaty with Britain to accompany Kuwait's independence in 1961, but was 
persuaded by the British Political Agent that this risked obstruction in the House of Commons, at 
which point the ruler settled for a more informal "Exchange of Letters". Following the agreement 
Abdullah Salim received statements of support for his country's independence from the pivotal 
Arab players Saudi Arabia and Egypt, as well as from Jordan and Iran'. 
1 Sir Stephen Egerton, who served in the Political Agency Kuwait, 1958-61. Personal interview, London, 
October 2000. 
2 Bernard Burrows, Footnotes in the Sand: The Gulf in Transition 1953-58 (Salisbury; Michael Russell 
Publishing, 1990), p. 128-144. 
3 Frank Brenchley, Britain and the Middle East - An Economic Histo[y 1945-87, (London; Lester Crook; 
1989); and Mustafa M. Alam, Operation Vantage - British Milita[y Intervention 
in Kuwait in 1961, 
(Surbiton; LAAM, 1990), p. 120. 
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The Iraqi leader General Abdul-Karim Qassim responded to the agreement between Kuwait and 
the United Kingdom with an outright denial a week later of the legitimacy of the amirate's 
independence and an assertion that Kuwait belonged to Iraq. When the Iraqi ruler had initially 
responded to the ending of the treaty and its mutual description by Britain and Kuwait as 
incompatible with Kuwait's "independent and sovereign status", it was to make a terse statement 
congratulating Kuwait's ruler Shaikh Abdullah Salim al-Sabah on ending the British commitment 
but made no mention of the country's independence. As a result, according to Britain's political 
resident in the Gulf, William Luce, the Amir's first response was to consult with him on what to 
do. A senior Foreign Office official' subsequently noted that when, a week later, the Iraqi leader 
pressed his formal claim to the amirate, and denied the right of the Amir - in the Iraqi leader's 
words, a mere "qarsai" (chief) of the "qaimaqqam" (sub-region) of the "Villayet of Basra" - to 
terminate agreements with a foreign power, Amir Abdullah Salim then took a further five days 
before, on June 30th, utilising his right to call on military assistance from the British under the 
terms of the Exchange of Letters agreed with the British government in place of the former Treaty 
of Protection (see Chapter 3). 
The Kuwaiti arnir desired that an Arab political solution could be presented as resolving the crisis 
and ending what, on the day of his formal request to the British, had seen the seemingly 
choreographed arrival of part of the British military taskforce. However in the few days after 
General Qassim's apparent threat, Amir Abdullah Salim was not inclined to wait for progress by 
the Egyptian-dominated Arab League, who, three days after the Qassirn statement, had begun 
efforts to find a political solution. The time taken to bring British army and naval personnel and 
assets to Kuwait's shoreline in the northern Gulf would suggest that a decision had been reached, 
by the British at least, two or more days earlier. In fact, it could be argued that Amir Abdullah 
Salim's invoking of the Exchange of Letters was done in unnecessary haste. After all, on the 29th 
June, only a day before the treaty was invoked, the Amir met with Abdul Khaliq Hassouneh, a 
Moroccan diplomat and secretary-general of the Arab League, and wished him well on his 
mission to Baghdad and other Arab capitals. However, it is unlikely that the Kuwaiti leader 
would have invested much confidence in the ability of the Arab League to deliver an agreement 
that would secure the full backing of the Iraqi government and thus end the apparent crisis. At the 
same time the Kuwaiti Amir's ability to determine the extent of any Iraqi military threat would 
have been almost entirely reliant on British officials and on their intelligence reports, with which 
he was being supplied. However, as soon as General Qassim had made his claims on Kuwait, the 
At the time Frank Brenchley was serving in the Arabian Department of the UK Foreign Office. Op cit. 
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amir was anxious that Britain provide an assurance of its willingness to act under the Anglo- 
Kuwaiti treaty. In fact the British premier Harold MacMillan and UK officials were concerned 
that such an assurance should not be made public, lest it provoke the Iraqi leader 5. Amir Abdullah 
Salim was impatient with such sensitivities and expressed considerable concern at the need to 
mollify Kuwaiti public concerns by ensuring that a commitment and some evidence of follow 
through would occur quickly. The ruler urged that a warship scheduled to arrive in the Gulf over 
a week later should berth in a Kuwaiti port far more promptly 6. 
Once the amir, a couple of days later, took the decision to request British military assistance, 
Kuwait was quite prepared to exaggerate the seemingly already slanted British account of Iraq's 
military movements and their likely purpoSe7. A judgement had plainly been made by Abdullah 
Salim that, whatever the real extent of the Iraqi military threat on the ground, Kuwait was in little 
position to question the British assessment about what was best for the amirate's external 
security. Kuwaiti officials were able to make a more informed judgement in retrospeCt8. 
The ruler had maintained a close relationship with the British and they had shared a mutual 
understanding about the timing of the amirate's independence. Against such a co-operative 
background, Britain's ability to encourage the amir to invite the UK forces, that, according to 
press reports from the UAR and Lebanon were already arriving in the Gulf, to intervene would 
have been considerable. However, for the amir, the verbal atmosphere created by Qassim and the 
counsel of British officials, who throughout the region were being told by London to emphasise a 
residual Iraqi military capability to cross the border as well as vaguer reports of manoeuvres 
southwards, was sufficient a reason to offset the apparent danger and effectively set the seal on an 
operation by UK military forces that, by the time of the Kuwaiti ruler's request, were waiting to 
disembark. 
5 RS Crawford, FCO to UK embassy Kuwait, 28 th June 1961 (FO 371/156846) 
6 Ambassador John Richmond, Kuwait to A. R. Walmsley, Eastern Dept., FCO (F0371/156847) 
7 According to the examples translated by BBC Monitoring, Alani op. cit. From this point onwards, 
Kuwait's account was in line with the alarmist versions emanating from the UAR media that in turn would 
have encouraged Kuwait to see an unexpected common UK-UAR interest in British military intervention. 
8 Abdul-Rahman Al-Ateegi served as under-secretary in the Kuwaiti ministry of foreign affairs from 1963- 
67, Mr Al-Ateegi commented on the extent of the Iraqi military threat to Kuwait in June to July 1961. 
"... [I]ts (Iraq's) troops were fighting in the north and south of the country. The threat was verbal..... it was 
nonsense because he (Qassim) couldn't do anything... 
" Personal interview, Kuwait, January 2005. 
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With the benefit of hindsight at least, it would seem that the British government wanted to make a 
show of military strength to reinforce the deterrent impact of its new agreement with Kuwait'. 
Furthen-nore, any consideration the Amir might have given to prioritising the Arab League's 
attempted mediation would have been undermined by the poor state of relations between the key 
Arab players. With Cairo's approval, the Arab League offered its diplomatic services to the two 
parties in dispute. However, relations between Iraq and the United Arab Republic (of Egypt and 
Syria') were at a low ebb. It would not have escaped the attention of the Kuwaiti amir and his 
senior officials that the UAR media, along with other state-controlled Arab news outlets in the 
region, were talking up an Iraqi threat to Kuwaiti', and engaging in vitriolic condemnation of 
General Qassim. 
Saudi Arabia continued to view Nasser's Egypt and its leadership of the UAR with suspicion, but 
was even more hostile to the republican regime that had taken power in Baghdad in 1958. Saudi 
Arabia had been desirous, despite its poor relations with Britain, for the US and Britain to apply 
their apparent commitment to regional intervention 12 , and take action to overthrow the Iraqi 
regime". Indeed, such was the kingdom's desire that it should itself make a clear, practical 
statement of support for Kuwait independence and its opposition to the Iraqi leader General 
Qassim, that when the British Military Mission began the first phase of its arrival in Kuwait on 
July I st, some 100 Saudi soldiers were already there. Their presence as a "token force" had been 
discussed by the amir with British officials. Abdullah Salim's willingness to accept the Saudis' 
9 In his statements to the House of Commons, British prime minister Harold MacMillan emphasised the 
apparent strength of the Iraqi threat. In his memoirs, while the Iraqi threat is still taken seriously, 
MacMillan writes of Qassem's "... irresolution being removed by our strong reaction to his threats", and of 
the British cabinet "being convinced that our honour as well as our interest was involved. " Harold 
MacMillan, Pointing the Way, 1959-6 1, (London; MacMillan, 1972). 
'0 The United Arab Republic (UAR) was founded in February 1958. Egypt's political stock in the Arab 
Near East (as well as the Gulf) had risen immensely, while its Arab nationalism had not only been seen to 
weaken the interests of Britain and France in the region but had made Nasser's rhetorical appeals to 
political unity appealing to an unstable Syrian regime keen to offset pressure from neighbouring Iraq. In the 
latter respect the primary objective of both the Egyptian and Syrian leadership, that of countering an Iraq 
closely allied with the mistrusted British, was met by political union. See also Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab 
Cold War - Gamal Abdul Nasser and His Rivals 1958-70, (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1971). 11 Alani, op. cit. 
12 The "Baghdad Pact" had been founded in the Iraqi capital in 1955 as an alliance of the US and the UK 
with pro-western states that also included Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. It was intended as an expression of 
collective "anti -com mun i st" commitment and mutual willingness to 
intervene to defend the incumbent 
regimes. The US willingness to intervene was reflected in the Eisenhower Doctrine after 1957. After 1958 
the Baghdad Pact became known as CENTO (Central Treaty Organisation). 
13 This enthusiasm was also shared with CENTO members, Iran and Turkey. Michael A. Palmer, Guardians 
of the Gulf -A History of America's 
Expanding Role in the Persian Gulf, 1833-1992, (New York; Free 
Press, 1992), p-80. 
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symbolic presence alongside a far more substantive British troop contingent emphasises Kuwait's 
desire to be seen to securing Arab backing for its independent status. 
The basis of foreign policy 
The decision of the Kuwaiti Amir to effectively by-pass the Arab League initiative is liable to 
have reflected his judgement that a tangible expression of Britain's commitment to defend the 
newly independent amirate's sovereignty was preferable to placing his faith in an uncertain Arab 
League political initiative. Abdullah Salim knew that Hassouneh's mission was unlikely to secure 
an about-turn by General Qassirn of what, a week earlier, had been a blanket assertion of Iraq's 
claims to Kuwait and an outright denial of its right of sovereignty. 
We now know that Iraq's military forces were not actually positioned to challenge Kuwait 
militarily and had significant security challenges to confront, especially in the Kurdish north 14 . 
Furthermore, it is clear that the arrival of the British taskforce killed off the Arab League's 
attempted political initiative. However this is less relevant to understanding the drivers of Kuwaiti 
foreign policy in this period than Kuwait's decision to overtly emphasise a British military 
guarantee that, although it became more discrete as the decade wore on, would minimise physical 
threats to the amirate's security as Kuwait strove for political acceptance and legitimacy in the 
eyes of its Gulf and wider Middle East neighbours (including from Iraq). Kuwait was evolving a 
foreign policy that, up until the departure of the British from the southern Gulf in 1971, would 
successfully combine a military alliance with the dominant armed power in the region, and the 
partially contradictory pursuit of a political strategy designed to enhance Kuwait's security. As 
such, Kuwait's Middle East policy was rooted in the legitimacy afforded by international 
diplomatic recognition and the maximisation of support - or at least begrudging acceptance - from 
key, if often disputatious, neighbours. Kuwaiti foreign policy in this period was in line with 
Stephen Walt's assumption that alliances are preferred with countries sufficiently geographically 
removed that they are not an imminent threat". Within the Gulf and wider Middle East, Kuwait 
largely adopted a non-alignment strategy designed to build as wide a base of support as possible, 
reflecting the unreliability of local alliances and Kuwait's need, as an independent country, to 
14 Richard A. Mobley, "Gauging the Iraqi threat to Kuwait in the 1960s", a CIA document authored by a 
US naval intelligence officer, unclassified and made available on the CIA website in May 2003; interviews 
with both former British and Kuwaiti officials. 
15 Stephen M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances (New York; Cornell University Press, 1990) 
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"swim in the sea", as British officials would put it, without any overt British assistance. Kuwait's 
ruler saw the country's primary security concerns as external. However Kuwaiti leaders' 
mindfulness of the influence among Kuwaiti and regional opinion of the UAR leader, Gamal 
Abdul Nasser, gave further impetus to their desire to ensure that the political basis of their foreign 
policy was "pro-Arab" (see Chapter 3). The British government had, following Kuwaiti 
independence, clarified that the UK could be called upon by the Kuwaiti ruler to intervene over 
internal as well as external threats to its security. However it was understood by both senior 
Kuwait and UK officials alike that, in the event of a military coup, which was seen as likely only 
with external encouragement, the British would not be practically or politically able to react in 
time, resulting in a fait accompli. 
The amir was acutely conscious of the sensitivities involved in calling on the country that had had 
sole responsibility for defence and foreign policy to militarily intervene in the amirate within two 
weeks of its independence. Throughout the previous sixty years of Kuwait's protected status such 
a step had never before been considered necessary by either Britain or the amirate. Any physical 
expression of military links in the past had been limited to the occasional arrival of a small 
number of officers on detachment from the British military naval bases in Bahrain and Aden, and 
discrete provision of training assistance for the emergent Kuwaiti military and security forces 
from the 1950s onwards. While there had never been a serious threat to internal security 
throughout the 1950s, during the 1956 war, and in part as a reflection of wider Arab events in 
1958, there had been Arab nationalist demonstrations and some strike activity that had fiercely 
criticised the British and even on occasion the operation of Al-Sabah rule. As a result the Kuwait 
leadership, while clearly able to keep a tight rein on political protest, understood that any 
significant British military presence would have been counterproductive. Abdullah Salim was 
particularly attuned to the local and regional strength of nationalist feeling that had to be 
accommodated (see Chapter 3). In 1961 he also understood that the prompt replacement of the 
British force with an Arab one would be essential to Kuwaiti security in terms of Arab 
legitimacy, and specifically Arab League recognition 16 . No sooner had the British military arrived 
than the Amir was continuing discussions with the Arab League about the introduction of a 
security force (see Chapter 4) and discussing with the British the need for their prompt departure. 
Abdullah Salim was as keen as the Arab League's dominant power, Egypt, that the British 
16 Abdullah Bishara served in the Kuwaiti foreign ministry from 1963-80. He described the Kuwaiti 
agreement with the Arab League as "symbolic" only, and 
Arab League membership, and thus the entry of 
its security force, as being conditional on "the 
departure of the British. " Personal interview, February, 
2003, Kuwait. 
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departure would be rapid. The Exchange of Letters, which facilitated the amirate's independence, 
had been attacked in Egypt's state-managed press, for all the UAR's official Support for Kuwaiti 
sovereignty. Both the UAR and Saudi Arabia were, on the one hand, keen to see Qassim checked, 
but were also uncomfortable about a former colonial power, Britain, being the one to do it. They 
therefore shared an interest in encouraging Kuwait to enable the Arab League to take over from 
the British military presence in the amirate as soon as possible. Egypt had done nothing to 
prevent the movement of the British naval component of the taskforce from sailing to Kuwait via 
the Suez Canal, having been powerless to prevent the amir from making his decision in close 
consultation with the amirate's British ally. The UAR's tabling of a UN resolution, supported by 
the Soviet Union, which condemned the arrival of the British forces emphasised Egypt's need to 
be seen to be opposing the UK's action, and a probable fear that British might be establishing a 
long term presence in Kuwait. However it did no harm to Egypt's interests to see Iraqi aspirations 
constrained by the British, especially when it was relatively cost free in political terms. Egypt had 
not been keen to put itself in a lead role in any Arab security initiative in Kuwait. They knew that 
neither the Amir or the British government would welcome their troops in Kuwait in significant 
numbers 17 , nor, despite the Cairo press's objections to Kuwait's ongoing military dependence on 
Britain, was the UAR seeking to tie a collective Arab force to any Kuwaiti renunciation of the 
Exchange of Letters. With the British taskforce present in the amirate and in the northern Gulf, 
Kuwait, the UAR and the other Arab states that had lined up against Iraq were keen that the 
British departure should begin promptly. However they were also keen that the departure should 
occur without leaving a security vacuum in its wake and that it should not be completed without 
the proposed Arab League Security Force (ALSF) having been properly assembled. 
The British however were concerned that the Kuwaiti ruler might be coming under pressure to 
rescind the Exchange of Letters as part of his negotiation with the Arab League over 
arrangements for the stationing of the ALSF. The talks were something that London was keen for 
its diplomats around the world to make clear in public it had no direct influence over18 . At the 
same time, private British assessments confirmed that the British Government had little to gain in 
17 Egypt's ambassador to Kuwait commented to the counsellor at the British embassy in August 1961 that 
his government would not be sending a large component of the proposed Arab League Security Force, 
contrary to reports emanating from the Arab League that it would be sending some 5,000, nearly as many 
as the combined number of British forces. Ambassador Zayyat commented that Cairo knew that both "Her 
Majesty's Government and the (Kuwaiti) Ruler" were "as anxious to prevent Egyptian predominance in 
Kuwait as to forestall Iraqi occupation. " Telegram to Kuwait, 28h August, 1961 (FO 371/156897). 
18 Confidential Foreign Office "Guidance Telegram", dated 12 th August 1961, sent from Commonwealth 
Relations Office to British embassies in Commonwealth countries (FO 371/156897). 
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trying to prevent the talks' success, and furthermore that the entry of the ALSF - which could be 
finessed as an "Arab solution" - could serve to reduce USSR and Iraqi hostility to the British role 
and that, once the British troops had departed, might aid the entry of Kuwait into the UN, which it 
eventually did. Britain, an official wrote, could not have prevented the success of these talks, 
"even if we wished to". Britain's priority was to ensure that the UK-Kuwaiti defence agreement 
was safe and, seemingly, to ensure that there was no danger of the issue of what arrangements 
would replace the recently deployed British military force becoming a matter for the United 
Nations to determine. Both Britain and Kuwait wanted to secure entry of the amirate to the UN as 
soon as possible and shared the objective that the ensuing UN debate on the issue would provide 
international legitimacy for the process whereby the ALSF would replace the British taskforce. 
However British officials were also concerned that the price of securing UN support for Kuwait's 
independence, and, effectively, the action that Britain had taken in the name of this objective, 
might be that the UN would decide the nature of security arrangements for a newly admitted 
country and might seek to establish some form of UN or international security force that could 
limit both the UK's ongoing military role and the imprimatur of political credibility provided by 
the useful symbolism of the involvement of Arab states (see Chapter 3). However the Soviet 
Union's rejection on July 6 th of a British drafted UN resolution in support of Kuwait's 
sovereignty and territorial integrity seemed to end this prospect", although British officials would 
continue to express concern about the role of its taskforce and of the incoming ALSF being 
decided in the UN Security Council'o. As a result the focus became what, for both Britain and 
Kuwait, was the mutually desired entry of the ALSF, and ensuring that this should be obtained on 
the best possible basis by not undermining Britain's ability to provide military support to Kuwait 
in the future and providing what was widely perceived by British officials as the "political 
deterrent" of an Arab League force that had broad representation. 
While Kuwaiti and UK officials were equally keen that the UAR's role should not be 
predominant, there was little London could do to influence the make-up of the force, other than 
seek to persuade Jordan to take a significant role in it. Saudi Arabia, who had not renewed 
relations with the UK since the Buraimi crisis (see Chapter 3), could not be influenced by Britain 
to send troops to Kuwait, nor could former French-held territories from which the contribution of 
armed forces, such as Lebanon or Morocco, was being discussed by their governments with Arab 
19 Foreign Office statement for use by UK representatives worldwide to explain current policy in Kuwait 
(Telegram number 33 1, date estimated as mid-August 1961 (FO 371/156899). 
20 For example, Sir Percy Dean, British Ambassador to the UN, as reported 
in FO communication with 
British embassy, Kuwait, August 4th 1961 (FO 
371/156897). 
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League representatives. The US State Department was keen that Saudi Arabia, with whom 
Washington at this point had developed good, but not yet close, relations, should play a dominant 
role in the force and that, at the same time, the UAR's role be minimised". However, the US's 
impact on developments in the Gulf was to remain relatively insignificant throughout this period. 
For the most part the US preferred to defer to Britain, which it viewed as a reliable power in the 
Gulf region. This was especially the case when the US's burgeoning Vietnam commitment had, 
by 1965, become an all-consuming foreign and defence policy issue, at least outside of events in 
Europe. The result was the sidelining of the direct US military interventionism that had been seen 
only three years earlier in 1958 in Lebanon and with the US-assisted UK-led operation in Jordan. 
These had typified the more forceful approach embodied in the Eisenhower Doctrine, which in 
turn had replaced the more indirect approach typified by the CIA-assisted overthrow of the 
nationalist regime in Iran in 1953. However, the US was now resuming a relatively detached 
stance, at least in the Middle East. This did not prevent the cautious development of defence 
relations however. From President Eisenhower onwards, US relations with Saudi Arabia were 
gradually extended, and under President Kennedy the US began what was to become a regular 
off-shore deployment in the Gulf. 
For its part Britain understood that not only was it largely powerless to influence the make-up of 
the ALSF, but that the arnir was not in a position to shape the composition of a force that was 
effectively being negotiated on his behalf by the Arab League 22 . On July 20th Kuwait was 
admitted to the Arab League by a decision of its council made in Iraq's absence. Both Britain and 
the amir understood that the price of entry was that the Kuwait leader would "undertake to 
request the withdrawal of British forces as soon as possible 9923 . Despite British concerns that such 
an agreement could irrevocably weaken its position in Kuwait - to the advantage of the UAR in 
the more alarmist analysis of some British officials outside of the arnirate - maintaining the 
Exchange of Letters was, in the words of a senior Kuwait official, a "cardinal principle" for the 
21 Sir Harold Caccia, British ambassador to the US, commented that, "(the US) State (department) is 
coming round to sympathise with the British action (in Kuwait), " Telegram to UK consulate, Kuwait, July 
2 th, 5,1961 (FO 370/156896). 
22 Oral statement by the UK Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Alec Douglas-Home, to the 
British 
Ih Cabinet, July 27 , 1961. 
(F0371/156896, Bkl 195/17). The details of the handover from the British to the 
ALSF would be negotiated between the Arab League Mission to Kuwait and representative of the 
British 
Middle East Command based in Aden. 
23 Ibid. 
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amir24. It was also understood on both sides that the entry of the ALSF should in no way 
undermine this agreement. Furthermore, Britain was keen that nothing should happen to prevent 
the pre-positioning of British military equipment, including Chieftan tanks, for potential use 
should a threat arise in the future. Kuwait was not minded to challenge a residual UK defence 
foothold that, with little outside knowledge, remained in place until 1971. In fact, rather 
surprisingly, it appeared at one point as if British armoured vehicles and weapons might be 
temporarily utilised by the incoming Arab force. In a goal shared across the board by Kuwaiti 
leaders, it was also agreed that a UK training mission be established to build up Kuwait's anned 
forces, with the objective that they be able to delay Iraqi troops for 36 hours". In other words 
Kuwait's accession to the Arab League would be a vital step in it securing political legitimacy in 
the Arab world, despite the relatively limited armed strength and, in Kuwaiti eyes, limited 
willingness of the ALSF to fight26 . Kuwait's accession the desire of both Kuwait and its military 
ally, Britain, and thus an unspoken (and temporary) alignment of interests between London, 
Kuwait and the UK's seeming opponents in the Arab world, namely the UAR and, to a lesser 
extent, Saudi Arabia. In this way the transfer of military authority to the ALSF, which arrived in 
the amirate in September, was enabled. 
Neither Arab League membership, nor even the ALSF, was seen by the Kuwaiti amir or the 
amirate's officials as a military deterrent against Iraq 
27 
. For that, the amir told a UK official, he 
ý28 put his faith in "God and the British' . While there is often an element of both Kuwait and 
British officials telling each other what they think the other would like to hear, and of British 
officials doing the same when reporting to London, much of the comment by senior Kuwaitis was 
bome out by the amirate's unwillingness to do anything that would undermine the British 
relationship. Acknowledging the equipment shortcomings of the incoming Arab force, the 
Kuwaiti ruler would tell the British Political Agent that he regarded the agreement with the Arab 
League over the ALSF as "satisfactory, especially with our (British) support still behind him. " 
The agreement over the stationing of the ALSF was understood by Kuwait as an 
acknowledgement by all the key Arab players, except at this stage Iraq, of the amirate's 
legitimacy. 
24 According to the Amir's Assistant State Secretary, in conversation with a British embassy official, July 
1961. 
2' UK Commonwealth Relations Office "guidance telegram", op. cit. 
26 Al-Rai AI-Amm, a relatively conservative Kuwaiti paper, owned by Shaikh Jabr Al-Ahmed, stated that it 
preferred British troops to Arab League ones as they would not hesitate, if necessary, to shed Arab blood. 
27 Alan Rothnie, Political Agent, Kuwait, 140'August, 1961 (FO 371/156897 103571; Bk 1196/34) 
28 British embassy to FO, October 1961 (FO 371/156897). 
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Other security constructs 
From the moment Kuwait was granted independence by Britain, its foreign policy combined 
maintenance of defence relations with London, with the search for legitimacy in the region, 
especially in the Arab world. The latter would primarily be sought through rhetorical and 
financial support for Arab "wahda" (unity) in the sense of solidarity and cooperation. However 
political unity projects of the kind referred to in the Arab League council's resolution, which 
admitted Kuwait and committed it and the other Arab League members to an eventual (and non- 
defined) "federation" would receive only the most general support. Kuwait sought legitimacy 
9929 through the mere fact of membership of regional and international "regimes . Membership of 
the Arab League provided a formal underscoring of Kuwait's state sovereignty, and as such was 
valued by both Kuwait and Britain". It was also seen by Kuwait, like the era of Arab summitry, 
as providing a potential vehicle for resolving inter-Arab disputes, as opposed to the divisive 
formation of blocs. More importantly, however, for Kuwait, membership of the Arab League was 
understood as a key step to the highly desired membership of the UN. The latter was to continue 
to be a thread in Kuwaiti foreign policy as the ultimate form of institutional recognition and 
legitimisation, and therefore, once membership was achieved two years later, Kuwait would seek 
security by pursuing good relations with the UN, both as a formal entity and, more particularly, in 
terms of establishing positive relations with all five of the permanent members (P5) of the UN 
Security Council (UNSC), even at the cost of upsetting two of them - its key international allies in 
this period, the UK and the US. This did not represent Kuwait's prioritisation of regional and 
international regimes as the basis of its foreign policy per se. Rather, Kuwait's foreign policy was 
to prioritise the search for security, and thus the building of broad friendships, not just in the 
Middle East but internationally. For this reason, by 1964 the Chinese Communist regime was 
being actively courted by Kuwait, some nine years before the US established diplomatic relations 
with Peking and thereby facilitated the People's Republic of China's eventual replacement of 
Taiwan on the P5. 
29 Keohane and Nye emphasise regime membership as affecting states' behaviour. See Robert 0. Keohane 
and Joseph S. Nye, Jr, "Power and Interdependence Revisited", International 
Organisation, Volume 41; 
Issue 4: 1987, p. 725-753. 
30 Oral statement, Douglas-Home, op. cit. 
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Britain promotes Arab acceptance of Kuwait 
Kuwait's desire to gain acceptance in the Arab world also included signing up to the Arab 
League's "Pact for Joint Defence and Economic Co-operation" in August 1961. This was a step 
that some British officials viewed as unfortunate, but about which the Political Agency staff 
acknowledged privately that they could do little to prevent. Dubbed the "Arab Collective Security 
Pact", this eight member body, including Kuwait, was seen by British officials as having a useful 
symbolic value for Kuwait but no military significance. Britain's political resident in the Gulf 
was advised by London that, "[I]t is doubtful whether the signatories would call the pact into 
operation against Iraq, " adding that "... (it) has never been taken very seriously, has no teeth, 
and.... was generally assumed at its genesis to be directed against Israel . 
ý93 ' The Kuwaiti ruler was 
happy to announce the accession of Kuwait to the pact and to make clear that this would mean 
that British troops would have to depart his country. Furthermore it would not have displeased 
either the Kuwaiti amir or other senior Al-Sabah that, in response, the Arab League Secretary- 
General, Abdul-Khaliq Hassouna, emphasised what he claimed was the Arab national fealty 
behind Kuwait's accession to a pact whose practical expression of collective security was 
32 presented in terms as concrete as that of NATO or the then Warsaw Pact. Thus the construct of 
Kuwaiti foreign policy - the ambiguous and partially contradictory notion of "Arabism" - was 
neatly affirmed in a collective Arab security arrangement that, in military terins, was to prove 
fairly short-lived and limited in scope. Kuwaiti state sovereignty, however, was being asserted 
through an expression of Arab solidarity and in policies presented as in tune with the pan-Arab 
desire for unity among Arab states . 
The British political resident in the Gulf was advised by the Foreign Office only to discuss the 
Arab League defence pact if, as was likely, the ruler should seek his advice. Britain was to 
31 Telegram from FO to British Political Resident (Bahrain) (F0371/156897 103571). Undated (estimate: 
mid-August, 196 1). The telegram reproduces the relevant clause of the pact (article 2), which states that the 
"contracting parties" "shall consider any act of armed aggression made against any one or more of them or 
against their forces, to be directed against them all and therefore ... they 
bind themselves to hasten to the aid 
of the state or states against which such aggression is committed. " 
32 Abdel-Khaliq Hassouna, secretary-general of the Arab League, was responding to the Amir of Kuwait's 
announcement. In a telegram dated 12th August 1961 he asserted that all the other seven members of the 
pact were bound to come to the defence of Kuwait in the event of an attack on it, which 
he said would 
constitute an attack on all the pact's members. He added that it pleases him to announce 
in the State of 
Kuwait, "[T]o the sons of the whole Arab nation, " that the ruler of Kuwait has requested the evacuation of 
the British troops and for preparation for the coming of "Arab forces as guests of Kuwait. In this way, " Mr 
Hassouna said, "[W]e give the best example of Arab solidarity and of our 
insistence on the promotion of 
.... 
Arabism and of rights. " His reply to the Kuwait ruler's announcement 
is contained in documents sent to 
the Foreign Office from the British consul-general in Kuwait, dated 13th August 1961 (FO 371/156898). 
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continue to be a source of considerable influence over Kuwaiti foreign policy, although the 
Kuwaiti ruler was also acutely aware that that advice may not be dispassionate. To this extent the 
UK, seeing an advantage in Kuwait seeking and securing membership in the "Arab club", did not 
want to prejudice this by raising the ruler's suspicions about the Arab League pact by appearing 
over keen on Kuwait's accession to it33 . Britain's military advice and ongoing assistance was 
particularly valued by Shaikh Abdullah Salim, and as such the UK both expected to be, and was 
keen to take advantage of being, in a position to counsel him that the pact was vague on what 
steps would be taken to face down any aggression against the amirate. However Kuwait was keen 
to ensure that the importance it attached to Britain's commitment to provide military assistance - 
despite what it had accepted as a necessarily overt expression of this in the first three months of 
independence - should be handled as discretely as possible. Kuwait's leaders were mindful of the 
need, for both regional and domestic consumption, to project a pro-Arab identity in the amirate's 
foreign policy and, as a result, to appear to be as free as possible from reliance on the British (see 
Chapter 2). Indicative of this was Abdullah Salim's statement to the British Political Resident, at 
a time when the British taskforce was still present in Kuwait, that "in due course he would thank 
Her Majesty's Government for their great assistance.... and to make clear that this in no way 
would affect our Exchange of Letters of June l9th... " However, the ruler made clear that this 
would only be done in the form of a letter to the British Political Resident that "should remain 
confidential between US. 3499 
British-Kuwaiti relations benefit from Arab division 
Throughout July and August, discussion ensued over the make up of the Arab League Security 
Force (ALSF), with British observers acerbically noting that the Arab country over which they 
retained significant influence (aside from Kuwait itself), Jordan, was continuing to prevaricate 
over its participation, with Kuwait's financial inducements being a key factor that finally ensured 
its involvement". A memorandum was drawn up by the Arab League's Military Secretariat in 
late July that assumed a lightly armed and relatively small force of 12 infantry companies plus 
technical and administrative units, and suggested that the total number would not exceed 2,00036, 
33 Telegram to Political Resident, op-cit. 
34 Ibid. 
35 UK embassy Amman to FO, 12'h August, 1961 (F0371/156899) 
36 Translation of document signed by General Ali Amer, military assistant to the secretary-general of the 
Arab League, July 24th, 1961, (FO371/156898 103571 Bk 1195/56). 
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markedly down on the British force whose total number, on and off-shore, was 5,000. Jordan 
headed the list of only six prospective participating Arab countries. in the event its involvement 
proved to be smaller than that of Saudi Arabia, which was the largest contributor to the ALSF 
when it entered Kuwait nearly two months later. In early August Jordan's foreign minister 
informed the British embassy in Amman of his "personal" ideas for providing a longer term 
solution to the defence of Kuwait. The revival of an earlier proposal of a federation of Jordan 
with Kuwait, which on this occasion was envisaged as bringing in Iraq at a later stage, was 
seemingly intended to overcome the exclusion of Iraq, and may even have been advocated at 
Baghdad's initiative. British officials observed that Jordan, which was stalling over the ALSF in 
order to maximise its financial reward, was hardly likely to attract the Kuwait ruler to a project 
promising the even more dubious appeal this time of absorption into a federation with republican 
Iraq. Furthermore, the different calculations of the four main Arab members of the proposed 
ALSF, namely the UAR, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Jordan, whose attitude and possible ambitions 
could impact on Kuwait, would only have emphasised to Kuwait the importance of seeking to 
avoid alignments within the region whilst maintaining the un-stated alliance with the UK. 
Kuwait and Jordan viewed each other as little more than a front for the interests of their perceived 
adversaries, Iraq and the UAR respectively. It was viewed as sufficiently important for Kuwait to 
have Jordan on board for it to pay handsomely for the privilege, despite an assumption by the 
British that Amman had the green light from Baghdad to do it. However Kuwait was under no 
illusion that the ALSF was anything other than an alliance of convenience, one that, in Britain's 
assessment, Kuwait would not regard as a good basis for its security over the longer term. Neither 
could Kuwait rely on sufficient UAR-Iraqi animosity, or, for that matter, Egyptian-Syrian unity to 
provide a deterrent against Kuwait being attacked on the basis that the UAR might invade Iraq 
from Syria if Baghdad was to threaten the amirate in the future. Yemen, along with an earlier 
prospective member of the ALSF, Lebanon, proved wary of a military involvement in Kuwait, 
and in the end a four country Arab League force consisting of Saudi Arabia, UAR, Jordan and 
Sudan succeeded the British taskforce (see Chapter 3). 
The ALSF was to remain in Kuwait until late January 1963, but without the UAR's 
comparatively small force, which had departed as early as October 1961 due to internal security 
priorities. A reawakening of British concern about an apparent Iraqi territorial threat was to occur 
two month later. In December 1961 a UK naval mobilisation took place in the northern Gulf and 
Kuwait made official complaints to Iraq about troop "concentrations", for which once again there 
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was no evidence 37 , and Baghdad's ongoing propaganda assaults on, and claims against, the 
amirate. The rhetorical onslaught against Kuwait was to continue from Baghdad, before a change 
of regime in February 1963 provided an opportunity for direct Kuwaiti engagement after various 
Arab intermediaries had failed to break the impasse over the previous year. In the intervening 
period, Shaikh Jabr A]-Ahmed AI-Sabah, who, like his half-brother, the then finance minister 
Jabr Al-Ahmed, tended to couch his statements in Arab nationalist rhetoric, reacted to Iraq's 
ongoing statements against Kuwait by asserting that, "My country finds no alternative but to take 
all measures which will preserve her safety and rightS38. " It was noted by British ambassador, Sir 
John Richmond, that the shaikh had made no specific reference to the recent presence of British 
troops, or to the role of Britain generally in preserving Kuwait's "safety and rights". However the 
meaning of Jabr's comments were clear, and the orientation of Kuwait foreign policy was not to 
change, even in light of the expedient accommodation of Iraqi financial demands in order to 
secure diplomatic recognition from Baghdad in October 1963. 
USSR lifts veto on UN membership 
At the same time as the make up and remit of the ALSF was being finalised in September 1961, a 
number of Arab states established diplomatic relations with Kuwait, despite the threat, acted on in 
some instances, that Iraq would break relations with them. Iraq's opposition to Kuwaiti 
admittance meant that Baghdad was effectively excluded from the Arab League for much of 
1962. Aside from the momentum generated by Kuwaiti overtures and financial offers after the 
short-lived change of regime in February 1963, the new Iraqi government was keen to break out 
of its isolation. Kuwait's success in securing diplomatic recognition from the USSR just one 
month after the Iraqi coup had damaged Baghdad's relations with Moscow, in turn removed the 
remaining barrier to the amirate's entry to the UN, which occurred in May. In previously denying 
Kuwait recognition, the Soviet Union had been influenced by Iraq's stance as Moscow sought to 
increase influence over a republican regime that enjoyed the support of the pro-Soviet, Iraqi 
Communist Party. However, after establishing formal state to state relations with, first the UK 
and then the US, Kuwait had, aided by the agreement over the entry of ALSF troops, established 
diplomatic relations with all the major Arab countries (except Iraq) as well as its key Gulf 
37 The amir was unaware of any Iraqi mobilisation and, according to the UK embassy in Kuwait, the source 
of the story appeared to have been Kuwaiti officers. December 23d, 1961 (F0371/156854) 
38 Public statement. Quoted in UK embassy telegram to FO, 18'h March 1962 (FO 371: 162898) 
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neighbour, Iran. Kuwait's first formal exchange of ambassadors in the Arab world was with the 
UAR, a country with whom the Soviets were establishing increasingly strong relations. By 1963, 
Kuwait's success in opening relations with P5 members France and China (represented by 
Taiwan), some additional European countries, and a number of states throughout Asia began to 
make the USSR look at the prospect of relations with Kuwait more favourably. The People's 
Republic of China (PRC) had formally recognised Kuwait as soon as its independence in 1961, 
however tentative diplomatic and trade relations did not begin until finance minister Shaikh Jabr 
Al-Ahmed visited Peking in 1964. Furthermore, Kuwait's entry to the UN, over which the 
Soviets held a veto, was by this point less bound up in cold war politics. At the time of Kuwait's 
independence in 1961 tensions between the two blocs were high and recognition of newly 
independent states was a matter of intense bargaining. By May 1963, when the Soviets lifted the 
veto on Kuwaiti admittance to the UN, relations between the US and the USSR had partly 
improved, making Kuwait, a country pursuing relations with a number of the USSR's Arab 
friends in the region, less sensitive. The Soviets were entirely pragmatic in their calculations, they 
saw benefits in that the Kuwaitis were willing to pursue external relations not favoured by their 
western allies and allowed "progressive" opinion represented, as they saw it, by Arab nationalists, 
to engage openly in domestic politics. However Moscow was under no illusion about the 
limitations of the commonly professed Arab nationalism in affecting the basic interests of the 
ruling Al-Sabah and believed that Arab solidarity was of limited substance in driving policy 
among disparate Arab governments. In 1964 Kuwait reacted angrily when these sentiments were 
expressed, in a very personal way, toward the amir by Soviet leader Nikolai Khrushchev at a 
meeting of Egyptian trade unionists; however their relations were unharmed by the event". 
Following the shift in policy toward Kuwait by the USSR in 1963, the UK government believed 
that Iraq had little choice but to accept diplomatic relations with the amirate. Ongoing internal 
security challenges and the relative internal weakness of the Baathi-led government compounded 
this likelihood. Throughout the period of negotiations between Kuwait and Iraq, the UK had tried, 
directly and indirectly, to counsel the foreign minister and, from October 1962, heir apparent, 
Shaikh Sabah Salim, against an overly enthusiastic approach that, in the view of British officials 
in Kuwait, could increase the pressure on Kuwait to terminate the Exchange of Letters as part of 
'9 "There is some little ruler sitting there, an Arab of course, a Muslim. He is given bribes (by the 
imperialists). He lives the life of the rich, but he is trading in the wealth of his people. He never had any 
conscience and he will never have any. Will you come to terms with 
him on unification? It is easier to eat 
three puds of salt than to reach an agreement with him, although you are 
both Arabs and Muslims. " 
Stephen Page, The USSR and Arabia - The Development of Soviet Policies and Attitudes Towards the 
Countries of the Arabian Peninsula, (London; Central Asian 
Research Centre, 197 1). 
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any agreement with Iraq. However there was never any likelihood that Sabah Salim would be a 
party to weakening the defence connection with Britain, nor that the amir, Abdullah Salim, would 
support one of his senior ministers should they try to. 
Leadership and the UK relationship 
Abdullah Salim would, unlike his successor Sabah Salim, take a leading, but not domineering, 
role in decision-making. He was keen to be seen to be exercising clear authority, but was always 
interested in hearing other opinion, including the ongoing counsel of the UK. The latter would 
range from advice on diplomatic propriety affecting Kuwait's opening of relations with other 
countries, to defence and security policy. Abdullah Salim would tend to dominate decision- 
making but was equally prepared to absent himself at times of internal family dispute, and, more 
generally, to enable significant autonomy to be exercised by senior and knowledgeable Al-Sabah 
politicians, in particular the finance minister Jabr Al-Ahmed; the latter's half brother, the foreign 
minister Sabah Al-Ahmed; the amir's son, interior and defence minister Saad Abdullah; as well 
as a handful of senior non Al-Sabah government officials (see Chapter 3). Amir Abdullah Salim, 
as he became known once a council of ministers (cabinet) was formed following the constituent 
assembly elections in 1962, also adopted the title of president of the council (effectively prime 
minister). This practice of the amir holding the top governmental job was to change under the 
new constitution in January 1963, with the result that the crown prince, Sabah Salim, became 
prime minister. However, following his accession in 1950, before health problems plagued him 
from 1964 until his death in November 1965, Abdullah Salim exercised continued executive 
authority, including, following independence, over foreign policy. However, while British 
concerns regarding the future of the Exchange of Letters as Kuwait negotiated with Iraq proved 
misplaced (see Chapter 3), Abdullah Salim's decision to appoint Sabah Salim, a younger brother, 
as his heir was a pleasant surprise to British officials in Kuwait and the wider Gulf, who had 
expected Jabr Al-Ahmed to accede on the basis of ability, the tradition of alternation between the 
Al-Salim and Al-Jabr branches of the family (see also Chapter 3), and strong indications that he 
had been favoured by the amir himself '0 
Abdullah Salim's decision to favour Sabah Salim rather than Jabr Al-Ahmed may also have been 
related to the contrasting views held of each by the British. This 
in no way suggests, however, 
40 Personal interview with Sir Bernard Burrows, London, 2000; and op. cit. p. 55, 
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that the Political Agent, for example, would have tried to directly influence Amir Abdullah's 
decision. Britain knew how sensitive Abdullah Salim was to avoiding creating an impression, 
domestically or within the region, that he was anything other than an independent ruler. However, 
Shaikh Abdullah wanted to ensure that Kuwait's handling of its independence would not, in any 
way, undermine the British defence guarantee. While Abdullah may not have believed that, as 
Amir, Jabr Al-Ahmed would have sought to abrogate the formal understanding with Britain, he 
knew that the British perception of Jabr as sympathetic with Arab nationalism might affect 
relations between the two countries". Crucially, in this respect, Amir Abdullah would not have 
wanted Britain to question its defence commitment. Shaikh Jabr's disdainful attitude toward the 
presence of British troops in Kuwait during 1961 had been widely noted by UK officials, as had 
his brusquely stated desire that, after the immediate crisis was over, they be removed with haste. 
Appointing Sabah Salim heir was likely to have occurred with the expectation and, at the least, an 
implicit understanding on the part of Amir Abdullah Salim, and the rest of the senior Al-Sabah - 
Sabah Salim and Jabr included - that as Amir, Sabah Salim would share power with Jabr. If 
Sabah Salim was to become heir apparent, then Jabr would effectively be the heir in waiting 42 . 
Sabah Salim's leadership style, and the fact that the traditional alternation between the Al-Salim 
and Al-Jabr branches of the AI-Sabah family had been broken 43 , would have encouraged an 
unspoken understanding to share power. 
Oil and Arab nationalism 
It was Jabr Al-Ahmed's likely importance in the decision making process, and the assumption 
that his instincts would be to play hardball with the British government, a factor displayed in oil 
negotiations from 1964, that would continue to worry the UK, despite their relative relief at 
Sabah Salim's appointment as crown prince. The protracted negotiations over the "supplemental 
agreement'944 with the British and US companies, BP and Gulf Oil respectively, who between 
them owned the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), had begun in 1964. However final tenns were not 
41 In the judgement of the British embassy in 195 8, Jabr Al-Ahmed could play a lead role in anticipated 
widespread Al-Sabah opposition to a mooted union with Hashemite Iraq and Jordan. PREM 11/2403 op. cit. 
42 As suggested to the author by the former Political Agency official 
(1949) and UK ambassador to Kuwait 
(1972-75), Sir John Wilton. Personal interview, 2000. 
43 Sir John Moberly, deputy-head, Political Agency, Kuwait (1954-56). Personal interview, 2000. 
44 This would reduce the amount of the posted oil price that 
foreign companies could claim back as "royalty 
expensing" to set against income tax. 
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agreed by Kuwait until 1967. The Kuwaiti amir, whose predecessor Shaikh Ahmed Jabr had 
granted the original oil concession, and the oil and finance minister, Jabr Al-Ahmed, were keen 
that the best possible terms should be secured. This was a matter of simple common sense, given 
that the long standing division of revenues from KOC's production and sale of Kuwait oil limited 
the government's income to half of the revenues accrued by KOC, and that the Kuwaiti 
government had no influence over this". Kuwait's driving of what British officials considered a 
hard bargain was largely directed by Jabr Al-Ahmed. However, despite British officials' attempts 
to win them over, they understood that this posture was wholly supported by prime minister 
Sabah Salim and by the amir. The latter had, after all put an end to what has subsequently been 
understood as politically unacceptable privileges for the "seven sisters", top British firms who 
gained major contracts in the 1950s from the British Political Agency that had ruled Kuwait46. 
Iran obtained better terrns from its British partner than had initially been agreed with KOC in 
1964, and as a result further protracted talks occurred over 1966, with Jabr Al-Ahmed continuing, 
as the then prime minister, to take a direct interest in efforts to agree better terms under the 
proposed supplemental agreement. It did him no harm to take up a plausibly tough posture against 
Britain in a national assembly where the Kuwaiti branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement was 
well represented (see Chapter 2), and from which Jabr Al-Ahmed was seeking approval of his 
nomination by the amir as heir. Thus oil policy was in part a foreign policy issue in which the 
illusive construct of "Arabism" was not so much a driver as a component, not least in the 
packaging of the Kuwaiti policy stance. Kuwait finally consented to the supplemental agreement 
when Jabr Al-Ahmed decided to urge a national assembly with a much smaller Arab nationalist- 
inclined presence to pass it, following elections in 1967 alleged by US and UK diplomats to have 
been rigged 47 . British and American officials speculated that in 1966 a 
hard bargain was being 
struck by Kuwait out of a desire to accommodate Iraq. The Iraqi government was simultaneously 
negotiating with the Iraqi Petroleum Company, which was also owned by BP. Given the 
overlapping personal and political factors at work in Kuwait's stance toward KOC, it seems likely 
that talks would have been as protracted, regardless of what was happening in Iraq. Striking the 
right stance for neighbours and for internal consumption would continue to be a Kuwait 
preoccupation even if it meant publicly disrespecting the UK and the US. However, after such 
45 The amirate had hosted the formation of OPEC (Organisation of Oil Producing Economies) in 1960, but, 
what would eventually be known as a cartel, did little to influence the market until the oil price hikes and 
production agreements that began in the 1970s (see Chapter 7). 
46 Moberly, op. cit. 
47 44 Kuwait in 1968", US embassy to State Department, 28 th October, 1968 (A352); and former British 
official who referred to ballots being returned from the virtually deserted island of Failaka. Personal 
interview, London, 2000. 
102 
protracted negotiations, Kuwait wanted a deal over a revenue source that it needed to ensure was 
maximised and that therefore the western oil companies would not be discouraged by these 
wrangles from increasing output levels. 
Kuwait's defence relationship with the UK was seemingly threatened in the heat of sharp 
exchanges in late 1965 when Jabr Al-Ahmed indicated to the UK ambassador that Kuwait's high 
level of sterling holdings in the UK might be withdrawn if the British government did not lean on 
the oil companies 48 . Such statements played well in Kuwait and beyond, but caused some alarm 
in British circles, although this was more a concern about the Arab nationalist tone and what this 
might auger for their ongoing relations, not least the Exchange of Letters, rather, than any belief 
that Kuwait would actually withdraw from these investments. However it also signalled that a 
more confident Kuwait perceived that its relationship with Britain was no longer as dependent as 
it appeared to be in 1961. Discussions at this time were being held between British officials and 
Kuwait's deputy chief of staff General Mubarrak Abdullah Al-Sabah, and the interior and defence 
minister Shaikh Saad Abdullah, about reducing the UK's defence commitment to air cover only 
due to the intended abandonment of Aden 49 . As a result the Kuwaiti crown prince and prime 
minister Jabr Al-Ahmed is likely to have had less inhibition about issuing threats about 
investments in Sterling. Jabr Al-Ahmed's message also reflected a keen awareness that 
devaluation was increasingly being talked about in the UK, an event that would, by definition, 
reduce the value of Kuwait's sterling holdings, and thus his statement about withdrawal from 
Sterling can be seen as an indication that he believed Kuwait needed to receive a higher 
proportion of the oil revenues that Britain was accruing in the arnirate. Jabr Al-Ahmed knew that 
pulling out of Sterling would have been likely to end the UK's formal defence commitment. 
Britain feared that Kuwait could come increasingly under the control of the crown prince who, in 
the early period of Amir Sabah Salim's rule, London considered was relatively unconstrained in 
asserting his will over decision-making, and thus might in certain circumstances be prepared to 
provoke a cancellation of the defence agreement. It is telling that at the beginning of 1964 the 
incoming UK ambassador Noel Jackson judged that "oil probably means that the UK is more 
important to Kuwait than Kuwait is to us"'O. The "probably" would have reflected the importance 
48 Sir John Graham, Head of Chancery in the British Embassy, felt aggrieved at the time at such "below 
the belt" tactics as Jabr Al-Ahmed threatening to withdraw Kuwaiti investments from Sterling if the 
"Government of Kuwait's demand for a revised Supplemental Agreement was not met". G. Noel Jackson, 
14th December 1965 (DEFE 11/616). 
49 British Political Resident, W. H. Luce, 16 
th October 1965 (FO 371/179842). 
5 nd 0 Ambassador G Noel Jackson, " 1963 Annual Review", January 2,1964 to FO, London (FO 
371/168728/106540) 
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to the UK economy of Kuwait's oil and its sterling investments, and the residual assumption the 
UK held that its strategic interest still lay in being the dominant military power in the oil-rich 
Gulf area. By 1966 the same ambassador was acknowledging that Kuwait's investments in 
Sterling were more important to the UK than to Kuwait. 
The UK government appeared sufficiently confident however in the Kuwaiti leadership's desire 
to retain, however begrudgingly in some cases, the defence commitment that the British was told 
that he should be prepared to say that the UK would reconsider the defence agreement if Kuwait 
continued to take what was considered a tough stance over the terms demanded under the 
supplemental agreement". Although Britain had begun to constrain that defence commitment in 
practical terms, it had not yet begun to question the utility of maintaining the Exchange of Letters 
with Kuwait, assuming that the agreement could be continued without undue political cost to 
Britain in the region. This was an arrangement that continued to be strongly endorsed by the US. 
US eyes Kuwait through cold war prism 
For Washington more than London, the British commitment to Kuwait was an important part of a 
cold war conception of strategic interests in the Middle East, and as a result the subtleties of 
Kuwait's non-aligned position were not immediately obvious to incoming diplomats". This could 
even extend to the assessments being made by more experienced hands in Washington who 
viewed the very well-staffed Soviet embassy in Kuwait as a security risk. Diplomatic relations 
with Czechoslovakia, Poland and Bulgaria followed the arrival of the first Soviet ambassador in 
August 1963. When Kuwait made diplomatic overtures toward East Germany and allowed a 
media conference of representatives from communist countries resulting in the first West German 
ambassador to the amirate delaying his arrival, US officials reacted with alarm. The attacks on 
West Germany in the more Arab nationalist parts of the Kuwaiti press, at a time when Bonn's 
close relations with Israel were proving more controversial as tensions increased between the 
5' The British Foreign office specifically advised the Embassy in Kuwait to threaten to terminate the 
Exchange of Letters in the event of "any unilateral action by Kuwait in breach of the KOC's concession. " It 
was additionally suggested that the British Embassy should inform the Amir and any other reliable and 
influential figures that Her Majesty's Government are still studying their defence commitments and to warn 
them that unilateral action by Kuwait in breach of KOC's concession might well affect Her Majesty's 
decision on whether they can afford to continue to keep forces available for the defence of Kuwait in an 
emergency. Telegram to G. Noel Jackson, 30th December 1965 (FO 371/181589). 
" See for example, US Ambassador Howard Cottam to State Department, 5 
th January 1964 (A 121)). 
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Jewish state and its neighbours, encouraged Kuwait to threaten to break relations with West 
Germany. This, the US noted, occurred before the UAR had indicated that it was prepared to take 
such a step. Furthermore, the signing by Kuwait of technical and economic agreements with the 
USSR in 1964 was seen as a further worrying sign that the amirate was taking its formal 
commitment to non-alignment, and thus extending relations across the board, too seriously. The 
UK too was not above speculating that the large pool of south Asian workers based in the amirate 
could be recruited by the new Soviet embassy for espionage work". That same year diplomatic 
relations were established with the People's Republic of China, whose poor relations with the 
Soviet bloc were of little consolation to US officials. Although the PRC would not establish an 
embassy as long as Taiwan were present in the amirate, Kuwait was to slowly develop economic 
relations with the mainland Chinese while the amir was to tell the UK that it supported PRC 
admittance to the UN. Such a stance was in tune with Kuwait's inclusive approach through which 
it hoped, in the assessment of a UK official, to "win friends and influence people". The broad 
base of Kuwait's diplomatic outreach eventually saw communist North Korea beat the south to 
representing Korea in the amirate. Nevertheless, the principle of building as broad a base of 
friendship as possible was understood by UK and US officials. However they, and Kuwait's Arab 
neighbours, assessed Kuwait's communist relations simply in terms of who the UAR had 
established relations with. This was undoubtedly a factor in Kuwait's application of the principle 
of "positive neutrality". It also overlapped with Kuwait's need to project Arabism, which Egypt 
had the greatest legitimacy in embodying regionally, which communist states' more critical 
stance toward Israel was in line with. Unsurprisingly, Kuwait's approach to non-alignment 
attracted opposition from Saudi Arabia, with whom Egyptian relations were worsening as their 
involvement in Yemen deepened. As a result Kuwait's foreign relations were often seen solely 
through the prism of cold war blocs in the Arab world, and the government's and parliament's 
Arab nationalist foreign policy rhetoric. What was becoming an established Kuwaiti foreign 
policy trend - of trying to ensure its international as well as its regional relations avoided 
alignments by reaching out to those states who could deny it recognition and legitimacy as well as 
to those more predisposed to support it - was not properly understood at the time. However the 
US did later speculate that this policy may have indicated the domestic ambitions of the 
increasingly influential Jabr Al-Ahmed, a factor that did not minimise Washington's alarm but 
did at least suggest an understanding of the essential pragmatism at work. 
53 Miriam Joyce, Ruling Sheikhs and Her Majesty's Government 1960-1969, (London; Frank Cass, 2003). 
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While more alarmist visions of a Nasserite "fifth column" in Kuwait that pervaded early US 
embassy reports could be played down in the State Department, there was a concern that the 
presence of large numbers of Palestinians, Iraqis and Egyptians could add to potential internal 
volatility and thus be exploited by the USSR. However US officials who served in Kuwait in the 
1960s and 1970s have since argued that cold war perspectives on Kuwait and other Arab 
countries at this time were greatly overdone. "There was, " one subsequently argued, "a weakness 
in American foreign policy ... to exaggerate the threat ... to interpret indigenous problems in terms 
of the cold war 54 ij In part this could have reflected a desire to report back to the home capital 
what it was perceived Washington wanted to hear. More experienced Kuwait "hands" in the US 
government argued that the Kuwaiti "ruling group" is more than aware of "communist 
machinations as a result of the 1958 coup in Iraq" (in which the Iraqi Communist Party played a 
significant role)55 . However the US generally held a cold war perspective on what it regarded as 
the inherent risks in how Kuwait managed its international relations. This in turn encouraged 
Kuwait to try to exploit Washington's increasing interest in the amirate. From 1964 the US 
planned to expand its intelligence operation there, mindful of the large Soviet embassy presence, 
and, despite Washington's confidence in British monitoring, reflecting its desire to have access to 
key information. Kuwait was already being given an increased flow of intelligence on the wider 
cold war context, something that at the time of the international crisis over Berlin in 1963, for 
example, it was very pleased to be privy to. This puts apparent US concerns that year about 
Kuwait's expanding roster of relations with Eastern Bloc countries in perspective. - By 1965 
senior Kuwaitis were telling the US embassy that they hoped that Washington, in addition to 
London, could provide the amirate with assurances that the US would intervene in the event of a 
threat to Kuwait's security. 
As early as 1961, when the UK granted Kuwait independence, Kuwait was, according to British 
embassy reports, considering approaching the US as an alternative defence guarantor, apparently 
in order that the "embarrassment" of the Exchange of Letters with the British could be 
terminated 56 . While perhaps surprising, this was essentially only a policy option, considered at a 
54 Personal interview with Talcot Seelye, former US consul to Kuwait (1957-60), August 2000 Washington 
DC, USA. Such a view was endorsed by William Stoltzfus, former US vice-Consul (1954-56), and 
ambassador (1972-75), August 2000, Maryland, USA. 
55 Talcott Seelye, Arabian Gulf, State Department, 1961-64. Correspondence with US embassy, Kuwait, 
1962. 
56 Dispatch written in 1963 from the British ambassador G Noel Jackson to the British Prime Minister Sir 
Alec Douglas Home. Robert Jarman, Sabah Salim, Amir of Kuwait 1965-77, A Political Biography, 
(London; London Centre for Arab Studies, 2002), p. 158. 
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time of growing regional pressure on Kuwait that its agreement with the UK be ended (see 
Chapter 3). It also confirms what remains to this day, that the essential importance to Kuwait of 
ensuring that, whatever happens, it has a defence guarantee from a country outside the region 
with whom it has friendly relations and on whom it can absolutely rely. In 1965 Kuwait 
approached the US over defence assurances, which leading Al-Sabah, Shaikh Jabr Al-Ali, said 
the amirate desired on a secret basis in addition to training and equipment, and, he indicated, not 
at the expense of the UK's extant public commitment. By this point the amirate's regional and 
international situation had changed. Kuwait now had diplomatic relations with all its key Gulf 
neighbours, including Iraq, as well as with the USSR and all the other members of the P5. 
Ironically, this more confident external position encouraged an adjustment in its domestic 
security and, to a lesser extent, its foreign policies to give what all senior Al-Sabah regarded as a 
necessary emphasis on "Kuwait first". This was first definitively expressed in 1966 when the 
traditional annual Amiri speech, which hitherto had been written very much under Amir Abdullah 
Salim's direction and delivered by his heir, was, following this precedent, given by Jabr Al- 
Ahmed in close consultation with the new amir, Sabah Salim (see Chapter 3). However the need 
for a policy shift was being expressed a year earlier among senior Kuwaitis and was reflected in 
comments by Jabr Al-Ali that Kuwait had gone too far in extending relations with communist 
countries. Essentially the same point was made differently by the under-secretary for foreign 
affairs, Abdul-Rahman Ateegi, who at the time of Kuwait's attendance at the Non-Aligned 
Movement conference in Cairo in 1965, was stressing to the US that Kuwait had "veered away 
from communists" and was now "comfortably neutral" in its foreign PoliCY57 (see Chapter 3). 
This move by Kuwait toward becoming "more neutral" was acknowledged by the US, despite its 
concerns. It was considered by the US to have found expression in a "two Chinas" policy that 
precluded allowing Peking to open an embassy in Kuwait on its termS58. In essence US 
perceptions did not waiver that, at bottom, Kuwait was "pro-westem"59 , an assessment that 
included expectations of what it believed Kuwait's foreign policy should be, given Kuwait's 
trading and investment connection with the west and its therefore inherent support for the 
operation of "western" free market interests. The US assessed, correctly, that Kuwait's projection 
of its foreign policy did not square with what were effectively the pro-western bases of its 
5' The description of Abdul-Rahman Ateegi's analysis is contained in US ambassador Howard Cottam's 
"Mid-Year Review", June 1965. 
58 In its early years of independence Kuwait did not want to develop a relationship with communist China, 
however much encouraged by the UAR and its local supporters, at the expense of relations with Taiwan, 
then a P5 member. Mid-year review, Ibid. By 1971 this was to change (see Chapter 7). 
'9 US embassy " 1965 Annual Report", January 1966 (A 19). 
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security and economic interests", and that this contradiction in view was found among influential 
merchants as well as the ruling family6 1. As early as 1965 the US was assessing that this 
unspoken pro-western orientation of Kuwait's security was essentially about the amirate being 
under a "US umbrella". While the UK remained the pre-eminent actor in Kuwait defence, there 
was at this time an increasing US relationship with Kuwait and a deepening role in Saudi Arabia 
and in the wider Gulf. 
Seeking US guarantees 
Comments made privately to the US ambassador by senior Kuwaitis, implying an adjustment in 
the country's foreign relations, were to some extent Kuwaiti "spin" designed to curry favour. 
However, they also reflected the priority of Kuwait's foreign policy. This was exemplified by the 
approach of Shaikh Jabr Al-Ali in particular, in his efforts to ensure that the amirate enjoyed firm, 
if discrete, defence assurances. In seeking an invitation for the Amir to make an official visit to 
Washington, Jabr Al-Ali, for all his private ambitions, was undoubtedly acting with the authority 
of the amir and the crown prince. Kuwait wanted a public and joint communiqu6 that would 
declare common economic objectives, as had been previously suggested by the more Arab 
national i st-incl ined Jabr Al-Ahmed and foreign minister Sabah Al-Ahmed; and a private 
understanding committing the US to the defence of Kuwait". Jabr Al-Ali suggested that what 
Kuwait had in mind was in addition to the commitment of the British, contradicting an earlier UK 
embassy report that in these circumstances Kuwait might have been prepared to give up the 
British guarantee for the sake of Iraqi recognition. However, despite what was the US's 
expanding interest in Kuwait by this point, Washington continued to express its confidence, both 
privately and publicly, in the UK's prior role in this respect and saw no reason for Kuwait being 
"under the defence umbrella of the US. " Washington did not in any way want to compete with 
what it saw as Kuwait's primary defence relationship with Britain. 
60 "... [T]op officialdom realise that we protect them and their oil, even though more for themselves than for 
Kuwait. Our defence umbrella permits Kuwaiti non-alignment and brinkmanship for trade or political 
benefit elsewhere. " (From US Embassy, 1963 Annual Report, February 24 th 1964 (A 121)). 
6'A senior Kuwait oil negotiator and merchant, Faisal Mazidi, commented a year later on his realisation 
that the flirtation that he and others had had with communist states had gone too far. "[M]any merchants 
were similarly spouting socialism and (at the same time) making commissions on free enterprise deals and 
from the financial institutions. " US embassy to State Department, May 6th, 1965 (A273) 
62 Shaikh Jabr Al-Ali Al-Sabah asked that the US "guarantee her independence, secretly and without 
strings. " US State Department to the US embassy, Kuwait, January 13th, 1965 (A 165). 
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US confidence in the British commitment can, with the benefit of hindsight at least, be seen as 
misplaced. However, in 1965 there was little reason for the US, and therefore for the Kuwaitis, to 
have any doubts about London's attachment to the Exchange of Letters. Furthermore the 
amirate's position in the Arab world had for the most part been well handled and suggested a 
confidence that enabled it to crack down on foreign Arab nationalists and even the press outlets of 
their Kuwaiti allies (see Chapter 2). Although Kuwait's foreign policy put it at odds with Saudi 
Arabia over Yemen and, more importantly Bahrain, the amirate struck a suitably Arab nationalist 
image by recognising the republican regime in Sana in 1963 and by doing little to prevent 
Bahraini opponents of the Al-Khalifa ruling family from freely organising in Kuwait, backed by 
strong parliamentary and press support (see Chapter 3). Kuwaiti leaders also mouthed generalities 
about supporting an end to foreign domination in the southern GUIP3 . During Kuwait's pre- 
independence period it had enjoyed what, for domestic and external consumption, was the useful 
position of being able to support financially, as well as rhetorically, the Imamate rebellion against 
the British-backed Sultanate of Oman, a position in accord at the time with both Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt. From 1963, however, Kuwait found itself in agreement with Britain and Saudi Arabia who 
were backing the Sultan against the Dhofari rebellion within Oman. The rebellion was linked to 
UAR-backed rebels based in the British-founded South Arabia Federation (SAF), established in 
1959. The contradictions in this position, given that Kuwait also gave verbal support to rebels 
fighting British troops in the south-west Arabian protectorate of Aden, that within a few years 
would be joined to the SAF in independent south Yemen, was of less importance than the value 
for Kuwait of siding with "anti-colonial" causes. It was fairly low cost stance too. Bahrain was 
the only foreign policy issue within the Arab world over which Kuwait had risked the wrath both 
of an important Arab neighbour, Saudi Arabia, and of Britain. However the limits to Saudi 
Arabia's anger were reflected in progress in negotiating the Neutral Zone agreement with Saudi 
Arabia (see Chapter 3). 
For its part, Britain was sensitive to Kuwait's unwillingness to constrain those linked to violence 
in Bahrain. After all, it was the location of the closest British military facility to Kuwait, which in 
1961 had been an important part of Britain's ability to intervene in Kuwait. However tensions on 
this score had done little to fundamentally unden-nine relations with the UK, and by the time of 
the internal clampdown that followed the adoption of a "Kuwait first" policy, the relatively low- 
6' The Amiri speech in 1963 expressed support for "(Arab) countries' struggle for independence and 
stability, and included reference to the southern Gulf and southern Yemen, and cooperating with the 
countries of the "Arab Gulf'. 3 oth October, 1963 (FO 371/168728. ) 
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ranking Bahraini and other foreign opposition activists based in Kuwait were removed, thereby 
improving Kuwait's poor relations with its southern neighbour. 
Kuwait's developing confidence in this period found expression in its willingness to attempt 
mediation in the Arab world and beyond. In the case of Yemen this reflected a confidence on the 
part of the republican government in the relative neutrality of Kuwait, which had had relations 
with the Zaidi Imamate and then within six months recognised the new regime. However 
Kuwait's articulation of Arab nationalist causes associated with the UAR, and the amirate's 
trumpeting of its "positive neutrality" in foreign affairS64, was seen by Egypt's opponents as 
compromising Kuwait's credentials as a mediator. Despite this, Kuwait, under an amir trying to 
assert his personal standing as much as Kuwait's, was keen that Britain should give its efforts 
recognition and, where feasible, assistance. In practice Kuwait was not remotely successful as a 
mediator until a few years later when, over Iranian claims to Bahrain, it stepped outside of the 
frame of inter-Arab disputes where suspicions of its motives tended to run high. While British 
officials had reservations about Kuwait's suitability for conflict resolution, they did conceive that 
this relative newcomer to independent status could play a useful role in prompting cooperation 
among the southern Gulf arnirates of Bahrain, Qatar and the Trucial States. The Kuwaitis 
themselves had previously made broad statements about wanting to promote cooperation in the 
"Arab Gulf' in the context of independence in its southern portion 6', and in 1965 the British tried 
to persuade the Bahrainis to open up unofficial "diplomatic" relations with independent Kuwait. 
It did not get anywhere as Bahrain continued to have strong political and personal resentments at 
Kuwait, and, in the UK's assessment, Manama lacked the personnel to make such an idea 
worthwhile. However both the UK and Kuwait were clearly already thinking about what the 
future of the southern Gulf arnirates was going to be, and believed that this early step could be a 
way of relieving pressure on Bahrain from UAR interests in particular66 . Aside from the 
implication that the UK had no wish that Bahrain be joined with Qatar and the Trucial States in 
some form of federation, this early initiative is interesting as it showed common interest between 
Kuwait and the UK in the amirate playing a potentially influential role in the southern Gulf, a 
policy seemingly endorsed by Egypt. The fact that a year later Kuwait set up an office to fund 
education provided overwhelmingly by Egyptian teachers (and which was seen locally as a front 
for Egyptian interests), did not prevent continued Kuwaiti emphasis on support for the "Amirates 
64 Upon Kuwait's accession to the UN, foreign minister Sabah Salim identified this as the hallmark of 
Kuwait foreign policy. 
65 Amiri speech, op-cit 
66 Joyce, gp-cit- p. 86, citing British embassy correspondence with the 
Political Resident, Bahrain. 
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of the Gulf' as well as the "Arab south", even as it gave more stress to Kuwaiti money meeting 
domestic needs firse'. Kuwaiti ambitions in the Gulf continued to be thwarted, however, with the 
blame for lack of progress directed by Kuwaiti officials at the UK, who it believed were 
influencing the southern amirates against Kuwait because of the latter's sponsorship of Egyptian 
teachers and other assistance that could indirectly aid the influence of Nasser's regime" (see also 
Chapter 3). 
Suspicion of British motives in the Middle East was hardly confined to Kuwait. However in a 
country whose decision makers continued to feel that they were operating in a predatory regional 
environment, even if less overtly so than in 1961, constant attention to what British officials 
likened to a British military prop underpinning Kuwait's necessarily unguided pursuit of a "pro- 
Arab" political identity, was needed. The UK's February 1966 White Paper, following the 
completion of a two year long defence review 69 , included the announcement of a withdrawal from 
the British protectorate of Aden that was due to be completed by 1968. A few months later, 
Kuwaiti leaders were told of the practical consequences of this decision for Britain's defence 
commitment. Although the British ambassador was keen to stress to prime minister Harold 
Wilson that the decision to withdraw from Aden "aroused no concern" in Kuwait70 , Kuwait's 
leaders were keen to assess the implications of the decision for a UK defence commitment that, 
like it or loathe it, would remain an essential part of the amirate's foreign policy. 
For all the apparent confidence expressed by the Amir in May 1966, on being told of the 
limitations on Britain's ability to deploy a ground force in the future", that Kuwait could rely on 
Arab ground troops, the UK judged that the residual air defence commitment was key to Sabah 
Salim and most of the senior leadership. The amir accepted the British position that its forces 
would not be able to be brought from East Asia or the UK without up to a month's notice, and 
that, as a consequence, the defence commitment had effectively been reduced to air power only. 
He pronounced himself satisfied that the maintenance of the commitment, and the UK's 
simultaneous "reinforcement" of its presence in Bahrain and Sharjah, represented a necessary 
" Amiri speech, US embassy, June 27" 1966 (A340) 
68 Suleiman Majid Al-Shahin, foreign ministry 196 3 -99, continues to maintain this view. 
69 This was the beginning of the commitment to stringent cuts in the 
defence estimates. Crossman, op. cit. 
70 Comment on reaction in 1966 is contained in "Annual Report 1967" from British Ambassador 
GG 
Arthur to Prime Minister Harold Wilson, 6h January, 1968 (FCO 8/609 113253). 
71 UK Secretary of State for Defence, Dennis Healey, writing in September 1966, referred to the cabinet 
having approved a revised commitment as being ".... 
limited to the provision of air support, unless the ruler 
gives us adequate time to move in land 
forces from the UK or the Far East to Kuwait. " (DEFE 13/564). 
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c4reconfiguration', 72 . Amir Sabah Salim emphasised what, for Kuwaiti leaders across the spectrum 
of supposedly "pro" and "anti" British opinion, was the undoubted perception that the risk of 
external attack on Kuwait had been reduced. There is no evidence however that this figured very 
highly in British defence calculations, nor in the subsequent ending of the commitment entirely. 
At the same time the new arrangement presented the risk in the eyes of British officials, including 
the foreign secretary, that, in the event of a future military threat, Kuwait would seek an 
exclusively "Arab solution" of the kind that in 1961 had only occurred post-facto. The regional 
and internal political expectations created by Kuwait's "Arab foreign policy", and what now 
would patently be practical constraints on the UK's military capabilities, made this a likely 
scenario. Initially Jabr Al-Ahmed's reaction to the formal announcement was to consider the 
effective reduction of the British defence commitment as insufficient. However, over the next few 
months he began to adopt a different position, in line with an amir who, despite British concerns 
that he was largely a figurehead, took a strong interest in issues that were fundamental to 
Kuwait's national interest. When Britain announced to Amir Sabah Salim that its defence 
commitment to Kuwait would, with the abandonment of Aden, primarily rest on the use of air 
power from Bahrain, Jabr expressed reservations that this would convey an image of dependency, 
and suggested the British base in Muscat instead, given its location further away from Kuwait, at 
the southern end of the Gulf His objections were in one sense understandable -a weakening of 
"colonial power" caused by the British withdrawal from the Red Sea port of Aden was something 
that would have appealed to the crown prince. However his initial concern was at the perceptible 
consolidation of Britain's position close to Kuwait. However, by the end of the year Jabr Al- 
Ahmed was echoing the arguments of the amir concerning the acceptability of the new defence 
proposal. Whatever his political instincts in terrns of regional and local reaction, the crown prince 
continued to see some utility in some form of British presence in the Gulf and in a willingness to 
intervene in Kuwait in extremis. His half-brother, foreign minister Sabah Al-Ahmed, had told a 
British newspaper upon a visit to London two years earlier that Kuwait did not need the UK's 
defence commitment, and that therefore there was no residual reason for Britain to retain Aden. 
While such statements played to an Arab nationalist gallery in the region and domestically, they 
7' Troop numbers were to be extended in Bahrain, where Britain operated a naval base. A meeting in 
August 1966 between the amir, his nephew the interior and defence minister Saad Abdullah, and the British 
ambassador, saw the two Kuwaitis express gratitude that the commitment in the Gulf was being re-enforced 
and Britain would still be in a position to defend Kuwait at a time when the Aden base was already in the 
process of being dismantled (with the result that, by 1967, the British had left the south-west Arabian 
protectorate and the resultant People's Republic of Yemen was founded, consisting of Aden and the former 
amirates of the South Arabia Federation. 10th August 1966 (FO 371/185402 - 113253).. 
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did not constitute official Kuwaiti PoliCY73. Having an international security prop remained a 
matter of AI-Sabah consensus: an issue that would remain a key element of foreign PoliCY71, 
albeit given a self-reliant gloss by arguing that British air power would combine with Kuwait's 
developing air force. British officials were reporting that Kuwaiti defence capabilities were 
growing, but continued to stress that this needed augmenting with additional defence supplies 
from the UK and further British military training support. Doubts would continue to be cast on 
Kuwait defence capabilities throughout the 1960s, however, with UK defence officials arguing 
that the long-desired standard of being an effective "trip wire" in order to sufficiently delay 
invading forces to enable outside assistance to arrive in time, was far from being realised. The 
fact that a new British ambassador felt the need to talk of Kuwait's "growing ability to defend 
herself' was probably a case of telling his foreign secretary what it was perceived he wanted to 
hear. After all, the UK appeared to be increasingly in the mode of heightening local capabilities 
with British sales and assistance, and was beginning to regard itself as the last line of defence 
should a local deterrence capability, and Kuwait's acceptance in the region and internationally, 
fail to prevent a military threat from arising. 
By 1967 Kuwait's regional and international relations had grown strongly. Relations between 
Arab neighbours had proven divisive, and therefore uncomfortable for Kuwait, however this had 
also provided an opportunity for the amirate to try its hand at mediation. While such efforts were 
not successful, they showed a more confident country gaining greater acceptance in the region. At 
the same time, despite being periodically difficult, Kuwait's relationship with the UK was 
operating on a stable basis where ongoing defence guarantees had little impact on the amirate's 
ability to develop an "Arab policy". However, with the devastating loss of Arab territory in the 
June 1967 war, the relationship with Britain, and for the first time with the US, was to be buffeted 
by both regional and internal pressure to take action against countries popularly believed to have 
aided the Israeli war effort (see chapters 2 and 3). With some other Arab countries breaking 
diplomatic relations with both the UK and the US, Kuwait acted quickly; the amirate and Libya 
were the first Arab countries to announce a boycott of oil sales. The crown prince declared, in 
suitably strident language, that Kuwait "would be the last country to resume oil sales to the UK 
73 Abdul-Latif Hassan Al-Rumaihi, "The Dynamics of Kuwaiti Foreign Policy" (Exeter; Exeter University, 
1983), p. 143. 
74 "All rulers of Kuwait wanted to rule away from the influence (of external forces) ... 
but they had been 
obliged to lead (under the) protection of mighty elements here, " commented Suleiman Majed Al-Shaheen, 
referring to the role of the British, and then later the US, in the security of Kuwait and the Gulf. Al-Shaheen 
op. cit. 
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and the US9M. In practice the fall in the value of Kuwaiti oil sales that circuitously continued to 
reach the UK in 1967 was relatively modeSt76, while the domestic clamour for a boycott of 
imports from Britain was not matched by significant action. British officials entirely understood 
that Kuwait had no choice but to at least be seen to be foregoing oil revenues from sales to the US 
and the UK when Iraq had played an active part in the war and appeared to be making economic 
sacrifices in the aftermath 77 . The Kuwaiti amir was keen to stress the limited economic 
effectiveness of the embargo, something that would have been known to his senior Al-Sabah 
colleagues. Similarly, the amir was eager to point out how successfully the prospect for violence 
against western interests of a kind seen in neighbouring countries had been contained in Kuwait. 
In practice the closure of the Suez Canal in the months after the war and its impact on oil and 
other supplies was of greater concem to the UK government than a formal declaration of an 
embargo. Kuwait had made clear to Britain during the war that its priorities were external defence 
and internal security. As such, British-supplied Chieftain tanks facing Iraq were held back from 
the allocation to the UAR in the build up to the war", and measures to prevent an influx of 
Palestinians were quickly taken in the aftermath'9. 
Sabah Salim considered himself to have played a skilful hand in managing the crisis, an 
assessment from which British officials did not demur. There was never any prospect that Kuwait 
would follow Syria and Iraq, both parties to the conflict, and Sudan in cutting diplomatic ties with 
the UK; or Egypt, also a party to the war, and Algeria and Yemen in cutting their ties to the US; 
nor was there any serious suggestion that Kuwait should do so. That said, the UK ambassador 
asserted that the war "had done permanent damage to Britain's position in Kuwait80, "a 
judgement that was to make him and other British diplomats especially bitter because much of the 
damage related to the "big lie" of British and American collusion in the war (see Chapter 3). 
Although of relatively limited impact and duration, the oil embargo renewed British concern 
about the possibility of significant "political withdrawals" from Sterling" at the behest of the 
75 CCR Battiscombe to FO, 16 th June 1967 (FO 8/614). 
76 Brenchley, pp. cit. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Sir John Graham, former head of chancery, UK embassy Kuwait (1966-68). Personal interview, 2000. 
79 Joyce, op. cit. 
80 GG Arthur to UK Foreign Secretary George Brown, 20t" August 1967 (FC08/614) 
" It was generally reported in British official correspondence that in practice there had been no such 
withdrawals. However the decision of the post-war Arab League conference in Khartoum to provide 
financial support for the frontline Arab states, led to f, 25m being withdrawn from the amirate's Sterling 
holdings. 
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crown prince, and caused worry that, should this occur, it would strengthen the hand of those in 
the British government who wanted to reduce the defence commitment to the amirate. 
Britain takes "pro-Arab" line 
Britain had taken a lead role in securing the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 242 in 
November 1967. It had contained what for Arab governments was a welcome condemnation of 
Israel's territorial seizure 82 . It also saw enormous relief among the Kuwaiti leadership as it led to 
the resumption of British diplomatic relations with E gypt8'. The creation of some relative 
goodwill toward the UK in the Arab world helped to ease what had become a potentially 
dangerous disconnect between the two contrasting, but key, elements of Kuwait's foreign policy: 
a British military guarantee and an Arab political identification. The British ambassador reported 
that at the height of the post-war tension in the region, Kuwait's leaders took solace from the fact 
that the arnirate could rely on the defence guarantee 84 . As ever, there was plainly a difference 
between public posture and private understanding. The UN resolution, after all, had been formally 
opposed by Kuwait for only addressing the Palestinian issue as a refugee problem. The UN 
resolution, however, helped smooth the gap between the ongoing UK defence relationship and the 
"Nasserite" language in which the Kuwaitis continued to cast much of their foreign policy. 
Devaluation fails to weaken UK relationship 
In the same month as the UK was improving relations with Kuwait and the wider Arab world, it 
announced, what in Kuwait as well as Britain, had been the long expected devaluation of Sterling. 
Gorowny Roberts, minister of state at the foreign office, was deputed to visit the region in order 
to smooth any potential ruffled feathers and in the process confirm the UK's commitment to the 
81 Its key, and most controversial and disputed, clauses however called for the "Withdrawal of Israeli armed 
forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict; " the "... respect for and acknowledgement of the 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and the right to live in 
peace within secure and recognised boundaries; " and "achieving ajust settlement of the refugee problem. " 
(UN Security Council documents website: http: //www. un. org/documents/scres. htm) 
83 "[No] government could have welcomed the resumption of diplomatic relations between the United 
Kingdom and United Arab Republic (UAR) with greater relief than the Government of Kuwait, " wrote GG 
Arthur, UK ambassador to Kuwait, in his Annual Report sent to prime minister Harold Wilson in January 
1968. Or, put another way, " Kuwait hates it when friends fight. " Brenchley, op. cit. 84 Joyce, op. cit. - 
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defence of the Gulf. In fact an increasing flow of parliamentary visitors had been arriving in 
Kuwait with a view to easing the tensions caused by the war and to build on the goodwill 
generated by Britain's diplomatic efforts at the UN. The expectation in Kuwait of Sterling's 
devaluation meant that, according to the British ambassador, it was received "with hardly a 
ripple". Despite a fall in oil sales revenues following the (limited) oil embargo, the cost of the 
devaluation had been estimated at a manageable E75 million, less than the annual commitments 
Kuwait would make to the Arab states neighbouring Israel in light of its obligations made on it 
and other oil-rich Arab states at the September 1967 Khartoum conference. It was noted, 
however, that Kuwait had, as a result, "lost her confidence in Sterling". There are no indications 
that Kuwait was given any prior private warning of the British government's decision, but neither 
would this have been expected, and Kuwaiti leaders such as Jabr Al-Ahmed, never normally one 
to avoid expressing irritation with British policy, did not raise the matter with Roberts when he 
arrived. In fact the British embassy noted some relief among the Kuwait leadership that the 
devaluation had not been of the order that had been expected. The devaluation obliged Britain's 
chancellor of the exchequer, James Callaghan, to resign, given his strong personal sense of 
responsibility, after more than three years of commitment not to devalue. Lord Callaghan recently 
stated that the fact that he had had to go back on an express commitment given to Kuwait was 
part and parcel of his decision to resign 85 . The UK decision though was not to impact on Kuwait's 
policy toward its military guarantor at this point, nor to see it gamble, as the British ambassador 
feared it might in the aftermath of the war, on an exclusively "Arab" foreign policy. Both the 
crown prince and the amir understood that maintaining Britain's support, even if the practical 
military expression of it had been reduced and might come under further pressure, was important 
enough for the amirate to both continue its financial interest in the UK and the UK's involvement 
in the Kuwaiti oil sector. After all, the economic benefits to Kuwait of this longstanding 
cooperation were also well understood. 
In the second half of 1967, however, Kuwait decided to assert the "Arab" component of its 
foreign policy with more vigour. Upon meeting with the crown prince and asserting the British 
commitment to stay in the Gulf that only two months later would be reneged upon, Gorowny 
Roberts was urged by Jabr Al-Ahmed that Britain should give its firm and unequivocal support 
for a "League of Gulf Arab States" that would include Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar along with the 
85 Lord Callaghan of Cardiff. Written interview with the author, November 2000. Lord Callaghan had made 
a personal commitment not to devalue earlier in 1967 to the Amir's son Shaikh Salim Sabah, who was the 
ambassador to the UK at the time. 
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Trucial States. Kuwait was preparing a renewed and more assertive commitment to the federation 
idea that it had begun exploring 18 months before, after earlier suggestions for lower level co- 
operation had floundered (see also Chapter 3). To Britain it was clear that the amirate's "ultimate 
aim" was a League of States under Kuwait's leadership. This was seen as insurance "against the 
time, which they expect - with resignation, if not with enthusiasm - when Her Majesty's 
Government relinquishes their special position in the Lower Gul f. 865ý 
New foreign policy phase 
Trying to influence the pattern of events in the Gulf would shortly become a more pressing 
priority for Kuwait. However, when what had become the expected departure of the British was 
announced sooner than expected, the amirate was not in a particularly vulnerable position 
regionally or internationally and could thus weather what was, largely, unwelcome news. Aside 
from the challenge to UK and US relations caused by the Arab-Israeli war, 1967 had also seen 
incidents confirming that Iraq remained a territorial threat to the amirate - reports of Iraqi 
civilians crossing the northern border were followed by three days of Iraqi air force overflights of 
the border area in April. On the other hand, the negative impact of the June war on Egypt's 
projection of military and political weight in the region had led to a rapprochement between 
Egypt and Saudi Arabia, two countries that, partly due to the war's impact on UK policy toward 
the conflict, had improved relations with Britain. This had helped to ensure that Kuwait's foreign 
relations - which were essentially structured in opposition to Iraq, albeit without seeking an 
alliance against it - were in greater equilibrium. 
It was clear from Kuwait's developing foreign policy that the institutional recognition of its state 
sovereignty and legitimacy afforded by membership of, and an active interest in, the U`N was an 
important prop; one for which Kuwait had even been prepared to deal directly with Iraq in order 
to secure its grudging recognition. Kuwait would follow closely the UN debates, beyond even 
those affecting the Arab world, the region with whom its policy was principally concerned. 
However Kuwait did not invest confidence in the UN being able to provide guarantees for its 
security, and certainly did not feel that even if such a commitment could be forthcoming that it 
would be worth compromising the UK's commitment for. Britain had considered promoting a 
"system of guarantees" from the UN for the state sovereignty of Kuwait and Iraq, as well as their 
86 GG Arthur, oxit. 
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Gulf neighbours, partly as a reaction to fears generated by Baath party rule in both Iraq and Syria 
in 1963. However this idea was quickly dropped when Britain realised that the amir's resentment 
of the UK's previous support for uniting Kuwait with Hashemite Iraq and Jordan would only be 
rekindled at a time when unity projects were increasing pressure on Kuwait to end its defence 
agreement with the UK. 
At the same time as Kuwait maintained its friendship with the UK, its recognition of the political 
difficulties this created for the image it was trying to project within the Arab world encouraged it 
to play down the "outward appearances of it"", and to complement its friendships with all the UN 
Security Council's permanent five members by reaching out to communist states in Europe and to 
Communist China and North Korea. However, aside from the Soviet Union, Kuwait's relations 
with communist states were essentially postures, designed to appeal to Nasserite opinion locally 
and in the region, and were reined in when they proved inconvenient. Of far greater substance 
was Kuwait's desire to secure a US defence assurance to bolster that provided by what for the 
great majority of this period, internally and within the region, was the politically more 
embarrassing guarantee provided by the UK. When, in early 1968, the British declared that they 
would be pulling out of the Gulf, the US assessed that "recent events had demonstrated that the 
UK could no longer provide military or monetary security and that pan-Arabism was no 
guarantee of Kuwaiti security, its wealth or its sovereignty. 8"' Although the Kuwait-British 
relationship would still retain important defence and economic components in the years ahead, 
from 1968 onwards Kuwait would seek to persuade Washington to replace London as the security 
prop for the amirate's continued and, partially contradictory, Arab foreign policy construct. 
87 Policy Assessment, February 1968, US State Department (A 124). 
81 Policy Assessment, US State Department, Washington D. C., USA; February 1968 (A 150). 
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Chapter 5 
Internal dimensions 1967-77 
Kuwait's internal political life during this period was largely characterised by the efforts of the 
country's key decision-makers to increase control. A key aspect of this was the incorporation of 
tribal interests, which have become a central feature of internal political management ever since. 
The efforts of senior AI-Sabah to assert authority over the domestic political process would see an 
intensification of authoritarian policies at the same time as the traditional compact with merchants 
weakened, compounded by a reduction in the ruling family's economic patronage in the aftermath 
of the 1967 war. Kuwait's Arab nationalists had been the direct target of the domestic 
clampdown, but merchant disquiet would lead to an easing of constraints, for all the discomfort 
that the AI-Sabah felt within the region at the political posturing of the country's radicals. 
The fluctuations in the Al-Sabah's control over parliamentary life would, however, have only a 
negligible impact on foreign policy. Domestic politics were periodically viewed by the Al-Sabah 
as a regional embarrassment, and from time to time would encourage fears of vulnerability to 
external upheaval. However internal events did not shape foreign policy. Rather, the internal Al- 
Sabah debate over domestic political management, and the arena of parliamentary life, became 
part of an increasing competition for authority within the ruling family. When parliament was 
finally closed down in 1976, this was primarily a way of reinforcing Kuwait's balance of regional 
relations, and thus of maintaining the autonomy of Al-Sabah decision-making from domestic 
constraints. 
The national assembly that had been elected in January 1967 saw the traditional basis of Kuwait's 
internal political compact begin to unravel. While the gerrymandered election had not prevented 
some senior liberal merchants such as former speaker Abdel Aziz Al-Saqr from successfully 
mobilising their supporters and securing seats, the extent to which the overall outcome was a 
parliament with a marked increase of tribal representatives due to the incorporation of some 
hitherto stateless bedbuin', alienated relatively liberal members of the merchant elite. In part this 
' "Bedouin" or "bedu" are, by tradition, the non-settled, rural, population. While their nomadness was more 
a matter of lineage than of reality, the bedbuin often continued to lack Kuwaiti nationality. During the 
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was a forrn of social snobbery, which the senior AI-Sabah also give expression to when the 
malleable parliament they had engineered proved uncooperative. Increased bedu representation 
had followed the expansion of nationality to some hitherto "stateless" residents. This, and the 
redrawing of constituencies to boost their electoral prospects, and the widespread belief in Kuwait 
that ballot rigging had occurred, was also a reflection of how much the senior merchants, the 
former partners in power, in Kuwait were being politically sidelined. Abdul Aziz Al-Saqr was to 
resign his seat shortly after the 1967 election, citing the specific issue of ballot rigging. 
The pattern of domestic alignment between the ruling Al-Sabah, an expanding bedbuin client 
base, and those, often less senior, merchants who were less political and more easily influenced, 
continued in the post- 1967 war period. If anything the war had further encouraged Crown Prince 
Jabr Al-Ahmed and interior and defence minister Saad Abdullah, who were largely driving 
internal policy, to extend the authoritarian approach to domestic political management that had 
characterised the "Kuwait First" policy articulated in 1966 (see Chapter 3). From the perspective 
of those leading this approach, the aftermath of the war was not a time to allow too much rein to 
those voices, whether relatively progressive or more radically Arab nationalist, who might 
conceivably utilise an angry domestic and regional mood to advance largely parochial goals'. 
From Amir Sabah Salim down, pride had been taken in how stable the domestic environment was 
in Kuwait. This was hardly a country on a knife edge, as was to prove the case in Jordan for 
example, which had a majority Palestinian population compared to the under 12% they 
represented in Kuwait prior to the post-war influx'. Nor did Kuwait see the angry demonstrations 
witnessed in a number of Arab capitals, let alone the direct attack on western interests seen in 
other parts of the Gulf (see Chapter 3). However an existing conception among the dominant 
players within the ruling family that adopting radical Arab stances on foreign policy did not 
require accommodation with mildly reformist merchants or even domestic Arab nationalists, was 
further enhanced, despite the fact that a number of other Arab regimes were at this point seeking 
1960s, the term "bidoon", literally "without", was not so commonly used to refer to stateless Arabs resident 
in Kuwait as it is now. 
2 KMAN leader Dr Ahmad Khatib recalls that Amir Sabah Salim's instincts were towards accommodation, 
but his initiatives in this respect were effectively vetoed by the crown prince and defence and interior 
minister. On one such occasion, he says, they monitored the amir's meetings with Khateeb and prevented 
press coverage of a political understanding between them. Personal interview, Kuwait, 2003. 
3 The total percentage represented by Jordanians, who were largely Palestinians with Jordanian nationality, 
and a smaller number of Palestinians without Jordanian nationality, was 
11.6%, according to the April 1965 
census. (Sourced from "Kuwait - Form at a Glance", March 1966 
(DEFE 11/616)). 
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to balance their intemal and external political relations'. The evident failure of self-styled radical 
Arab states in the 1967 war and the subsequent introspection, despite their outward expression of 
defiance, made Kuwait's ruling family able to more forcefully apply constraints on political life 
in the name of "Kuwait First", believing this would increase their domestic political authority. 
The exclusion of many senior merchants from decision-making on domestic policy was not 
confined to the formal political process but, to the surprise of western governments, extended to 
the usually more significant circle of informal consultation. Diwaniyyas ("associations") would 
continue to be held both by Al-Sabah and by senior merchant figures alike (see Chapter 3). 
However, after the local political fallout from the January 1967 election, there was less discrete 
consultation where business, both political and economic, could be conducted between senior 
government and merchant figures, although there were other ways in which merchant interests 
could be accommodated. The process of state patronage through business contracts, or the 
ongoing process of selling valuable real estate at favourable terms, was a helpful glue, especially 
for the many merchants who were only inclined to be political if their business interests were 
threatened'. However, in the wake of samud ("steadfastness") payments to the "confrontation 
states" agreed at the September 1967 Arab League summit in Khartoum (see Chapter 4), and the 
fall in the value of Kuwait's Sterling holdings as a result of the UK government's devaluation 
(see Chapter 4), by 1969 merchants were holding the government responsible for the domestic 
economic slowdown. This provided part of the economic backdrop to what had become a 
significant rise in domestic political tension inside Kuwait. 
Bomb attack sparks further clampdown 
The spark for the discontent among the wealthier and more politicised merchants was the 
widespread perception among Kuwaitis and foreign observers that the unprecedented bomb blasts 
in January 1969 at the ministry of interior, the national assembly, and Saad Abdullah's residential 
4 In a sense Kuwait was inverting Steven David's concept of "omnibalancing" 
between external ideological 
pressures and their internal impact, by prioritising the regional environment through 
its Arabist foreign 
policy construct, thereby enabling it freer rein at home. Steven 
R. David "Explaining Third World 
Alignment", World Politics, Vol. 43 Issue 2, p. 233-256. 
5 The pattern of recycling landed interests enabled the 
Al-Sabah to become patrons after the merchants had 
initially enriched the ruling family through favourable trading. 
Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait University. 
Personal interview, January 2003, Kuwait. 
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garages were instigated by the ministry 6. There had been only minor injuries as a result, but some 
four months were spent questioning students and young activists who in some instances were 
from elite families. Shocking by Kuwaiti standards, beatings and even torture were allegedly used 
to produce confessions. One of the detained, Hussein Al-Yuha, was widely known as one of the 
most radical within the Kuwaiti branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement (KMAN), and there 
was a commonplace belief that the whole exercise had been planned by Saad Abdullah in order to 
frame At-Yuha and other KMAN activists', not least as labour union militancy, in which the 
faction was instrumental, rose. In the wake of the bomb attacks, some 3,500 foreign nationals 
were deported in January and February; 250 members of KMAN were arrested; and its 
mouthpiece, the weekly newspaper Al-Talia, was once again suspended from publication. 
Deportations of foreign leftists and non-Kuwaiti Arab nationalists continued, and, relative to the 
small total population size, reached an incredibly high figure over 1969-70 of approximately 
8 10,000 per year . 
Kuwait's organised Arab nationalists were not seen by the government as needing to be appeased 
by the adoption of staunchly pro-Arab foreign policy stances. In time, however, the government 
would recognise that repression could strengthen KMAN, which had already been reduced as a 
potential internal challenge, given its differences with the far more radical MAN, and divisions 
within the Kuwaiti "branch" organisation too (see Appendix 6). Kicked out of MAN, the 
"rightist" KMAN was encouraged to deepen its more or less exclusive "regional" (i. e. Kuwaiti) 
focus. In Aden leftist Arab nationalists had taken power and founded the People's Democratic 
Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in January 1968, following the departure of the British two months 
earlier. In July, the Baathists staged two coups in Iraq, the second ensuring they retained power. 
However, mindful of the recognition deal agreed with the Ba'ath government in 1963, the new 
regime was initially seen with some optimism by Kuwait, despite its far more radical ideological 
orientation than its immediate predecessor. In 1969 an essentially pro-Nasserite coup had been 
successfully conducted in Libya, led by Colonel Qaddafi. Despite North Africa's geographical 
remove, the Kuwaiti leadership were more concerned about events in Tripoli than in Aden and, it 
6 The US embassy for one was in little doubt that this was the case. (Telegram, August 14th, 1969, (A 146)). 
Interestingly, the US embassy also gave some credibility to the idea popular in Kuwait at the time that the 
British had a hand in at least advising on the operation, given the presence of a CID officer within the 
interior ministry (Ibid. ). 
7 Many Kuwaitis believed that the bomb itself had been planted by the ministry of interior, according to the 
US embassy, "Country Appraisal", June 24th, 1969 (A 124). 
8 According to interior and defence minister, Shaikh Saad Abdullah, in a May 1971 national assembly 
debate on the government's internal security measures. 
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seemed, Baghdad. In Libya, after all, a perceptibly pro-western monarch had been overthrown. 
Throughout the Arabian Peninsula, the Kuwaiti leadership had long expressed support and even 
funded Arab nationalist challenges to traditional, often shaikhly, pro-British rule. Ironically, 
closer to home, foreign policy needed to be constructed with an Arab nationalist and therefore 
effectively anti-British symbolism in mind, but inside Kuwait organised Arab nationalists could 
be reined in as long as this was not counter-productive. In reality the "success" of such forces in 
south Yemen was not welcomed, but, diplomatically, they were firmly embraced (see Chapter 6). 
Regional upheaval that in many instances had a direct relationship to the aftermath of the 1967 
war, would at the same time encourage the Kuwaiti leadership to favour internal political 
constraint. 
KMAN continued to endorse the non-revolutionary socialism of the Nasserite variety, whilst also 
asserting its right to "regional" autonomy. The Kuwaiti authorities, however, continued to view 
KMAN as potentially damaging to internal stability and to the amirate's foreign relations; 
southern Gulf Arab governments for example expressed disquiet at KMAN's encouragement of 
agitation against the British presence. This perception only grew in the post-war period, and 
despite, or perhaps because of, evidence that MAN had little regional weight and were divided 
locally, the government sought to constrain KMAN further. The government's contempt for 
KMAN was compounded by the fact that the recent assassination of former Iraqi vice-president 
Hardan Al-Tikriti in Kuwait, by, it was assumed, Iraqi agents, had not been mentioned in the 
debate by any of the Arab nationalist MPs, despite being a very clear breach of internal security'. 
To the anger of KMAN, among those escaping the post- 1967 domestic political clampdown were 
non-Kuwaiti Islamists and conservatives, such as figures from Hizbut Tahrir and the Syrian 
Social Nationalist Party (SSNP). The Kuwaiti goverm-nent wanted to foster domestic conservative 
Islamist opinion as a bulwark against the "secular" nationalists, and as such prefigured the 
approach to the "political salafi" and Muslim Brotherhood organisations in the amirate after the 
1990 occupation. 
9 Saad Abdullah told the US ambassador that "he was inclined to suspect that there was some sort of 1h 
association between the (Kuwaiti) Arab Nationalist 
Movement and certain Iraqis" May 26 , 1971 
(A5 1). 
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Merchants repoliticised 
The government's authoritarian posture had had the affect of repoliticising some of the wealthier 
merchant families, who had hitherto been relatively quiet. The Al-Jana'at clan were especially 
aggrieved at the actions the government was taking to constrain political life". The government 
had upset the delicate internal balance by which senior families had traditionally been 
accommodated either on the inside of the political process or, more typically, through informal 
decision making channels in which they were carefully consulted. 
Shaikh Jabr Al-Ali, the minister for guidance and Islamic affairs, commented in 1968 that the 
country was "still a bedu society, " which he said, "thrives on, and can only be controlled by, 
machinations, " identifying Saudi Arabia as a parallel with how politics should, in his view, be 
managed in Kuwait". In fact Kuwait's relations with Saudi Arabia were to be upset by the extent 
to which Jabr Al-Ali's patronage politics saw him grant citizenship to a number of members of 
his wife's tribe, the Ajman. The Ajman were central to Saudi Arabia's tribal polity12 and Riyadh 
viewed its members as Saudi in origin". Jabr Al-Ali, a nephew of the amir and a fellow member 
of the Al-Salim line, directly cultivated and armed Kuwaiti bedouin leaders and sought to draw 
them into the political process" as a counterweight to urbanised, relatively liberal senior families 
that were opposing the government's authoritarianism. However he was uncomfortable with how 
far the government had gone in clamping down on dissent and had long offered to "relieve" the 
crown prince of the "burden" of the premiership and thus of managing parliament and wider 
political relations. 
Kuwait's management of oil patronage had been an example of "tribalised govemment"15 in the 
sense of co-option of key kinship interests having been facilitated by the disbursal of property and 
government contracts. Since the 1940s this process had helped to create urbanised elites from 
'0 US embassy to State Department, June 24 th , 1969 
(A 124). 
" US embassy report of Ambassador's meeting with Jabr Al-Ali, November 25th, 1968 (A380). 
12 Madawi Al-Rashid, "Tribal Confederations and Emirates in Central Arabia", Tribes and Power - 
Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East, Faleh A. Jabar and Hosham-Dawood (Ed) (London; Saqi, 
2003). 
" Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf - Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Fuad 1. Khuri, Tribe and State in Bahrain - The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an 
Arab State, (London; University of Chicago Press, 1980), p239. 
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among the senior families and had therefore aided the process of "detribalisation" as kinship 
groups thought less in tribal ten-ns and more in terms of their common business interests. 
However from the late 1960s the beginning of the political and economic incorporation of the 
bedouin gave their leaders enhanced economic authority at the same time as lessening their tribal 
autonomy. This was in a sense a further extension of the long-standing co-optive tribalism seen in 
Kuwait and other Gulf amirates 16 ,a form of political management that had steadily deepened 
state authority by patronising kinship interests without emphasising tribal identity. However the 
bedu were now being incorporated in order that they could be politically manipulated by senior 
AI-Sabah against the wealthy urban elite families, a politically partisan exercise that therefore 
contrasted with what had been the steady accretion of state authority over tribal organisation. 
These "politicised" bedouin tribal interests would gradually coalesce with the incipient religious 
conservatism that the government was promoting, and provide a deepening of support, albeit 
eventually willing to be critical, for the Al-Sabah against liberal and Arab nationalist groupings. 
The senior merchant families, such as that traditional bastion of political influence, the Al-Saqr, 
could continue to be politically side-stepped by the ruling Al-Sabah as long as oil revenues were 
effectively and generously disbursed. By late 1969, a number of senior liberal merchants, 
including Abdel Aziz Al-Sagr, held an open public meeting, provocatively declaring themselves 
the "real parliament", at which they held the government responsible for the economic slowdown 
being experienced in Kuwait". This economic complaint would coincide with senior merchant 
disquiet at the Al-Sabah's style of domestic political management and at the new tribal interests it 
was favouring. While this renewed merchant political activism fits with rentier-based assessments 
of Kuwaiti politics", the elite merchants continued to support domestic and foreign policies that 
19 disadvantaged their economic interests 
In response to criticism of its economic management, the government would continue to stress its 
leading role in the country's developmene'. However Kuwait's increasingly authoritarian polity 
increased sympathy for KMAN among relatively liberal merchants whose political persuasions, 
16 Ibid. 
17 US embassy to State Department, December 24th, 1969 (A-207). 
" Crystal op. cit. and Mary Ann T6treault "Autonomy, Necessity, and the Small State: Ruling Kuwait 
in the 
Twentieth Century", International OrRanisation 45,4 (1991). 
19 Abdel Aziz Al-Sagr held the Ford agency contract in Kuwait. However he supported the government's 
boycott of foreign companies that had business involvements in Israel, and never criticised the 
government's inclusion of Ford in its boycott list. 
20 On one occasion, in almost the same breath, fealty with Mecca was expressed alongside a proud 
boast 
about the number of post boxes there were in the amirate. 
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while broadly sympathetic to Arab nationalism, were usually more sceptical about the socialism 
that KMAN espoused, even if some had sounded sympathetic a few years earlier. The political 
fallout was far from uniform however, or in some instances was beginning to emerge in the 
government's favour. One emergent countervailing trend to the reformist and radical groupings 
were the Social Reform Society (SRS), which some less elite merchants supported. As the 
government moved to control organised political trends, it increased its funding of this 
conservative Muslim group. This, in significant measure, was an outlet for the relatively small but 
active number of Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwaan Muslimeen) members in Kuwait who included 
among their number sympathisers from Egypt. The discrete presence of Ikhwaan Muslimeen 
among the large community of Egyptian teachers in Kuwait was occurring at the same time as 
neighbouring Saudi Arabia was providing a relative free rein in its education sector for Nasser's 
enemies. By 1970 the SRS was challenging the newly-founded Kuwait University, which was 
proposing to introduce co-education. Other trends succeeded in offsetting pressure. Senior 
members of the AI-Sagr clan intervened directly with KMAN and succeeded, given the respect 
afforded the public stance of this leading liberal merchant family, in persuading them not to stage 
protest demonstrations for fear of clashes. 
Palestine as badge of pro-Arab policy 
Despite domestic upheaval, Kuwait continued to maintain the bases of its foreign policy. While 
the outcome of the 1967 war had, on the face of it, made the shaikhly regimes in the Gulf less 
sensitive to ideological attack, it did not alter the Al-Sabah's established approach to regional 
relations. Funding by the Kuwait government and by senior individual Al-Sabah for what from 
1969 had become the dominant PLO faction, Fatah, was not simply a matter of cynical politics 
although it did no harm to the regime's image at home and in the region. After all, ardent support 
for the Palestinian cause was already a long standing foreign policy construct and in large 
measure an article of (political) faith that embraced senior Al-Sabah and well placed members of 
the foreign ministry in particular". The historical antecedents of this policy were evident in the 
beliefs of many of the merchants who led the movement for political reform in Kuwait in the 
1930s and the fact that the founding and political succour of Fatah had taken place in the amirate 
21 According to Dr Abdul-Reda Assiri, the personal predilections of the foreign minister and senior foreign 
ministry advisors were of significance in Kuwait's overtly pro-Palestinian policy. 
Personal interview, 
Kuwait, January 2003. 
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(see Chapter 3)22. Western officials in Kuwait were less charitable in their assessments, however, 
and the US embassy, for example, saw such events as "Commando Week" in 1969 as a particular 
pet project of the minister responsible, Shaikh Jabr AI-Ali. He was continually seeking ways to 
enhance his domestic and Arab political stock, and thus would have been attracted to this 
relatively painless use of what in Kuwait (and throughout the region) was a political virility 
symbol. In general the US saw the large levels of financial aid to Fatah that flowed from Kuwaiti 
government officials and private businessmen in the post-1967 period as a contribution to the 
country's "image building", believing it of undoubted utility in the domestic (as well as regional) 
political arena. "Progressives, " wrote a US embassy analysis, "are therefore obliged to admit that 
Kuwait's capitalist heart beats for at least one doctrinally acceptable cause 23 ." There is no doubt 
that well-placed officials and well-connected individuals understood that such donations fitted 
with the projection that the government wanted to make of its formal commitment to Palestine, 
and that in making such financial contributions they certainly would not be acting against 
government "policy". However, given that an emergent radical Palestinian nationalism was 
beginning to grab regional and world attention in its armed expression byfedayeen (guerrillas), 
such support had significant connotations for Kuwait's wider relations, and was not quite the easy 
gesture that US assessments suggested. In addition, the autonomy of key Kuwaiti decision- 
makers and other lower ranking officials and businessmen in making these financial 
commitments, indicates how "policy" on this and more complex issues, was a matter of 
individual preference based on an almost intuitive understanding of what the parameters were. 
This was less collective cabinet responsibility as traditionally understood in Britain, than 
individual choices within a consensual framework. Palestine was a badge of the Kuwaiti elite, of 
the Al-Sabah and non Al-Sabah's fealty to the Arab nation; it served presentational purposes, 
sometimes quite calculatedly, for example when ministers joined Shaikh Jabr Al-Ali in publicly 
lauding the fedayeen and school children were taught, often by Palestinian teachers, of the 
guerrillas' heroism. 
Events in Palestine, and the influx of Palestinians as well as educated Arabs from Syria, Iraq and 
Egypt especially from the 1930s onwards, and Kuwaiti merchants' education in the major Arab 
capitals in the 1940s and 1950s, had had a direct impact on the original politicisation of the 
22 See for example Rosemary Zahlan, "The Gulf States and the Palestine Problem, 
1936-48", Arab Studies 
Quarterly, Volume 3 Number I (198 1). Others, such as KMAN leader Ahmed Khateeb, view the amirate's 
early solidarity as more instrumental (see Appendices). 
23 US embassy Kuwait to State department (May 
27th 1969 (A I 11)). The analysis includes the even more 
acerbic reference to the "guilty consciences" of "private 
Kuwaitis and government officials with crocks of 
gold, and no desire to confront IDF snipers, assuage their consciences with 
bank drafts. " 
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merchant elites and on Shaikh Abdullah Salim and other less conservative Al-Sabah 24 . Some of 
these views continued to be widely held among leading Al-Sabah and in wider government 
circles, among whom were several naturalised Palestinians. The attachment to Palestine, although 
far from unique in the Arab world, helped inform a notion that senior Al-Sabah often had of the 
country's "role" in the region. Kuwait's "national role conception"25 , and the ideational factors 
behind its foreign PoliCY16 , revealed an overlap 
between collective self-conception and policy 
outputs. However, the primary factor behind Kuwait's leadership sometimes assertively 
projecting the "role" of upholder of Arab nationalist causes that were seemingly at odds with the 
country's shaikhly traditions and defence relations with the UK (and, increasingly from the early 
1970s, the US), was to offset Kuwait's perceived vulnerability within the region. This explains 
the difference between the obligation on all Arab governments to at least be seen to be saying the 
right things over Palestine, and an essentially conservative Kuwaiti regime that, in both rhetorical 
and practical terms, went "beyond the call of duty". Its leaders were mindful of the country's 
traditions and of the popular sympathies of the political and economic elites, but ultimately 
maintained a consensus within a tight circle of Al-Sabah decision makers that projecting an 
identification with Palestine, and even with Arab "anti-colonial" struggles in Arabia, could 
minimise hostility from radical Arab states. Ironically, Kuwait projected an Arabist foreign policy 
that often saw it effectively saw it side with nationalists in neighbouring states in their struggle 
against British-backed hereditary ruling families (see Chapter 3). The strength or weakness of its 
own Arab nationalists had little bearing on this. Rather, the fact that KMAN were able to agitate 
through the assembly and organise Kuwaiti nationals in trade unions gave the Al-Sabah greater 
confidence in expressing solidarity with similar movements abroad. The extent to which they did 
so was more a judgement about external Arab pressures, however. 
The attachment of the Kuwaiti government to the Palestinian cause was seen by US officials in 
the amirate at the time as symptomatic of the strength of Palestinian representation within 
Kuwait, both as a numerically sizeable group with a major, white collar public sector role, and as 
an organised political presence whose substance became more significant in regional and 
international terms post- 1967. Less deterministic positions have been taken by some US officials 
24 1 am grateful to both Dr Abdul-Reda Assiri of Kuwait University and Dr 
Ahmed Khateeb (former 
KMAN leader) for their insights into this historical process, which, while potentially self-serving in the 
latter case, provided an interesting insight into Kuwaiti national self-perceptions among elites outside of 
the 
ruling family. See also Zahlan, op. cit. 
25 K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy" in Stephen Walker (Ed. ), Role 
Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (Durham 
(NC); Duke University Press, 1987). 
26 Barnett, pp. cit. 
128 
subsequentl Y27 . However, after the 1967 war the large dispersion of Palestinian refugees into 
neighbouring states and further a field, including a greatly increased number, in addition to the 
already large community, in Kuwaie', and the regional tension caused by heightened Palestinian 
fedayeen activity in Jordan and Lebanon from 1969-71, prompted widespread speculation among 
Arab states as to what their domestic Palestinian populations would do. However the Kuwaiti 
leadership had a clearly understood modus vivendi with Fatah, who, as the dominant PLO faction, 
provided the focus for the more political among Palestinians resident in the amirate. The 
obligations on Fatah, including total non- interference in Kuwaiti politics, had been carefully 
respected by the leading Palestinian faction since its founding in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti 
government had allowed the Palestinian organisation to maintain its office, albeit clandestinely. 
This was despite the fact that the PLO had been established in 1964 as an Egyptian-led initiative 
at the Arab League to make it the representative of the PalestinianS29 . British officials would later 
reflect on the Kuwaitis having "for many years purchased immunity from Palestinian outrages by 
a cautious provision of money and a safe haven"". However, the Kuwaitis' refusal to "rein in the 
fedayeen" in the amirate did not mean that the presence compelled them to support the struggle in 
Palestine. The US tried to encourage the Kuwaitis to act against the presence of Palestinian 
factions at a time when their fighters were coming under control in Lebanon due to an Egyptian 
diplomatic initiative, and then in Jordan due to violent repression. A Kuwaiti decision to kick out 
Fatah and other factions, and to overtly support westem-sponsored peace initiatives backed by 
Egypt, Jordan and eventually Syria (see Chapters 6 and 7) could have invited far more trouble 
than that constituted by the arrival of hijackers in 1972 and the terror incident in 1974 (see 
below). However Kuwait's stance on Palestine was not dictated by the organised Palestinian 
presence, nor was its financial support for the struggle against Israel comparable to the use of 
cash to facilitate Iraq's recognition of Kuwait as an independent state. 
27 According to William Brewer (former US consul in Kuwait (1955-57), who later became head of the 
Arabian Peninsula desk at the State Department (1966-70)), the Kuwaitis "did not need to appease the 
Palestinians" living in the amirate. Personal interview, Mass., USA, 2000. 
28 In 1975 there were 204,178 Palestinians in Kuwait, representing 20% of the total population, or 39% of 
the foreign population. Their number had risen by nearly three-fold since 1965, when they constituted 31% 
of the foreign population. Alvin Cottrell (General Editor), The Persian Gulf States -A General Survey 
(Baltimore; John Hopkins University, 1980). 
29 The maintenance of the Fatah office, despite the fact that Kuwait felt obliged to 
honour the Arab League 
decision to found the PLO and thus not have two organisations representing the Palestinians (up until the 
fedayeen takeover of the PLO from 1968), was attested to by a senior Kuwait-based Fatah leader, Khaled 
Al-Hassan. Alan Hart, Ara tt -A Political Biography (Bloomington and Indianapolis; 
Indiana University 
Press, 1989. ) p. 168. 
30 Ambassador John Wilton, Annual dispatch 1973, written January 1974 (FCO 8/2188) 
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On the other hand, the extent of Fatah's organisation of Palestinians in Kuwait did begin to give 
Kuwaitis, as well as some Palestinians, a sense that the amirate had devolved part of its security 
responsibility vis-d-vis this community to the local Fatah leadershi P31 . Kuwait also periodically 
feared that the Palestinian presence would, in the context of ongoing lack of resolution of their 
territorial conflict with Israel, translate into political demands within the Kuwaiti body politic". 
There is no doubt that the Kuwaiti leadership continued to recognise the power of fellow feeling 
in Kuwait amidst a strong Arab nationalist sentiment internally and regionally for Palestine. This 
could, on occasions, reach dramatic proportions. However it was carefully and assiduously 
managed by the Kuwaiti leadership33. 
Whatever the perceived desires of Palestinian residents, the fedayeen within or without its 
borders, or Kuwait's MAN branch and wider Arab nationalist sentiment and groupings within the 
country, the Kuwaiti government did not shape its Palestine or wider regional policies primarily 
with internal constituencies in mind. On Palestine, as on many other issues, there was not a 
coherent collectively determined policy, although there was a basic understanding that it was 
politic to back the PLO, notwithstanding the definite red lines that limited what the Palestinian 
residents or the Fatah office in Kuwait could do. Senior Fatah officials in the amirate, such as 
Khaled Al-Hassan, held an especially privileged position within the amirate. According to his 
own rather partial, but instructive, assessment, he was effectively running the government prior to 
independence 34 , and was being provided with a car and accommodation as a very part-time 
ministry of electricity official". However, with the exception of what was a very well behaved 
day of protest over the Jordanian clampdown in September 1970 (which was prevented from 
reaching the Jordanian and US embassies), the Palestinian community was not mobilised by the 
local Fatah office. Indicative of the Kuwaiti domestic management of the Palestine issue, and in a 
3' Laurie A. Brand, Palestinians in the Arab World - Institution Buildina and the Search for State (New 
York; Columbia University Press, 1988) p. 123, 
32 "First Impressions", Ambassador Archie Lamb, April 1974 (FC08/2192) 
33 A Palestinian solidarity event was organised in Kuwait by the government-funded, and regulated, 
National Union of Kuwaiti Students. Taking place at the time of the "Black September" crushing of 
Palestinian fedayeen by Jordanian forces in September 1970, it featured injured guerrillas who were 
publicly paraded to a very vocal and supportive audience. I am grateful to Professor Fred Halliday 
for his 
recollection of this event. 
34 Khaled Al-Hassan, one of the founders of Fatah, ran the Kuwait municipality prior to its election in 1962, 
and has described his role, given the municipality's primary role at that point for the amirate's public 
services, as akin to running Kuwait (Hart, gp. cit. ). 
35 From the late 1960s Khaled Al-Hassan, who was then employed by the ministry of electricity, was 
increasingly wrestling with other Fatah officials in Kuwait for control of the local office. However, 
according to US correspondence, this was conducted without 
impact upon, or reference to, the Kuwaiti 
government. 
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step that was unusual in the region 36 , payments to the PLO were deducted by the Kuwaiti 
authorities from the salaries of Palestinians working in the public sector (see Chapter 3). Despite 
the domestic and regional disquiet caused by the events of "Black September" in Jordan, the 
Palestinians' strike action in Kuwait was less than comprehensive, and was easily circumvented 
when Fatah activists sought to follow it up with a strike extending to all Kuwaitis. Given 
Kuwait's almost paternalistic approach to Fatah since its inception, and between whom there was 
a clear interest in mutual accommodation, this is hardly surprising. 
Individual Al-Sabah would seek to exploit the presence of a large number of Palestinians for 
intra-Kuwaiti political advantage, the most notable example being Shaikh Jabr Al-Ali. However 
the place of Palestine in the Kuwaiti body politic did not extend beyond carefully managed and 
understood boundarieS37 . The Kuwaiti military's largely symbolic contribution to the Al- 
Yarmouk brigade from before the 1967 war was exemplified by the state funerals given to 
Kuwaiti "martyrs" killed in the Suez Canal zone during the "war of attrition. However this would 
not be allowed to impinge on the amirate's defence and security policy. The Kuwaiti military 
regulations required that any member of its armed forces who had any connection with the 
fedayeen be court-martial led, while the chief of staff, Shaikh Mubarak Abdullah Al-Jabr Al- 
Sabah, asserted that no Kuwaiti was fighting with thefedayeen, although there was at least one, 
rather senior, exception to thiS38. In practice Kuwaiti arms were reaching Palestinian fighters in 
Jordan, presumably via Iraq. While probably not directly sanctioned by the Kuwaiti chief of staff, 
these acts of solidarity were likely to have been undertaken with the knowledge of the Kuwaiti 
army command 39 . This emphasises 
how Kuwait made gestures on Palestine, at the risk of 
alienating Jordan, but would not allow any action in support of Palestinian armed organisations 
that could threaten its own national security. This was not unlike the constraints that Syria, for 
example, put on Fatah and the PFLP's MAN forerunner before and, rather more 
36 This move, which was unique among the Gulf Arab monarchies and shaikhdoms, was not formally 
introduced in Kuwait until 1968, when, following the 1967 war, the Kuwaiti leadership was anxious to be 
seen regionally and internally as assisting the Palestinian struggle, albeit from a safe remove. Interestingly, 
however, steps toward this had been discussed by senior Kuwaitis as early as 1964. 
37 This understanding, evident in the British and US embassy records, has subsequently been confirmed 
in 
the author's interviews with senior Kuwaitis. 
38 Fahad Ahmed AI-Sabah (a younger half-brother of Crown Prince Jabr al-Ahmed) fought with Fatah in 
Al-Salt in Jordan, where he had been injured in an Israeli attack in 1968; and, according to Dr Rosemary 
Said-Zahlan, was arrested in Lebanon for fighting with thefedayeen; and then went on to raise 
funds in 
Kuwait for Fatah. US embassy, April 28th, 1969, "The Kuwaiti military and the fedayeen" (A083); and 
information supplied personally by Dr Said-Zahlan. 
39 Reports of anns from Kuwait reaching the Palestinians 
in Jordan were contained in US embassy briefings 
for the State Department during this period. 
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comprehensively, after the 1967 war. However Kuwait had no "frontline" to defend, nor was it 
interested in taking up an overt position on what was becoming an increasingly contentious issue 
in the Arab world of thefedayeen's freedom of activity in states neighbouring Israel. 
No internal military threats 
The Kuwaiti armed forces did not include any Palestinian nationals, in part because of a 
perceived risk. However, among the non-commissioned and junior officer ranks there were some 
foreign Arabs, chiefly Iraqis, as well as Egyptians and Syrians. However, in the context of 
territorial pressure from Iraq and the increased activity of its intelligence services in the amirate, 
the rate of increase in the number of Iraqis working in various capacities in the amirate had 
slowed markedly by 1975 40 . Iraqi guest workers in the amirate were widely resented as a number 
of them tried, albeit with very little success, to recruit local Kuwaitis to join the Ba'ath part Y4 1. 
The ordinary ranks of the Kuwaiti armed forces were mainly dominated by Kuwaiti bedu, as were 
approximately half of the officer posts, while most senior ranks were occupied by non-bedu 
Kuwaiti nationals. The bedouin, despite their unequal political and economic position in Kuwait, 
were very loyal to the Al-Sabah 4' and were more capable soldiers than other KuwaitiS43 . However 
the desire to exclude foreign Arabs and other non-Kuwaitis from the armed forces meant that 
throughout the 1970s there was still a shortage of commissioned and non-commissioned 
officerS44 . The most likely threat of a coup, or at 
least disaffection, was from younger, 
commissioned officers, frustrated - as were other younger, reformist, western- educated, members 
of the Kuwaiti elite - with the relative paralysis in domestic politics. However the prospect of 
serious disaffection taking hold was slim. One factor was the dominant position of bedu 
throughout the rankS45. More fundamentally, the lack of permeation of radical Arab nationalist 
ideology among Kuwaitis; the ongoing government patronage of merchants, despite their earlier 
economic frustrations; and the financial and political incorporation of the bedouin, made coup 
plots unlikely. Attempts at external stimulation in the post-1967 environment were even less 
40 In 1975 Iraqis in Kuwait numbered 45,070, some 4.5% of the total population. Cottrell, op. cit. In 1965 
there were 39,316, or 8.4%. 
41 Suleiman Majid Al-Shaheen, former foreign ministry official. Personal interview, Kuwait, January 2003. 
42 In the period prior to the Iraqi invasion of 1990, the sensitivity about Kuwait-resident 
bedouin believed to 
have originated from Iraq was not markedly greater than toward those who 
dwelt in the south of Kuwait. 
43 UK embassy to FO, November 4h, 1974 
(FC08/2189). 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
132 
plausible. Internal upheavals in Iraq after the coups in 1968 that eventually ensured the return of 
the Ba'ath to power, the continuing intra-party power struggles in Syria, and Egypt's established 
desire to maintain Kuwait as a stable and independent entity made this scenario unlikely. The 
revolutionary upheavals of neighbouring Arab states held little appeal in Kuwait, even among its 
more radical Arab nationalists. However the constraints caused by upheaval inside Kuwait's 
radical neighbours made the Kuwaiti leadership concerned about prospective local sympathisers, 
in particular foreign nationals, whatever their apparent ideological differences with the "home" 
country. 
When communicating about Kuwait, the US government was disproportionately preoccupied 
with assessing how the presence of Arab nationals from "radical" Arab states could contribute to 
instability in the amirate to the potential advantage of the USSR. However, the US embassy's 
assessment overwhelmingly continued to be that the large non-Kuwaiti Arab population had little 
interest in being in Kuwait other than to make money and that they would not be prepared to put 
this at risk. Nevertheless, the US simultaneously believed that the very presence of Palestinians 
was directly moulding Kuwait's policy on Palestine. Saudi Arabia prognosticated that the nearly 
50% of the population who were foreign Arabs would be the first to join some popular uprising 
against the Al-Sabah. However the US did not judge that the Palestinians or other foreign Arabs 
were likely to play a part in any scenario of internal upheaval in this period". 
Domestic radicalism 
The Kuwaiti authorities' greatest concern was external security threats. However the events of 
Black September in Jordan did give the government pause to reflect on its ability to deal with an 
internal challenge beyond past conceptions of external invasion or a related coup. This in turn 
encouraged it to seek the US's advice on internal security matters. Senior Al-Sabah were clearly 
suspicious enough of KMAN to want to ensure that its political strength was contained. However 
the government was to eventually decide that it was better to use more subtle means. The crown 
prince and prime minister, Jabr Al-Ahmed, and his close ally, the defence and interior minister, 
Saad Abdullah, concluded that too authoritarian a polity risked upsetting those whose tacit 
" According to the US embassy, a rather confused assessment of foreign Arab nationals' motivation was 
provided in 1969 by Omar Saqqaf, the Saudi foreign minister, who, while arguing that they were primarily 
in Kuwait for financial reasons, believed they would be prepared to put that at risk and to support an 
"uprising". US embassy, Jiddah to State Department, 4th January 1969 (POL23/KUW XR DEF 1) 
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political consent, whether formally expressed within the assembly or not, was an important prop 
to Al-Sabah rule. Talk of electoral reform came to nothing, however, and leading merchant 
reformers were not persuaded to answer the crown prince's call of "public duty". 
Despite this, the 1971 election saw 15 MPs returned who were either KMAN members, or 
sympathetic to them, a marked increase on the six KMAN MPs who were elected in 1967. The 
1971 election also led to greater bedu representation in the assembly. The maintenance of a 
comparatively large number of constituencies, 25, in an electorate whose number remained small 
but had been selectively expanded by Shaikh Jabr Al-Ali's recruitment of additional bedouin 
voters, increased the latter's representation to the point where, despite the lack of election 
gerrymandering, the result had effectively been engineered to raise the overall number of "pro- 
government" representatives. The bedu MPs elected in January 1971, while clearly orientated (as 
those identifiable as "tribal" largely are to this day in Kuwait) toward maintaining their own 
patronage networks, proved loyal. However their loyalty was not so much to the government as to 
their specific Al-Sabah patron, Jabr Al-Ali. He tried to use the ongoing dispute in parliament and 
with KOC over the oil "participation agreement" to increase his bargaining position with Jabr Al- 
Ahmed. At one point it even looked like government could fall over the desire of a senior Al- 
Sabah to secure a top position within it. 
Oil policy 
The oil participation agreement, which initially proposed a 20% stake for Kuwait in line with an 
947 OPEC negotiated "norm , turned into a two year wrangle 
between the government and KOC. 
Encouraged by demands for a far greater stake articulated by Jabr Al-Ali's supporters in 
parliament and KMAN, and Al-Siyassa'8 , the government secured a 
60% Kuwaiti "participation" 
agreement with the international oil companies (IOCs) in July 1973. Senior officials had for 
several years assumed that full public ownership of Kuwaiti oil assets, in common with other 
Arab oil producers, would eventually follow, and indeed Kuwait had been one of the first to make 
an agreement, in principle at least, over participation. However Crown Prince Jabr Al-Ahmed was 
prepared for the pace and extent to be altered according, principally, to the regional mood and 
47 In 1972, the Geneva Agreement established that OPEC member countries would seek 20% ownership of 
production, refining and distribution of their national oil industries. 
48 Al-Siyassah was founded in 1968 by Shaikh Jabr Al-Ali with the undoubted purpose of advancing 
his 
claims to a top position by adopting a critical, mildly 
Arab nationalist, perspective on government policy. 
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powerful neighbours' own agreements with the IOCs. Notably, in 1972 the Kuwaiti parliament 
passed a unanimous resolution praising Iraq for its nationalisation of the Iraqi National Oil 
Company, in overtly Arab nationalist language. The pace of Kuwait's increasing participation in 
KOC would bear Iraq, and the closer parallel of Saudi Arabia's negotiations, in mind. A]-Ateegi 
was keen to accommodate the strengthening regional and domestic mood and, like his 
parliamentary opponents in parliament, saw oil as a totem of his Arab nationalist credentials. 
However, Al-Ateegi was also keen to ensure that increasing public ownership was secured by 
agreement with the IOCs'9, and to serve both the interests of the Kuwaiti government and of the 
country's oil sector. In 1973 the national assembly was effectively setting the ever widening 
parameters of the Kuwaiti government's oil ownership ambitions. Following the rise in Arab 
nationalist sentiment caused by the war, the assembly debated a bill backed by essentially 
conservative MPs for immediate nationalisation. For the Kuwaiti government the oil issue was an 
increasingly urgent test at home and in the wider Arab world; one that, by taking bigger slices of 
KOC-produced oil into public ownership and constraining oil supplies internationally, enabled 
calculations of economic interest and political posturing to increasingly overlap. 
Consensus understood but unspoken 
Despite the view expressed by one senior Al-Sabah that there was a collective policy on oil 
participation, in Kuwait neither this or any other policy was a matter of cabinet discussion, let 
alone "bureaucratic" decision making of the traditional, collective cabinet, kind then operating in 
Britain. Within the Kuwaiti government, policies were not discussed within a formal cabinet 
setting, and rarely, in any detail, between even the senior players of this period: the crown prince, 
the defence and interior minister, and the foreign minister". 
This is likened by the British ambassador of the period as encouraging not so much bureaucratic 
interests as business ones in an environment where formal decision making structures are almost 
complete lacking. ".. the Administration-cum-Establishment operate largely as individuals, 
making their policy and carrying it out to meet their personal inclinations. The cabinet discusses 
routine affairs of the day almost to the exclusion of long-term policy considerations; no structure 
49AI-Ateegi. Personal interview, February 2005, Kuwait City. 
50 "First impressions of Kuwait", AR Lamb, British Ambassador to Kuwait, I't August 1974, to James 
Callaghan, Foreign Secretary, (FCO 8/2192). 
135 
of Cabinet Committees or Planning and Assessment Staff supports ministers in their collective 
task; every Minister or senior (and junior) official is actively engaged in business as well as in 
government; and the disinterested man is, it appears, nowhere to be found 
Policies were merely "understood"; enormous autonomy as to how they were implemented, and 
adjusted, lay in the hands of the appropriate minister. On oil and finance, two issues of direct 
relevance to Kuwait's primary relations outside of the Arab world, the UK and the US, this meant 
Al-Ateegi. One other influential key player outside of the family was the former ambassador to 
the UN and the Arab League, and during the 1970s the minister for cabinet affairs, Abdul Aziz 
Hussein. His fon-nal role was liaising between the government and the national assembly. This 
made his counsel to the crown prince in particular invaluable. In foreign policy, Sabah Al-Ahmed 
Al-Sabah, half brother of the crown prince, did not have that much autonomy and was, in this 
period at least, still prone to consulting widely with Jabr Al-Ahmed 51 . 
Amiri abdication speculation 
The position of the amir, Sabah Salim, had become largely ceremonial by the beginning of the 
1970s. In part this was how he preferred it, and furthermore this fitted with the evolving 
constitutional structure established under Amir Abdullah Salim, who had created the position of 
prime minister following Kuwait's independence four years earlier and had envisaged it as the 
focal point for day to day government. Despite having a more active foreign policy interest, both 
as prime minister, and then in his first few years as amir, when he sought to embody Kuwait's 
regional aspirations, bolster its relations with the US, and raise his own profile in the process, for 
most of his period as amir, Sabah Salim settled into a role akin to that of a constitutional head of 
state in western monarchieS52 . Throughout the 
1970s, recurrent health problems, which had raised 
questions more than a decade earlier about Sabah Salim's eventual accession, reinforced his 
inclination to be largely detached from the day to day business of government. This even included 
51 One Kuwaiti observer has given weight to Sabah Al-Ahmed in the shaping of foreign policy 
in this 
period. For example, Dr Abdul-Reda Assiri, professor of political science, Kuwait 
University, personal 
interview, and Kuwaiti Foreign Polia, pp-cit. However serving US and British officials 
from this period 
tend to view Sabah Al-Ahmed as outside the loop when 
it came to key decision-making. For example, Sir 
Archie Lamb and Frank Maerstrone. Personal interviews, 2000. 
52 This view of the constitutional role of the Kuwaiti 
head of state having evolved in way that lent 
comparison to the "dignified" role of the monarch 
in the UK was endorsed by a UK ambassador to Kuwait 
during Sabah Salim's rule. Personal interview, September 2000. 
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foreign policy, especially once the die had been cast and his fondness for the British relationship 
failed to have any impact on the decision made by the UK government in 1968 to withdraw from 
the Gulf and to terminate its defence commitment to Kuwait (see Chapter 7). With his accession 
having come at the expense of the claims of the younger Jabr Al-Ahmed, then Sabah Salim was 
further inclined to allow the sharper, and more capable, former finance minister to take up a role 
akin to a chief executive. To some close observers of Al-Sabah politics, Sabah Salim's tendency 
to prefer office to power was a reflection of the compromise that had earlier seen him made heir 
apparent. A former British ambassador to Kuwait observes that as, under the pattern of intra- 
family alternance, the position of amir would after Abdullah Salim normally have gone to a 
senior member of the AI-Jabr, this would have made Sabah Salim "both temperamentally and 
constitutionally. ... reluctant to try to overrule or downgrade Jabr Al-Ahmed"". 
However, even though the Kuwaiti amir may often have been little more than the occupant of 
high office, his ongoing ability to conduct that role, in common with other Gulf Arab leaders then 
and today, made him central to the hierarchy of power beneath him and, ultimately, to the next 
accession. This consideration became crucial in the last few months of 1972 when it appeared 
increasingly likely that the amir would resign on health grounds. Al-Rai Al-Amm, the daily 
newspaper owned by the crown prince but, significantly, edited by Abdul Aziz Musa'eed, a close 
ally of Jabr Al-Ali, effectively called on Sabah Salim to stand down 54 . Upon the amir's return 
from successful health treatment in the US, however, a very large crowd gathered to greet him, 
and speculation as to his abdication soon died away. While the domestic political stalemate 
related to Jabr Al-Ali's parliamentary games may have encouraged the amir to consider 
resignation, Sabah Salim's willingness to continue was as likely to have been the result of 
pressure from the crown prince and the amir's nephew Saad Abdullah, whose interests were 
unlikely to be favoured in any shake-up of the emergent accession order. By the time Jabr Al-Ali 
eventually returned to the cabinet after the elections in January 1975, it was in a capacity that 
both satisfied his pride and ensured that the crown prince was firmly in control. Jabr Al-Ali re- 
entered government replete with the formal title of deputy prime minister. The tight circle of 
foreign policy decision-making, however, remained intact. 
" The pattern of alternance between the Al-Jabr and Al-Salim lines (descendents of the first two sons of 
Mubarak "the great") had effectively become the "constitutional position". Ibid. This is despite not being 
formally written down, and to this day being a matter of some dispute among those branches of the ruling 
family descended from the revered "founding" leader's other sons. 
5' Telegram to State Dept., October 27th, 1972 (A 145). 
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After the 1975 elections, the national assembly continued to contain a large number of bedu MPs. 
Despite the fact that Arab nationalists and Jabr Al-Ali's allies had created uncertainty in domestic 
political life, the election had been the most open, so far, in Kuwait's history. The election had 
featured the largest number of candidates seen since assembly elections were first held 12 years 
earlier, and more than half of those who took their seats in the assembly were new to 
parliament". The KMAN group and other elected Arab nationalists took advantage of the influx 
of some MPs less prone to government persuasion, and as a result were able to create a hijzhlv 
effective alliance on a range of issues. The most significant was the opposition's effort to oblige 
the government to negotiate the prompt move to 100% public ownership of KOC, which was 
effectively already a government commitment. Thus, when in 1975 the government announced 
that it was to take measures to transfer the newly formed joint management company, which had 
only just begun operating, into 100% public ownership, this was a speeding up of a process that 
had seen Kuwait left behind by its neighbours. 
Parliament crosses foreign policy red lines 
By Kuwaiti standards the assembly was becoming quite boisterous in two areas that crossed "red 
lines" as far as the ruling family was concerned. One was criticism of neighbouring countries and 
the other was criticism of members of the ruling family. The opposition, and in particular KMAN 
MPs such as Dr Ahmed Khateeb and Abdullah Nibari, were more emboldened to speak out on a 
range of issues sensitive for the Al-Sabah, and opposed a proposed increase in government 
powers over press and publications. In 1976 the assembly passed a resolution condemning Syrian 
military intervention in the Lebanese civil war and proposing that the government cut off all aid 
to Syria. The Lebanese conflict helped develop a concern in Kuwait, the seeds of which had been 
planted by the attempted fedayeen takeover in Jordan, that the amirate was potentially vulnerable 
to instability given its large Palestinian population, and what, by this stage, was the Kuwaiti 
national population's clear minority status vis-d-vis foreign nationals. Sections of the Kuwaiti 
press were giving expression to these concerns when the Lebanese civil war began in 1975. 
However, as the conflict ensued, a number of Kuwaiti press titles were, to the government's 
consternation, also becoming battlegrounds for differing Arab perspectives on the war and Syria's 
presence in Lebanon. The Kuwaiti press was largely staffed by ex-patriot Arabs, often 
Palestinians, but was owned and controlled by Kuwaiti nationals. It normally functioned as an 
55 Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1995) p. 92. 
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outlet for the former's political concerns, which traditionally were broadly congruent with the 
government's foreign policy stance. Over the conflict in Lebanon, however, the Arab world was 
polarising. 
In 1976 the Kuwaiti government closed down the network of Palestinian schools that had sprung 
up in the wake of the PLO's expansion of activities in Kuwait after 1967, and reintegrated 
Palestinian pupils into Kuwaiti state schools 56 . Despite events in Jordan a few years earlier, the 
Kuwaiti government had not altered its attitude toward the domestic Palestinian community, nor 
to the infrastructure of services and institutions for Palestinians whose offices were providing the 
leadership for Palestinians throughout the Gulf'. Nor had the Kuwaiti government sought to 
restrain the Palestinian community following the one, and only, Palestinian-related terror incident 
to be initiated on its soil. In February 1974, PFLP guerrillas; an obscure group, Sons of Palestine; 
and Palestinians operating in the name of the Japanese Red Army had occupied the Japanese 
embassy in Kuwait, and the authorities subsequently allowed a hijacked Japanese plane that had 
18 been commandeered in Singapore to land in the amirate . In the event Kuwaiti forces stormed 
the embassy and a deal was forged by Saad Abdullah whereby the hijacked plane could depart 
with the Palestinian fighters on board and head for Aden. In 1972 hijackers, connected in one 
instance to Fatah, had been forced on to the Kuwaiti authorities after having flown from European 
destinations, presumably in the belief that they would be treated more sympathetically in the 
amirate". As a result of these incidents, the Kuwaiti government became more sensitive to the 
possible overlap of what was assumed to be externally orchestrated terror, with its domestic 
Palestinian community. However, little action was taken against Palestinian interests in Kuwait 
until the Lebanese conflict began. Although careful to distinguish between Fatah and the PFLP, 
the Kuwaiti government wondered if its modus vivendi with Fatah would always be reliable, and 
also if the leading PLO faction would continue to constrain other Palestinian factions present in 
the amirate. Of course hijackings of aircraft were numerous throughout the Middle East during 
this period. In 1977 a series of incidents involved Kuwait along with a number of other Arab 
states when Palestinian, or pro-Palestinian, guerrillas sought to land in the amirate, or on doing so 
would attempt to extract money, and even, on one particularly audacious occasion, upon landing 
56 Laurie Brandt, Palestinians in the Arab World (Columbia; Columbia University Press, 1988), p. 122-125. 
" Ibid. 
58 John Wilton to Foreign Office, July 1974 (FCO 8/2190). 
59 In an incident in December 1972, fedayeen, who had occupied the Saudi embassy in Paris, landed by 
plane in Kuwait; and earlier that year, the Palestinian instigators of an attack at Rome airport arrived in 
Kuwait. 
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managed to acquire high-powered Kuwaiti and Palestinian hostageS60 . However Kuwait would 
often prove resistant to attempts by hijacked aircraft to land, and would manage to foil or end a 
plot without concessions being made to hijackers whose motivations were often venal as much as 
political". 
If the national assembly's reaction to the Lebanese conflict had been unwelcome to the Kuwaiti, 
as well as Syrian, government, then the fact that the parliament was to attack senior Al-Sabah 
members was wholly unacceptable to the ruling family. Three newspapers had been closed, 
apparently for printing allegations concerning the role of members of the Al-Sabah in land and 
property speculation, and the assembly asked "awkward questions 1162 about the conduct of the 
ruling family. This was seen by senior Al-Sabah as crossing a line which could have implications 
for the authority of the ruling family in general. The assembly was perfectly free to attack the Al- 
Sabah's policies, but denigrating individual members was seen quite differently. 
Assembly suspended 
The fact that the parliament had stirred up regional sensitivities, prompted domestic existential 
fears, and was prepared to target not just the Al-Sabah, but, in the absence of any significant 
merchant representation, to challenge vested economic interests too, meant that it had few friends 
among the elite and, at best, indifference among many ordinary Kuwaitis. Arab nationalist MPs 
had mobilised on many fronts, including attacking the planning process, the lack of effective 
stock market regulation, the operation of price controls and, most sensitive of all to those outside 
as well as within government circles, corruption. The decision to suspend the assembly was taken 
during the summer recess when many Kuwaitis, including many MPs, are out of the country. 
Upon his return to the country in August, an increasingly unhealthy amir was persuaded by Jabr 
Al-Ahmed, who had never been convinced of the elected assembly's merits, to announce the 
suspension of two clauses of the constitution. This enabled the indefinite suspension of the 
'0 In one incident in July 1977, the Kuwaiti chief of security and two senior PLO officials based in Kuwait 
were exchanged for the release of some of the original hostages, but all were eventually released on arrival 
in Syria. "Arab hijackers disown leader and surrender", July I Ph, 1977, Robert Fisk, The Times. 
61 , Commandos seize hijacker in wheelchair", June 7"', 1977, Robert Fisk, The Times. 
62 Frangois Dickman, Personal interview, August 2000. Dickman headed the Arabian Desk at the US State 
Department, 1972-76; and was ambassador to Kuwait, 1981-85. 
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parliament and of the commitment to press freedOM63 . The announcement did not meet any 
significant public opposition then, or in the subsequent monthS64 . However, in a reflection of the 
importance of the plethora of professional bodies in the domestic political life of the amirate, the 
government moved quickly to remove the existing boards of the major organisations and banned 
some completely, lest they express criticism of the assembly closure. 65 
The assembly was not to reconvene until early 1981, when, following the Iranian revolution of 
1978/79, Shia radicalism, both as an internal and regional force, having compounded their caution 
initially, led Kuwaiti leaders to seek to be more domestically inclusive but, once again, on a 
carefully calculated basis. The 1975 assembly election had already put down markers for the 
inclusion of Kuwaiti Shia by returning ten Shia MPs. While below the proportion of Shia in the 
national population, this was a significant advance on previous representation and reflected their 
utility to the government. By tending to be socially conservative (as seen in their willingness to 
ally with the SRS), Shia MPs were seen as a bulwark against more "secular", Arab nationalist 
representatives. A number of the Shia MPs were so-called "ajarn Kuwaitis", nationals of Persian 
extraction. When tensions rose with Iran after Britain's announced departure from the Gulf, then 
Kuwaiti leaders would worry about the size of their own Shia population as they had for some 
years about the large number of illegal Iranian workers in the arnirate (see Chapter 6). Prior to the 
Iranian revolution, however, the Kuwaiti government, while concerned about scenarios in which 
Shia leaders might be swayed by Tehran, did not believe they were fundamentally disloyal, even 
if the Shia community in general were less favoured by state policy than the Sunni Arab majority. 
The particular focus of the Al-Sabah's manipulation of the composition of the assembly during 
the period prior to the closure, had continued to be the bedouin, and, in an acknowledgement of 
their conservatism, Islam received a greater rhetorical focus in the set piece statements of the amir 
and the crown prince from the late 1960s, when it was mentioned in the same breath as the ritual 
commitment to Arabism (see Chapter 6). The leadership was also picking up on an emergent 
regional shift, encouraged by Saudi Arabia, of playing an Islamic card in foreign policy, and 
suggestions by the Saudis that Kuwait was no longer applying Islamic (Shariah) law. This, was in 
the context, however, of changing social mores and what the Saudis saw as the Al-Sabah's 
"irresponsibility" in allowing radicals in the assembly to grandstand on sensitive issues. Islamic 
63 Kelly, pp. cit. 
64 Sir Archie (AJ) Lamb, British ambassador to Kuwait 1974-77. Personal interview, 2000. 
65 Abdul-Latif Hassan Al-Rumaihi, "The Dynamics of Kuwaiti Foreign Policy"(Exeter; Exeter University, 
1983). p. 371. 
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references served a domestic and regional purpose, with the Al-Bayan speech notably seeing the 
crown prince "confirming" that Islamic law is "the source of all legislation"66 ,a position that did 
not reflect the more ambiguous constitutional position 67 , nor assuage Sunni Islamists who, 
principally through the vehicle of the SRS, would in the 1980s demand that the constitution be 
changed to reflect this assertion. 
Internal political autonomy 
Over the period following the 1967 war until the accession of Jabr Al-Ahmed as amir at the 
beginning of 1978, Kuwait's internal politics had gone through three distinct phases. The first 
was largely authoritarian and one in which the traditional Kuwaiti style of broad inclusiveness 
that could embrace both senior merchants of an often, but not exclusively, liberal inclination, and 
radical Arab nationalists, was mostly abandoned In the second phase there was a return to 
inclusiveness, albeit measured; and in the third a resumption of authoritarian politics, but not to 
the exclusion of the more senior of the traditional merchant allies of the Al-Sabah. 
Although political tensions inhibited decision making at the top, especially when the challenge 
from Jabr Al-Ali was at its height, there was little threat to stability within the amirate, whether 
from domestic opposition forces or from foreign Arab nationals. The fact that the senior Al-Sabah 
developed concerns about the potential for disruption from the large number of resident 
Palestinians, especially when a terrorist incident occurred, did not significantly impact on 
relations with this community or with Fatah, the principal PLO faction. Kuwaiti foreign policy on 
Arab national questions, or more discretely in relation to its security partnerships with the UK and 
then the US, were governed primarily by external calculations (see Chapter 7). The presentational 
need for "acceptable" stances on Palestine, and to a lesser extent in relation to "anti-British" 
movements in the southern Gulf, did not appreciably change as security fears increased. Nor were 
they in any sense reinforced as some kind of compensation for internal political forces. After all, 
Arab nationalists as well as conservatives were frustrated in their political demands, and were 
ultimately denied a formal platform altogether when the assembly was suspended. 
66 Bayan speech, US embassy to State Department, June I 
St 1970, (Pol I Kwt). 
67 Article 2 (State Religion) "The religion of the state is Islam and the Islamic Sharia shall be a main source 
of legislation. " 
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Internal dynamics in Kuwait in the period from 1967 until 1977 saw a growing sensitivity on the 
part of Kuwait's leadership to domestic developments, not least out of fear that the country could 
become prone to regional upheaval. One response of the amirate's "principle decision-makers 1168 
was to seek to broaden their domestic support by developing what has since become an 
established practice, that of patronising tribal interests. At the same time, Kuwait's radical 
political voices were periodically constrained, moves that initially upset merchant opinion. 
However, by 1976, the wholesale curtailing of public political life could be conducted with little 
opposition from key, non-Al-Sabah, families. Like the ruling family, they were mindful of 
regional concerns and, given the breadth of interests being targeted by KMAN, also believed that 
domestic dissent should have its limits. Kuwait's decision-makers were, in effect, solidifying 
their political autonomy and maintaining a plausible non-aligned Arabism in foreign policy by 
constraining political opposition at home. Domestic policies had partly changed as a result of a 
changed regional climate, while Egypt's changed status in the Arab world undoubtedly made 
Kuwait both feel more able to close down the assembly and more mindful of Saudi objections to 
its existence. In the 1975-76 period at least, the national assembly patently did not conforrn to the 
notion of a political elite as portrayed by Dawisha 69 in his typology of foreign policy decision 
making in Middle East states; the most outspoken MPs plainly were not cut from the social or 
ideological cloth of the principle decision makers in the way he, for example, suggested of the 
Egyptian parliament. Kuwaiti decision-making throughout the 1967-77 period would, however, 
remain the preserve of the few. Domestic political management was partly intended to underwrite 
the existing basis of foreign policy, and thus the latter did not shift to accommodate the changing 
weight of internal pressures, despite for example an increased concern about the Palestinian 
presence. Kuwaiti foreign policy decision making could be affected by members of the non Al- 
Sabah, and in one policy area of foreign as well as domestic policy relevance, the nationalisation 
of the oil sector, parliament plainly influenced that policy's evolution. For the most part, 
however, foreign policy was the sole preserve of a small coterie of decision makers who adhered 
to established foreign policy lines, even as the policy packaging would be altered to reflect a 
changing regional mood. 
68 A. I. Dawisha, " The Middle East", Christopher Clapham (Ed. ), Foreign Policy Making in Developing 
States: A Comparative Approach (Teakfield; Saxon House, 1975); and A. I. Dawisha, Egypt in the Arab 
World - The Elements of Foreign 
Policy (London; Macmillan, 1976) 
69 Ibid. 
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Chapter 6 
Regional dimensions 1967-77 
In the aftermath of the 1967 war, the Arab oil producers' embargo against those countries 
perceived as having aided Israel was soon terminated. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the leading Arab 
oil producers, faced little regional resistance in ending a policy to which they were plainly far 
from wedded. The embargo had by no means been thoroughly observed. However the shared 
need of Arab states, despite their very different polities, for a strong statement of opposition to 
compromise with Israel meant that a kind of quid pro quo applied at the post-war Arab League 
summit in Khartoum held in September 1967. The conference ended with a declaration 
containing the famous "three no's"; namely, "no" to negotiating with Israel, "no" to conceding 
territory to Israel, and "no" to recognising Israel. However, in a much less quoted part of the same 
passage, support for the diplomatic process, then gathering at the UN, was clearly affirmed'. 
Albeit in a contradictory fashion, the closing statement emphasised the on-going importance of 
Arab nationalist rhetoric to very different Arab states with very different foreign policy 
requirements. 
Kuwait continued its blanket assertion of the right of Palestinians to national self-determination 
and publicly opposed the emerging diplomatic process based on UNSCR242, which required 
recognition of Israel and its right to security (see Chapter 4). This stance remained a key prop of 
Kuwait's foreign policy identity throughout this period. It was also possible though to find 
Kuwaiti official statements that reflected the shifting mood within the Arab world, and 
specifically reflecting the assertion by the PLO, given its increasing prominence, of the primary 
role of Palestinian nationalism in the Arab struggle to establish a state in Palestine 
2. In private 
Kuwait would berate the US for not doing more to secure progress with efforts to advance a 
peace process involving a resolution of the Palestinian question and, by implication, a settlement 
with Israel. 
1 Alan R. Taylor, The Arab Balance of Power (New York; Syracuse University Press, 1982) 
2 The Amiri speech of 1971 contained reference to the rights of the Palestinians "to liberate their 
homeland", as opposed to the more traditional tendency to talk of the collective struggle of the Arab nation. 
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The outcome of the 1967 war caused a shift in the way Arab national ideas were expressed within 
the region. The soul-searching after the loss of all of historic Palestine led to a fundamental 
questioning in the Arab world of the relatively secular pan-Arab nationalism, with the Egyptian 
variant embodied as much by the personality, as the limited ideology, of Gamal Abdul Nasser', 
which was now in eclipse within the region 4. This did not prevent another, seemingly more 
radical, variant of radical Arab nationalist ideology' being asserted when, in Iraq, which had 
contributed troops to the fighting, the Baath party capitalised on the sense of failure and in 1968 
retook power. At the same time an essentially Nasserite coup led by Colonel Qaddafi was 
successfully staged in Libya in 1969. However, the gradual decline in the ideological authority of 
Egypt, despite remaining the leading military power in the Arab world, would eventually see a 
marked easing in the sharpness of the ideological cleavage of the "Arab Cold War 96 , whereby 
Cairo had previously sought to corral Arab countries into the so-called progressive as opposed to 
conservative camp. In its stead a rise of ideas expressing solidarity between very different Arab 
regimes occurred, and, gradually, a suffusion of this more generalised Arabism with an assertion 
of Islamic identity. The fallout from the 1967 war did not see blame within the Arab states of the 
Gulf attach to their leaders, nor a pronounced rise in domestic radicalism, even though this had 
been feared by the Kuwaiti leadership (see Chapter 5). Furthermore, the increased leverage that 
Arab oil producers' wealth gave them - the Khartoum conference had also mandated Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and Libya to make annual samud ("steadfastness") payments to the Arab states 
bordering Israel - meant that a more conservative, and therefore less polarising, take on Arab 
nationalism was now more in vogue. This followed the populist, radical Arab nationalism that 
had been dominant in the region following the military coup in Egypt in 1952 7. In the Kuwaiti 
case at least, this did not mean that its foreign policy on Palestine, or in support of what it 
3 Arguably "Nasserism" was no more populist and simplistic in its expression of pan-Arabism than its 
Baathist rival. However the founders of the Ba'athist movement, at least, sought to draw on an intellectual 
tradition in Arab nationalism, whilst incorporating this with aspects of socialism. See for example Bassam 
Tibi, Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enqjýia (London; MacMillan, 1981). 
4 Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament - Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967 (Cambridge; 
Cambridge University Press, 198 1); Tibi prefers to describe this as the decline of an ideology associated 
with Nasser, rather than of "pan-Arabism" per se. 
5 Tibi, op. cit. 
6 The title of Malcolm Kerr's assessment of the ideological disputes among the Arab states. Malcolm H. 
Kerr, The Arab Cold War - Gamal 'Abd aj-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958-70 (New York; Oxford University 
Press, 1971) 
7 Ajami, op. cit. (p. 80-8 1) "The style and expressions of the pan-Arabists gave way to a subdued language 
that was more in line with the sensibilities of the conservative states, more deferential to the heritage, less 
threatening to the prerogatives of wealth and power. The political discourse of the established leaders now 
emphasised inter-Arab solidarity rather than ideological splits and assigned a more central place to Islam 
than had been the case in the previous era. " 
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continued to portray as anti-colonial struggles elsewhere in the region, was displayed in language 
that was any less Arab nationalist. Kuwait's identification with causes long emblematic of the so- 
called "progressive" line was undimmed, even as it, in common with its arguably more 
conservative Gulf Arab neighbours, was, for the most part, less vilified in the Arab region. 
Ideology would continue to compound Kuwait's sense of security threat, however, as the Ba'ath 
take-over in Iraq - initially a source of optimism in the Kuwaiti government as they had 
negotiated recognition with the last Baath-led government in 1963 - was, in common with 
Ba'athist Syria, to project a radically Arab nationalist stance that maintained aspects of Egypt's 
formerly polarising approach to the region, but at much closer a distance. 
For one seasoned western official, the "central dilemma of Kuwaiti foreign policy" was the 
contradiction of being an oil-rich Gulf shaikhdom having to profess Arab nationalist causes as a 
kind of insurance policy against Arab nationalist regimes. 
"For a score of reasons of domestic political prudence, emotional commitments over Palestine, a 
desire to stand well with everybody, and a realistic assessment of the inability of the conservative 
regimes of the Arab world to help her in time of trouble, Kuwait has seen the best hope of 
political survival, at home and abroad, to lie in the espousal of the 'progressive' line, whether this 
emanates from Algiers, Tripoli, Cairo, Damascus or Baghdad. ,8 
However, in the early post-war period Kuwait was cleaving to a progressive line that often had 
more in common with Baghdad and Damascus than with Cairo, while Algiers and Tripoli (after 
the 1969 coup) were smaller and more removed players in Arab politics and as such were not to 
impact that directly on Kuwaiti foreign policy (see Chapter 6). 
An Islamic foreign policy? 
Following the political lead shown by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait reacted to the Arab political vacuum 
following the 1967 war with an assertion of her Islamic identity. However, given Kuwait's 
perceived vulnerability within the Arab world, a structure that Bassam Tibi has likened to a 
"regional sub-system"9, the amirate would continue to encourage caution and, as far as possible, 
accommodation with differing political trends. Kuwait's non-aligned espousal of Arab national, 
8 Ambassador John Wilton, "Annual Review 1972", January 1973 (FCO 8/1987). 
Tibi, op. cit., p. 23. 
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and what were increasingly Islamic, norms was to an extent a way of trying to opt out of the 
confines of the regional structure, whether an Arab one or a Gulf-wide one, by avoiding an 
ideological niche that was exclusively radical or conservative. Nor, by dint of Kuwait's past 
success in balancing a defence partnership with the UK, with radical foreign policy stances 
reflecting its regional and internal political tradition, would it suit it to try to adopt one single 
approach. Therefore, alongside the continued identification with mostly, but not exclusively, 
radical Arab causes, Kuwait's foreign policy would increasingly throughout this period also 
emphasise the country's Islamic identity. Kuwait had already begun to promote an Islamist 
political competitor to the Kuwaiti Arab Nationalist Movement (KMAN) within the domestic 
political sphere (see Chapter 5). However Kuwait's commitment to "Islamic fraternity", 
alongside "Arab unity" and non-alignment with the cold war blocs as the defining elements of its 
foreign policy'o, was to develop after Saudi Arabia formed the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC). In 1969, a series of meetings of representatives from the world's Muslim 
countries was launched by King Faisal, and a permanent secretariat was set up in the Saudi city of 
Jiddah. The founding of the OIC provided a platform for Saudi Arabia to offer a wider basis of 
leadership than the Arab nationalism that it distrusted, at a time when King Faisal's Arab rival, 
Gamal Abdul Nasser, was in political decline. Kuwait responded qualitatively differently to the 
OIC than it had to King Faisal's previous proposal for an "Islamic Summit" in 1965 (see Chapter 
3). In the new environment, however, the Saudi move appeared far less suggestive of divisive 
blocs within the Arab and wider Muslim world. All Arab states attended the first meeting, 
alongside other Muslim countries, and the October 1970 "Amiri speech" observed that the first 
meeting of the OIC was the only "positive note" in a series of incidents in the region in the 
previous 12 months which, it was recalled, had caused unwelcome division or discomfort". 
Intrinsically, Kuwaiti foreign policy, as a reflection of its national interest, would see little benefit 
in division among the Arab states or between the Arabs and Kuwait's powerful neighbour, Iran. 
Therefore Kuwait would continue to seek to mediate between countries in the region, or even 
beyond, in the case of India and Pakistan". Divisions within the Arab world specifically were not 
judged as beneficial to its own security position. Arab unity projects, such as those formally 
This was stated in the crown prince's "Bayan speech" in June 1970. US embassy to State Department, 
June 1970 (Pol I Kuw). 
11 Amiri speech, US embassy to State Department October 26th, 1970 (A 132). 
12 Kuwait tried to build on its efforts in brokering an agreement over Yemen by attempting to end the war 
that broke out in 1971 between India and Pakistan over the civil uprising 
in East Pakistan (Bangladesh). 
While historic connections with the Indian sub-continent were strong, Kuwait 
lacked the knowledge and 
leverage to be an effective player in resolving a conflict that had regional and 
international ramifications. 
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agreed in 1970 between Egypt, Syria, Libya and Sudan, and a different version a year later 
excluding Sudan, were officially welcomed. After all, Kuwait had professed a commitment to 
political unity as a means to secure Iraqi recognition and to accommodate wider regional as well 
as domestic Arab nationalist opinion (see Chapter 3). Rarely heralding meaningful political co- 
operation, the rhetorical commitment of Arab states to such plans was generally seen positively 
by Kuwait as being symptomatic of improved inter-Arab state relations, even if any likelihood of 
substantive political unity involving Iraq would make it nervous. Arab divisions had provided the 
backdrop to the apparent threat from Iraq in 1961, and Kuwait believed that its best prospect for 
13 advancing a foreign policy, whose primary focus was always "sovereign independence" , lay in 
ensuring that the most likely Arab threat, that from Iraq, was constrained when Baghdad was 
enjoying reasonable relations with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Kuwait's need to walk a careful line 
between the Arab world's "progressives" and "traditionalists" was made all the more difficult 
when these key countries "were at loggerheads" and the amirate was therefore obliged to choose 
one camp or the other 14. In the post-1967 environment this was less problematic, although, as 
Malcolm Kerr observed", the more radical countries were successful in preventing diplomatic 
progress involving Egypt or the "moderate" Arab states, by which he meant Saudi Arabia (and, 
by extension, Kuwait). Thus the Kuwaitis increasingly talked up Islamic solidarity and publicly 
opposed UNSCR242. Egypt, however, had supported the UN Security Council resolution as it 
could conceivably have led to the restoration of its lost territory, arguably reflecting the 
pragmatism that had encouraged Cairo to seek to restrain Syrian actions before a series of steps 
made war seemingly unavoidable in June 1967. 
Aligned with the PLO 
Kuwait's public position toward the post-war diplomatic initiatives reflected the dichotomy in the 
Arab world. An increasing number of Arab regimes now saw diplomacy as the only way to 
recover territory from Israel, hopefully, from the perspective of its neighbours in particular, 
without the addition of another Arab country, Palestine, whose political representatives were, 
from the late 1960s onwards, to cause major instability in Lebanon and Jordan. However 
13 The US assessed that, "Retention of sovereign independence will remain the core of Kuwait's policy, 
though endorsements of Arab brotherhood and solidarity are in many cases genuine and will continue. " US 
embassy to State Department, April 28th, 1969 (A08 1). 
14 UK Ambassador, Noel Jackson, quoted in Robert L. Jarman, Sabah Al-Salim Al-Sabah - Amir of Kuwait 
1965-77 (A Political Biography) (London; London Centre of Arab Studies, 2002) p. 235. 
15 Kerr, op. cit. 
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advocating a diplomatic solution that, by definition, excluded the increasingly popular fedayeen, 
the only forces that appeared capable and willing to challenge Israel, was risky for Kuwait, given 
the mood of popular Arab opinion. Notably, Kuwait gave the new PLO chairman, Yasser Arafat, 
political support, even as his rising profile and authority among Palestinians appeared to upset 
Egyptian desires to move closer to the US-backed peace process, after Cairo had in 1969 sought 
the PLO's constraint in Lebanon and then acquiesced in Jordan's crushing of PLO fighters in 
1970-71. Despite the Palestinians' guerrilla activity in Lebanon, Kuwait continued to provide an 
institutional, but not guerrilla, base for Fatah, in the face of criticism in Beirut and later Amman. 
Kuwait's long-standing identification with the Palestinian cause was overlapping with popular 
Arab opinion, including that of its most threatening neighbour, Iraq, as well as Syria, and from 
1969, Libya, who supported the armed struggle and rejected accommodation with Israel. Kuwait 
shared the radical Arab states' opposition toward international diplomatic efforts involving 
compromise with Israel, but only because it could not be seen to publicly back such initiatives. 
Thus Kuwait, despite its private sympathies, refused to publicly endorse the mission of the UN 
Secretary General's special representative Gunner Jarring, following the passing of UNSCR242. 
In private conversation with US ambassador Howard Cottam in advance of Amir Sabah Salim's 
trip to Washington in December 1968 (see Chapter 7), Crown Prince Jabr Al-Ahmed had said that 
if an agreement as a consequence of the Jarring mission could assure a "just and equitable 
solution", then Kuwait "would then lend it her support, even though this would be contrary to its 
deep convictions that Palestinians should be able to retrieve their homeland. " However, the 
Kuwaiti crown prince was explicit that he did not want word of this to get out publicly. In other 
words, the amirate was not prepared to run the risk of laying itself open to charges of 
compromising the fedayeen for a process that may fail to roll back Israel's recent territorial 
occupation, but would be happy to fall in line with her fellow Arab states if the process turned out 
to be successful. Nor would Kuwait do anything to assist what appeared to be improved prospects 
for a diplomatic breakthrough following the 1973 war, even though Syria looked as if it would 
embrace an initiative if it could be seen to provide a role for the PLO in negotiations. 
Neither Egypt nor Saudi Arabia were prepared to explicitly support reining in the fedayeen in 
Lebanon or Jordan. Therefore there was little expectation that Kuwait would shift from its official 
position of full solidarity with the guerrillas, even when specific incidents included attacks on 
non-Israeli targets and were therefore perceived as nothing other than terrorism by western 
governments. In March 1973, following the assassination by PLO gunmen of the US ambassador 
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in Sudan, the Amir was quoted in the Lebanese press expressing "unlimited support for the 
fedayeen"". While not a direct reference to the incident, but rather to the right of thefedayeen to 
pursue the armed struggle, the comment angered the US administration. Foreign minister Sabah 
17 Al-Ahmed then clarified that Kuwait did not support attacks on non-Israeli targets . However no 
senior Al-Sabah official was prepared to specifically criticise the Palestinian guerrillas for any of 
their actions, aside from 1974, when they were conducted on Kuwaiti soil (see Chapter 5) and the 
factions responsible were condemned by PLO chairman Yasser Arafat. 
Kuwait's adamant defence of the rights of the Palestinian fedayeen could conflict with its non- 
aligned position in the Arab world. In November 1969 Egyptian president Gamal Abdul-Nasser 
negotiated the Cairo Agreement with the fedayeen. The deal tried to take both a radical and a 
pragmatic position, maintaining the fedayeen's right to bear arms and conduct operations in 
defined areas, but not to contradict Lebanese sovereignty and security. This then became the 
position of the Kuwait government. However, both the Lebanese and Jordanian authorities were 
greatly irritated with the "holier than thou" attitude of both Kuwait officials and the Kuwaiti press 
in suggesting that, as "frontline states", they should be doing more". It was unsurprising therefore 
that the Kuwaitis' attempt at mediation in the crisis in Jordan proved forlorn. Kuwait strongly 
criticised Jordan after the "Black September" crushing of Palestinian fighters in 1970, a position 
in line with that uniformly adopted by Arab leaderships. Jordan was also being systematically 
attacked in the Kuwaiti press over what was seen as its repression of the Palestinian resistance, a 
position in tune with popular sentiment across the Arab world. Privately, most Arab governments, 
including Kuwait, had increasingly less time for the fedayeen, but were conscious that the 
guerrillas' deeds were popularly lauded and put their own relative inactivity toward the 
occupation in a bad light. Kuwait's divided feelings over the issue were shown by its adoption of 
the "logic" of the failed Cairo Agreement toward events in Jordan. Kuwait stated its belief that 
thefedayeen in Jordan should respect the kingdom's sovereignty, but it also upheld their right to 
conduct armed struggle. At the October 1974 Arab summit in Rabat, the Kuwaitis were again to 
effectively align with the PLO in supporting the decision to recognise them as the "sole legitimate 
representative of the Palestinians". This was hardly a source of major discomfort, given that the 
decision was, with the exception of Jordan, unanimous. The decision to legitimise the PLO's 
position of responsibility for leading and liberating the Palestinians reflected the political realities 
16 US embassy Kuwait to State Department, l8thMarch 1973 (Secret telegram, numbered 227) 17 Ibid. 
" US embassy Kuwait to State Department, May 27th, 1969 (A II I). 
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of a regional shift begun after 1967. This was compounded by the emergent "triple alliance" of 
Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia that had fought or financed the 1973 war in order to accommodate 
internal pressures, particularly within Egypt, and achieve Comparatively limited territorial and/or 
political goals, rather than liberate Palestine. Non-alignment in the Arab world, while generally 
preferred by Kuwait, and adhered to in terms of avoiding firm alliances, could not be maintained 
on the issue of Palestine. 
Iranian and Iraqi threat potential 
While the Palestinian issue would begin to raise practical concerns as well as presentational ones 
for Kuwaiti foreign policy, the amirate's immediate backyard, the Gulf region, was viewed with 
greater concern. The political environment was being seen by officials as more fluid; specifically 
due to the "retreat of British influence" following the UK's announced withdrawal from the Gulf 
region in January 196819. In the immediate aftermath of the announcement, Kuwait found itself 
sharing similar concerns as Iraq about Iran. Iran was the most militarily powerful Gulf state, and 
was signalling its desire to fill the resultant strategic vacuum that the UK's departure would 
create. Shortly after the UK decision was made public, Iran reasserted a long standing claim to 
the Gulf Arab island of Bahrain", and a year later was to threaten US oil companies engaged in 
drilling on the island of Abu Musa, which it maintained a claim to and which, under British 
control, had formed part of the Trucial State of Sharjah. In April 1969, Iran also directly 
challenged Iraq's attempt to enforce a 1937 agreement that Baghdad interpreted as giving it 
control over the whole of the Shatt Al-Arab (Arvand Rud) waterway, which in the south of Iraq 
separated it from Iran and provided a significant part of Iraq's limited access to the Gulf. The 
sailing of an armed Iranian battleship down the Shatt defied Iraq's provocative demand that all 
shipping display the Iraqi flag. Iraq's response was to expel a large number of Iranian passport 
holders from Iraq, believing, as did Kuwait about Iranian nationals resident in the amirate, that 
some of them might be used as 5th columnists, a concern that Kuwait even had about its own 
19 According to Shaikh Jabr Al-Ali. US embassy Kuwait to State Department April 28th, 1969 (A08 1). 
20 Described by Alinaghi Alikhani as a 100 year old claim that was "becoming increasingly unrealistic", he 
assessed that the Shah had to find a way, in the context of Britain's planned relinquishing of control of the 
Gulf island along with Qatar and the Trucial States, of saving Iranian national face over the claim. Alinaghi 
Alikhani (Editor), The Shah and I- The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court (The Diaries of 
Asadollah Alam, Minister of Court, 1962-77) (London; I. B. Tauris, 1971). 
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"Iranian" population". However Iraq lacked any significant ability to project military strength, 
something from which Kuwait leaders took heart. Border tensions between Iraq and Iran persisted 
though, and Iran would conduct a proxy war in Iraqi Kurdistan that lasted until 1975. 
Iran was increasingly seen by Kuwait as a potential threat to regional and internal security. Its 
claims on majority Shia Arab Bahrain might, it was feared, stir up difficulties with the 
approximately 25% of the Kuwaiti national population who were Shia; while as many as 15% of 
the total Kuwaiti population were estimated by the US to be Iranian nationals 22 . Kuwait was in no 
doubt that Bahrain could not be allowed to fall into Iranian hands, believing that this would be a 
strategic setback for Kuwait. Given Iraq's relative internal weakness, a factor compounded by the 
further upheaval caused by the Baathist coups of 1968, and Iran's financial and intelligence 
assistance to the leading Kurdish opposition forces, then Iraq might have been considered by 
Kuwait as less of a danger than Iran, at least if a "balance of threats" analysis is applied 23 . Iraq's 
ongoing internal instability partly offset the concerns Kuwait had about the ideological 
assertiveness of a "revolutionary" regime in Baghdad that had poor relations with Egypt and for a 
period was allied with fellow Baathi Syria. 
However, while Iran was potentially an indirect threat to Kuwait, it was not seen by the Al-Sabah 
leadership as likely to directly attack or to promote instability in the amirate, even though this 
might be a consequence of Tehran's policies elsewhere in the Gulf Gregory Gause argues that 
ideology, and in particular its deployment in a manner capable of threatening the internal stability 
of another country, enables a more comprehensive assessment of the "balance of threat" to any 
given country. The resultant "aggregate of the power threat 924 to Kuwait suggested that Iraq 
continued to constitute a greater problem, given that Iran had not threatened Kuwait directly, as 
Iraq had appeared to do in 1961; made incursions into its territory, as Iraq began to do from 1969; 
" To assert his point, Jabr Al-Ali claimed that there were 600,000 "Iranians" in Iraq. According to official 
Kuwaiti census data, Iranian nationals numbered 40,842 in 1975. The shaikh was no doubt counting the one 
third of Kuwaiti nationals who were Shia, many of whom were of Persian extraction, as "Iranians". Even 
then his arithmetic is suspect, given that the total population of the country at this time was less than a 
million. Kuwait however had long been concerned about illegal Iranian and other workers from 
neighbouring countries in the amirate. A former Iranian official told the author that only 15,000 of the 
40,000 or so Iranian nationals in Kuwait were registered with the embassy in 1976. Personal interview, 
December 2005. 
22 According to the US embassy, Kuwait. Telegram to State Department, April 28th 1969 (A08 1). Given the 
Kuwaiti census data of 1975, confirmed to the author by Iranian sources, then the US calculation appears 
overstated. 
23 Stephen M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances (New York; Cornell University Press, 1990). 
2' F Gregory Gause 111, "Balancing What? Threat Perceptions and Alliance Choice in the Gulf, " Security 
Studies, Winter 2003-04. 
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nor, unlike Iraq, deployed ideological assaults against Kuwait, which conceivably could have 
weakened its internal position. 
In Kuwait's case, however, an ideological threat was largely a weapon that Iraq and, to a lesser 
extent Egypt and Saudi Arabia, could deploy against the amirate to undermine its perceived 
external security, and to a lesser extent Kuwait's internal political management, by periodically 
upsetting the Al-Sabah's desire and ability to build friendships within the Arab world. In this 
sense the ideology of Arab nationalism was largely an externally motivated tool that Kuwait in 
turn was obliged to wield in order to enhance her legitimacy rather than to seek to de-legitimise 
other states. This contrasts with a largely internally motivated commitment to Arab national 
causes suggested by a constructivist assessment of the role of ideology in Arab states' foreign 
PoliCY25. In common with other Arab states, Kuwait deployed Arab nationalist ideology as a "tool 
of foreign policy"26 . In this respect Kuwait's use of Arab nationalism, albeit sitting oddly with its 
international defence relations, was not dissimilar in its utilisation of an appropriate foreign 
policy image to that adopted by a diverse range of Arab regimes. According to Bassam Tibi, 
"Since the 1950s pan-Arab nationalism had been a more or less an obligatory doctrine in most 
Arab countries, although often expressed more in words than in deeds. This is true of feudal states 
such as Saudi Arabia, pseudo-socialist states such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq, and of pseudo- 
democratic parliamentary states such as Lebanon 27 . 
In writing on the role of ideology in Middle Eastern states' foreign policy, Fred Halliday stresses 
the importance of, "values and images, not least the rival theatres of public display between 
rulers"". Kuwait understood the need for presentational correctness when packaging its foreign 
policy. However it did not seek an alignment or to bandwagon as a consequence of any 
assessment of where the "true" balance of threats lay. Thus, when examining the dangers from 
both Iran and Iraq during this period, both as distinct threats to Kuwaiti security and in terms of 
the increasing danger by the early 1970s that war might break out between them, potentially 
25 For example, Michael N Barnett and Jack S Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments - 
The 
Case of Egypt 1962-73", International Organisation XLV (1991). p. 369-395. 
26 Ajami, op. cit., p. 453. 
27 Bassam Tibi argues that in the "post-colonial era" Arab nationalism "has degenerated 
into an ideology to 
mask existing social contradictions and deficiencies. " Tibi, op. cit., p. 
175. 
28 Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 
2005) p. 29. 
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involving Kuwait, the amirate's leadership expressed public support for Iraq, but its practical co- 
operation with Baghdad was only given under duress. 
Iraq-Iran tensions threaten Kuwait 
When Iraq decided to issue Iran with an ultimatum regarding the operation of shipping in the 
Shatt A]-Arab waterway, it took the precaution of extending its troop position south of the port 
town of Um Qasr, its only practical outlet in the Gulf. This move, Iraq claimed, was given the 
"green light" by Kuwait, whose territory was, as a result, penetrated a short distance south of the 
international but un-demarcated border, which itself lay just to the south of Um Qasr. Kuwait's 
interior and defence minister, Saad Abdullah, argued that, despite Iraqi claims, the amirate had 
not given official approval of the penetration at a meeting he held with the Iraqi vice-president 
and the Iraqi defence minister to discuss the issue. The incursion in any case occurred prior to it 
being discussed at the rapidly convened bi-lateral meeting in Kuwait29 . As the incursion could be 
presented by Iraq as a defensive necessity vis-d-vis an Iran widely perceived in the Arab world as 
an increasing threat in the wake of the British planned departure, this was plainly something that 
Kuwait felt unable to argue with and hence a de facto green light could be suggested. The 
presence of Iraqi troops just inside a border that, despite Kuwait's constant urging, Iraq had 
refused to agree to being demarcated ever since it recognised Kuwait in 1963, was not something 
that it was practical politics to argue against, especially when Arab solidarity was almost 
obligatory. 
While Kuwait undoubtedly had its concerns about Iran's wider objectives in the region, and 
needed to be seen to be siding with fellow Arabs when they came into conflict with Tehran, it 
was neither the foreign policy style of the amirate nor within its capabilities to ally against Iran. 
As senior shaikh, Jabr Al-Ali Al-Sabah, observed of the Iraqi-Iranian tensions in 1969, "Kuwait 
is too small to take an outspoken separate policy on such a question. "" In contrast to his 
29 Majid Khoury, Socialist Iraq -A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1968 (Washington; Middle 
East Institute, 
1978) p. 15 6. Khoury interviewed Shaikh Saad Abdullah Al-Sabah, Kuwait's defence and interior minister, 
who held the meeting with Iraqi vice-president Hardan Al-Tikriti and defence minister Salih Majid 
Ammash in April 1969. 
30 Jabr Al-Ali Al-Sabah also commented to the US embassy that the "repercussions" of tensions between 
Iraq and Iran did not bother Kuwait. He argued that Iran was "knocking big heads so that small ones would 
tremble. " In saying this Jabr Al-Ali was mindftil of Iraq's attempt to strengthen the will of Bahrain 
in the 
face of Iranian claims to it; Iraq's defence minister Hardan Al-Tikriti visited Bahrain 
during the same 
month that Iraq tried to prevent Iranian shipping in the Shatt Al-Arab waterway, and that 
it made its first 
incursion into Kuwait. The US embassy expressed its scepticism about the shaikh's analysis, with some 
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sometimes rash observations, Jabr Al-Ali's comment was a fair reflection of Kuwait's sense of 
what was feasible in foreign policy terms. Kuwait did offer to mediate between Iraq and Iran 
during this period. However the amirate was not viewed as having the weight, nor specifically 
would it have been trusted by Iran to take a neutral posture vis-d-vis an Arab neighbour that was 
understood by Iran to have been effectively bought off by the Kuwaitis in order to stave off a 
perceived threat3l. As tensions increased between Kuwait and Iraq in the run up to the British 
departure from the Gulf, tensions that some Kuwaitis linked to the UK's improved relationship 
with Iraq (see Chapter 7), Kuwait was not minded to try to seek an accommodation with Iraq 
directly. However Kuwait's periodic financial inducements to Iraq, and to a number of relatively 
poor but powerful Arab states, was maintained in order to try to yield some influence or at least 
acceptance. 
To the suggestion that Kuwait might have considered approaching Iraq to discuss some form of 
alignment, given the impending power vacuum in the Gulf, and given the assertiveness of Iran, 
the then oil and finance minister (1967-75), Abdul-Rahman Al-Ateegi, commented recently, 
"How could we approach Iraq? Never! We knew what the Iraqis think..... we knew we had a 
32 problem with them (concerning) the borders... ." However there was also a practical 
consideration that made an alignment with Iraq at this time inconceivable. "We knew that Iraq 
was in a very bad situation. -They are not secure even in their own country, so we could not ask 
anything from them, " said AI-Ateegi 33 . 
Regional alliances unattractive 
Aligning with Iraq, or more plausibly with Egypt, which, from Kuwait's perspective, was at a 
safer remove and with whom Kuwait was always conscious of the need to maintain good 
relations, would have obviously run the risk of exposing the amirate to pressure from Iran, its 
justification, given that Iran's action vis-A-vis Iraq had their own momentum. It also seems doubtful that 
Kuwait was not bothered about events between its two powerful Gulf neighbours. If Kuwait was not 
worried at this point, then the beginning of border clashes between the two powerful neighbours of Kuwait 
in 1972 seems likely to have changed that perspective. 
31 Retired Iranian official. Off the record interview, London, November 2005. 
32 Abdul Rahman Al-Ateegi. He was also finance minister from 1975-8 1. Personal interview, Kuwait, 
February 2005. 
33 Ibid. 
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close and militarily powerful neighbour". Such alignments would also have been wholly out of 
kilter with Kuwait's ongoing attempt to build a closer defence relationship with the US in the 
wake of the UK's announced departure from the Gulf, given that Baghdad and Cairo had not had 
diplomatic relations with the US since the 1967 war. Therefore non-alignment within the Arab 
world also reflected Kuwait's established preference for extra-regional security partnerships. 
Saudi Arabia, however, was a country that Kuwait would have to accommodate more as Egypt's 
weight declined after the 1967 war. External security co-operation though would be constrained. 
In part this was due to Saudi Arabia's continued hostility toward the amirate's internal politics 
and relative political openness, given that Kuwait was still allowing those whom Riyadh judged 
to be the two countries' common enemies to reside there. In Saudi Arabia, according to a British 
official, "The Kuwaitis (in general) were dismissed as creatures of Nasser, betrayers of secrets, 
harbourers of Soviet and Iraqi subversive networks ... [T]he Saudi attitude is naturally different 
from their attitude towards the Kuwaiti Government. The Amir of Kuwait is, so to speak, a'traitor 
to his class'... "". Following the UK's announced departure from the Gulf, however, speculation 
periodically abounded in the region that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would work more closely with 
Iran, something that the Shah early on suggested to the Kuwaiti amir could be expressed by some 
form of defence co-operation between all three countries. Despite their mutual development as 
66pillars" in a US-backed security structure in the Gulf (see Chapter 7), Saudi Arabia was wary of 
too close a relationship with Iran, a country with far greater military clout. From Kuwait's 
perspective, Saudi Arabia's geographical proximity would have made too close a security 
relationship uncomfortable, while historical resentments (see Appendix 1) and contemporary 
distrust compounded the amirate's desire to prioritise friendship but to avoid seeking a formal 
alliance. Given Iran's strength and seemingly threatening posture in the region, to adopt Stephen 
Walt's terminology36 , Kuwait might in theory have considered "band-wagoning" with Iran in 
order to constrain the historically distrusted Iraq. After all, Iran was to become key to US strategy 
in the Gulf following the British departure. However the pan-Arab ideological prop of Kuwait's 
foreign policy made an alignment with Iran unthinkable. On the other hand, Kuwait's desire to 
maintain good relations across the wider Middle East region, save the obvious case of Israel37, 
34 44 Whatever brotherly relations I have with Egypt, I cannot put Iran aside. Whether the time of the Shah or 
the clerics, I can't put Iran aside. Iran is a neighbour taking the whole (eastern) side of the Gulf.... (Its) 
population exceeds all of and Syria and Iraq (combined), and so you cannot ignore Iran. " Ibid. 
35 rd W. Morris, UK embassy, Jeddah to FCO, December 3,1968 (FCO 8/1171). 
36 Walt, op. cit. 
37 Kuwait claimed to the US that she increasingly feared an Israeli attack. US embassy, Kuwait, to State 
Department, April 28th, 1969 (A08 1). A possible attack was something actively discussed by the Kuwaiti 
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meant that Kuwait sought to engage with Iran as much as possible, all the more so when it 
became evident that Tehran would exploit the power vacuum in the Gulf 
Abdul-Rahman Al-Ateegi commented recently that he had encouraged the Kuwaiti leadership to 
engage with Iran because of the amirate's close relations with Egypt. This made Kuwait 
concerned to ensure that her relations with Iran would not be negatively affected as a 
consequence. According to Al-Ateegi, "Relations were so harsh (between) Egypt and Iran ... it 
(was) reflecting (badly) on our relations (with Iran) . 
38, ' A long delayed official visit to Iran by 
Amir Sabah Salim took place in January 1968, following a visit he had made three years earlier in 
his capacity as prime minister. The intervening period had not seen major bi-lateral tensions, and 
the visit proved largely ceremonial, despite some initial discussion, following the UK's 
announced departure from the Gulf only two days earlier, of Iran's historic claim to Bahrain". 
Given the continuing poor state of Egyptian-Iranian relations, Kuwait was conscious of the need 
to use the goodwill the visit to Iran was expected to generate to ensure they had "cordial 
relations"40 . After all, Kuwait was well aware that Iran, like Saudi Arabia, resented the political 
platform enjoyed by Arab nationalists in the national assembly, while Kuwait had continued to be 
concerned over the large number of illegal Iranian nationals in the amirate. The Shah's reciprocal 
visit to Kuwait in November took place against the backdrop of intense speculation in the region 
about the consequences of the British-announced withdrawal from the Gulf, and Iran's assertion 
of its claim to Bahrain. This had only inflamed KMAN and others in the assembly, and tensions 
were created by Iran's objections to what it, exaggeratedly, saw as strong Nasserite activism in 
the amirate 41 . Bahrain was the dominant theme in more than two hours of dialogue. Kuwait's 
identification with the need for Bahrain, a fellow Arab country, to be independent was plain, even 
to the point of bravado. The Kuwaiti amir apparently made clear to the Shah that Kuwait itself 
had, "... No problem with you ... the only issue for us is Bahrain. I can't 
beat you, but if you 
decide to use force with Bahrain, I will be there fighting with them. 4259 
press in 1969, especially after the amirate was identified by the Israeli ambassador to the UN as playing an 
active military and political part in what was seen as the Egyptian war effort. 
38 Al-Ateegi, qp. cit. 
39 According to Robert Jarman, aside from discussion of the continental shelf, which impacted on some of 
the as yet undefined maritime boundaries between the two countries; and periodic concerns about Iranians 
illegally resident in Kuwait, there had been no major problems to concern Kuwait in their bilateral 
relationship. The mutual desire to symbolise the stable basis of relations was indicated when Iran issued a 
commemorative stamp in honour of the Amir's visit. Jarman, op. cit. p. 235-236. 
40 Al-Ateegi, op. cit. 
4' According to the British embassy, the Shah's previous conception of Kuwait as a "monster" had been 
somewhat dispelled by the visit. Jarman, op. cit., p. 238. 
42 Al-Ateegi, pp. cit. 
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Mediation embodies non-alignment 
However Kuwait was not interested in increasing tension in the Gulf region over this or any other 
issue. It was well aware that the Shah had to think of his internal constituencies just as the Arab 
states, including Kuwait, had to think about their's, and that Iran needed a "face-saving 
formula', 43 . Kuwait also hoped to use the November 1968 meeting with the Shah in Kuwait to 
mediate in the Bahrain dispute, and thus extend its mediation role generally; a conception of its 
identity wholly in tune with its preference for co-operation, not division, within the region. Amir 
Sabah Salim, who had been particularly keen on developing this identity for Kuwait, even to the 
point of naivete (see Chapter 3), used the occasion to press the Shah to consider some form of 
international fact-finding mission on what status Bahrainis wanted for their island after 1971, 
confident that the one thing they did not want was absorption into Iran. At the time Kuwait felt 
pleased that its concerns on Bahrain and what it advocated as a mechanism for its resolution was, 
in its view, to contribute to the solution 44 . In 1969 Iran and Britain put their differences aside over 
Bahrain and agreed to a UN fact-finding mission, which would visit the island and consult with 
the populace, in an exercise that, on the assumption that independence would be advocated, rather 
than the worst case scenario for Iran of support for federation with her southern Trucial states, 
was understood by Iran as a means to get itself off the hook, having so strongly staked its claim to 
the territory45. 
4' As observed by the then Kuwaiti ambassador to the US, the Amir's son, Shaikh Salim Sabah Al-Salim 
Al-Sabah. UK embassy Kuwait (FCO 8/1990) 
44 However, the then Kuwaiti foreign ministry undersecretary, Abdullah Bishara, played down Kuwait's 
influence with Iran on the Bahrain issue, suggesting only that the amirate had "some quiet impact" on the 
finding of a compromise. Personal interview, January 2003, Kuwait. 
45 The precise method of consultation of the Bahraini populace was to cause considerable dispute between 
Iran and Britain, with Iran actually wanting a plebiscite, something that was understood by Kuwait and the 
UK to be anathema to the ruler of Bahrain. The idea of the UN "consultation" had been taken up by the UK 
and would eventually be finessed to Iran's satisfaction. It was imperative for the Shah to be seen to resolve 
the problem of his claim to Bahrain in a manner that would be seen at home to be in the Iranian national 
interest. Alam, op. cit. p. 31 and p-85-86. The fact finding mission eventually took place in early 1970 and 
resulted in overwhelming support for full independence, rather than the rule of the Shah or 
joining the Gulf 
Arab states' federation. 
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Federation provides no hinterland 
Kuwait believed that the British-proposed Federation of Arab Amirates (FAA) was of benefit as a 
union of formerly British-protected amirates with whom Kuwait could have influence and which 
could therefore strengthen her own position in the region (see Chapter 3). This was especially the 
case as Iran and Iraq were looked to by Kuwait with increasing concern, and relations with Saudi 
Arabia, though amicable, were periodically problematic. However Kuwait was acutely aware of 
Iran's attitude to the FAA, which was rightly perceived as a "creature of the British", and that too 
strong a bloc, especially one including Bahrain, was not welcome in Tehran. Kuwait's attitude 
toward the FAA was further complicated by the ambiguous views toward Kuwait and each other, 
among the Trucial States and the potential additional members of the proposed federation, 
Bahrain and Qatar. There was also hostility in Abu Dhabi, as well as Oman, toward Saudi Arabia 
over the disputed territory of Buraimi, which continued to poison relations. On the other hand, 
many of the FAA's putative members looked toward Saudi Arabia, as the leading Arab actor in 
the Gulf, to provide support; for their part, both Qatar and Bahrain maintained close relations 
with Riyadh as they considered their future options. If Kuwait was to have any prospect of 
shepherding the FAA it needed to gain the confidence of Saudi Arabia, but Riyadh did not look 
with favour on a FAA in which Kuwait would be a leading actor. Since the mid-1960s Kuwait 
had sought to promote a leading role exclusively for itself over the southern Gulf amirates, 
without regard for what Saudi Arabia or Iran thought46 , and seemingly oblivious to the 
widespread hostility of her target audience. However the fact that the federation was to eventually 
emerge successfully, albeit in a smaller form and lacking the partnership with Kuwait that the 
amirate had sought, was partly due to Saudi Arabia's willingness to back the project. In fact in 
seeking to ensure the formation of what became the FAA, Kuwait was obliged to seek direct 
47 involvement by Riyadh 
The federation had looked as if it was going to be destabilised as soon as it was due to be formed 
as the United Arab Amirates (UAA), when the departure of the British immediately saw Iran 
seize both the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands that had been under the authority of Ras Al- 
Khaimah. (Iran had reached an understanding with Sharjah over dividing sovereignty over the 
46 Abdul Rahman Al-Ateegi commented privately two years later that Kuwait's concern was what the 
Trucial states, Bahrain and Qatar thought about the proposal; Kuwait did not, he said, consult Saudi Arabia 
over it. UK embassy telegram to Foreign Office, Is' July, 1973. (FCO 8/1993). 
47 Abdul-Latif Hassan AI-Rumaihi, "The Dynamics of Kuwaiti Foreign Policy"(Exeter, U. K.; Exeter 
University, 1983), p. 157. 
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other Gulf island in dispute, Abu Mousa). This obviously increased Kuwait's concerns about 
Tehran's ambitions in the region. Otherwise, however, the formation of UAA went ahead 
smoothly on 31 st November 197 1, for all the Shah's desire to prevent the formation of a bloc of 
Arab Gulf states, suspicious as he was of British objectives in the Gulf area and desirous of 
keeping the southern Gulf amirates weaker by being divided". Kuwait was to remain concerned 
that divisions within the UAA - Dubai for example had traditionally looked to Iran for their 
49 51 political as well as business orientation - could be exploited by Iran to weaken the federation . 
Bahrain and Qatar were established as separate sovereign states and admitted to the UN in 1971. 
The Sultanate of Oman also joined the UN at this time. Ras Al-Khaimah did not enter the United 
Arab Amirates until a year later, out of opposition to what was widely believed in the Arab world 
to have been a conspiracy between Iran and the UK, with the ending of Iran's opposition to 
Bahraini independence apparently being rewarded with the provision of a British "green light" for 
Iran to take the Tunbs. For once the "conspiracy" appears to have been borne out by real itY5 1. 
Not dispirited by how the politicking over the UAA turned out, Kuwait continued to see the 
establishment of a federation as a positive development and to articulate that co-operation among 
the Gulf Arab states would be of mutual benefit. This thinking had been behind its, partly self- 
serving, efforts to foster co-operation in the 1960s. In the early 1970s the Kuwaitis would play a 
leading in role in fostering Gulf Arab cooperation, providing money and often the headquarters 
for a variety of economic partnership projects, some of which have stood the test of time. While 
such schemes were firmly in line with the efforts of senior Al-Sabah to promote closer working 
with its fellow arnirates, the proposal of specifics owed a lot to the enthusiasms of senior 
bureaucrats across governinent working within a dedicated unit, the Committee for Co-operation 
with the Arabian Gulf States 52 By the mid-1970s the Kuwaiti crown prince, Jabr Al-Ahmed, 
would return to the rhetorical theme, urging that co-operation among all the states of the Gulf 
occur across a number of fields, and arguing that, "some form of union or unity be built on a just 
and solid basis for the sake of the people of the Gulf and the security of the region". " Coinciding 
48 The Shah had suggested privately that Iran should do what it could to prevent the federation ever being 
formed, and considered offering bi-lateral defence guarantees to each Trucial state. Allam, Ibid., p. 155. 
49 As of 1971 the Crown Prince of Dubai was reportedly continuing to refer to himself in conversation as 
one of the Shah's "loyal servants", Allam op. cit., p. 155. 
50 Foreign minister Shaikh Sabah Al-Ahmed commented to this effect in conversation with the British 
Ambassador, Archie Lamb. Telegram from British embassy Kuwait to FCO, 8 th December 1974 (FCO 
8/2195). 
" Off the record interview with former Iranian official. November 2005, London. 
52 Al-Rumaihi, op. cit. p 160-163 
53 Abdul-Reda Assiri, pp. cit., p. 76. 
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with efforts to set up a forum for all eight Gulf littoral states, the suggestion was not that far from 
Iranian ideas, except that Kuwait appeared to have in mind that Iraq should be as much a part of 
any initiative as Iran. The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), founded in 1981, would in many 
ways embody these earlier aspirations; it was a response to the desire for enhanced security, but 
as a reaction on the part of the Gulf Arab amirates and monarchies to the then threat from Iran 
and, to a lesser but significant extent, Iraq. 
Kuwaiti concerns about the Shah's ambitions over the Arab side of the Gulf region were 
inevitably deepened by Iran's seizure of the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands, which was 
portrayed throughout the Arab world, and within Kuwait by the press and especially vociferously 
by KMAN in parliament, as an attack upon the Arab nation. The Kuwaiti amir chose to target his 
concerns at the British, finding them an easier scapegoat54 . Kuwait though did make clear its 
displeasure with Iran. Diplomatic relations patently could not continue at the high level seen in 
1968, and Iran's new ambassador was barred from receiving his credentials in Kuwait for nearly a 
year following the occupation of the islandS51 . However Kuwait did not abandon its policy of 
engagement with Tehran, evidently believing that this was the best way to ease the tensions 
caused by Iran's actions elsewhere in the Gulf, even if the Kuwaiti government was criticised for 
continuing to maintain relations with Iran by its Arab neighbours as well as by the Kuwaiti 
national assembly. In late 1972 the Kuwaiti parliament passed a resolution urging a boycott of 
government contacts with Tehran. The Shah continued to periodically express anger with both 
Kuwait's press and the parliament, complaining, following the 1971 election, about the presence 
of what he described as "Habash's boys" (supporters of the Palestinian leftist leader) in the 
national assembIY56 . The fact that the Shah was misguided in his sense of the political allegiance 
of KMAN and of its importance in Kuwaiti politics does not detract from the negative impact that 
the perception of the parliament, and thus of the Al-Sabah's method of rule, caused to bilateral 
relations. The importance of Iran as the pre-eminent military power in the Gulf, and how this 
could be used to Kuwait's benefit, was however underscored when Iraq occupied a Kuwaiti 
border post at Al-Samita (see below). 
To emphasise where the mainstream in the Kuwaiti national assembly were and to use them as an 
advance guard in an effort to build closer relations again with Iran, the government encouraged 
54 US embassy, Kuwait, January 4th, 1972 (A2). 
55 John Wilton, Annual Report (1972), UK embassy to FCO, January 1973 (FCO 8/1987) 
56 US embassy, Tehran, to State Department, January 1971 (POL14) 
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the formation of a parliamentary delegation, headed by the assembly speaker, to visit Tehran in 
June 1973. The move was ardently attacked by the "anti-Iranians" in the national assembly, but 
the Kuwaiti leadership paid them little heed and made its support for the trip expl iCit57 . Despite 
the goodwill this trip generated, and the fundamental concern about Iraq that they both shared, 
Kuwait and Iran diverged in their approach to the Gulf, much to the disappointment of Britain. 
UK speculation about a "joint initiative" on the Gulf to be instigated by the Shah, but intended to 
be launched with the support of Kuwait and other Arab amirates, came to nothing58 . Iran was 
attempting to use the US's emphasis on Tehran and Riyadh as "pillars" of a US security 
framework in the Gulf in order to reach a better political understanding with her Arab Gulf 
neighbours. Kuwait for its part was sensitive to domestic and regional speculation about a mooted 
"triple alliance" in the Gulf between Iran, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, not least given Iran's 
membership of CENTO. 
Kuwaiti concerns about Iran were to increase when the ongoing Dhofari rebellion in Oman led to 
Iranian troops entering the Sultanate in December 1973'9. While the presence of some 1,000 
Iranian troops in the Dhofar region had been at the request of the Sultan, who maintained good 
relations with Iran, and had followed the support of Saudi Arabia, the UAA, India and Pakistan, 
and the involvement of some Jordanian troops, it was a set-back for Saudi Arabian ambitions to 
oversee an Arab solution. A residual Iranian troop presence was to remain after the bulk had 
departed in early 1977 60 , finally departing following the Iranian revolution in 1978/9. While 
Kuwait's discomfort at Iran's involvement would to some extent have been assuaged by the 
financial and military assistance of a number of Arab states in Oman's security, Kuwait believed 
that it was further evidence of Iran's territorial ambitions on the western side of the Gulf, 
although the amirate did not believe there was a direct Iranian threat to itself. 
57 KMAN and those MPs of a similar "Nasserite" perspective used ideological language to denounce what 
they saw as Iranian threats to the Arab nation and were thus commonly referred to as anti-Iranian in 
western embassy communications from Kuwait. Contrastingly, the defence and interior minister, Shaikh 
Saad Abdullah, saw the national assembly delegation off at Kuwait airport. UK embassy, Tehran to FCO, 
4th July 1973 (FCO 8/1990). 
5' Ibid. 
'9 As expressed by Kuwaiti foreign minister Shaikh Sabah Al-Ahmed to the UK ambassador to Kuwait, 
Archie Lamb (FCO 8/1990) 
60 The residual force was to depart following the Iranian revolution of 1978-79. Shaikh Zayyed, President 
of the UAA, was to pronounce himself relaxed about the Iranian involvement, noting, dryly, that the Arabs 
had been asked first. UK embassy to Foreign Office, June 1974 (F08/2193) 
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Saudi-Kuwaiti relations hurt by Yemen factor 
Saudi Arabia shared Kuwait's concerns at Iran's posture in the Gulf at a time when Iran was also 
able to undermine Iraq, both in terms of its internal security and by putting it under direct 
pressure through border attacks. At the same time Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were concerned 
about residual Iraqi ambitions. On the one hand Iraq's relative weakness was not welcomed as it 
had allowed Iran to seek to fill the regional void left by the British; on the other, Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait were wary of Iraq's ideological attacks and what appeared to be an Iraqi desire to redraw 
its border with Kuwait by stealth. However there were also tensions in the Saudi-Kuwait 
relationship, albeit to a markedly smaller extent. Saudi Arabia had an ongoing perception that 
Kuwait was too close to radical Arab states and to South Yemen in particular. This made it all the 
more unlikely that Kuwait would seek Saudi support for its southern Gulf policy. A visit by King 
Faisal of Saudi Arabia to Kuwait in 1968 - the second that year as Riyadh tried to ensure that 
developments in a post-British Gulf region would not be to its disadvantage - did not go 
smoothly. One factor was Kuwait's willingness to fund the People's Democratic Republic of 
Yemen (PDRY), having recognised it shortly after it was founded following the departure of the 
British from Aden in November 1967. Such was the extent of Saudi Arabian tensions with the 
PDRY that its troops were to cross the border into south Yemen for a period in 1969. 
The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR; North Yemen), at least, was less of a thorn in Kuwait-Saudi 
relations these days. After the withdrawal of Egyptian forces following the agreement at the Arab 
League's conference in Khartoum in September 1967, it became conceivable that Saudi Arabia 
would before long recognise the YAR, which in 1970 it did. This step was warmly welcomed in 
Kuwait, not least as it created greater equilibrium in the amirate's Arab relations, given the 
tension between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia over the fonner's recognition in 1963 (see chapter 3) 
of the YAR, whose republican forces Riyadh has sought to weaken in the course of the civil war. 
Ironically, Kuwait had broken diplomatic relations with North Yemen when Egypt's soon to be 
departing troops authored the overthrow of the comparatively long-standing government of 
President Abdallah Sallal in November 1967. By doing so, Kuwait was emphasising its 
commitment to an end to external Arab intervention in the Yemen Arab Republic and the 
beginning of some distance in the amirate's policies from those of Egypt. However Kuwait was 
soon keen to restore its relations and financial support for the YAR. The contradictions inherent 
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in maintaining relations with the ever radicalising PDRY but not having them with the YAR 
added to the impetus for Kuwait to resolve its differences with Sana'. Prior to Riyadh's about-tum 
in its relations with the YAR, Kuwait had re-opened relations at a time when the US too was 
considering recognising the Sana' government, prompted by the Egyptians' earlier troop 
departure. 
KI uwait's confused southern peninsula policy 
The fact that Kuwait was the only Arabian Peninsula country to maintain air links with the self- 
styled Marxist revolutionary regime of the PDRY, and periodically provided aid and soft loans, as 
well as to the YAR, despite increasing concern within Kuwait at the cost of doing so", was a 
source of grievance in Saudi Arabia. After all, Aden was the base and principal funder of the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), which was later to merge 
with another organisation, strengthening its ability to resist British-assisted Omani attacks". 
Implicitly the "occupied Arab Gulf' included Kuwait", but the amirate was able to avoid direct 
hostility from the south Yemenis. This remained the case even when Kuwait gave political 
support to Sultan Qaboos, the newly-installed Omani leader, who took power at the behest of the 
British in 1970. Furthermore, Kuwait did not criticise his initiation of military action, taken in 
common with British troops, against PFLOAG-supported Dhofari rebels in 1971, while the Amir 
privately expressed sympathy with the British over the campaign. This was a marked foreign 
policy shift by Kuwait. After all, Kuwait had given political support to the Oman-based Imamate 
against the forces of Sultan Qabous's father from the late-1950s. Furthermore, Kuwait had 
continued to treat a representative of the Oman Imamate as tantamount to a member of the 
diplomatic corp, just as the amirate had previously allowed opponents of southern Gulf regimes 
to organise within Kuwait or travel via the amirate (see Chapter 3). Some observers believe that 
this practice was still occurring in the case of PFLOAG fighters en route to Oman 64 ,a possibility 
" As expressed by Shaikh Jabr Al-Ali. US embassy, Kuwait to State department, April 28th, 1969 (A08 1) 
62 It was thus renamed the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, and 
ideologically shifted to a national-democratic as opposed to Marxian orientation. 
63 Fred Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy - The Case of South Yemen (Cambridge; Cambridge 
University Press, 1980), p. 166. Fred Halliday related to the author that he asked PFLOAG representatives 
in 1970 (prior to their 1971 renaming as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arabian 
Gulf), whether the word "occupied" in their title included Kuwait. Their answers were ambiguous. 
64 Kelly, op. cit. p. 137. Kelly adds that in the late 1960s Kuwait remained a "clearing house for much of the 
clandestine movement of revolutionaries and weapons in the Gulf area. " 
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that may have reflected what, in the Arabian Peninsula at this time, was Kuwait's exclusive direct 
air links with Aden. 
With Egypt's withdrawal from Yemen after the 1967 war, and thus the decline of its influence 
within the Peninsula, Cairo's defining of "correct" foreign policy stances in the Arabian 
Peninsula was less important to Kuwait. An adjustment by Egypt against the South Yemen- 
backed PFLOAG did not contradict Kuwait's relations with Egypt in that Cairo's relations with 
South Yemen's revolutionaries had been problematic, even before the formation of the PDRY in 
November 1967. From then on, Aden maintained its links with the leftists within MAN who 
opposed Cairo, including those within the PL061 (see also Appendix 6). At the same time, in 
continuing to fund the PDRY, Kuwait was supporting allies of leftist Arab nationalists agitating 
in the Gulf, and an Aden government that questioned the legitimacy of the FAA and then the 
legitimacy of the independent states of the UAA, Qatar and Bahrain when they applied to join the 
Arab League in 197 166 . Kuwait would attempt to offset the multiple contradictions of its foreign 
policy toward Oman and South Yemen by once more seeking to mediate in Yemeni affairs, 
especially after Omani troops clashed with PFLOAG fighters inside the South Yemen border in 
1972. In 1973 Kuwait sought to broker a deal between the Omani authorities and the PFLOAG 67 . 
In an indication of Kuwait's good relations with the PDRY, and in recognition of the amirate's 
previous efforts at mediation within Yemen, Kuwait was appointed by the Arab League to a five 
country mediating committee that also included Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Syria. The eventual 
end of the Dhofari guerrilla campaign in late 1975, following the earlier constraining by the 
PFLOAG of its focus to Oman-only operations, put an end to these contradictions in Kuwaiti 
foreign policy. (Only a year earlier, Oman had expelled the Kuwaiti attach6 because of the 
amirate's relations with South Yemen"). With the revolutionary struggle of the former PFLOAG 
effectively curtailed, and its Arab nationalist energies diverted into a separate and largely political 
campaign in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia recognised the PDRY in 1976. 
65 This did not preclude co-operation between Egypt and the PDRY, however, when interests converged 
against Israel. Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Policy op. cit., p. 175. 
66 For South Yemen's attitude toward the emergent independent Gulf Arab states, see Halliday, Lbid. p. 167. 
67 Fred Halliday, Arabia without Sultans (London; Penguin, 1974) p. 354. 
68 Halliday, Revolution and Foreign Poligy gp. cit., p. 166. 
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Domestic politics rind regional disfavour 
There were several other reasons for difficulty between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Kuwait's 
national assembly, and the amirate's continued openness to radical political opponents of 
neighbouring regimes, including those of the Al-Saud, found great disfavour in Riyadh. In 1974 
Kuwaiti felicity to political exiles was extended to Shaikh Hassan Safar, the senior Saudi Shia 
cleric whose political activism has seen him expelled from the kingdom, along with several 
colleagues; a year later however they had moved on. '9. Kuwait's tribal policy succeeded in 
angering Saudi Arabia too, as it could interfere with the kingdom's internal patronage networks 
(see Chapter 5). Saudi Arabia was also frustrated that Kuwait continued to allow the Palestinian 
fedayeen to use Kuwait as an organisational base with little constraint. Funding for armed action 
conducted in Israel or from neighbouring countries was considered acceptable. However, their 
free (political) rein in Kuwait troubled Saudi Arabia, not least as this was even extended to leftists 
groups who were anathema to both Kuwait and Riyadh, the main funders of Fatah from 1968 
onwards". 
A sort of regional equilibrium 
However Saudi Arabia and Kuwait shared mutual concerns about Iran and Iraq - the apparent 
threat from the latter having brought the kingdom and the amirate together in 1961. With the end 
to hostility between Cairo and Riyadh following the 1967 war, Kuwait's key Arab relationships 
were less contradictory, and the now greater importance of her relations with Saudi Arabia was 
emphasised. In a reflection of Egypt's prioritisation of its territorial requirements closer to home, 
it re-established diplomatic relations with Iran in 1970, following the removal of the impediment 
created by the death of Nasser that year. His vitriol against the Shah had further poisoned 
69 During this period Kuwait was also allowing a small number of exiled members of the Iraqi Shia Islamist 
party, Al-Da'wa, to reside in the amirate, where they, and the rest of the Iraqi community, were closely 
monitored by the extensive Iraqi intelligence presence. Arguably there were long-term benefits in this risky 
strategy as Al-Da'wa, and later SCIRI, who were hosted rather more openly from 1991, became the leading 
parties in the coalition that dominated the Iraqi government formed in 2004. 
'0 There was a tightening of the internal environment for Palestinian institutions in Kuwait following the 
Japanese embassy incident in 1974; however there was a sense of too little too late. (See also chapter 5). 
British ambassador John Wilton, in reference to two earlier hijacking incidents whose culprits ended up on 
Kuwait soil, argued that, while previously Kuwait had "purchased immunity from Palestinian outrages... 
[now] the real price Kuwait pays for not having the Palestinians be beastly to her is not being able to 
beastly to them, even at the risk of annoying the Saudis and the Moroccans not to mention the Americans. " 
A. J. Wilton, Annual Dispatch 1973, to FCO, 6 th January 1974 (FC08/2188). 
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relations following the ending of diplomatic relations in 1964. Kuwait's regional relations were, 
overall, moving into greater equilibrium. 
When, in March 1973, tensions increased between Iraq and Kuwait following Iraq's seizure of a 
border post inside Kuwaiti territory, Saudi Arabia was the only Arab state that was militarily 
supportive. Kuwait turned to Riyadh straight away", knowing that Saudi Arabia was the only 
Arab country whose geographical location and political weight would enable it to respond. Saudi 
Arabia sent several thousand troops to the Saudi-Kuwaiti border and made clear that it was 
prepared to intervene 72 . On the other hand, Kuwait was to argue in 1974 that the recent settlement 
of the Buraimi territorial dispute between the Kingdom and Oman and the UAA had been at the 
latter's expense, and that too much had been conceded to Riyadh 7'. The sensitivity about Saudi 
weight and influence was, and remains, not uncommon among the smaller Gulf Arab amirates; 
Kuwait was no exception. 
However, for all their mutual concerns and sensitivities, Kuwait viewed Saudi Arabia as its most 
important relationship in the Gulf, believing that its friendship served to balance the friendly 
relations it had with the other key Arab power at this time, Egypt. Kuwait though did not look on 
its friendship with Saudi Arabia as being maintained at the expense of E gypt74 , despite the 
different interests that, up to June 1967 at least, had seen Saudi Arabia and Egypt sponsor rival 
blocs within the Arab world. For all the relative decline in Egypt's political weight in the Arab 
world, Kuwait continued to foster its relationship with Cairo with high levels of financial support. 
At the same time, Kuwait's foreign policy stances for the most part fitted with the, now more 
mildly, progressive line from Egypt. However this was not born of any great affection among the 
Al-Sabah 75 for an Egyptian regime that had on occasions targeted the ruling family for rhetorical 
71 Abdullah Bishara commented that Kuwait "engaged the Saudis on the border question .... (and that the 
resultant) Saudi (military) dispatch was well received (in Kuwait). " Bishara, op. cit. 
72 Richard Schofield, Kuwait and Iraq: Historical Claims and Territorial Disputes (London; Royal Institute 
of International Affairs, 1993) p. 116. 
73 In private Kuwait would harshly criticise Saudi Arabia. For example a senior Al-Sabah figure cited a 
recent oil conference as an example of how regional events were, in Kuwait's view, being manipulated to 
serve Riyadh's interests. Lamb, op. cit. 
74 In commenting on events throughout the period from independence through to the 1967 war, Abdul 
Rahman Al-Ateegi told the author, "(Our) key ally was Saudi Arabia... " This, Al-Ateegi said, provided a 
balance with our relations with Egypt, but was not, he stressed, a relationship Kuwait cultivated against 
Egypt. 
7' According to the leading KMAN figure, Ahmed Khateeb, when Gamal Abdul Nasser collapsed in 
Kuwait in 1970, shortly before his eventual death that year, he was taken to the Amir's palace. Sabah 
Salim, says Khateeb, told the press, " 'I assure you.... he will be alright, ' but 
deep in his heart he wanted 
him to die. " Ahmed Khateeb is obviously not a dispassionate observer. However this also makes him very 
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attack, and which had been seen by the Kuwaiti leadership as regionally destabilising and, to a 
lesser extent, a potentially disruptive force within Kuwait, given the traditional closeness to Egypt 
of the Kuwaiti Arab Nationalist Movement (KMAN - see Chapters 2 and 5). The formal Kuwaiti 
eulogies for President Gamal Abdul Nasser upon his death in 1970 were ritualised affirmations of 
the Egyptian leader's undoubted status in the Arab world and of Kuwait's rhetorical need to 
emphasise that its foreign policy continued to be conceived in Arab national termS76 . Despite the 
weakening of the radical, populist variant of Arab nationalism in the region post-1967, Egypt 
remained the pre-eminent player in Arab politics, and Kuwait would continue to be mindful of 
thiS77 , as it was of the increased importance within the Gulf region specifically of Saudi Arabia 
and Iran, and of course the perceived ongoing direct threat to Kuwait from Iraq. 
Funding friendships or resentments? 
Egypt's importance to Kuwait was reflected in the fact that it would continue to be one of the 
largest recipients of soft loans from the Kuwait Fund for Economic Development (KFED)78. 
Cairo had always been one of the top beneficiaries of a fund that has also benefited Arab 
countries who rather less identifiably participated in the Arab national struggle, whether through 
force of arms or ideologicallY79. In addition Kuwait was a prime mover in financing a number of 
well qualified to judge the strength of the attachment of senior Al-Sabah to Nasser, the pre-eminent Arab 
nationalist figure of the 1950s and 60s, and thus to the progressive, Arab nationalist causes the Egyptian 
leader espoused. 
76 The Amir said of Nasser that he was, "One of this nation's greatest men and leaders. " (US embassy 
Kuwait to State Department, Amiri speech October 26th, 1970. (A 132)) 
77 Amid the hyperbole, the reality of Kuwait's ongoing need to ensure that it was not too out of step with 
Egyptian priorities was emphasised. The Amir said, "We on this occasion would like to emphasise that 
Kuwait, which stood by the UAR (Egypt) in her struggle and her constructive efforts to unite the Arab 
ranks, will live up to her promises and will always stand by the side of her elder sister, backing her and 
cooperating with her in all spheres. " 
7' For the period 1970-71, Egypt was the second largest recipient of monies supposedly paid as soft loans 
from the Kuwait Fund for Economic Development. It received 16.4% of total support given to Arab 
countries. Iraq, however, only received 3.7% and PDRY did not receive a single payment. Surprisingly 
perhaps, the relatively conservative republic, Tunisia, received the largest financial support from the fund 
during this period, at 17.9% of the total. Halliday, "Arabia Without Sultans", Ibid. p. 440. This continued a 
pattern of aiding its strongest (needy) supporters that had begun in 196 1, and the KFED's attempt to 
provide aid to projects of a practical nature. The Kuwait Fund was to maintain this approach, with Tunisia, 
Sudan and Jordan receiving generous assistance throughout the 1970s and 1980s, while Syria and Egypt, 
two key supporters in 1990-91, were, respectively, its top recipients as of end-2004. 
79 According to Dr Ahmed Khateeb, the Kuwaiti government expressed their commitment to Arab national 
causes, but gave money from the Kuwait Fund in accordance with US requests. That may be right, but is 
somewhat dwarfed by the priorities of its often informal and one-off aid payments, whose recipients were 
often not those that Washington would approve of. 
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collective Arab funds whose principle recipients were the poorer, often radical, states of the 
region. These included the Arab Fund for Social and Economic Development. This had been 
founded in Kuwait in 1971 under some pressure from the Arab League, which had urged Kuwait 
to push approval for a large portion of the new organisation's funding through the national 
assembly". However much larger amounts of money, often disbursed in undisclosed amounts as 
grants (unlike the theoretically repayable loans from the KFED), while harder to calculate, 
emphasise the amirate's prioritisation of aid to comparatively heavyweight "progressive" Arab 
states and causes. Kuwait made direct payments to Iraq to try to garner support; made similarly 
discrete payments to Fatah (the leading PLO faction); contributed "steadfastness" payments to 
Egypt and the other "frontline" states, as well as monies paid to Egypt and Syria on a strictly 
informal basis; and funded North and South Yemen. Taken together this presents a picture of 
Kuwaiti largesse that prioritised aid for countries or organisations perceived by Kuwait as either a 
direct threat militarily, or as capable of generating ideological hostility. The success of this "dinar 
diplomacy" policy is however another matter. In its early incarnation under Amir Abdullah 
Salim, the Kuwait Fund was seen in the Arab world as distributing largesse born of a genuine 
identification with Arab causes and with Arab countries in need. However, as Kuwait's 
disbursement of monies increased, especially as its oil wealth grew exponentially following the 
oil crisis of 1973-4, then her aid began to be looked on in the region with a more jaundiced eye. 
The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development, which was re-branded as the Kuwait Fund 
for Economic Development in order to aid non-Arab countries as well, was, after 1973, to provide 
financial support to a number of sub-Saharan African countries, as well as increased support for 
non oil-rich Arab countries, who had suffered from the sharp rise in oil prices that had increased 
the wealth of Kuwait. 
The politics of resentment was to grow within the Arab world at how the fruits of the 1973 war 
were managed, and precisely who gained. This in turn was to fuel part of the tension behind the 
outbreak of the Lebanese civil war and the rise of Islamism". The rise of grassroots movements, 
in some cases reflecting historically resonant trends in their societies, provided an outlet for local 
resentments as economic disparities grew. Kuwait tried to accommodate this developing regional 
trend, which was to later gain ground in the amirate too, by ritually peppering the presentation of 
both foreign and domestic policy with reference to Islamic as well as Arab nationalist verities, 
80US Ambassador John Patrick-Walsh to US State Department, February 22 nd 1971 (A-22) 
" See Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament, in relation to the causes and consequences of the Lebanese 
civil war specifically. See also both Ajami op. cit. and Tibi op. cit. in relation to popular frustrations with the 
outcome of the 1973 war and with Arab nationalist regimes and ideology. 
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and emphasising its economic beneficence. However, in this more divisive regional environment, 
Kuwait's use of its oil wealth, and the attitudes that were felt to accompany it, meant that its 
financial largesse, although still a tool of a foreign policy that sought to project an attachment to 
Arab and wider solidarities, became less effective in diplomatic terms. In the case of Iraq though, 
Kuwait's oil wealth would continue to be a necessary, if not always durable, price of reducing 
hostility, or worse, from Baghdad. 
Al-Samita attack emphasises Iraqi threat 
At bottom Iraq would remain the primary focus of Kuwaiti security concerns. Former Kuwaiti 
officials, curiously perhaps, differentiate between the incursion of 1969, and the attack on the 
border post at Al-Samita, some 2 kin south of the Iraqi port of Um Qasr, and the capture of a 
further police position close by, on March 19"'/20th 1973 82 . Perhaps this was due to alleged 
Kuwaiti government complicity in the earlier incursion. However it may also have reflected the 
genuine difficulty in defining precisely where the border lay, given Iraq's refusal, to Kuwait's 
enormous frustration, to agree to its physical demarcation despite the signing of a mutual 
recognition agreement in 1963. Indeed, such was the difficulty in defining how much of an 
incursion had actually occurred in 1973, that a senior official in the British Foreign Office was to 
tell HM Government after the Al-Samita attack that the incident followed an incursion some six 
months earlier when Iraq entered to a depth of one krn within an area "claimed by Kuwait south 
of Um Qasr (my emphasis)"". The Iraqi attack on the police post at Al-Samita had followed an 
earlier Iraqi incursion into this "claimed area". The incident in late 1972 occurred when the Iraqis 
had begun building a road south of an artillery position seemingly put in place by Iraq as part of 
an ongoing desire to extend the area of its control around the strategically vital port of Urn Qasr". 
By the time of the Al-Samita incident, the police post actually lay "between Iraqi lines"85 . 
8' Abdul-Rahman Al-Ateegi observed that Iraq adhered to the "Arab League line" when it moved south in 
1969, and that they apparently stayed their side of it. In contrast he commented that the events of 1973 were 
"different" to incidents that had occurred previously, but stressed that the attack on Al-Samita was "not an 
invasion 
... (but) a clash 
in between two (police) stations ... You can talk about the Iraqis' aim 
(in launching 
the action) ... but a very small number of 
forces clashed, " he said. 
8' RM. Hunt, Head of Middle East Department, Foreign Office, in a written briefing to Private secretary, 
Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home, 22 nd March 1973, FCO 8/2193 
84 UK Cabinet Office, 22 nd March, 1973, FC08/2193 
85 Hunt, op. cit. 
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However Kuwait was in no doubt on this occasion that a clear infringement of its sovereignty had 
occurred. The amirate was strengthened in its angry determination to oblige Iraq to withdraw by 
the fact that, for the first time since the 1930s, a border dispute had led to the loss of Kuwaiti 
lives: two border policemen who had tried to reinforce the Al-Samita post when Iraqi troops 
initially occupied it and a post nearby. The Kuwaitis could perhaps judge the 1969 incursion to be 
bearable on the basis of the line that Arab League troops policed in 1961. However, as of March 
20th 1973, it was clear that a small contingent of Iraqi troops had raised the Iraqi flag an 
additional 2krn south of where the 1969 incursion had taken place; itself lying south of what was 
understood by Kuwait, the UK, and seemingly the international community, to be the border 86 . 
The incursion had taken place within a couple of weeks of Iraq making territorial proposals to a 
visiting Kuwaiti government delegation headed by foreign minister Sabah Al-Ahmed. These had 
appeared to offer demarcation as per the Kuwaiti interpretation of where the border lay, but only 
if the Gulf islands of Warba and Bubiyan were excluded, and either transferred or leased to Iraq 87 . 
An oil pipeline project connecting Iraq to Bubiyan would also, under these latest Iraqi proposals, 
be able to enlist the support of a "third party"88 , which, given the presence of Soviet engineers in 
developing Urn Qasr following their Treaty of Friendship signed a year earlier, compounded the 
unacceptability to Kuwait of the Iraqi proposals. 
British officials in Kuwait assessed that the short-term desire to extend control around Um Qasr, 
emphasised by the taking of the Al-Samita border post, was intended to put pressure on Kuwait to 
89 
concede the strategically vital island of Warba , which lay directly east of the 
Iraqi port, and, 
together with the larger island of Bubiyan lying to its immediate south, meant that Iraq's ability to 
access the northern Gulf headwaters was subject to the amirate's co-operation". Given Kuwait's 
defence alliance with the UK, and relative closeness with the US, this was understandably looked 
on with some concern in Baghdad". The Iraqis argued that the Al-Samita incident had occurred 
when the Iraqi garrison that had entered in 1969 had moved to the southern-most point of a 2km 
operation zone previously agreed with Kuwait, and whose purpose was to reinforce the port of 
86 A UK MoD map drawn up in 1965 for example defines the international border as running about 2km 
south of Safwan, and then heading south-eastwards to a point barely south of the Iraqi port of Um Qasr on 
the Khawr Abdullah (DEFE 11/616). 
8' Khadouri, Ibid. p. 15 8. 
88 Kelly, Lbid., p. 253. 
89 British Ambassador to Kuwait, John Wilton to the FCO, 25th March 1973 (FCO 8/1991) 
90 Hunt 22 d March 1973, Ibid. The UK official described Bubiyan as "... strategically placed to control the 
approaches to Um Qasr. 
, 
for a good sense of Iraqi foreign policy concerns in relation to its territorial 91 See Khadouri, Ibid 
dispensation with Kuwait. 
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Um Qasr 92 . 
While claims of a prior agreement over reinforcing Um Qasr had been disputed by 
Kuwait, Iraq's emphasis on "securing" its southernmost port city, and its seemingly related 
ambitions over nearby Warba, suggests that its the greater objective may have been less about 
territorial domination of Kuwait by stealth, than to extend its access and defence capability, at 
Kuwait's expense, at the northern headwaters of the Gulf. In part this would have been to offset 
pressure from Iran with whom it had engaged in violent border clashes between 1972-3. For 
Kuwait, however, the precise motivation behind the territorial encroachments were less important 
than the fact that they occurred -a perspective that was later vindicated when encroachments 
continued after Iraq and Iran had seemingly resolved their border dispute 93 . Kuwait had been 
unwilling to discuss leasing Warba and Bubiyan without Iraqi willingness to demarcate what it 
considered Baghdad had recognised as the international boundary in 1963. Compromise on this 
, 94 was not, in the words of a former senior Kuwaiti foreign ministry official, "the Arab way' . With 
Iraq's increasing closeness to the Soviet Union, Iraq's stepping up of activity inside Kuwaiti 
territory from 1972, Baghdad's assertion that sovereignty over the islands had not been 
determined and should in fact be ceded or at least compromised, and the direct linking of this to 
the assertion that Iraq is a "Gulf state 05 were now being seen with increasing concern in Kuwait. 
After the Al-Samita incident a demand was issued by Kuwait for the immediate Iraqi withdrawal 
to the "Arab League line", and that there should be a prompt demarcation of the border in accord 
with the 1963 agreement. The amirate's troops were initially mobilised in armoured vehicles to 
within six miles of that boundary 96 . There were some reports that Kuwaiti troops 
had moved 
much closer to the border, albeit probably short of where the Iraqis had been positioned'. Strong 
statements were made by both Kuwaiti defence and interior officials about the willingness of the 
amirate's troops to fight the Iraqis, and even to attack the nearest Iraqi town should they advance 
92 Khoury, op. cit. p. 156. 
93 According to Abdullah Bishara, then a senior foreign ministry official, "(Iraq) used the pretext of pan- 
Arabism to grab Kuwaiti territory.... (Iraq) had had a row with the Shah ... and 
(then) expanded south in 
Kuwait... (this was) creeping annexation. " Personal interview, 20 th January 2003, Kuwait. 
9' Ibid. 
95 According to Issa Hamed, director of political affairs at the Kuwaiti foreign ministry official, in 1972 
Iraq condemned Kuwait for the presence of a survey party on Bubiyan, arguing that its status had not been 
agreed. It was also of considerable concern to Kuwait that Iraq was now describing itself as a Gulf state, 
with explicit implications for its territorial dispensation with Kuwait (As reported by P. De Courcey- 
Ireland, UK embassy Kuwait, Telegram to FCO, 21" February 1973 (F08/1991)). 
96 R. Hunt, Head, Middle East Department, FCO, written briefing for Private Secretary to Alec Douglas 
Home, Foreign Secretary, 21" March, 1973 (1708/199 1) 
97 John Wilton to Alec Douglas-Home, 20'h March 1973 (F08/1991) 
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further south 98 . 
However Kuwait was keen that Arab mediation be used to encourage the Iraqis to 
withdraw, or at least to move north from Al-Samita. In addition to an Arab League mediator, 
senior representatives were sent from Egypt and Syria, while, incongruously perhaps, confidence, 
at least publicly, was invested by the Kuwaiti leadership in the prospect of mediation by Yasser 
Arafat while King Hussein also offered his services. While hopeful that a solution could be found 
that would be underwritten by the leading Arab states and therefore presented an "Arab solution" 
in a manner more convincing than the outcome of the 1961 crisis, Kuwait judged that nothing 
short of the demarcation of the border would constitute a real solution and the means to prevent 
the threat of border incursions occurring again in the future as they had repeatedly over the 
previous few years". 
Kuwait was not remotely hopeful however that this would be delivered by what in many respects 
was half-hearted Arab mediation. Only Saudi Arabia had distinguished herself among the Arab 
countries in being prepared to take military measures, along with the, otherwise widely suspected, 
Iran in an offer of military intervention that was privately appreciated by Kuwait. Statements on 
the crisis issued from virtually all Arab capitals, including Riyadh and Cairo, evinced a distinct 
air of "a plague on both your houses" for perpetuating this "distraction" as the prospect of another 
Arab-Israeli war loomedloo. Iraq obviously had no problem with this turn of events. Despite 
making clear that it would only negotiate bilaterally, and not on the basis of the 1932 or 1963 
agreements, Baghdad was facing no explicit demand from the Arab League or other Arab parties 
to withdraw to the "Arab League" line at least. However Kuwait's relatively early establishment 
of diplomatic relations with North Yemen, and the latter's resentment at Iraqi interference in 
North Yemen, seemed to have accrued at least some dividends when Egypt's allies in Sana' sent 
the Kuwaiti amir a telegram condemning the Iraqi actions 101. 
98 According to Mohammed Riad, a mediator appointed by the Arab League Secretary General, Kuwait's 
defence and interior minister Saad Abdullah had told him that if the Iraqis advanced toward Abdali they 
would fight them; he was apparently less verbose about Warba, despite its strategic importance, where 
apparently only five Kuwaiti policemen were present. Ibid. 
99 Kuwait told Arab mediators that, "The crisis would be considered unresolved" unless the withdrawal to 
the Arab League line and demarcation of the border were dealt with. UK embassy to FCO, 26h March 1973 
(FCO 8/1991). 
'00 Radio reports were transcribed by the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts and are contained in Foreign 
Office correspondence with the UK embassy, Kuwait, March 1973 (FCO 8/1991). 
101 The Yemen Arab Republic's prime minister Abdullah al-Hajri sent a telegram to the Kuwait amir 
expressing his "regret" for what happened at Al-Samita and "condemning the Iraqi occupation, " according 
to a report broadcast on Kuwait radio. Ibid. 
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Domestic opinion within Kuwait was clearly, even militantly, behind the government in its 
demand that Iraq withdraw and agree to the demarcation of the border in accordance with 
Kuwait's understanding of where it lay. Kuwaiti youth and students, the latter were otherwise a 
hotbed of radical Arab nationalist stances (see Chapter 5), dominated a demonstration following 
the highly emotional funeral of the two dead Kuwaiti officers. The demonstrators demanded that 
the government arm them and allow them to go to the border. Among many of the officers in the 
Kuwaiti military there was a determination that the armed forces should show their resolve, a 
position that was to grow as other territorial incursions occurred over the next 18 months. This 
mood among the officers had encouraged the standing to of forces close to the Iraqi border when 
the Al-Samita incursion first occurred. That, and indications that military advisors from Britain's 
Royal Air Force might well enter the conflict if they came under attack (see Chapter 7), in 
addition to troops from Iran and Saudi Arabia, helped to ensure that Kuwait maintained its defiant 
stance toward Iraq. For its part the Kuwaiti national assembly produced a statement within hours 
of the incident that urged Iraq to withdraw to the "international boundaries" 102 .A couple of weeks 
earlier the UK embassy had reported that because KMAN and other Arab nationalist 
sympathisers in parliament had, following the broad-based parliamentary delegation that a month 
earlier visited Baghdad, expressed support for Iraq's position on the border dispute, the 
government had encouraged the assembly to go into secret session"'. Yet there was little 
evidence of any equivocation in the KMAN MPs' support for the statement the assembly 
produced after the subsequent incident at Al-Samita, which was wholly in accord with the 
government position. 
Kuwait was acutely conscious of the difficulty of enjoying Tehran's support in the context of 
trying to build Arab solidarity for Kuwait's defence. Iraq's vice-president Saddam. Hussein would 
soon define the Gulf as "a vital part of Arab territory, which is the object of external designs 
related to a grand imperial project in the region. ""' With Iran presented as threatening to Arab 
interests, not for the last time Saddam. Hussein would pose as the Arabs' defender in the Gulf 
region. The ideology of Arab nationalism was deployed by Iraq as it informed Kuwait that it 
102 The statement condemned incursions and attacks on the Al-Samita police post on Kuwaiti territory, and 
stated that the boundary is a matter of international recognition and was agreed in 1963 
between the two 
countries (UK embassy, 20th March (FCO 8/1991)). 
103 John Wilton wrote of the KMAN MPs expressing the "straight Iraq line" in the assembly and the press 
and that this led to the secret session thereby preventing the counter arguments of the 
"silent majority" from 
being heard. Letter to Foreign Secretary Alec Douglas-Home, 7th March 1973 (FC08/1991). 
104 FCO assessment of Iraq and its regional ambitions. Supplied to 
UK embassy Kuwait, June 1974 
(FC08/2193) 
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should adjust the insistence on negotiating on the basis of previous agreements, and accommodate 
itself to wider Arab interests of which Baghdad was seemingly the exclusive defender. At the 
same time, Iraq used the increasing tension with Israel to try to present the border issue as little 
more than a "spat", peripheral to ordinary Kuwaiti and wider Arab interests. 
In the end Kuwait's support from the two pivotal Gulf players, and residual, but undeclared, UK 
backing, helped ensure that events did not escalate further. However, the partial success for 
Kuwaiti policy of Iraq withdrawing its troops from Al-Samita the following month could have 
been encouraged by a financial payment by Kuwait; certainly this is what one senior Kuwaiti 
official believed Iraq had been seeking in the first place 105 . The Kuwaiti press had been 
speculating for some time that a proper demarcation deal would have to be paid for, just like the 
1963 recognition. The withdrawal though was a long way short of a comprehensive deal. Even 
after pulling out of AI-Samita, Iraq remained in occupation of some Kuwaiti territory and, it was 
reported, at the time of the Al-Samita incursion had put some small infantry contingents on the 
Kuwaiti islands of Warba and Bubiyan 116 ,a key strategic interest of Baghdad. Kuwait did not 
have any reason to expect that the support of Iran or Saudi Arabia would secure an Iraqi 
withdrawal other than from the most publicised presence of Iraqi troops at Al-Samita. 
Without the mobilising impact of Kuwaiti deaths, the goverm-nent may well have lacked the 
stomach to continue to press the issue. The unwillingness of other Arab countries to 
unequivocally condemn Iraq for provoking the border dispute, or at least for seeking to strengthen 
its position by force of arms, partly reflected the greater Arab preoccupation with rising tensions 
with Israel in the lead up to what became the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. For once the official Arab 
rhetoric, as transmitted by state-owned broadcasting services, reflected a genuine desire to project 
a politically unified front vis-d-vis Israel, given the common interest of Arab regimes in 
107 deflecting popular criticism, and even upheaval, after the 1967 war . With Egypt in the 
front 
105 According to Kelly, Lbid., p284, "several million Kuwaiti dinars" were paid once Iraqi withdrew. Some 
11.6 million Kuwaiti dinars, were lent that year to Iraq by the Kuwaiti ministry of finance, the first official 
loans since recognition was secured in 1963. Abdul-Latif Hassan Al-Rumaihi, "The Dynamics of Kuwaiti 
Foreign Policy"(Exeter, U. K.; Exeter University, 1983), p. 217. Suleiman Majid Al-Shahin, under- 
secretary, ministry of foreign affairs, 1980-99, commented, Iraq was "looking for money not occupation. " 
Personal interview, 19'hJanuary 2003, Kuwait. 
106 According to unsubstantiated reports referred to by Kelly, Ibid, p283, and based on one other source, 
Schofield, Ibid, p. 117. Khadouri, Ibid, for example, notes that Iraq withdrew from Al-Samita but makes no 
mention of any other areas Iraq held within Kuwait. 
107 Thus their ideological stances on the border crisis between Iraq and Kuwait were highly instrumental, 
and in many instances, not least Egypt and Syria, were designed to offset their relative powerlessness to 
constrain Baghdad in the manner they had previously. 
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line of the conflict with Israel, and having withdrawn from its foothold in the Arabian Peninsula, 
Cairo was plainly not in position to play the pivotal role in the generation of Arab support for 
Kuwait it did in 1961. For their part, however, the lead actors within the Gulf region had taken 
precautionary steps against an Iraq that, although militarily contained, remained capable of 
further military action within Kuwait and was still therefore a potential threat to their own geo- 
strategic interests. 
Kuwait's Arabist oil construct 
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia had been resisting increased calls in the region for the deployment of 
the "oil weapon". However, their language had begun to change in 1973, in tandem with 
discussions between Egypt and Syria, and eventually Jordan, over a war that would be fought 
with the objective of restoring Egyptian and Syrian territory occupied by Israel in 1967. As such, 
the 1973 war and the consequent oil boycott are presented by Stephen Walt as being pursued by 
an alliance of principally Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia who targeted Israel and its ally the US in 
order to break the "diplomatic logjam" and ensure the return of occupied territory"'. This neo- 
realist reading of events has undoubted relevance for the military interlocutors who, unlike in 
1967, were plainly not bounced by a mutual ideological competition of the kind identified by 
Michael Barnett'09, but were identifying strategic goals. However, the conversion of Kuwait to 
support an oil embargo that, unlike the one introduced after the 1967 war, would make a major 
economic impact, reflected different imperatives of which the chief driver, ideological 
positioning, lends itself to a constructivist analysis. Kuwait could not afford to be seen to be 
dragging its feet on an emergent Arab consensus whose only dissenting voice over the economic 
component was Iraq. A long standing Gulf Arab desire to secure better terms from the western oil 
companies and to maximise oil reserves helped to remove any economic disquiet the raising of 
prices and the cutting of output levels would cause. Once the decision to specifically target the 
US for an oil embargo had been initiated by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait felt compelled to support it. 
108 Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (New York; Cornell University Press, 1989) p. 123-124. 
109 Michael N. Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York; Columbia 
University Press, 1998). 
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What Barnett characterises as the largely "symbolic politics" behind Arab states' relations 
explains a Kuwaiti decision in line with a long standing desire to portray its foreign policy in 
Arabist terms. Barnett argues that the "symbols and shadows" of 1967 had mostly disappeared by 
the time of the 1973 war and that the differing interests of the Arab interlocutors made them less 
susceptible to "symbolic sanctions" from each other, thereby facilitating some diplomatic 
progress after the war"'. However, for Kuwait, symbolism was very much in evidence in 1973/4. 
Its avowed desire to see the realisation of the embargo's official objectives was less important 
than ensuring that it was seen to provide what Walt refers to as the "symbolic support" of other 
Arab states". As the most significant Gulf Arab oil producer after Saudi Arabia, Kuwait's 
contribution to the economic impact of the embargo was more than symbolic. Kuwait however 
took no part in the attempt to co-ordinate common approaches among the leading members of the 
Arab alliance. Rather, Kuwait's adherence to measures that targeted the US, and affected the UK 
as well as Holland, and therefore went beyond the economic self-interest of raising oil prices and 
conserving output, was a reflection of how a revived Arab nationalist imperative regionally had to 
be embraced by the amirate. This was less an attempt to offset internal security challenges of the 
kind Barnett identifies as, for example, prompting Jordan's embrace of an undesired conflict in 
1967, than part of an ongoing foreign policy construct that Kuwait used to offset both regional 
and internal criticism in light of its traditional defence alignment with the UK, and now 
increasingly the US. This was not a construct that threatened to delegitimise the existence of 
states like Kuwait, in contrast to Barnett's assumptions about the threat, up until 1967 at least, 
posed by Arab nationalism to Arab state sovereignty. Rather, Arabism was a language that 
Kuwait drew on as a safety net to ensure it maintained the sympathy of Arab countries, the most 
important of which, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, had no strategic interest in seeing Kuwait absorbed 
by its principal claimant, Iraq. 
Before the 1973 war, Kuwait, like Saudi Arabia, had wanted to provide financial support for 
Egypt, not so much to encourage war, as to maintain Egypt's internal stability and encourage its 
realignment away from the Soviet Union and toward the US. In this sense Kuwait's support for 
Egypt was part of an attempt by oil-rich Gulf Arab states to leverage economic muscle to reshape 
international alliances in the Middle East, thus fitting with Walt's assessment of how conservative 
Arab states aligned with Egypt to use military and economic power to promote diplomatic 
progress under a US umbrella. However Kuwait had earlier feared that an oil boycott of the US 
110 lbid p. 182. 
"' Walt, op. cit. p. 288. 
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would upset this ob ective, believing that using economic muscle would undermine US support 
j 
for engagement with Egypt. Therefore the Kuwaiti switch, as war clouds gathered, in favour of 
the oil boycott shows how Kuwaiti foreign policy on this question evidenced the prioritisation of 
the symbols of Arabism, of using an Arab national construct as a tool to counteract perceived 
security vulnerability. Wider regional alignment considerations proved not to be Kuwait's 
priority; not did it conceive itself as able to do more than support such possibilities. 
Encouraging new regional alliances 
Kuwait was obviously playing second fiddle to Saudi Arabia's lead role in preparation for the war 
in October 1973. Whereas Riyadh was privy to the war planning, Kuwait's role was strictly 
financial. To Barnett the "conservative oil-rich Arab states" were building political influence. 
Beginning with their leading financial role in the aftermath of the 1967 war in contributing to the 
survival of the Egyptian and Syrian regimes, he argues that this played a significant part in the 
eventual decision by Cairo to go to war in 1973 as its funding would otherwise decline and as 
domestic radicalism and mass military mobilisation would become an untenable combination"'. 
The doubling of Arab financial assistance to Egypt following the decision to form the Arab 
Defence Council (ADC) in January 1973 was due to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia increasing its 
financing of both Cairo's military spending and of its overall government budget. This certainly 
made war possible and was seemingly encouraged by the fact that Egypt was distancing itself 
from the Soviet Union"', and thus funding from Kuwait seemed to become more than a relatively 
obligated expression of its fealty to the pan-Arab cause. Kuwait had already indicated it was 
willing to support Anwar Sadat's weakening of Egypt's USSR connection in favour of the US, by 
being willing to discuss financing possible Egyptian arms purchases from the US, and enabling 
training on UK-supplied Lightning aircraft to take place in Kuwait' 14 . 
Kuwait's frustration with the Egyptian and general Arab reaction to the events at Al-Samita. was 
to lead to it threatening to reduce its commitment to the ADC and specifically the offer of 
112 Michael N Barnett and Jack S Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments - The Case of 
Egypt 1962-73", International Organisation ILV (1991) p369-395 
113 Barnett and Levy ibid. 
114 John Wilton, UK embassy Kuwait to Foreign Off ice, Annual Review, January 1973 (FCO 8/1993). 
Wilton noted in relation to Kuwait's possible support for an Egyptian realignment, that in July 1972 Sadat 
had dismissed the Soviet military advisors. 
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Lightning aircraft'15. However, neither this, or rumours that Kuwait was considering reducing 
Kuwait's symbolic commitment of troops to the AI-Yarmouk brigade stationed in Egypt came to 
anything. Kuwait maintained appropriate pan-Arab rigour in its commitment to the collective 
Arab effort against Israel through funding and the contribution of, an admittedly, small quantity 
of men and materiel. Kuwait was not seeking to influence war and peace decisions, rather it was 
accommodating itself to the increasing need to provide financial and political support to Egypt 
and Syria as war loomed, albeit seeing opportunities in the process to encourage Egypt's 
international realignment. As the region became increasingly preoccupied with preparations for 
war, ideological adherence to pan-Arab goals were, temporarily at least, reinvigorated as the 
cloak in which Arab states' foreign policies were dressed. This trend would only last until the 
immediate aftermath of the war, when the Arab states once again divided; this time over how best 
to spend the accrued political capital, in particular from the increased leverage provided by the 
use of the oil weapon"'. 
Kuwait brandishes the oil weapon 
The Kuwaiti leadership had given a strong public indication some months before the war that it 
supported the use of the oil weapon, indeed officials had hinted at a measure of this order as far 
back as 1970. Like its earlier desire to use financial largesse to effectively fund diplomatic 
engagement between Cairo and Washington, Kuwait's backing for the oil boycott was, in part, an 
attempt to help secure the same outcome, economic pressure for Israeli withdrawal from the 
territories occupied in 1967. When regional tensions rose and war appeared increasingly 
inevitable, made all the more possible by Kuwaiti and other Gulf Arab funding of the frontline 
states, Kuwait was quick to fall in line with the increasingly militant Arab mood and to state 
baldly her enthusiasm for using the oil weapon. Press opinion in the amirate was firmly 
encouraging such a step, but Kuwaiti officials had long been talking of the possibility. In April 
1973 the Amir, Sabah Salim Al-Sabah, stated, "When zero hour comes, we shall use the oil as an 
effective weapon in the battle. " He added that Kuwait was likewise prepared to manipulate the oil 
price to bring pressure to bear directly on the USA to influence Israel"'. Saudi Arabia had been 
indicating its conversion to supporting an oil embargo and therefore Kuwait needed to ensure that 
115 UK embassy to Foreign Office, 26th March 1973 (FC08/1991). 
116 See Ajami, pp. cit 
117 Kelly, p386,2p. cit. 
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its stance fitted with the emerging Arab consensus. Internal factors were also an element, as 
pressure for 100% public ownership continued from Arab nationalists who had increased their 
representation in the national assembly (see Chapter 5). At the same time, an embargo was 
increasingly being discussed in the Arab world, whether among leading OPEC members or by 
Egypt 118 , with whom Kuwait and all the other Arab oil producers were effectively aligned against 
Israel. 
Following the rather limited impact of the relatively uncoordinated oil embargo announced after 
the 1967 war (see Chapter 5), Kuwait had played a lead role in the formation of, and hosted the 
headquarters of, OAPEC (the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries)"'. In 1971 
the lead actors in the impending conflict with Israel, Egypt and Syria, although they barely 
produced oil, were admitted to the club, along with the UAA (including oil-rich Abu Dhabi) and 
(relatively oil-poor) Bahrain. The formation of such an organisation, which had little institutional 
clout, reflected how much the political interests of the Arab oil producing states was conceived of 
as something to be collectively determined with the Arab "frontline" states and in need of such a 
collective, Arabist gloss. In the course of the 1973 war, as Egypt and Syria appeared to be gaining 
the territorial advantage, OAPEC issued a formal announcement that it was responding to the US 
decision to air lift arms supplies to Israel by reducing oil output by 5% for each successive month 
that Israel remained in occupation of territory acquired in the course of the 1967 war. Countries 
judged to be "hostile" to the Arab cause and supportive of Israel, such as the US, were to be 
embargoed from receiving any oil. Europeans, including the UK, were treated in a more 
unpredictable fashion (see Chapter 7). While Kuwait had been one of the first Arab oil producing 
states to make vociferous noises about using the oil weapon, the key country in determining the 
extent of the collective embargo and, given the size of its output, the one country that had the 
ability and willingness to make more substantive unilateral cuts, was Saudi Arabia. It was Saudi 
Arabia to whom Egypt would eventually turn when it decided to leverage the weight it felt it had 
now acquired with the US and to cancel the embargo ahead of any potential territorial 
concessions. 
By early 1974 the oil price had nearly quadrupled, as OPEC oil producers assumed that, in an 
exceedingly tight market, this could be bome by consumers without any international 
consequences. Thus Arab oil producers were being more than compensated for their cuts to 
118 Ibid., p. 387 
119 Formed in January 1968, it initially consisted of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Algeria and Libya. 
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national output, while the economic pressure in oil-dependent countries, with the exception of 
those Arab countries receiving generous subsidies from the OAPEC countries, was immense. 
President Anwar Sadat's decision to urge cancellation of the embargo was met with formal 
objections by Kuwait. The amirate's oil and finance minister had issued highly charged 
comments at the height of the crisis, which created considerable friction between Kuwait on the 
one side, and the UK and the US on the other (see Chapter 7). The impression Kuwait wanted to 
create was that the only consideration of its oil policy was that which would cause the most 
pressure to end Israel's occupation. It was never prepared, however, to try to hold out for any 
specific terms. Its bottom line, put forward at OAPEC meetings, was "sharing the pain with our 
brothers in Egypt and Syria""'. Once the leading frontline state, Egypt, had decided it wanted a 
way out of the pain in the form of a US-brokered return of at least Egyptian territory, then Kuwait 
was happy to ease its own international diplomatic discomfort; there was certainly no financial 
price being paid by the amirate, quite the opposite. In public Kuwait expressed frustration that the 
embargo was being ended, but few took this stance at face value 121 . In private Kuwait was to 
stress to Egypt, once Cairo had secured the agreement of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, that a 
decision to end the embargo needed to be presented properly 122 . The political wisdom or 
otherwise of President Sadat in forfeiting collective economic leverage in return for the uncertain 
outcome of greater US engagement in resolving the territorial conflict was not something that 
concerned Kuwait at this time. The shift to bilateral approaches from what, officially at least, had 
been defined as a collective Arab conflict with Israel, and which led directly to the US brokering 
of separate disengagement agreements between Israel, and Egypt and Syria respectively, would 
not be criticised by Kuwait. The 1974 disengagement agreements, and the more controversial 
1975 "Sinai 11" agreement that saw further Israeli disengagement that all but ended the state of 
war with Egypt, were not seen by Kuwait as steps that it was appropriate for it to pass judgement 
on. The principal Arab military interlocutors had determined how economic leverage should be 
utilised and when it should be ended. With Saudi Arabia taking the lead in slapping down critics 
of Sinai 11, Kuwait saw no reason to publicly assess the rights and wrongs of Egyptian decision- 
120 According to the then oil and finance minister, Abdul-Rahman Ateegi, this was Kuwait's purpose in 
backing the boycott. Personal interview, Ibid. 
12 ' According to the then US ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Herman Eilts, the Kuwaitis expressed frustration 
that the embargo was going to be lifted, but in Washington and the region "this was dismissed as good 
Arab nationalist rhetoric" Personal interview, Boston MA, USA August 2000. 
122 Abdul-Rahman Ateegi was anxious that Kuwait not be seen to be falling in line with Egypt's desire to 
end the embargo without the cover of collective decision-making. He met with Anwar Sadat in April 1974 
and, according to Ateegi, told him, "... we can't waive this by order in Cairo. This is not good for you or for 
us. " As a result a subsequent OAPEC meeting decided to postpone the announcement until all the Arab oil 
producers met at an OPEC meeting in Vienna. Ibid. 
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making. Kuwait had seen the embargo as a useful opportunity to make a high profile expression 
of a foreign policy supposedly rooted in Arab solidarity; this it had succeeded in doing. 
Kuwait's joining of the oil embargo did not follow deliberation on its foreign policy options. 
Kuwait's support, says its then oil and finance minister, was due to the "mood" in the Arab world, 
not coercion from its neighbours. In fact the only country that might have been willing to coerce 
an appropriate stance from Kuwait regarding oil issues was Iraq. In 1972, for example, Kuwait 
had seen participation as a way of controlling output for the benefit of conserving Kuwait's oil 
reserves over the longer tenn, but also to meet a short term need of not being seen by Baghdad to 
be profiting from the slowdown in output following the latter's dispute with the Iraqi National Oil 
Company (INOC) over compensation claims. When Iraq moved to nationalise INOC, even 
though this was not the favoured approach of Kuwait, whose preferred method was to negotiate 
an extended stake in its oil resource, Kuwait understood that it had to be seen to be backing the 
policy, especially when it was also under pressure in the national assembly to drive a harder 
bargain with the international oil companies 123 . However, by the time of the collective Arab 
decision on production cuts, Kuwait and Iraq had clearly diverged, with Iraq arguing that having 
nationalised its oil industry, then it should be exempted from making production cuts that would 
only hurt itself and therefore the Arab world (as opposed to the partly foreign-owned oil sectors 
in the other OAPEC countries). 
Kuwait had raised its standing on the regional and international stage as a result of the oil 
embargo. The decision to abandon it did not immediately lessen this profile as international and 
Arab attention, albeit in different ways, focussed on how the Gulf Arab producers used their 
immensely increased oil revenues. Kuwait was widely seen as enjoying its ability to play on a 
much bigger stage. In doing so it had at least partially escaped the attention its foreign policy 
necessarily had had to pay to what was acceptable in Baghdad. British officials believed that the 
Al-Samita crisis had encouraged Kuwait to take a more independent stance, conscious of how 
accommodating Baghdad had singularly failed to prevent hostile Iraqi action 124 . However it was 
never very likely that Kuwait would take Iraq's side and oppose an oil boycott that had been 
building up for some months prior to the war's outbreak, in part due to the amirate's public 
123 US embassy Telegram to US State Department. (day unknown, June 1972, A70). Iraq also ensured that 
it had financial commitments from Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Libya to help it financially should production 
be cut by INOC for a significant period. See Khadouri 2p. cit. 
124 AD Harris observed that Kuwait was pursuing a notably more independent line following Al-Samita, but 
suggested that since then there had been signs of Iraq "tweaking the reins" again. 
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support for the measure. Kuwait had deployed its oil wealth on a larger stage, first in the 
collective Arab conflict with Israel and then, following the ending of the boycott, in what became 
a debate with Europe in particular, over their economic interdependence and about policy toward 
the Middle East. Associating itself with pan-Arab causes and avoiding inter-Arab alignments had 
always been the way that Kuwait had hoped to offset its bi-lateral existential conflict with Iraq. 
However, in the aftermath of the 1973 war with Israel, Kuwait's raised profile within the Arab 
mainstream and internationally would provide little deterrence against Iraq. 
Pan-Arabism fails to protect Kuwait 
After a further military incursion into Kuwait by Iraq occurred in December 1974, Kuwait found 
itself more diplomatically and militarily exposed than it had been in March 1973. The extent of 
the incursion was more ambiguous than previously, with British officials, for example, initially 
unsure if an incursion had actually taken place, and then assuming that it had been talked up by 
the Kuwait deputy chief of staff and by military intelligence. However the Kuwait government 
and media were in no doubt that it had occurred, railing against the unwillingness of Arab 
governments to engage with the issue, even to the level, itself seen as disappointing by Kuwait, 
that had occurred the previous year. OAPEC had ended the oil embargo in March 1974, which 
Kuwait duly presented as assisting its ability to aid the "comprehensive struggle against the 
aggressor" 125 , implying it would increase 
disposable revenues to aid Arab causes. With the 
abandonment of collective Arab economic action and disputes over the diplomatic way forward, 
Iraq sensed an opportunity to advance its interests vis-d-vis Kuwait with greater impunity. 
Kuwait had tried to accommodate Iraq's practical need for greater access from the Gulf, given the 
pressure on its existing outlets at Basra and Um Qasa, by agreeing in early 1974 an economic deal 
with Iraq whereby Kuwait's ports could be used by its northern neighbour. These ports were the 
source of large quantities of goods; according to some reports these included military hardware, 
that ended up in Iraq throughout the 1970s 126 . However Iraq clearly 
felt that, with the collective 
Arab front fraying, this was an opportune moment to put pressure on Kuwait for more than 
125 Amiri Speech, October 1974 (FCO 8/2193) 
126 Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait's Foreign Policy - City-State in World Politics (Colorado; Westview Press, 
1990) 
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economic co-operation. The benefits of Arab solidarity, if they did deter Iraq during the height of 
the oil crisis, were plainly very limited in the aftermath. 
Following the latest Iraqi territorial penetration, which Al-Rai AI-Amm reported was, like before, 
some 2krn into Kuwaiti territory, the Kuwaiti newspaper wrote of "the unacceptable state of 
anxiety" this had created. Bemoaning the fact that it had elicited only a muted response from 
other Arab capitals, the conservative daily, owned by and politically close to the crown prince, 
decried the: 
".... [D]ashing of hopes for Arab solidarity which emerged in the October War. " It added, "It's 
surprising that Egypt and Syria, which are aware of the sacrifice made by Kuwait in the context 
of the Arab battle, have not lifted a finger to maintain Arab solidarity. 12799 
There was more than embellishment in the implication of hardships having been endured in 
Kuwait' 18 , 
but there was no doubt that the two frontline Arab countries had been, and continued 
to be, generously funded by the Gulf Arab oil states. Kuwait had also been one of eight non- 
frontline Arab countries that sent troops - in Kuwait's case adding to its existing troop presence 
in Egypt with a contingent on the Syrian side of the occupied Golan Heights. 
The Iraq penetration and the lack of wider Arab interest in it also saw bitter press suggestions that 
Kuwait should respond by devoting itself to "another cause" than the Arab "national dream", and 
should "concentrate on ensuring security for herself "'9. These comments were pointedly targeted 
to coincide with the arrival of Egypt's prime minister, Abdul-Aziz Higazi, who was on a 
scheduled visit to Kuwait to discuss "social and economic co-operation" i. e. the amirate's 
ongoing high level of financial support for Egypt now that the war was over and it was focused 
on less costly, diplomatic efforts to regain its territory. 
However exposed Kuwait may have felt within the Arab context, this did not prevent it from 
taking fairly robust action near the border in an attempt to deter Iraq from further incursions. A 
battalion of troops were immediately dispatched to the border zone to build a trench at the 
46conflict point with Iraq", a road was constructed running east of Um Qasr to the sea, and a new 
"' Editorial, Al-Rai Al-Amm, I" December 1974 (FCO 8/2193) 
128 In the period leading up to the war, Kuwait, together with Iraq, Libya and Algeria, symbolically stopped 
its oil production for one hour in a gesture of opposition to US support 
for Israel. Libya, apparently, 
managed to at least keep the effort going for a day. Freedman, op. cit. 
129 Al-Rai Al-Amm 2p-. cit 
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border post was put in place. The mood was one of detennination to appear strong in the face of 
Iraq's incursions. While the (now) chief of staff, General Mubarak Al-Sabah, in common with the 
senior political leadership, wanted to project calm about the border situation, his deputy, General 
Salah Mohammed Al-Sabah, and younger officers beneath him, seemed determined to talk up the 
incursion in order that definitive steps be taken to try to deter further encroachments at the 
border 130 . More significant in preventing further Iraqi military moves, however, was probably the 
ongoing potential for Iran to intervene in any crisis, which its exaggeration of the extent of Iraq's 
latest incursion suggested it did not mind provoking. Pressure continued to be applied by Iraq in 
1975 when further proposals were tabled by Baghdad for a territorial solution that, while it 
appeared to abandon what, from a Kuwaiti perspective, was the wholly unacceptable Iraqi desire 
for sovereignty over Warba and Bubiyan islands, presented proposals for leasing Warba and for 
the effective occupation of one half of the far larger Bubiyan island. These proposals did nothing 
to ease the Kuwaiti concern that the islands would not only become a de-facto pennanent Iraqi 
hold on strategic territory in the northern Gulf, but could serve as a bridgehead for Baghdad's 
ally, the Soviet Union (see Chapter 7). Iraq's proposals to Kuwait were in marked contrast to the 
perception among its other neighbours that, in the wake of the 1975 Algiers Agreement with Iran, 
Iraq had become more accommodating 131 . The agreement, formally signed in Baghdad in June, 
saw Iraq abandon what had been presented as the Arabs' interest in maintaining sovereignty over 
the Shatt Al-Arab (or Arvand Rud) waterway, in return for an end to Iran's sponsorship of the 
Kurdish revolt inside Iraq. Kuwait had seen the Algiers Agreement as an opportunity to press Iraq 
to agree the border demarcation, now that Baghdad's claimed need to enhance its territorial depth 
in the face of an Iranian threat was apparently no longer relevant. Kuwaiti officials would 
continue to stress that without a resolution of the issue, deep suspicions and resentment would 
remain in Kuwait about Iraqi objectives"'. However the Kuwaiti interpretation of the Iraq-Iranian 
accord did not find favour in Baghdad, where the extension of its unilateral ability to enhance the 
security of the Iraqi port of Um Qasr was still presented as imperative' 33 . 
130 Peter Hinchcliffe, deputy head of mission, UK embassy Kuwait, to Foreign Office, December 1974 
(FCO 8/2193). 
131 In general this appears to have been true. For example, Iraqi overtures to Saudi Arabia, see below. Also 
Gregory Gause III notes that there was some moderation of the Iraqi ideological onslaught against Syria 
and Jordan in 1975. Gause, pp. cit 
132 Khadouri, op. cit. p. 159, 
133 Ibid. 
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Lebanese alignment 
Kuwait continued to ride the wave of its heightened profile after the oil crisis and became a 
player, albeit a secondary one, in the inter-Arab politicking intended to end the Lebanese war that 
had begun in 1975. The war was to impact on many Arab countries who, in their desire to offset 
its domestic impact, became involved in the internal politics of Lebanon to greater or lesser 
degrees. Events in Lebanon had had an impact on Kuwait's decision to suspend its parliament 
(see Chapter 5). However Kuwait's role in Lebanon was to lend the support of the conservative 
oil-rich Arab states to attempts to end the conflict, albeit in a junior capacity to Saudi Arabia. The 
Riyadh Agreement of 1976, building on previous inter-Arab attempts to mediate a solution, 
committed Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria to sending military observers to Lebanon"'. 
Iraq, whose enmity with Syria had resumed the vicious ideological contest begun in the aftermath 
of the 1973 war, reserved special opprobrium for Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the pre-eminent 
funders of Syria and of Egypt, for underwriting the dominant role of Syria in Lebanon"'. 
In September 1976, Iraq conducted another penetration of Kuwaiti territory, again of around 2km, 
but this time the incursion continued for ten months, with troops from either country facing each 
other across the border, and yet more attempts at Arab mediation including the Saudi leader, King 
Khaled 136 . This was an 
increase in its pressure on the amirate that coincided with the worsening 
of their bilateral relations following their differences over oil policy and the outbreak of the 
Lebanese war. Kuwait's maintenance of good relations with the other key players in the Arab 
world, now in common cause over Lebanon, was another example of how the amirate was 
effectively deviating from its professed regional non-alignment policy. However this was not 
motivated by a desire to balance against what Kuwait continued to see as its greatest regional 
threat, but it was an alignment in as much as it excluded Iraq. Aside from the events of 1961, 
Kuwait had avoided inter-Arab alignments, even at Iraq's expense. However in the Arab world 
post- 1967, this was longer feasible. 
The decline of Egypt's regional weight and the related rise of Saudi Arabia as a regional player 
and, following the British departure from the Gulf, its increased importance as the pre-eminent 
134 See Taylor, op. cit for an account of Arab politicking over Lebanon. 
135 Iraq was to state in reaction to the Riyadh Accord of 
October 1976, "The masses will settle accounts 
with the reactionary regimes of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait whose riches underpin 
the treachery. " R. 0. 
Freedman, Soviet Policy Towards the Middle East Since 1970 (New York; Praeger 1978) p. 261. 
136 Al-Rumaihi, op. cit., p. 120; Schofield, op. cit. p. 119. 
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Arab state in Kuwait's backyard, created a new inter-Arab reality where the amirate was a player 
in tandem with its fellow oil-rich Arab neighbour. This did not reduce Kuwait to being a tool of 
Riyadh, as strong differences over Kuwait's internal policy evidenced, but it did mean that 
accommodating the kingdom took on greater importance. Egypt's tenuous alliance with Syria in 
1977 quickly dissolved in December of that year when President Sadat confirmed Cairo's 
determination to find a bilateral solution to the conflict with Israel, by flying direct to Jerusalem 
and addressing the Israeli parliament in favour of a peace accord between the two states. Kuwait's 
ability to maintain a non-aligned stance within the Arab world was thus weakened further. 
Maintaining friendship and accommodation with both Egypt and Saudi Arabia had effectively 
been the props of Kuwait's non-alignment in the Arab world and the wider Middle East. However 
the decline of the influence of Egypt, a country that in many ways had been Kuwait's most 
important Arab relationship since 1961, had reached its apotheosis in a decision by Cairo to 
effectively absent itself from influence in the Arab world 137 . However Kuwait still declined, like 
Saudi Arabia and Jordan, from siding with Syria, much less Iraq, in their respective "rejection" 
and "steadfastness and confrontation" fronts against Egypt's "betrayal". Kuwait was genuinely 
shocked, as might be expected when the country that had helped shape its adherence to Arab 
nationalist norms, left the ideological battlefield. However, while Kuwait came under direct 
138 
pressure from Iraq to side with its Rejection Front, the amirate maintained a relative distance . 
Among the Gulf Arabs, strong criticism of Egypt was left to Saudi Arabia, but neither the 
kingdom, Kuwait, nor the southern Gulf Arab states desired to overtly align against Egypt on this 
issue 139 . Kuwait's ailing 
leader, Sabah Salim, would bemoan the increasing inter-Arab divisions 
as he neared his demise 140 . However, the amirate's 
foreign policy style continued to be to avoid 
taking overt sides, even, as far as possible, in relation to the existential threat it perceived from 
Iraq. 
"' Or at least until the inter-Arab exigencies of the 1980s Gulf war required Egypt to be allowed back in to 
the Arab fold. 
"' According to Abdul-Rahman Ateegi, who attended an inter-Arab meeting in Baghdad shortly after 
President Sadat went to Jerusalem, Kuwait faced considerable pressure from Iraq, Syria and the PLO 
chairman Yasser Arafat to join an anti-Egyptian front in opposition to Sadat's initiative. However, "thank 
God", he said, the amirate did not ever consider joining either the Iraq-led Rejection Front, or the 
Steadfastness and Confrontation front led by Syria and including the PLO. 
"9 Kuwait did not cut its funding to Egypt until after it signed the peace accord with Israel in 1979. In the 
wake of the Camp David process, Iraq seized the initiative and in 1978 hosted an Arab League summit at 
which Kuwait agreed a series of payments to the three remaining frontline "confrontation" states and to the 
PLO. Assiri, op. cit. p. 151. 
140 Just prior to his death in December 1977, Amir Sabah Salim said that 
in his political life, "My sole aim 
is to do my best to unify all Arabs. It is a matter which grieves me deeply particularly at this stage when 
I 
see so many divisions. " Jarman, op. cit. p. 316-7. 
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For virtually the whole period following the 1967 war until Egyptian president Anwar Sadat flew 
to Jerusalem in November 1977, Kuwait had been able to be, as the Arab nationalist ideological 
line had it, "in the same trench" as both Egypt and Saudi Arabia and most other Arab 
governments. Playing a leading role in the 1973/4 oil boycott was hardly uncomfortable for a 
Kuwait that had presented Palestine as the key totem of its pan-Arab foreign policy credentials, 
while Kuwait's support a fairly pronounced role in favour of a "pax-Syriana" to end the Lebanese 
civil war was in keeping with past efforts to mediate in internal or intra-Arab disputes. At the 
same time, moving closer to Saudi Arabia did not exclude Kuwaiti engagement with Iran, which 
was to develop considerable tension in its relations with Saudi Arabia in the Gulf region post- 
1971. This conciliatory approach was largely a reflection of Kuwait's traditional foreign policy 
desire to avoid alliances and to seek understandings with all the key regional players. On 
Palestine, Kuwait was prepared to take a different stance from Egypt, which, despite its weakened 
position post-1967, would continue to be the main Arab player in the conflict with Israel, up until 
November 1977 at least. Kuwait's refusal to endorse the post-1967 international diplomatic 
politicking was less about Saudi influence than the decline of Egyptian weight within the region, 
and the importance to Kuwait of not being too far adrift from the Arab mainstream, both at the 
popular and regime level, on such a touchstone issue. 
The bottom line though for Kuwait was the perceived threat from Iraq, despite its relatively 
modest military capabilities. Since 1969 this had been emphasised for Kuwait by a series of 
incursions and an accompanying rise in ideological attacks. The "aggregate" balance of threat 
came from Iraq, but the policy response was not, for the most part, what those who apply a neo- 
realist approach to Arab states' foreign policy would have expected 14 1. Kuwait in many ways 
ploughed its own furrow on foreign policy, judging its limited size and military capability as a 
reason to avoid regional alignments, rather than what might have been the expected but, from its 
perspective, risky venture of seeing alliances as the best guarantor of security. Kuwait's 
ideational packaging of policy in the Arab world served to underwrite this largely regionally non- 
aligned approach, avoiding rhetorical fratricide, but emphasising its adherence to mainstream 
pan-Arab identifiers in way that was qualitatively different to Saudi Arabia's conservative 
Islamism. However, after 1967 Kuwaiti foreign policy was equally likely to be cast in Islamic as 
Arabist terms, a factor that reflected both regional shifts, most obviously embodied by Saudi 
Arabia's creation of the OIC, but also Islamist developments at the grassroots, a factor that 
Kuwait had domestically patronised (see Chapter 5). In addressing Kuwait's oil policies in the 
141 See Gause and Walt op. cit. 
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post-1973 war environment, which had included the abandonment of the oil embargo in April 
1974, Amir Sabah Salim Sabah emphasised the rising oil prices as a shift in resources from the 
developed world. Shrewd language perhaps, given the rising anger in the Arab world at who had 
really benefited from the war. The Kuwait Fund's recasting from its exclusive Arab focus enabled 
the amirate to direct considerable largesse toward poorer Islamic, and often non-Arab, states. 
Almost in the same breath the amir stressed Islamic verities at home and a new policy of funding 
international radio broadcasts in a variety of languages to Islamic countries "in order to spread 
awareness of Islam in these countries and to acquaint them with Kuwait""'. Kuwait was always 
more inclined than so-called "secular" Arab states to cast its policies in terrns of Islamic identity, 
and to an extent there appeared to be genuine personal religious adherence among many of the 
senior Al-Sabah 143, who expressed language rarely heard from senior officials in the so-called 
progressive Arab states. However, a foreign policy shift was also occurring, reflecting both 
regional and local developments. 
Kuwait was clearly conscious that the long-standing basis of its foreign policy may no longer be 
adequate. Kuwait's ritualistic appeals to Arab unity in the midst of what proved, despite 
collective Arab diplomatic forays, to be an ongoing conflict in Lebanon, and her vaguer 
comments about divisions elsewhere in the Arab world, were largely a reflection of despair. Nor 
for that matter did Kuwait's increased political closeness to Saudi Arabia, and the practical co- 
144 
operation evident in their finalising in 1974 of the demarcation of the Neutral Zone , provide 
any guarantee of Kuwaiti security. Indeed, their mutual relations continued to be subject to 
numerous grievances, albeit that the closure of the assembly had helped improve matters. 
Notably, having taken ten years over the land demarcation, and despite forming a joint technical 
committee, the two countries could not resolve the maritime delimitation of the Neutral Zone 
until as recently as July 2000. The potential for exploiting energy reserves in the area meant that 
sovereignty over two tiny uninhabited islands, Qaru and Um Al-Maradim, which lay off the 
Kuwaiti half of the Neutral Zone, was strongly disputed. Given Kuwait's desire to continue to 
broaden the basis of its international support, notwithstanding its essential orientation toward the 
US, in late 1975 the Kuwaiti foreign minister's visit to Moscow resulted in agreement on a large 
142 Amiri speech, October 1974, transcribed and included in telegram 
from UK embassy Kuwait to Foreign 
Office (FCO 8/2195). 
143 Amir Sabah Salim reportedly remarked in his final days that Kuwait's objective 
had been to "defend the 
religion of Islam and the dignity of the Arab nation. 
" Jarman, Ibid. p. 316. 
144 According to Khadouri, Ibid., the territorial delimitation of the Neutral Zone was 
finally agreed in 1974. 
The formal division had been agreed by both countries in 1966 (see Chapter 4) 
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armaments deal that caused consternation in Saudi Arabia and in the US"' (see Chapter 7). 
Kuwait's engagement with the USSR was in line with its long standing policy of pursuing good 
relations with all the permanent members of the UNSC. Specifically, however, Kuwait had in 
mind befriending the Soviet Union in order to secure the latter's support to offset pressure from 
its ally, Iraq. Winning the support of the USSR in 1963, after all, had been important to finally 
securing Iraqi recognition later that year. The upshot of the arms deal, however, was tension with 
146 Saudi Arabia. In mid-1977 this saw Saudi troops occupy both Qaru and Um Al-Maradim . 
While wholly lacking the strategic and geo-political significance of Iraq's incursions south of Um 
Qasr, this event, carefully hushed up and quickly resolved by very senior discussions between 
Riyadh and Kuwait 147 , caused the amirate considerable shock, not least given Saudi Arabia's 
intervention on Kuwait's side during the earlier Al-Samita crisis. 
While Iraq was keen to improve terms with Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of its concessions to 
Iran in 1975, and to engage with the smaller Gulf states, seemingly including Kuwait, the latter's 
concerns over border incursions were not assuaged. An agreement delimiting the Iraqi-Saudi 
neutral zone in 1975 on the same, equal basis as that agreed between Kuwait and Saudi a year 
earlier"' encouraged Iraqi attempts to improve its relations more widely and even saw a 
conference in Muscat in November 1976 at which Iraq and Iran joined the six Gulf Arab 
monarchies and amirates in discussing Gulf regional co-operation. The proposal did not get off 
the ground, but a seemingly more modest one, on environmental standards for shipping in the 
Gulf, brought Iran, Iraq and the Gulf Arabs to Kuwait where an agreement was signed in 1977. 
However, the dispute with Kuwait, which continued to report further incursions by Iraq, would 
remain an obstacle to improving understandings between Iraq and Saudi Arabia and therefore 
with the smaller Gulf Arab states, while disputes over approaches toward Lebanon were also a 
key source of division between Iraq on one side and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait on the other, with 
its own implications for Iraq-Kuwait border tensions. 
Iraq was not above attempting a softer approach to Kuwait as a way of enabling better relations 
with its wider Gulf Arab neighbours, however. It may also have been responding to the Soviets 
stepping up of relations with Kuwait. In June 1977, for example, Iraq and Kuwait agreed to form 
145 Freedman, op. cit. p. 217; and Assiri, op. cit. p. 81-2. 
146 Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait's Foreign Policy - City-State in World Politics, Westview Press, Colorado, 
USA, 1990. p82. 
147 Assiri, Ibid p. 82, 
148 Khadouri, Ibid p 16 1. 
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a "joint management committee" with the intention of discussing ways of at least containing the 
danger of tensions spilling over from their differences 149 .A month later Iraq offered to withdraw 
from the positions it held inside Kuwait, presenting this announcement as an indication of its 
intent to settle the border dispute in an amicable manner"'. The lack of resolution of the latter 
however would continue to emphasise the importance of Iran as well as Saudi Arabia to Kuwaiti 
security calculations. A naval visit by Iran to Kuwait, for example, was seen by Kuwaiti leaders 
151 as a useful part of its deterrence against Iraq 
The bottom line for Kuwait, however, as it smoothly transitioned from the largely figurehead 
leadership of Sabah Salim, who died on December 31" 1977, to the more assertive rule of the 
Jabr Al-Ahmed, would continue to be the need to offset a perceived vulnerability vis-ei-vis Iraq. 
In the period leading up to the Iranian revolution of 1978-9 at least, Kuwait's policy responses to 
this requirement remained the avoidance of overt alignment within the region; "correct", or at 
least inoffensive, stances on pan-Arab issues assisted by financial largesse; and the ongoing, but 
relatively discrete, search for supportive defence relations internationally. 
149 Schofield, pp. cit 
150 Khadouri, op. cit., p. 159. 
15 1 According to a former Iranian official, Amir Sabah Salim thanked Iran 
for "intervening" after another 
Iraqi border incursion had occurred. The arrival of three Iranian warships and some 50-60 naval personnel 
had however been planned for months. Off the record interview, London, November 2005. 
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Chapter 7 
International dimensions 1967-77 
One week prior to the formal announcement on January 16'h, 1968 in the House of Commons, 
Britain's minister of state at the Foreign Office, Gorowny Roberts, visited the Gulf Arab leaders 
to inform them that in three years time Britain would withdraw its military presence in the area. it 
was explained to Kuwait that the UK's termination of its treaties of protection with the other Gulf 
amirates would mean that the commitment to Kuwait's defence, agreed upon at the time of the 
country's independence in 1961, would also come to an end. Kuwait's former balance between 
international security and regional relations would be further undermined as Egypt's weight in the 
Arab world declined after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. In contrast, after the 1973 war, Saudi 
Arabia's economic strength and its conservative, Islamic values grew in influence. The result of 
these developments for Kuwait was that it faced a Gulf region in which Iran was moving to fill 
the security vacuum left by the UK, leaving Saudi Arabia as the only Arab player to whom Gulf 
Arab states could look to counter perceived threats. However Kuwait, while increasingly subject 
to Saudi influence, followed the existing course of its foreign policy in avoiding regional 
alliances, including with Riyadh, and sought to offset a comparatively more exposed regional 
position by bolstering its defence relations with the US, but with only partial success. 
Largely symbolic contributions to Kuwait's security continued to be made by the UK as its 
former primary regional role gave way to a semi-detached US security role in the Gulf On the 
one hand the US approach fitted better with the amirate's desire to keep western defence alliances 
discrete and at arm's length; on the other Washington delegated its security interests to the two 
leading Gulf players, Iran and Saudi Arabia, countries that Kuwait eyed warily and that it had no 
desire to ally with. In mid- 1977, however, the US initiated steps that would lead to a gradually 
more interventionist approach to the region, especially after the Iranian revolution and the 
beginning of the Iraq-Iran war. In the 1980s this would make it possible for Kuwait to shift its 
strategy and secure a partial alignment with the US after the amirate had abandoned its non- 
1 What a year later would begin to take on the shape of a US "Rapid Deployment Force" 
in the Gulf 
followed a presidential directive issued by President Jimmy Carter in August 1977. 
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aligned regional stance and, like Washington, aided Iraq in the course of the eight year long war 
with Iran. 
End of formal UK commitment 
Britain's decision to depart from virtually all of its territory "East of Suez" had its greatest 
implications in the Gulf for the nine southern Gulf shaikhdoms that were still under a treaty of 
protection with the UK. Following the end of Britain's defence commitment they became the 
United Arab Amirates (UAA), a seven-member federation of the former Trucial States; and the 
independent states of Bahrain and Qatar. Regarding Kuwait, it made inevitable a change to the 
UK's defence commitment represented in Clause D of the Exchange of LetterS2 . This was a 
change that the Kuwaiti amir and the British ambassador' had both initially hoped could be 
finessed without having to terminate the defence commitment under which Britain had militarily 
intervened shortly after the amirate had become independent (see Chapter 4). Even the 
perceptibly more Arab nationalist crown prince, Jabr Al-Ahmed, was happy to keep some 
semblance of British protection, however limited 4. The amir was deeply shocked by Mr Roberts' 
announcement, not least because the comments of the British minister when he had visited the 
region only two months earlier, had implied a rather more long term commitment5 . Crown Prince 
Jabr Al-Ahmed would claim that he had told the British minister on his earlier visit that UK 
troops would have to leave the Gulf region eventually because of popular opposition to their 
presence 6. However both the amir and the British ambassador looked to an amendment rather 
than a wholesale abandonment of the bilateral agreement, and specifically hoped that a UK 
commitment to provide air defence from its bases in Cyprus could be maintained. Earlier Foreign 
Office advice, while making clear that the defence commitment as an obligation had to end, 
suggested that Clause D could be reinterpreted, thereby avoiding the political damage that an 
abrupt ending could cause to Britain's standing in Kuwait and the region, and avoiding any 
obligation to register a new interpretation with the UN. However, a later Foreign Office 
2 Paragraph "d" stated "Nothing in these conclusions shall affect the readiness of Her Majesty's 
Government to assist the government of Kuwait if the latter required such assistance" Quoted in a Foreign 
Office telegram to British Embassy, 27 th March, 1968, FCO 8/102. 
3 Ambassador GG Arthur to FCO, 18th January 1968, FCO 8/47. 
4 John Graham commented, "... [I]n practice he (Jabr) didn't want the fig leaf of British protection to be 
removed. " Personal interview, 16'h November, 2000. th 
GG Arthur to Foreign Office, January 28 , 1968, 
FCO 8/48 
6, Uncertainty on Kuwait treaty", January 30th, 1968, The Times. 
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judgement suggested that any change to the defence obligation would have to be passed to the 
UN, something that the Kuwaitis, while desiring a "gloss" that would amend the clause rather 
than terminate the commitment, were keen to avoid. 
While the British government wished to make clear that no element of its former defence 
commitment could remain as an obligation, both the UK and Kuwait were keen to find a form of 
words that would soften the impression of a termination, which the UK feared could encourage 
Iraq to threaten Kuwait. The British ambassador suggested that reference be made to the intended 
1971 pullout, but without specifically stating that the UK's defence commitment had ended; the 
Foreign Office hoped it would include a statement that the change in commitment "will not affect 
HMG's readiness to assist the Kuwaiti Armed Forces with supplies training and advice on the 
same basis as in the past"7 . However the UK government, like the Kuwaitis, was also keen to 
avoid this issue becoming too public. Britain feared entanglement in potentially difficult 
questions in parliament. For Kuwait, having what would effectively be a termination of the 
British defence commitment subjected to a very public re-registering with the UN, held little 
appeal. The new wording would provide little deterrence against regional threats, but by being 
made public would still suggest the amirate was dependent on the UK. The result was that no 
66gloss" was put on the former commitment and the first official announcement that the 1961 
agreement had been terminated came on the 13'hMay 1968 when a new Exchange of Letters were 
issued, ending the original agreement and stating that the termination had been initiated by 
Kuwait'. Given that Kuwait had objected to any rewording going to the UN, then effectively it 
was responsible for the termination of the 1961 agreement; however there was little doubt that 
this presentation of events was intended to save face on both sides. Furthermore, it enabled 
Shaikh Jabr Al-Ahmad to tell the National Assembly two months later that, "Kuwait would 
neither need nor would accept any foreign presence, British or otherwise, in the area. 
9" 
The new Exchange of Letters included the phraseology, "... [R]elations between our two 
countries will continue to be governed by a spirit of close friendship and co-operation". " While 
confirming the inevitable, that the two countries would continue to have a close relationship in 
defence as well as economic matters, this forin of words also suited the British Labour 
Government's desire to end the UK's formal Gulf defence obligations, whilst emphasising its 
7 GG Arthur to Foreign office 18th March 1968, FC08/102 
8 GG Arthur to Foreign office, 12th May 1968 (Telegram Number 112) 
9 JB Kelly, Arabia Th p Gulf and the West (Basic Books; USA, 1980) p. 172. rd 10 Quoted by Sam Falle, British ambassador to Kuwait Telegram to FCO, 23 January 1969 (FCO 
8/1069)... 
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residual role in military training and supply. The interpretation of the defence commitment so 
readily acted upon by the British in July 1961 had been watered down by the Labour Government 
in its February 1966 White Paper (see Chapter 4), in part due to the abandonment of the British 
base in Aden, expected in 1968. In retrospect at least, the decision to offset the planned pullout 
from Aden with a partial redeployment of RAF and army units to the UK's bases in Bahrain and 
Sharjah can be seen as a holding operation. In July 1967 a new defence white paper stated that 
Britain would markedly reduce its presence in the Far East by 1970/71". As conflict with 
Indonesia had ceased a year earlier, and the UK government had made preparations in March 
1967 to bring the Aden pullout forward to November 1967, cabinet consideration of ending the 
UK's defence commitments in both the Far East (with the exception of the crown colony Hong 
Kong) and the Middle East seemed inevitable 12 . Within the Labour cabinet there was little 
inclination to oppose what had been a pattern of constraint on defence commitments and 
expenditure since it came into office in 1964, and what had been a steady abandonment of 
Britain's international defence and territorial commitments since 1945. Furthermore, the decision 
to terminate, rather than continually reduce, its "East of Suez" commitments followed a decision 
to renew the UK's application for European Common Market membership. Domestic UK politics 
accelerated a seemingly inevitable process. Cabinet agreement necessitated a sharing of burdens 
as a wide-ranging programme of cuts was introduced in the wake of Sterling's devaluation in 
November 1967. Neither the new right-wing Labour chancellor, Roy Jenkins, who was avowedly 
pro-European, nor the predominantly left-wing mood of the party in the country, allowed for any 
sentiment for perceptibly "colonial" commitments. 
Kuwait can't buy protection 
In this environment, the willingness of the Kuwaiti amir, together with the rulers of the lower 
Gulf states, to fund the cost of the British commitment in their region in order that the announced 
decision, as least as far as it applied to the Gulf, could be postponed, was always likely to be a 
non-starter. It was neither politically expedient nor practical to reverse a decision on the basis of 
verbal commitments, which in the case of Kuwait at least, could not be publicly stated and the 
payment of which would have to be made via its southern Gulf Arab neighbours. The Kuwaiti 
" Dennis Healey, The Time of My Life (Penguin Books; London, 1989), p. 293. 
12 Ibid., and Richard Crossman The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister - Volume Two, 1966-68 (London; 
Hamish Hamilton, 1976) 
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leadership feared the reaction of Arab nationalists in the region and at home to any news of them 
clinging on to the British commitment with financial inducements 13 . This made the Kuwaitis' 
desire to use financial incentives to prompt a change of heart by the British politically 
unreliable 14 . Within three months, despite continuing to express ongoing puzzlement about the 
absoluteness of the termination, the Kuwait ruler had plainly adjusted to the reality of a decision 
that had been made. In the context of the spin put on the British decision by the crown prince, 
Shaikh Jabr Al-Ahmed, who had said it "did not directly affect Kuwait", Amir Sabah Salim 
heeded his advisors and adopted a more indifferent tone. 
Gulf destabilisation fears 
Despite this, Kuwait was concerned at how significant the direct and "indirect effect" of the 
pullout could be. The immediate Kuwaiti fear was that the current pattern of deterrence could 
break down: Saudi Arabia could take all of the claimed Buraimi territory from Abu Dhabi, Iran 
would then take Bahrain, and therefore Iraq would not hesitate to annex Kuwait, argued a senior 
official". However Jabr Al-Ahmed put on a braver face, and declared that Kuwait would take 
immediate steps to bolster its an-ned forces, without making reference to the expected British role 
in supply and training, in order that "Iraq could not just walk in. " UK military assessments 
dismissed Kuwait's military capability as having little more than delaying potential in the event 
of an opportunist, as opposed to a full scale, attack. In the event of the latter, the UK continued to 
16 envisage itself intervening, at least until the wider Gulf pullout at the end of 1971 . In the short 
term, neither Kuwait nor the UK saw a direct threat from an internally weak Iraq in a Gulf in 
which Iran was powerful 17 . The Kuwaiti crown prince 
declared that he "... could not believe that 
13 "Politically they would fight shy of courting the unpopularity with the Arab nationalists (both within and 
outside Kuwait) by offering financial support to keep British forces in Arab countries. " GG Arthur to FCO, 
14t" January, 1968 (FCO 8/47). The British ambassador also mentioned the "difficult year" for the Kuwaitis 
financially, following devaluation and the "steadfastness" payments to Israel's Arab neighbours after the 
1967 war. However Arthur considered Kuwaiti financial support feasible. Three days later he reports the 
amir as willing to offer to make such payments via Kuwait's southern Arab neighbours if she felt confident 
of a positive reply. (FCO 8/47). 
14 Notably, the desire of the UK defence secretary to push through the reduction of the defence commitment 
to Kuwait in 1966 had reflected uncertainty over whether the new amir would be able to uphold the 
agreement. (See Chapter 4). 
" This scenario was privately outlined by the amir's eldest son, Shaikh Salim Sabah, ambassador to the 
UK, as reported by the UK ambassador to Kuwait. G. G. Arthur to M. Weir, 8th February, 
1968 (FCO 8/42). 
16 UK Chief of Staff, Ministry of Defence, 22 nd October 1968 (DEFE 11/617) 
17 DEFE 11/617 ppxiu, and Frank Brenchley, Britain and the Middle East - An Economic Histo! y 1957- 
87, (London; Lester Crook, 1989) 
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the occupation of Kuwait by force would be acceptable to Kuwait's other neighbours, to world 
opinion or to the UN - Kuwait's independence and personality were now well-established. 18ýi In 
terms of the "indirect threat" to Kuwait caused by the withdrawal, Kuwait's leaders raised the 
spectre of events in South Arabia where unreformed shaikhdoms had been unable to resist radical 
pressures following the British withdrawal from Aden. An outcome even more detrimental to UK 
interests could occur because, as Jabr Al-Ahmed put it, Iran was directly involved in the Gulf 
Iran's assertion of its claim to Bahrain had raised Kuwaiti fears that Britain's departure would 
prompt an unstable southern Gulf region in which Iran faced little resistance to a more assertive, 
if not outrightly aggressive, policy. 
Amir seeks US defence commitment 
From 1968 the British defence role in Kuwait and the lower Gulf would become less pivotal, 
while Kuwait was conducting its economic relationship with Britain with largely short-term 
commercial considerations in mind. Against the backdrop of a weakening of Kuwait's traditional 
western defence prop, the Kuwaiti arnir undertook a three day state visit to the United States in 
December 1968. One of the factors that made the amir's state visit attractive to the US, during the 
awkward interregnurn between outgoing president Lyndon Johnson and newly elected president 
Richard Nixon, was that it would be the first visit since the June 1967 war by a representative of 
what it termed the "Arab east" i. e. the Gulf Arab states. Prior to the visit the State Department 
had said that the visit would be "... useful to us in stressing publicly that there are moderate Arab 
regimes with which we still enjoy close relations. 19" However it was Kuwait's intention that the 
visit should provide some reassurance as to what these "close relations" might mean if the 
amirate was territorially threatened. In May 1968, the USSR had made its first significant naval 
visit to Iraq, affirming its ongoing support, a stance not affected by the Baathist takeover two 
months later. In the context of the UK's termination of its defence agreement, this only increased 
Kuwaiti concerns. The US State Department was very aware of the dangers, from its perspective, 
of a vacuum in the Gulf, and thus it told the White House "... [W]e hope that the USSR will not 
" Report on Jabr Al-Ahmed's meeting with Reginald Maudling MEP, Ambassador G. G. Arthur, 10th 
February 1968 (FCO 8/137 B22/9). 
19 US State Department Confidential Briefing to the White House prior to the Amir's Visit, November 
1968, A21 0. 
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fail to notice the (amir's) visit as an indication that the US Government will continue to have an 
interest in Gulf affairs after 197 120.,, 
For their part the Kuwaitis now accepted the need for a more public face to their relationship with 
Washington. Immediately after the British announcement in January 1968 that it was pulling out 
of the Gulf, the Kuwaitis asked when the US navy would visit the amirate. This Kuwaiti desire 
only grew after the USSR naval visit to Iraq, contrasting markedly with Kuwait's prevarication 
over previous US requests that its navy dock at a Kuwaiti port. The Kuwaitis continued to want to 
promote an impression that they were non-aligned internationally as well as regionally. However, 
despite its relatively good relations with the USSR, Kuwait did not encourage the Soviets to make 
a naval visit to the amirate. The Kuwaitis also made a number of approaches to US officials about 
buying arms, to which the standard US response throughout this period was that the Kuwaitis 
should continue to took to the UK as the principal source of supplies. Relative discreteness in 
Kuwait's western defence relations would continue to be the watchword, however. Thus the amir 
came to the US for a largely ceremonial occasion, but with an agenda, agreed among the Kuwaiti 
leadership, to secure private understandings that the amirate could rely on the US to militarily 
intervene in Kuwait's defence if necessary. 
The Kuwaiti amir, together with the foreign minister Sabah Al-Ahmed, conducted talks with 
President Johnson and with Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Despite some suggestions that the amir 
would have liked a US defence commitment to replace that of the UK, he did not come to 
Washington looking for a public declaration by the US that it would defend Kuwait, nor would 
one have been compatible with how the amirate projected its foreign policy for regional 
consumption". However the Amir directly asked if "we could expect armed support" if there was 
an attack on any of the Gulf Arab countries. Receiving what for the most part were inevitably 
bland responses from the outgoing president, given the constitutional position, the amir continued 
to press Johnson and Rusk in order to be sure "who he could count on. " From Washington's 
perspective regarding the visit, there was "no particular thing to achieve: relations were good and 
20 A21 0, op. cit. 
21 According to Dayton Mak, Sabah Salim asked him in a private capacity in 1967 whether the US would 
make a public commitment. A request of this kind was never formally submitted however. It was the 
belief 
of Herman Eilts, then US ambassador to Riyadh, that this is what Kuwait wanted 
in 1968. This view was 
firmly rebuffed by other US officials however, including William Brewer, who 
headed the Arabian desk at 
the State Department at the time and had served in Kuwait. Ibid. 
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the [part US-owned] Gulf oil company was operating normal ly. 
22" However from Kuwait's 
perspective there was plainly quite a lot to try to achieve. 
To Rusk's suggestion that "a group of Gulf states" should agree a mutual defence arrangement 
among themselves, the Kuwaitis were dismissive". After all, such a policy would have had to 
include Iran to have had substance, and as such would have appealed to Iran, the UK and, in time, 
the US. Yet the amir told Johnson that the greatest security threat in the region did not come from 
the "Arab side of the Gulf'. Furthermore, a mutual defence pact would have excluded Iraq in 
what, politically at least, would have been a US-backed alliance. Thus the fundamental balance of 
Kuwaiti foreign policy would have been upset. An alignment that included Iran would, by 
definition, have excluded Iraq and Egypt. The ambassador to the UK, in an earlier discussion of 
such an arrangement, argued that Kuwait needed at least one "progressive Arab state, " otherwise 
"its association with such a group would weaken its security". Rusk, however, did go further than 
his president in stating that the US had a "serious interest in an independent Kuwait 25 , although he 
necessarily emphasised the constitutional difficulty in telling the Amir precisely what a future 
administration would do in particular circumstances. This position was repeated by Rusk when 
the amir met with President-elect Nixon, although pointed reference was made to the US decision 
to move destroyers to the Gulf when British troops entered Kuwait in 1961. 
It is unlikely that the Kuwaiti side would have expected to have achieved more than this 
regarding its primary policy interese'. Kuwait was keen to stress its belief that Iran could be 
helped to find a way out of its claim to Bahrain and that the Shah had invited Kuwait to work 
toward a mechanism to achieve precisely this. However, the Kuwaitis were also plainly hoping 
that they could use this issue and that of their shared concern at the Soviet "foothold" in South 
Arabia to encourage the US to be more engaged politically in the region and in a way which, it 
hoped, would aid the standing of Kuwait. To this effect they also discussed how US relations with 
Egypt could be improved, something the amir urged, and how the Kuwaitis might be able to help 
to facilitate this. It is likely that the Kuwaitis would have carried Cairo's blessing for its attempt 
22 William Brewer, Country Director, Arabian desk, US State Department 1966-70. Personal interview, 
Falmouth, MA, USA, 150' September 2000. 
23 Sabah Al-Ahmed told the secretary of state tartly that they would not be looking for a mutual defence 
treaty among the Gulf states. 
24 Telegram from UK embassy Kuwait to Foreign Office, January (day unspecified) 1968 (FCO 8/47) 
25 Howard Cottarn, US ambassador to Kuwait. to US State Department November 1968. Telegram no. 
194. 
2' According to Abdullah Bishara, then a senior foreign ministry official, "He (the Amir) felt 
satisfaction ... 
he had laid his list of concerns at the door of the White House. " (Personal interview, 20t" 
January 2003, Kuwait). 
199 
to promote rapprochement, which later would include the offer of finance and facilities for US 
defence support. Palestine was not Kuwait's priority on this trip, nor would it be a foreign policy 
preoccupation of its leaders from now on 21 . However it remained an important domestic and 
regional concern at both the popular and governmental level; one that Kuwait had no intention of 
exposing itself to criticism over. 
While Kuwait succeeded from an American perspective in "putting itself', and for that matter, its 
security concerns, "on the map"28 , it could not have achieved any "concessions". Nor, if a 
meeting had been held with President Nixon subsequent to his entry to the White House in 
January 1969, would this have enabled a fully empowered president to have reassured the 
Kuwaitis any more. The US assessment was that the "net effect of the Amir's visit and 
conversation has been to strengthen Kuwaiti confidence that Americans have real interest in 
Kuwait29. " Kuwait had gone as far as it could in courting the Americans, given its need to be 
mindful of relations with leading Arab states and of internal opinion. Had Kuwait been prepared 
to boldly embrace the "moderate" image the US had of it and therefore expose itself to 
widespread opprobrium in the region and at home by publicly supporting the, ultimately doomed, 
Jarring Mission, any subsequent reassurance that President Nixon may have been able to give in 
private regarding the US commitment to Kuwait's security would have been undermined by a 
weakening of the amirate's careful cultivation of mainstream Arab opinion. 
The Saudi foreign minister, Omar Saqqaf, expressed criticism of the Amir for seeking security 
guarantees from the US and, he believed, Iran, deeming this "quest ... entirely unnecessary 
30 
." His 
argument that Iraq was not presently a threat, and that Saudi Arabia would certainly not invade 
Kuwait, may not have been disputed by Kuwait, but would not have been seen as sufficient 
reassurance. Iraq was internally preoccupied but had increasing Soviet support. For its part, Saudi 
Arabia was not capable of filling the vacuum left by the British, nor would it be interested in 
working closely with Iran to do so. For Kuwait an effective "band-wagoning,, 31 with Iran in order 
to provide security against the feared renewal of Iraqi threats, would have been in line with the 
27 1 Oth July 1969, Telegram from US ambassador Howard Cottam to State Department (A 132). 
28 Brewer, op. cit. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Quoted in Telegram from US Embassy Jiddah to State Department, 4th January 1969 (POL23KUW XR 
DEF I KUW). 
31A concept, along with the more common alliance against threats, used by Stephen Walt to try to explain 
Middle Eastern states' alliance patterns. Stephen Walt, The Origin of Alliances (New York; Comell 
University Press, 1990). 
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amirate's emergent defence alignment with the US. However it would have removed the security 
prop provided by its alignment with the vagaries of Arabism. 
By the early 1970s the Nixon administration had worked this regional emphasis on Iran and Saudi 
Arabia into a strategic policy, "Twin Pillars", with Iran serving as its primary "pillar', and Saudi 
Arabia, militarily and numerically weaker and subject to greater regional sensitivities, supposedly 
picking up the secondary "pillar" role. These countries, despite being in an increasingly close 
military alliance with the US, had little practical basis for direct co-operation in the Gulf and 
retained strong suspicions of each other. Furthermore, the "Nixon Doctrine", expressed, with 
Vietnam very much in mind, as leaving "primary responsibility for the affairs of the world" to 
local nations, meant that what the US regarded as the "two main regional powers 3299 would be 
primarily responsible for security in the Gulf. This was, however, underpinned by US support and 
what the US still valued as the long tradition and "parallel nature of American and British 
interests in the Persian Gulf"'. This did not necessarily require cooperation between the two 
"pillars", and in any case was to represent a particular and increasing reliance on the main pillar, 
Iran. 
In its desire to see an end to foreign bases in the Gulf, Iran shared the same official outlook as 
that of Kuwait - together they had opposed, along with Saudi Arabia and "progressive" Arab 
governments, the US's announcement in December 1971 that it would lease the former UK naval 
base in Bahrain. Iran was in a position to become the pre-eminent Gulf actor with US military 
support, and thus there was a logic in opposing a highly visible, potential future constraint on its 
power. For Kuwait, falling in line with regional opposition to the US naval presence in Bahrain 
was in keeping with the ideological packaging of its foreign policy. However the stationing of the 
US naval squadron in the leased base, as opposed to the access rights it had been granted in 
Bahrain since the 1940s, would provide the US with an effective means to conduct operations in 
the Gulf and thus enable it to do as the amir had requested and be able to intervene to defend the 
Gulf Arabs. Prior to the US's announcement regarding Bahrain, the Kuwaiti amir had expressed 
frustration with the commander of the US's Middle East Force over the limitations on the 
presence of US naval warships in the Gulf and had appeared to be comfortable with what he 
erroneously described as a US "base" in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia and with US "bases" in Iran 34. It 
32 The phrase used by Assistant Secretary of State for NESA Affairs Joseph Sisco in House testimony 
August 86,1972, quoted by Alinaghi, (footnote) Ibid.., p282. 
33 Alinaghi, op. cit. 
34 Report on COMIDEASTFOR Admiral King's meeting with the Kuwaiti Amir, 7th October 1969 (A 176). 
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may well have been that the military realities of US intervention and a beefed up naval presence 
had not been fully considered by the Kuwaiti amir or the wider leadership, believing perhaps that 
US fighter aircraft and access rights in Saudi Arabia was sufficient a regional intervention 
capability. After all, the Kuwaiti crown prince, Jabr Al-Ahmed, had been happy with only a 
residual British defence "fig leaf' and had baulked at the post-Aden expansion of its presence in 
Bahrain. 
The US understood the careful political line that the Kuwaitis had to walk for internal and 
regional consumption, describing it as "the country's basic Arabism", but contrasting this with 
the government's actual practice 35 . Kuwait was among those that the US believed could be 
broadly counted as being supportive of US interests in the Gulf, yet the amirate remained wedded 
to international neutrality, or the impression of it at least. Kuwait was only concerned about the 
Soviet Union in so far as Moscow's relations with Iraq could have a negative impact on Kuwait's 
position in the Gulf. President Johnson's flattering reference to the amirate's "role of leadership" 
in the region" reflected the hope rather than the expectation that, together with Kuwait's financial 
patronage in the Arab world and identification with free enterprise, would come the adoption of 
desirable foreign policies. However the US also knew that the Kuwaiti government's need to be 
heard saying the right thing regarding the Palestinians served as the principal inhibitor on 
46 ... moderation on oil, money and trade"". In a sense this would be 
borne out by Kuwait's 
strident posture during the 1973-4 oil embargo, but Kuwait's economic policies, in so far as they 
affected western business partners, were largely pragmatic. There is little evidence, however, that 
Kuwait's foreign policy was affected by what the US also believed was Kuwait's "need for us as 
an ally in preventing the spread of communism in the area. " For example, Kuwait took a 
markedly different line than international or regional friends regarding South Yemen, which was 
supported by both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). However, despite 
this, pursuing increased understandings with the US would be a priority for Kuwait. 
35 "Kuwait: 6 Monthly Country Appraisal", US Embassy to State Department, July I Oth, 1969 (A 13 2). 
36 Transcript of conversation between President Johnson and Amir Sabah Salim, December 12th, 1968, 
Public Papers of President Lyndon B Johnson, President Johnson Library, Texas, USA. 
37 Kuwait: 6 monthly country appraisal, July 10th, 1969, Telegram to State department, A132 
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US defence and security role begins 
By the time of Black September in Jordan, the US began to fear that Palestinian leftists might 
conduct attacks on US interests in the amirate. By the following year, Washington was asked to 
help in the fon-nation of an internal security command centre, a role their ambassador, John 
Patrick-Walsh, believed exceeded that which had been formerly exercised by the British. The UK 
had had military and security advisors in Kuwait, and, after 1971, ran the Kuwait Liaison Team to 
provide training. However, by the end of 1971, Patrick-Walsh was informing the State 
Department that "the doors are open" as far as US defence interests in Kuwait are concerned. 
"The Kuwaitis have quietly contemplated their future in the midst of turbulence, and have 
decided that their future rests with us, " he wrote. Measuring the shift in the short period since his 
arrival in late 1969, Patrick-Walsh commented, ".... [S]tarting from a position of bristling 
antagonism they have come full circle to a position of intimacy and basic trust. This is 
particularly true in respect to internal security and defence matters, 08 wrote Walsh, in reference 
to the Kuwaiti decision to strengthen internal and external defence forces in co-ordination with 
the US. 
Oil ownership meets economic and political objectives 
Following the departure of the British from the Gulf, Kuwait (in common with the rest of the Gulf 
states, including Iran, ) was planning for a closer defence partnership with the US, without 
wishing to negate the useful symbolism of its residual defence co-operation with the UK. At the 
same time Kuwait would continue to protect its wider position in the Arab world by maintaining a 
firm stance in support of the Palestinians, and, in common, with fellow Arab oil producers in 
particular, taking a greater proportion of national oil production into state ownership. The 
Kuwaiti oil and finance minister, Abdul Rahman Al-Ateegi, was to state that the motive behind 
urging Kuwaiti "participation", i. e. ownership stakes in the Kuwait Oil Company, was part of a 
wider initiative among the Arab oil producers to ensure they had ".. jefffective control over 
38 Transcript of report sent by US ambassador John Patrick-Walsh to Secretary of State, 17th November 
1971 (contained in the US Department of State Telegram November 1971 to US consulate, Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia, POL23 KUW, "Secret" telegram No. 762). Patrick-Walsh also noted that US arms sales could take 
advantage of the recent decision to grant Kuwait "Foreign Military Sales" status, thereby providing 
US 
financial assistance, the absence of which had caused great antagonism 
in the Kuwaiti security 
establishment. 
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investment and production decisions, an active role in production operations, and a real influence 
in world oil marketS39" . There had been Kuwaiti officials who talked privately in much tougher 
terms, mindful it seemed of regional pressures in the event of another Arab-Israeli war". 
However the direction of Kuwaiti oil policy remained pragmatic. The participation negotiations, 
whilst erratic and, ultimately, to culminate in the introduction of 100% government ownership by 
1975, were pursued steadily and relatively co-operatively with the international oil companies. It 
was clear to the oil and finance minister" and therefore to Kuwait's leadership, that 
"nationalisation" in the sense that Al-Ateegi meant it, of outright expropriation with little 
negotiation over acceptable compensation terms, would be damaging to the country's 
"international relations" i. e. to relations with both the US and the UK. 
AI-Samita a step too far 
Despite the formal ending of their defence agreement, the UK ambassador invited the Kuwaiti 
chief of staff to consider British intervention when Iraq's latest territorial incursion led to clashes 
at Al-Samita in March 1973 (see also Chapter 6). However, in a pointed reflection of their 
changing relationship, General Mubarak Al-Sabah declined, stating that Britain's military support 
had already been sufficient. He was referring to the approximately one hundred British troops in 
the Kuwait Liaison Team (KLT), half of whom were positioned just south of the border town of 
Abdali, while an RAF contingent was training recently UK-supplied Lightning aircraft. British 
pilots could intervene if there was a "risk to other troops, " while British soldiers attached to a 
Kuwaiti armoured regiment were expected to "deploy forward" with their Kuwaiti colleagues 
should this be necessary 42 . The UK assessed that the 
decision to keep their British military 
trainers in place meant that, had Baghdad been considering moving further south, they would 
have "... [G]ot the message that it wasn't going to be that easy. 4399 
39 Press conference, January 26t", 1973, Kuwait (Middle East Economic Survey Vol. XVI, No 14). 
4' Ashraf Lutfi, former head of the Amiri Diwan, talked of a collective Arab plan that in Kuwait's case at 
least included 100% nationalization. Telegram to State Department, October 28th, 1968 (A354). 
41 Middle East Economic Survey, op. cit. 
42 PRH Wright, Head NlED, Foreign Office, to private secretary, Secretary of State Douglas-Home, 23 rd 
March 1973, FC08/1991 
43 Sir John Wilton, Personal interview, Falmouth, UK, 2000 
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British officials downplayed the Kuwaiti fears of a Soviet angle to the events, a perspective 
seemingly bome out by the fact that Saddarn Hussein was summoned to Moscow" to account for 
an action which would also have upset Soviet attempts to forge a better relationship with Iran, 
with whom a treaty of friendship had just been signed. A senior US State Department official 
emphasised to the author that the USSR turned down an Iraqi offer of access to Um Qasr, 
considering the waters of the northern Gulf too shallow for its navY45 . Doubts about the 
significance of a Soviet danger may partly account for the decidedly cool reaction of the US to 
the events at Al-Samita. Certainly Washington, seeking to uphold d6tente and keen to make a 
reality of the Nixon Doctrine, would not have wanted to over-react. Although expected by the 
British to defend their ally if need be, the Soviets did not want to become embroiled in a regional 
conflict, and in general had considerable reservations about their would-be allies among the 
"progressive" Arab stateS46. 
The US appeared to foreshadow its stance just prior to the 1990 invasion when, in 1973, the State 
Department made clear it wanted to sound "neutral" and publicly urged an Arab League solution 
for fear that, if it condemned the incursion, Washington's relations with Iraq and with other Arab 
countries would be damaged furthef47 . The 
UK had also privately urged Kuwait to find an Arab 
solution, but Kuwait decided to publicly condemn the Iraqi attack on the police post. On the 
ground, however, Britain was effectively in deterrent mode alongside Kuwaiti troops. Not that its 
role was much appreciated in the arnirate; some Kuwaiti officials even suspected a British 
conspiracy 48 . 
Embargo puts Arabism before US friendship 
Kuwait's desire to discretely strengthen the defence relationship with the US alongside rhetorical 
and practical fealty to the Arab national cause would be at its most strained during the October 
1973 Arab-Israeli war and the subsequent embargo of oil sales to the US. The US's emergency 
44 Majid Khadouri, Socialist Iraq -A Study in Iraqi Politics Since 1968 (Middle East 
Institute, Washington 
DC, 1978) 
45 Personal interview with Herman Eilts, US ambassador to Saudi Arabia 1965-70 and Egypt 1973-77. 
46 See Robert 0 Friedman, Soviet Policy Towards the Middle East Since 1970 (New York; Praeger, 1978) 
and Page op. cit for the limitations of Soviet influence on Arab politics and so-called progressive regimes 
and their militaries. 
47 Summary of conversation between US ambassador to Kuwait, Francois Dickman, and UK ambassador 
John Wilton, 22 nd March, 1973 (FC08/1991). 
48 p. j. Wright, 24h July 1973 (FC08/2003). 
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supply of fighter jets to Israel as the tide appeared to be turning in favour of the Egyptian and 
Syrian forces caused considerable political frustration on the part of foreign minister, Sabah Al- 
Ahmed, and other representatives of non-combatant Arab countries, including the Saudi foreign 
minister Omar Saqqaf, during an appointment with President Nixon. The meeting took place in 
the wake of Saudi proposals to double the posted price of its oil. Although this fitted with the 
expressed desire of oil producers to raise posted prices, its scale and timing was an attempt to 
leverage political pressure on Israel from western oil consumers. Economic interests and political 
stances toward the Palestine Question were overlapping. 
UK relations still valued 
For all Kuwait's apparent enjoyment of a political platform for its professed Arab nationalism, 
the amirate was also keen that its international relations should not be fundamentally 
compromised. Only one month into an embargo that had angered the British government, Kuwait 
proposed that UK energy companies be offered guaranteed quotas of Kuwait's participation oil. 
Kuwait's importance to the UK economy had been underlined as the amirate's Sterling holdings 
rocketed. The amirate was persuaded by the British government to "recycle" some of its 
mounting Sterling holdings by investing more in the UK. Its willingness to do so was helped by 
the arrival in 1975 of James Callaghan, the first time a serving British foreign secretary had 
visited Kuwaie9. The balance of UK-Kuwaiti relations had shifted significantly since 1971, a 
factor also reflected in Kuwait's gradual spreading of some of its currency holdings outside of 
Sterling altogether. Callaghan's visit had also been intended to emphasise the UK's residual 
military role in the region. The UK continued to provide defence training in Kuwait and was still 
a major supplier of arms to the amirate as well as to its powerful neighbours, Iran and Saudi 
Arabia. Britain had an ongoing, if reduced, presence in the Gulf exemplified by regular military 
visits and exercises", and enjoyed improved relations with Iraq. Kuwait's desire for advice from 
Britain about Iraq and prospective developments in the region was to increase in the more 
uncertain regional environment after the end of the oil embargo5l . Notwithstanding the UK 
government's fear that the Kuwaitis may be tempted to again express the "pan-Arab rigor" they 
49 Sir A. T. Lamb, UK ambassador to Kuwait, 1974-77, personal interview 2000 
50 1974 Defence Estimates White Paper 2 I't January 1974 (CAB 129/174) 
" Kuwaiti officials, including defence and interior minister Saad Abdullah, privately admitted to British 
officials their lack of knowledge about what was going on in Iraq. 
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displayed during the embargo, the two countries understood their mutual interest in maintaining 
close relations. 
US relations take priority 
Kuwait's relations with the US during the course of the oil embargo were not to suffer the marked 
increase in tension seen in Saudi-US relations. The Al-Saud's principal role in the embargo had 
made it the focus of US diplomacy, and the apparent target of more abrasive attempts to 
emphasise Washington's interest in the free flow of oil. Ambiguous talk by the US of "counter 
measures'9 when the embargo was first declared, had developed, some seven months after the 
embargo had been lifted, into direct US references to military action if the interests of industrial 
nations were threatened. At the same time strong statements were made by Saudi Arabia in which 
destruction of oilfields was threatened in reprisal for any hint of US intervention". Kuwait was 
initially not immune from engagement in some similarly heated rhetoric at the beginning of the 
embargo; however it avoided any direct verbal engagements with the US. In time the combination 
of strategic steps taken by the western oil consumers, Washington's relatively successful 
diplomacy in the wider Arab world, and common regional interests typified by the Dhofar 
rebellion in Oman, helped take the heat out of the issue. Part of the US's successful diplomacy 
was exemplified when it brokered military disengagement agreements with Egypt and Syria, 
while relations with Cairo in particular continued to improve, a development in which Kuwait 
had been playing a part. Following the 1973 war, the Soviet Union also came in for considerable 
criticism in the Arab world, including sections of the Kuwaiti press, for what was perceived to be 
its inactivity during the conflict and caution in the aftermath. Therefore Egypt's move toward the 
US was a step the Kuwait could afford to discretely encourage. For all the verbal sparring and 
rising tensions between the Gulf Arab oil producers and the US in particular during the embargo, 
Washington remained Kuwait's pre-eminent focus for its efforts to build an international defence 
partner, as indeed it was for Saudi Arabia and Iran. However there was concern among the US's 
international allies that events in Vietnam indicated a wider weakening of Washington's political 
will. While this did not encourage Kuwait to consider a major international realignment, it did 
suggest that improved relations with the USSR, which after all remained close to Iraq, and, to a 
lesser extent, China, could be beneficial to the arnirate. Kuwaiti-Soviet relations could also 
52 JB Kelly, op. cit. 
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specifically incentivise the US to make good on existing commitments to modernise Kuwait's air 
defences. 
Communist relations boosted 
Kuwait was to step up relations with the Soviet Union when the foreign minister Shaikh Sabah 
Al-Ahmed paid a visit in December 1975. The trip produced a form of words that Kuwait hoped 
might encourage Soviet restraint of Iraq, and, from the USSR's perspective, suggested the 
possibility of capitalising on recent Gulf Arab tensions with the western powers and on Kuwait's 
53 professed non-aligm-nent. In August 1976 Kuwait initialled an agreement with the USSR to buy 
US$300 million worth of SAM7 air to air and ground to air missiles as well as tanks, advanced 
artillery and anti-personnel weaponS54. Some accounts suggested far higher costs and more 
extensive commitments. However the Soviet an-ns, which began arriving later that year, were not 
to be a prelude to the arrival of Soviet military trainers, emphasising what for Kuwait was a deal 
intended to gain influence with Moscow and to concentrate minds in Washington. The Kuwait 
leadership wanted the US to make good on the earlier recommendations to supply air defence and 
other equipment, acknowledged by Congress as evidence of the amirate's desire for "closer co- 
operation" but frustrated due to objections by pro-Israeli congressmen 55 . Unsurprisingly the US 
was highly concerned about the deal, but claims it was able to persuade Kuwait to ease off on the 
scale of its discussions with the Soviet Union by suggesting that otherwise the chances of US air 
defence batteries being supplied were limited 56 . 
Sensing an opportunity to broaden the basis of its international support, and to exploit China's 
desire to end its isolation, Kuwait had broken with Taiwan and established full diplomatic 
relations with Peking as early as 1971. Although in doing so Kuwait was decidedly out of kilter 
with many of its Gulf Arab neighbours, China had recognised the amirate ten years earlier, since 
when business relations had grown. At a time when Iran was seeking to build relations with the 
53 c, Peace and security in this area (Persian Gulf) could be strengthened by prohibiting foreign interference 
in the affairs of this region, by insuring freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf, and by establishing trust 
and good neighbourly co-operation among all the states in the Gulf zone on the basis of non-interference in 
each others internal affairs and respect for the right of each to free and independent development. " Quoted 
p217, Freedman op. cit. 
54 Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait's Foreign Policy - City State in World Politics (Boulder; Westview Press, 
1989), p. 81 
5' Assiri, op. cit. 
56 Frank Maerstrone, ex-US ambassador to Kuwait 1976-79, personal interview 2000 
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PRC, and the US was beginning its diplomatic engagement with the People's Republic, the 
Kuwaiti move in 1971 was a bold but far from reckless broadening of friendships in keeping with 
its long standing practice. 
A manageable balance of relations 
As measured by defence supplies and training packages, by the end of 1977 the US's 
commitment to Kuwait, while growing, remained relatively limited 57 . However their defence 
relations showed every likelihood of expanding over the short to medium term, albeit subject to 
ongoing Congressional constraints and Kuwait continuing to play off the US and USSR. Kuwait 
had sought to maximise acceptance among its neighbours for its independence and for what had 
developed into a sometimes controversial courting of international allies. Its policies had proven 
largely successful, although its outreach to the Soviets had, by the time of the above proposed 
arms deal, threatened to destabilise relations with Saudi Arabia. 
Kuwait therefore entered the period of Amir Jabr Al-Ahmed's rule, following the death of Shaikh 
Sabah Salim in December 1977, struggling to put its international relations on a firm basis that 
did not contradict key regional relations. However the priorities of Kuwait's foreign policy were 
in place: an increasingly close relationship with the US; and mostly positive relations with 
Washington's strategic allies in the Gulf region, Iran and Saudi Arabia, and also with Egypt, 
which from 1974 was effectively the third pillar in the US's Middle East strategy. In this sense 
there was actually less of a disconnect in Kuwait's foreign policy than there had been in the 
aftermath of the 1967 war, when the defence alliance with the UK seemed at odds with the 
rejectionist mood among both Arab belligerents and ordinary opinion, while regime changes hurt 
western interests in South Arabia, Iraq and Libya, and caused upheaval in Jordan. 
However the key to balancing Kuwait's international defence relations with both the UK and the 
US was the same as it had been at the time of its independence in 1961: a non-aligned regional 
policy, facilitated by mediation and largesse, and adherence to the touchstone Arab cause of 
Palestine. While it had been politically sensitive, the relationship with the UK had offset Kuwait's 
relative external exposure by providing an off-shore defence guarantee as the country felt its way 
toward a regionally non-aligned but essentially Arabist foreign policy following independence. 
57 Assiri, op. cit. 
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Over the 1970s Kuwait's relationship with the US would develop aspects of the defence 
relationship it formerly had the UK. However this could not provide the amirate with the same 
assurances that the UK's more pronounced role in Kuwait and the wider Gulf had given. By 1977 
Kuwait was patently less dependent on international allies as a regional security prop. The 
seeking of an "Arab solution" in the face of Iraqi territorial incursions, and the upholding of an 
Arab oil embargo that targeted the US and the UK, emphasised what had become Kuwait's 
primary foreign policy considerations, albeit that such policies were inadequate in meeting its 
external security concerns. In late 1977, when President Sadat went to Jerusalem, Palestine 
effectively fractured the harmony between Kuwait's promotion of Egypt's realignment toward 
the US, and the amirate's fealty to the Arab cause. The outcome would emphasise Kuwait's need 
to pursue close relations with Saudi Arabia and, consequently, the pursuit of a relatively 
conservative foreign policy in terms of the amirate's "Arabism" and in its international relations. 
For the most part this was maintained, although circumstances in the 1980s deepened Kuwait's 
relationship with the US, but in the process ended its regional non-alignment, a step that 
contributed to the ultimate failure of its foreign policy in 1990. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis explored the factors driving Kuwait's foreign policy during a relatively short, but 
intense, period, both in the region and domestically. It started with Kuwait's independence in 
1961 and the subsequent UK military intervention; traced the impact of the 1967 and 1973 Arab- 
Israeli wars; examined Kuwait's role in the 1973/4 oil embargo; and ended in 1977. This was the 
year that Egypt began its direct engagement with Israel, and that Amir Sabah Salim died, 
ushering in the rule of Jabr Al-Ahmed, who remained amir until his death at the beginning of 
2006. Egypt's policy shift in 1977 severely weakened its regional influence for much of the next 
15 years and therefore removed it as a prop of Kuwaiti foreign policy. Within 12 months, Iran 
was to begin a period of internal upheaval that culminated in the overthrow of the Shah. With a 
corresponding rise in Iraqi ambitions and the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait's increasingly 
forlorn attempts at upholding its regional non-alignment policy were over. 
The international relations theories that underpinned this thesis' emphasis on the regional and 
international components of Kuwait's foreign relations - neo-realism and constructivism - cannot 
wholly explain what, in combination, created a duality, if not outright contradiction, in policy 
during the 1961-77 period. Kuwait adopted an Arabist foreign policy construct that was largely 
focussed on external legitimacy in order to offset regional threats born largely of its strategic 
location and enormous oil assets. Kuwait's relative autonomy from internal pressures and 
institutional constraints fitted with the domestic realities identified by those who have deployed 
an essentially Foreign Policy Analysis approach to Arab states' decision making. This helped to 
emphasise how Kuwaiti decision-makers were not, for the most part, measuring external policy in 
terms of internal legitimacy problems. However the specifics of the Kuwaiti case have shown 
how domestic autonomy was aided by the combination of "correct" Arabist stances externally 
and, drawing on the work of writers who have examined Kuwait from the perspective of rentier 
theory, the internal patronage afforded by oil wealth. At the same time, the Kuwaiti leadership 
maintained defence relations with the UK, and then pursued them with the US, in contradiction 
with a professed Arabism. Backing up a foreign policy presented in ideological terms, Kuwait 
sought to reduce its perceived external vulnerability by publicly deploying its oil wealth 
in 
support of Arabist causes and by making payments to radical Arab states. Kuwait's international 
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alignments were at variance with many of the assumptions behind constructivist understandings 
of foreign policy. However its deployment of ideology to deflect external security pressures did 
not correspond with neo-realist assumptions either, nor did its, for the most part, avoidance of 
regional alliances. In short, Kuwait utilised Arabist ideology, oil money, and western defence 
partnerships to deter what was primarily conceived of as an external threat. Its foreign policy in 
this period does not therefore fit neatly into any one theoretical framework. 
In separating the internal, regional and international dimensions, I have been able to assess their 
relative significance in the determination of Kuwait's foreign policy. In this way the importance 
to Kuwaiti foreign policy of different Al-Sabah leaders, of top non Al-Sabah officials, and of the 
national assembly and related political trends, has been considered. Kuwait's attention to regional 
security threats and to the adoption of policy stances mindful of Arab opinion has been explored. 
Finally, the weight Kuwait gave to its international relations, primarily the traditional relationship 
with Britain and the development of relations with the US, has been addressed. 
Foreign policy was decided by the senior Al-Sabah leadership, but not in a manner recognisable 
to students of government decision-making in western countries. This was not a matter of cabinet 
majorities, minuted proceedings, or long term considerations. Rather, broad lines were 
understood, thereby allowing some autonomy for particular expertise. Indeed, other than oil, 
Kuwaiti foreign policy was often little more than a generalised Al-Sabah consensus. It was less 
policy of the concrete, programmatic kind, than a collection of broad stances, of predictable 
responses, that reflected the importance to Kuwait, a militarily inconsequential and perceptibly 
politically vulnerable Arab state, of keeping within the mainstream of an identifiable Arab 
regional consensus. This did not mean that Kuwait lacked foreign policy aspirations, as is often 
suggested of relatively weak states. However, Kuwait's publicly declared policies identified with 
the touchstones of Arab nationalism, a construct that for the amirate was largely a rhetorical, 
defensive prop, rather than the tool of regional influence it would, for example, be for Egypt, at 
least until the 1967 war. 
The senior Al-Sabah, most obviously Jabr Al-Ahmed, the crown prince and premier for much of 
the 1961-77 period; and his half brother, Sabah Al-Ahmed, the foreign minister, would tend to 
adopt stronger Arabist rhetoric than Kuwait's rulers, whether Abdullah Salim (1950-65) or Sabah 
Salim (1965-77). On occasions this would suggest potential differences of substantive policy to, 
for example, the ostensibly pro-British Sabah Salim. However, in practice, for example in the 
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case of Jabr Al-Ahmed's threat to reduce Kuwait's Sterling investments in response to a dispute 
over oil revenues, these were merely tactical moves designed to enhance the arnirate's bargaining 
position. 
Kuwait forged a foreign policy balance based largely on external, but also periodic internal, 
security concerns. This encouraged it to maintain its mostly discrete defence alliance with the UK 
and the search for "understandings" with the US, offset with an identifiably "pro-Arab" foreign 
policy stance within the region. The contradictions in this balance produced tensions across 
Kuwait's internal, regional and international relationships, however for the most part it proved 
successful, at least during the period with which this thesis was concerned. 
In Chapters 2 and 5, the thesis considered the dynamics of Kuwait's internal political dimension. 
During the period from 1961-67, Kuwait moved from a mostly benign exercise of authority 
largely concentrated in the hands of Amir Abdullah Salim, to a more authoritarian polity in which 
Jabr Al-Ahmed was the driving force. Kuwait held existential concerns about large number of 
foreign Arab nationals in its population, which included Palestinians in the public sector, 
Egyptian oil workers, and initially a small, but significant, number of Iraqis in its armed forces. 
Kuwaiti Arab nationalists, who were largely supportive of Gamal Abdul Nasser's regime in 
Egypt, coalesced with exiled Arab nationalists and, it was feared, might seek to manipulate 
foreign Arab residents. This encouraged a domestic political clampdown from 1966 to 1971, 
which by the late 1960s had gone so far as to weaken the AI-Sabah's compact with some leading 
merchant families who normally preferred political co-operation to open disputes with the 
government. The government's shift to relatively authoritarian practices included manipulation of 
the national assembly election in 1967 to favour tribal and other conservative interests that were 
more easily controllable by leading AI-Sabah, thus setting the pattern for much subsequent 
practice. This had some impact on foreign policy in terms of an end to what some more 
conservative Al-Sabah saw as pandering to communist states such as East Germany and North 
Korea. However, the broad lines of foreign policy were unaffected by the domestic clampdown. 
Indeed Kuwait's adherence to Arab policy norms, and its support for radical regimes, backed up 
by financial largesse, made it all the easier to clamp-down with relative impunity from the 
opinion of its Arab neighbours; all the more so following the decline of Egyptian influence after 
1967. When the Kuwaiti government returned to a policy of relative internal repression in 1976, 
and unconstitutionally suspended a national assembly that had threatened to upset the amirate's 
regional as well as internal relations, the broad lines of foreign policy retained their Arabist 
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identifiers. In fact, Kuwait's desire to maintain its "pro-Arab" regional relations encouraged the 
suspension in the first place. 
In Chapters 3 and 6, the regional context for Kuwait's adoption of a pan-Arab foreign policy 
construct was explored. The primary existential fear created by Iraq's territorial assertions in 
1961, and Kuwait's periodic territorial concerns regarding its northern neighbour after Baghdad's 
begrudging recognition of Kuwait in 1963, emphasised what would be a key constant in the 
amirate's foreign policy: a non-aligned, but identifiably pro-Arab, regional political stance 
designed to retain the initial support shown by key Arab states for Kuwait's independence. As 
seen in Chapter 6, in the aftermath of Britain's decision in 1968 to depart from the Gulf, Kuwaiti 
security concerns would to an extent shift to Iran. At the same time, Iran's regional assertiveness 
further emphasised to Kuwait the residual insecurity it felt vis-d-vis Iraq. Baghdad used its 
nascent conflict with Iran to justify territorial encroachments into Kuwait, most strikingly at Al- 
Samita in March 1973. In the face of Iran's suspicion of the amirate, Kuwait actively sought 
engagement with the Shah, whose desire to contain Iraq saw him wam off Baghdad from making 
further incursions into the amirate. Once the apparent regional plaudits Kuwait received for its 
overt expression of Arab solidarity in the 1973-4 oil embargo had died away, and inter-Arab 
division over the politics of disengagement with Israel and regarding the Lebanese civil war 
grew, the amirate was exposed to further territorial pressure from Iraq, and a strong sense that it 
lacked support within the Arab world as bigger issues took precedence. 
Kuwait had played a major role in funding Egypt's realignment from the Soviet Union to the US, 
seeing the latter's strengthened regional role as beneficial to offsetting the USSR's support for 
Iraq and as bolstering the position of the Gulf Arab countries. However Egypt's reduced regional 
weight, and gradual movement toward bilateral peace with Israel, also began to lessen the 
constraints on Iraqi and Iranian competition for Gulf hegemony. Following the Iranian revolution, 
an open contest ensued in which Saddam. Hussein's Iraq was, after a previous perceived 
capitulation to Iranian power, now able to pose as the new citadel of Arabism. This left Kuwait 
exposed. Though having inevitably drawn closer to Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of 1967, and 
especially following the British departure in 1971, Kuwait did not want to rely exclusively on 
Riyadh, but by the end of the decade non-alignment no longer appeared viable. 
Kuwait's regional fears had earlier necessitated non-alignment. This in turn meant it had little 
choice but to retain the international defence prop of its foreign policy, given the unpredictability 
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of its regional position. In Chapter 4 we saw how a partly manipulated Kuwait provided an 
opportunity for Britain, which had been weakened in the region, to assert its remaining relations 
in the Middle East by demonstrating a willingness to defend Kuwait within days of its 
independence in June 1961. After the departure of British troops, Kuwait's adherence to the 
construct of Arab unity, represented by the entry of an Arab security force, would ensure the 
amirate "legitimacy" through acceptance in the Arab League; and the political palliative of cash 
would secure it recognition by Iraq. However, we also saw how Kuwait was, despite British fears, 
unwilling to bargain away the UK defence commitment to ease the process of recognition from 
Iraq that some other Arab states were also keen to facilitate on that basis. The practical expression 
of the UK's defence commitment would, over 1965-7, be steadily reduced without any major 
concern from Kuwait. The amirate believed that the security of its position within the region had 
improved due to its careful courting of Arab states and, to an extent, the Iranian government. 
Despite this, Kuwait essentially remained in an alliance with Britain, thereby providing a discrete 
backdrop against which it could project overt statements of adherence to Palestine and, ironically, 
in support of Arab nationalists opposing British interests in Aden and Bahrain. Recognising the 
unpopularity regionally and internally of even this "offshore" defence partnership, and hoping to 
ensure that it was not beholden to just one, possibly unreliable, international guarantor, in 1965 
Kuwait sought a "secret" US commitment to its defence, having considered asking Washington to 
substitute for the UK's public commitment within months of the 1961 intervention. 
After the UK's regional withdrawal announcement in 1968, and fearful of the security vacuum 
that raised concerns about both Iran and Iraq, Kuwait actively sought a clear-cut but wholly 
private defence commitment from the US. In Chapter 7 we saw how the amirate's leadership 
accepted the value of, inevitably vague, statements by both the departing and the incoming US 
president. Both Kuwait and the US preferred to build implicit understandings, rather than specific 
commitments, through naval visits, military and security advisers, and the US's entry to the 
formerly largely exclusive UK preserve of defence sales. The limitations upon this relationship, 
in the wider context of what remained a limited US Gulf security role further exacerbated by its 
perceptible international weakness in Vietnam, and Kuwait's sense of increased vulnerability in 
the region, encouraged Kuwait to flirt with the USSR in 1975. This development was in line with 
her desire to project non alignment internationally as well as regionally, but ultimately was a 
trend that would be beholden to the greater concern about US and Saudi reaction, concerns that 
reflected what, by 1977, had become Kuwait's principle relationships at the international and 
regional level respectively. 
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Of the different factors shaping Kuwaiti foreign policy considerations, Kuwait's regional 
relations proved the more significant over the period from 1961-77. International defence 
relationships were important for the amirate. However the desire for an "over the horizon" 
commitment limited the extent to which Kuwait could utilise these friendships to deter regional 
threats, albeit that the UK defence guarantee enabled the amirate to more confidently assert an 
Arabist stance in its early post-independence years. The limitations to the deterrence that 
international allies could provide was compounded after 1968, when the US only partly filled the 
role that had been largely vacated by the UK, and Washington preferred to outsource its regional 
security interests by extensively arming its principal Gulf allies, Iran and Saudi Arabia. While 
naval visits to Kuwait would be allowed after 1968, this was a long way short, for example, of the 
right to use Saudi air and naval facilities, which the US exercised. In keeping the UK and the US 
largely at arm's length, Kuwait was prioritising a foreign policy that sought to respond to 
perceived regional vulnerability by publicly adhering to Arabism. Kuwait endorsed foreign policy 
stances that were closer to Egypt (at least up to 1967) than Saudi Arabia, affirming an essentially 
rejectionist position on Palestine that was at one with regional and domestic opinion, and giving 
political and financial support to Arab nationalist opposition groups in the southern Gulf and even 
for the Marxist regime in south Yemen. 
The internal dimension is arguably the least significant element in deten-nining Kuwaiti foreign 
policy. This thesis has given considerable attention to the different internal factors that affected 
decision-making on foreign policy, but concludes that their significance was more as a reinforcer 
of what became a relatively constant formula. For example the connection between Egypt and the 
Kuwaiti "branch" of the Arab Nationalist Movement bolstered the amirate's radical posturing and 
communist bloc flirtation of the early years of Kuwait's independence. However Kuwait's 
confidence in its foreign policy's Arabist credentials and its judicious use of financial support for 
Egypt and other radical Arab nationalist states enabled it to clamp down on domestic radicalism 
and "re-balance", in the words of Shaikh Jabr Al-Ali Al-Sabah, its international relations away 
from communist countries. 
The emphasis of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) on the internal factors shaping policy making 
proved useful in thinking about the domestic Kuwaiti context. The amirate's foreign policy 
determination is largely the preserve of the top layer of a hereditary ruling family, and whose 
opaque decision-making is characterised by informality and generalisation. This also emphasised 
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how decisions were, and could be, exercised in a manner largely autonomous from the domestic 
environment, and how external factors generally over-rode prospective internal "inputs". As such 
the assumptions underpinning the typology adopted by Adeed Dawisha in examining the key 
players in the exercise of decision-making in Middle Eastern and especially Arab states, helped 
provide a theoretical framework for exploring the domestic dimension of Kuwait's foreign policy. 
Ultimately, however, the external environment would shape the decisions of a few key players in 
Kuwait; decisions that did not so much see the international and regional environments as 
providing "capacity" or "constraint" as Dawisha saw in the very different case of Egypt, but 
were seen, defensively, as generating threats that had to be managed. 
Therefore this study of Kuwait has given greater attention to neo-realist and constructivist 
analysis of the region, but these too have revealed significant limitations. Both see Arab 
nationalism as presenting a threat to the authority and even the security of some states, whether as 
a tool of a given country, most obviously Egypt, which sponsored Arab nationalist opposition 
groups throughout the Arab world, thereby increasing the "balance of threat" felt by many states; 
or as a popularly endorsed ideology that in and of itself could create internal credibility problems 
for governments. Thus both Stephen Walt and Michael Barnett identify ideological imperatives 
behind Jordan's decision to enter the 1967 war, with its large Palestinian population obliging an 
alignment with the kingdom's more powerful rivals, Egypt and Syria. While the leadership in 
Kuwait periodically saw regional developments, most notably Black September and the Lebanese 
Civil War, as potentially affecting its internal position vis-a-vis the large exiled Palestinian 
population resident in the amirate, it did not adopt a firmer line on Palestine in response. Rather, 
Kuwait viewed the closure of the national assembly as partly a precautionary step in light of local 
Palestinian anger over events in Lebanon, but also as a way of assuaging Syria over assembly 
criticism of its role in Lebanon. Some, relatively piecemeal, constraint occurred on Palestinian 
political activists from the leftist PLO factions after the shock of the 1974 terror incident that 
involved external actors but raised questions about local involvement then, or in the future. 
Arguably, domestic constraint on Palestinians or Kuwaiti Arab nationalists was balanced by 
maintaining a fin-n position on Palestine in line with the PLO mainstream that the amirate 
continued to fund. It was this close historic and financial relationship that for the most part made 
Kuwait feels it had rather less to prove than for example Jordan, a country by definition on the 
frontline of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Kuwait in a sense had long functioned as a Fatah base 
within clearly defined and respected lines of operation, but without an implicit security threat that 
shaped Kuwaiti foreign policy. The fact that the Palestinian political leadership and community in 
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Kuwait proved to be a very profound security liability in 1990 does not mean that they were 
effectively internal determinants of foreign policy twenty years earlier, although it obviously 
raises questions about the wisdom of Kuwait's regional and Arabist orientation in its foreign 
policy. 
This brings us to the more general question of how Kuwaiti foreign policy was formulated. 
Kuwait's black box of decision-making was confined to a small coterie of senior Al-Sabah, who, 
as this thesis argued, worked for the most part according to general understandings, with an 
increasing authority over both foreign as well as domestic policy being held by Crown Prince 
Jabr Al-Ahmed as the period wore on. This thesis has partly been able to open up this closed 
process by conducting first hand interviews with senior Kuwaiti and western officials and by 
reference to UK and US embassy reporting during the period. The question of the relative weight 
Kuwaiti decision-makers placed on a succession of challenges, and the priority they afforded to 
the different elements of the amirate's foreign policy package, has had to proceed from this 
"evidence" and from my own interpretation of it. Theory can be an external guide, but it cannot 
explain the specific foreign policy priorities of the Al-Sabah. 
Throughout the period with which this thesis was concerned, the Kuwaiti foreign policy balance 
can be regarded as a success, in so much as there was no comprehensive territorial invasion, nor 
did the amirate prove vulnerable to any overt external coercion that could have distorted the 
country's political or economic life. Judged with the benefit of hindsight, however, Kuwait's 
exposure to overt Iranian pressure in the course of its war with Iraq in the 1980s, and, most 
profoundly, Kuwait's temporary demise as an independent state following Iraq's invasion in 
1990, suggests fundamental flaws in the amirate's foreign policy. 
Of relevance to this thesis is whether the turbulent events Kuwait directly experienced from 1980 
onwards can be attributed to flaws in a foreign policy developed in the 1960s as a balance 
between Arabism and discrete international defence partnerships. The Iraq-Iran war (1980-88) 
saw Kuwait abandon its professed regional non-alignment in favour of overt political and 
financial support for Iraq, the country that had been judged by Kuwait as its greatest threat. This 
in turn saw the amirate exposed to internal attacks sponsored by the revolutionary Shia Islamic 
regime in Tehran, and, increasingly, over the course of Iran's war with Iraq, attempts by the 
Iranian Revolutionary Guard to sink Kuwaiti oil tankers in the Gulf. The apparent switch in 
Kuwaiti foreign policy in part reflected a qualitatively different reaction it felt toward the new 
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regime that came to power after the 1978/79 Iranian revolution than that of the Shah it replaced. 
The revolution in Iran had seen demonstrations in sympathy in the amirate held primarily by 
Kuwaiti Shia, as there had been in other Gulf Arab states and more widely in the Middle East. 
The rhetoric of the revolution, and the widespread sympathy among Kuwait's Shia community 
for a regime that appeared bent on exporting revolution across the Gulf, created considerable 
apprehension on the part of the Kuwaiti government, and over time would engender strong 
sectarian antipathy from the majority Sunnis toward the Shia population, whether they held 
Kuwaiti nationality or not. 
Kuwait would have found it difficult to have stood aside from the war that Iraq began with Iran in 
1980. The common threat from Iran felt by Arab governments inevitably encouraged Kuwaiti co- 
operation with Iraq. However Kuwait's relations with Iran under the Shah, while broadly positive, 
had already proved themselves subject to what the arnirate felt was the greater priority of 
displaying Arab solidarity. Worryingly for Kuwait, the Iraq-Iran war saw a series of border 
incursions by Iraq into the amirate with the apparent objective of enhancing access to the northern 
Gulf headwaters in the face of Iranian military pressure. In the context of a revolutionary 
transformation in Iran, Kuwait had shifted from leaning toward Iraq in the previous phase of 
conflict, to a firm alignment that saw the amirate provide generous financial grants and soft loans, 
the use of Kuwaiti ports for Iraqi imports of arms as well as civilian goods, and turning a blind 
eye to further Iraqi incursions. The new regime in Iran, and the context of an all-out war as 
opposed to the periodic border conflicts seen from 1969-75, made it very difficult, if not 
impossible, for Kuwait to do otherwise. Practical expressions of fealty to Arab solidarity had been 
required at the time of the 1973-4 oil embargo when a collective Arab interest was underpinned 
by regional and internal pressure to act. It was inconceivable that Kuwait would now act 
differently than its fellow oil-rich Arab states in the face of an Iranian regime engaged in an all- 
out war with Iraq; the longer, or even relatively short, term consequences of aiding Iraqi military 
capabilities were not considered. The amirate hoped that, through finance and practical steps 
reflecting its strategic location, it was emphasising its indispensability to Iraqi and wider Arab 
interests. However in the process of allying with Iraq, Kuwait made itself more vulnerable to 
Iran ian-sponsored attacks, which in the early 1980s included the bombing of western embassies, 
an attempted assassination of the amir, and the sinking of oil tankers. Kuwait would then be left 
wholly exposed when, within two years of the war's end, Iraq decided to invade Kuwait. After 
the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in August 1990, Iraq once more renounced what had been the 
ostensible objective of eight years of war with Iran - sovereignty over the Shatt Al-Arab - in 
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order to accommodate the strategic "loss" caused to Iran by the apparent ending of Kuwait's 
independence. 
In the 1980s Kuwait abandoned its residual regional non-alignment. A balance of threats analysis 
suggests that Iran was a greater concern to Kuwait than Iraq. However this was significantly due 
to the support Kuwait was giving Iraq in the war, itself arguably reflecting the threat of greater 
territorial incursions than those that were periodically conducted by an Iraq on a fully-fledged war 
footing. Ideational factors both enhanced Kuwait's sense of internal as well as external security 
threat from Iran, and underpinned the Arabist obligation on Kuwait to be "on-side" with Iraq. A 
more neutral Kuwait would possibly have made it more difficult for Iraq to count on sidelining 
Iran in 1990, if this was part of Baghdad's calculation. However Kuwait lacked the confidence to 
withstand the pressure to firmly align with Iraq in 1980. 
Kuwait, along with the other Gulf Arab states, had seen the Iraq-Iran conflict as necessitating an 
assertion of a distinct common interest among six, largely oil-rich, conservative monarchies and 
amirates. Within 12 months of the war's beginning, Kuwait, which had previously sought to 
promote southern Gulf co-operation, played a leading part in setting up the Gulf Co-operation 
Council (GCC). This brought the six Gulf Arab states together in a common framework originally 
intended as a vehicle for forging political and security co-operation among countries that to a 
greater or lesser degree felt threatened by both Iraq and Iran. With Iran encroaching on Kuwaiti 
as well as Iraqi interests - with the 1986 seizure of the Fao peninsula and a stepping up of Iranian 
attacks on Kuwait and other Gulf states' oil tankers - the Kuwaitis sought a GCC commitment to 
the defence of Bubiyan island and a collective defence of member states' shipping'. After the 
rejection of this proposal, Kuwait took the step that more overtly intemationalised the regional 
conflict by inviting the Permanent Five (P5) members of the UNSC to re-flag Kuwaiti shipping 
and therefore make themselves responsible for safe passage of "their" oil tankers. Kuwait's 
initiative helped end a conflict that, after eight years, saw ever decreasing benefits for either side. 
Kuwaiti officials and observers emphasise how the amirate's approach to the Soviet Union, after 
initially failing to get the US to agree to the commercial hire of US-registered vessels or to the re- 
flagging of Kuwaiti ones, was intended to stimulate Washington into seeing the geo-strategic 
importance of stepping up its role in Gulf security, whilst ensuring a genuinely international 
presence. The 1980 "Carter Doctrine" had asserted a US interest in dealing with any (Iranian) 
1 Abdul-Reda Assiri, Kuwait's Foreign Policy - City-State in World Politics (Colorado; West-view Press, 
1990), p 10 1 
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threat to regimes within the region, while the US had gradually been extending its naval presence 
over the decade. However, it took Kuwait to stimulate what became a lead US role in re-flagging 
and a military escort of first Kuwaiti and then Saudi and other Gulf shipping. As the US took a 
more forward role in containing Iran, Kuwait was stepping up its defence relations with 
Washington. While initially Kuwait still had to play to regional and internal sensitivities, by the 
time of Iraq's invasion in 1990 the Kuwait-US relationship had become more pronounced, albeit 
some way short of an alliance. 
The balance of power in the region had radically changed since 1977. The Iranian revolution and 
the eight year long war with Iran had seen Iraq's relationship to the US in some ways mirror that 
formerly enjoyed by Iran. While Kuwaiti moves to encourage reflagging had helped to create a 
clearer impression of a US commitment to the amirate, they had also brought the US into sharper 
conflict with Iraq's enemy, Iran. Against this background, a combination of strategic interest and 
ideological posturing encouraged Iraq to invade Iran. In the context of some internal discontent 
during the war and over its outcome, Saddam Hussein arguably transferred his motivations 
against Iran in 1980 to Kuwait in 1990. However the background to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, 
stood in marked contrast to its periodic territorial incursions into the amirate from 1969 onwards. 
To varying degrees, there was a strategic element to the former incursions. This particularly 
seemed to be the case when major tensions or outright conflict between Iraq and Iran emphasised 
the vulnerability of Iraq's position in the northern Gulf, and Kuwait was being pressed by 
Baghdad to make concessions over Warba and Bubiyan. However in 1990 Iran was not a threat to 
Iraq, while Baghdad was giving greater emphasis to financial and oil-related complaints against 
Kuwait. This suggests that Iraq lacked a clear strategy and was unable to extract itself from an 
escalating crisis in which there little to constrain its actions. 
Kuwait's foreign policy in 1990 was not in direct contradiction of its foreign policy in 1977. 
Kuwait had, however, been obliged to shift closer to Iraq and to an Arab alignment against an 
Iran that seemingly could no longer be befriended as a regional counterweight. Kuwait had not 
though abandoned its Arabism. It had held firm to many of its core policy stances, although it was 
doing so in a region that was more divided and where regional non-alignment had proven 
impossible. Kuwait's Arabist construct patently failed to offset the threat from Iraq, for whom 
there was no contradiction in presenting its national interest in swallowing Kuwait in Arabist, 
64anti-colonial", colours, and, in doing so, garnering the effective support of some of the greatest 
recipients of Kuwaiti aid. At the same time Iraq drew widespread popular sympathy in the Arab 
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world by playing to the Arab nationalist touchstone, Palestine. Egypt, which had once been a 
pillar of Kuwaiti Arabism, lacked regional clout. Saudi Arabia, militarily dwarfed by Iraq, had 
had its counsel on oil policy pointedly ignored by Kuwait. 
Before Iraqi troops had entered Kuwait, the amirate had shifted toward meeting its northern 
neighbour's economic demands, including the reduction of its oil output. A sudden Kuwaiti 
concession on the islands would not however have been in keeping with Kuwait's previous 
approach to Iraq. Kuwaiti officials and politicians emphasise that, despite being willing to talk, 
the leadership in the 1960s and 1970s would never have countenanced leasing the islands in order 
to get a border demarcation agreement with Iraq. This remained the case right up to 1990, 
encouraged by Iran's desire to prevent Iraq gaining a strategic advantage. 
Would less attention to Arabism in the 1960s and 1970s, including the symbolic badge of 
Palestine, and greater, public, courting of enhanced security support from the US and/or a 
combination of P5 actors have served Kuwait better, in light of events post-1977? The answer 
depends on the likelihood of Kuwait achieving anything other than the discrete defence relations 
it already held with the US, which in 1990 had so signally failed to deter Iraq from invading. In 
light of the Iranian revolution, the US had begun to shift from its policy of delegating the 
maintenance of Gulf security to local actors. However an increased military presence in the Gulf 
and the US's development of a doctrine to justify intervention, did not affect the leading, and 
largely malign, role that Iraq and Iran were allowed to play in the security of the region, and 
specifically toward Kuwait. By the end of the 1980-88 war, the US still lacked formal security 
arrangements with Kuwait or the other Gulf Arab states, despite having basing rights in Saudi 
Arabia and Bahrain. By its own subsequent admission, the US did not give much consideration to 
Kuwaiti security concerns, and saw the re-flagging in wider geo-strategic terms'. Kuwait had not 
desired a public commitment from the US when the UK announced its departure in 1968. At the 
same time, given the US's delegation to Iran of the primary role in the security of the Gulf 
during 
this period, and Iran's ability to offset Iraqi pressure on Kuwait and other Gulf Arab states whose 
security the US held as in its strategic interest, there was little likelihood that the US would 
have 
wanted to give a firm public commitment to Kuwait that would have had to 
have been given to its 
Gulf Arab neighbours as well. 
2 Personal interviews with William Brewer, Head Arabian Peninsula desk, US State 
Department; and 
Herman Eilts, former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Egypt. 
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Kuwaiti regret, post-1990, at how much it had "Arabised" its foreign policy at the expense of its 
own security needs' had to some extent been prefigured in the frustration expressed in the mid- 
1970s at a lack of effective Arab action to uphold its security. After 1990 this would take on an 
especial bitterness, with the collaboration of some Palestinians in Kuwait with the invading Iraqi 
forces and the support for Iraq expressed by Yasser Arafat. However the US had long understood 
the instrumentality of what it called Kuwait's "basic Arabism", and there is no evidence that any 
willingness on the part of the amirate to take up stances out of step with the Palestinian 
leadership, but apparently more helpful to Washington, would have facilitated a more overt US 
commitment to Kuwait. 
Kuwait could have been more willing to differentiate between fealty to Arabism in terms of 
Palestine, and putting a greater public emphasis on US defence relations, without necessarily 
expecting or desiring an overt defence commitment. It took until just prior to the Iraqi invasion 
for Kuwait to feel confident enough about regional and internal reaction to, for the first time, 
publicly admit that the US was paying the amirate a naval visit. By 1988 it is arguable that, in a 
Gulf and wider Middle East in which Kuwait no longer enjoyed the broad support that its regional 
non-alignment had previously afforded, a wiser Kuwaiti policy would have been to more actively 
befriend the US. By this stage official basing rights could have been offered to the US, although 
there would have been no guarantee that the US would welcome such a forward posture toward 
Iraq. 
More fundamentally, however, it is not clear that a more co-operative public stance would have 
made any difference to Washington's attitude to Kuwait's border dispute with Iraq. The US was 
no more willing to pronounce on Iraqi-Kuwaiti territorial issues in July 1990 than at the time of 
Iraq's incursion into Kuwait in March 1973. The US would not have needed to make an overt 
commitment to Kuwait in order to deter Iraq prior to the 1990 invasion. The UK's intervention in 
1961 had emphasised to Iraq the strength of Britain's formal defence commitment to Kuwait and 
helped to prevent rhetorical assaults from going any further. With the benefit of hindsight at least, 
it can be argued that an offshore US naval mobilisation and a strong message to Baghdad would 
have had the same effect in 1990. 
The occupation and the subsequent US-led war to liberate Kuwait meant that, from now on, 
Washington's semi-detached Gulf security posture, whether delegated to regional pillars or 
3 Abdullah Bishara, former senior foreign ministry official. Personal interview, Kuwait, January 2003. 
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proxies, would be abandoned as the US effectively became the regional hegemon and pursued the 
constraint of both Iraq and Iran in a policy approximating to the widely used label, "dual 
containment". The proven weakness of Kuwait's position, and its inability to forge sufficiently 
strong and reliable enough friendships in the region to ensure her security, saw the amirate 
abandon the vestiges of balance of its foreign policy in favour of an unambiguous political and 
security alignment with the US. Elements of Kuwait's Arabism would remain, but the principal 
totem, Palestine, would largely be confined to continued hostility to Israel. Relations with the 
PLO, which the Kuwaitis had strongly supported and funded; and with Yemen, Jordan and 
Sudan, who, despite the amirate's support, essentially sided with Iraq, were tenninated. Kuwaiti 
relations with the PLO were not to be normalised until the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004. 
Iraq invasion raises long term questions 
Kuwait was the only Arab state in which there was widespread support for the US 
administration's decision in 2003, in company with the UK, to invade Iraq. The amirate's role in 
providing the exclusive territorial base for the ground invasion, and for the continued flow of 
coalition troops to Iraq, has left Kuwait regionally exposed. The aftermath of an unstable Iraq had 
reduced Kuwaiti confidence in its future stability. However its security concerns are now largely 
related to internal factors. Kuwait, in common with Saudi Arabia and the other Sunni-led GCC 
states, has resumed aspects of the existential paranoia witnessed in the early years of the Iranian 
revolution about the loyalty of their Shia populations. Sunni Islamist pressures have raised serious 
security fears related to the insurgency in Iraq. In the event that the US-led coalition will exit Iraq 
without having resolved the internal challenges, Kuwait cannot re-adopt the deployment of 
ideology to advance its security. Kuwait is compromised, given the firmness of its alliance with 
the US and its role in the war in Iraq, in the eyes of radical Islamist opinion at home and in the 
region. 
More fundamentally, over the longer term, Kuwait and Iraq look set to return to a discussion of 
territorial issues. For a significant section of the new Iraqi political elite, the borders are still an 
unresolved question. UN Security Council Resolution 833, passed in 1993, underwrote the 1963 
Iraq-Kuwait border agreement. However this is no guarantee that what included a controversial, 
and disputed, demarcation of claimed maritime delimits in the northern Gulf, which run mostly to 
the south of a de facto Iraqi-Kuwaiti boundary line, will remain acceptable to future Iraqi 
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governments. A more stable Iraq in which the US retains interests will raise questions about 
Kuwait's ability to resist territorial concessions, and about the long term strategic utility of 
Kuwait - something that in the 1970s was not a high priority for US administrations. As such, 
Kuwait's trading of its Arabist construct for a full-blown US defence and political alliance could 
make its long standing prime foreign policy objective of offsetting external security threats begin 
to look shaky. 
Arabism has largely lost its meaning, and certainly its utility, as a tool of states' foreign policy, 
while the desirability of Arab state sovereignty is no longer questioned, at least by governments. 
However, while Iraqi territorial claims toward Kuwait can no longer be dressed up in Arabist 
terms, they could easily come to the fore again as an issue of Iraqi national "rights". More 
positively, respect for its stance toward the former Iraq regime, at least among those parties 
linked to Iran, with whom the amirate has since 1991 fostered far healthier relations, could enable 
a more durable relationship, assisted by Iran's traditional interest in upholding Kuwaiti 
sovereignty. As ever, Kuwait's relations with Iran and Iraq will need to be pursued mindful of 
Saudi Arabian concerns. At the same time, Palestine is far from dormant as a popular issue in the 
Arab and Islamic world. However, whereas it once had such instrumentality for Kuwaiti foreign 
policy, public statements of solidarity lack the ideological cache that the amirate's historic 
relationship with Fatah afforded. 
The careful, if albeit contradictory, balance of Kuwaiti foreign policy in the period from 1961-77 
is essentially dead. Events in the 1980s saw the amirate obliged to abandon regional non- 
alignment and to develop a more public relationship with the US. Events in the 1990s saw Kuwait 
largely isolated in the region at the same time as it deepened its US and UK alignment. Kuwait's 
foreign policy is today beholden to the vicissitudes of US policy in the Gulf, and to the amirate's 
more traditional policy of trying to build Arab support by financial generosity, in particular in 
neighbouring Iraq. Kuwait's policy options had always been limited. However, during the period 
with which this thesis is concerned, it was able to deepen its regional role, in part as a reaction to 
the political and security pressures of the time, and, from 1968, to the declining regional 
importance of the UK. Kuwait today continues to avoid regional alignments but seeks to broaden, 
where possible, its regional and extra-regional relations, whilst maintaining a strong emphasis on 
its defence and security partnership with the US. The regional environment, however, continues 
to be the key consideration of Kuwait's foreign policy. Radical Islamist, non-state, security 
threats have increasing importance but provide little scope for the leadership to deploy ideational 
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constructs as a foreign policy response. Despite this, the amirate continues to assert and to 
encourage conservative Islamic verities, albeit largely as a tool of domestic political management, 
and to express Arab and Islamic fealty in its statements on Palestine. At bottom, Kuwaiti foreign 
policy's primary focus still concerns security threats and is still managed by a small coterie of 
decision-makers. As such, Kuwaiti foreign policy from 1961 to 1977, and to a lesser but still 
important extent today, is best approached in terms of its threat perceptions, and the alignments 
and ideological commitments with which it has sought to counter them. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: The Majlis Movement 
At the time of its independence in 1961, Kuwait had seen a stronger and more political assertion 
of merchant interests than in the Gulf amirates granted independence after the annulling of their 
treaties of protection with Britain 10 years later. Unlike Qatar, Bahrain and Dubai's merchants 
had asserted themselves through municipal platforms in the 1920s and '30s. However, unlike 
Kuwait, in Bahrain and Dubai this had not led to the institution of a legislative body, no majlis al- 
shoura (consultative council), through which more elite merchant families would increasingly 
seek to direct the political life of the country. By 1930 Kuwaiti merchants, influenced by a similar 
body operating in Bahrain, and building on their successful agitation that they be allowed to 
found an educational council to provide schooling, received approval for founding a municipality 
elected and funded by tax-paying local merchants who financed public services in Kuwait City. 
(This was not wholly unprecedented in that a consultative body had advised Shaikh Mubarak Al- 
Sabah at the turn of the century. ) A key element motivating the demands for legislative authority 
in the 1930s however was economic. The hardship caused by the decline in trade with Nejd in 
Saudi Arabia, and the competition from cheap pearls manufactured in Japan following the 
depression in Europe, had hurt Kuwaiti merchants. This had been combined with a number of 
attempts by the Al-Sabah to secure income and to redress the economic imbalance by taxing the 
merchants' pearling revenues. At the same time the discovery of oil in 1934 emphasised that 
economic power was about to shift from the merchants. The leading merchants' belief that they 
were important, if subsequently not always active, participants in the Kuwaiti political system - 
and that the Al-Sabah were "first among equals" - was also given practical expression in the 
merchants' agitation for a formal role in decision making when, in 1938, they tried to secure a 
council (majlis) of leading merchants that would have legislative authority. Economic necessity 
was motivating a desire to enter the political realm at a time when exclusively Al-Sabah rule was 
threatening their economic interests. The "Majlis Movement" also had a significant external 
dimension, however. Following the 1936 unrest in Mandate Palestine, opposition to Britain's Peel 
Commission proposal in 1937 to divide the country into two states, and widely opposed 
expansion of Zionist migration, a period of considerable agitation in the Middle East occurred 
that, in Syria and Iraq in particular, contributed to a growth of Arab nationalist affiliation. 
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Most of the merchant elite in Kuwait looked to Britain, the protecting power, for support for their 
political aspirations. However, their political and financial support for the Palestinian struggle 
came to be seen by Shaikh Ahmed AI-Jabr (r. 1921-50) as needing a public hearing in the face of 
Iraqi attacks on him over the issue and over the merchants' domestic agitation. Thus external 
Arab criticism of Kuwait's Arab nationalist credentials would at this early stage overlap with 
domestic political consciousness outside of the ruling family, a development that would continue 
to shape foreign policy. In the late 1930s the ruler faced externally supported domestic agitation 
for a legislative body that could wind-back unwanted tax measures whilst pronouncing on foreign 
affairs, not least Arab national causes like Palestine. The merchant elites, by definition more 
travelled and more educated than most of the AI-Sabah, were well aware of the wider convulsion 
in the Arab world that was growing in opposition to the role of Britain, Kuwait's protector, in the 
region. Although Britain did not station troops in the amirate, the defence relationship was plain, 
and the military presence was acute in a number of neighbouring countries. On occasions, 
however, in light of the 1899 Treaty of Protection, British troops were present in Kuwait. This 
could be appreciated too e. g. they played a key part in constraining the excesses of the Wahhabi 
tribes from Nejd in central Arabia at various points following their expansion in the region as 
Ottoman authority waned. However, under the 1899 treaty, the British were able to agree the 
1922 Treaty of Uqair that appeased emergent Al-Saud power at the expense of two thirds of 
Kuwaiti territory. Despite this, there was not widespread Kuwaiti hostility to Britain until the 
1930s. However when Britain made an about-turn and opposed the Majlis Movement, this helped 
to spur anti-British feeling among some merchants in Kuwait, which, after all, was a natural 
component of the emergent Arab nationalism. 
Iraq's public claims to Kuwait in 1938, following the discovery of oil in the amirate four years 
earlier, was partly a reaction to domestic political upheaval in Kuwait which appeared ripe for 
exploitation, providing Baghdad with an opportunity to use the Majlis Movement to try to 
strengthen pro-Iraqi sympathies in order to aid its territorial ambitions. However, while this raised 
existential fears for Kuwait's future among the Al-Sabah and their British ally, the key driver for 
the Majlis Movement had been domestic; its ultimate collapse had been significantly affected by 
the fact that its backing was a result of an alliance between elite Sunni merchants and a section of 
the Al-Sabah that began the long standing practice of exploiting the legislature for their own 
career objectives. The Majlis Movement had been given a significant lease of life by the 
willingness of the younger members of the Al-Salim branch of the ruling family, who in a move 
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foreshadowing subsequent Al-Sabah manipulation of assembly members, sought to use their 
merchant allies to bolster their challenge to the concentration of power by Shaikh Ahmed, from 
the AI-Jabr line. Members of the AI-Jabr and the Al-Salim, descendents of the first two sons of 
Shaikh Mubarak Al-Sabah, have by tradition acceded as ruler, and thus these two lines dominate 
family and governmental politics. However, less privileged merchants had not been brought 
behind the Al-Salim challenge, while those from the Shia minority were mobilised by the ruler, 
Shaikh Ahmed, against the Majlis. Amir Abdullah Salim's later decision, following 
independence, to allow an elected national assembly was not seen favourably by some senior 
members of the Al-Ahmed line, while future Al-Sabah relations with the assembly would be 
characterised by calculations of internal family competition. 
Initially the ruling family had been encouraged by the British Political Agent to set up a council 
which, in 1938, functioned for a few months before being disbanded. However, support for what 
is sometimes dubbed the "Majlis revolt" or "movement" in Arabic, came from younger ruling 
family members, in particular the future amir, Abdullah Salim and his brothers. The young shaikh 
was to become the president of a second MaJlis in 1939. Elections were eventually conducted to 
the council and it would seek powers over external as well as domestic functions, including over 
oil revenue, that, if agreed, would conceivably have reduced the ruling family to a largely 
ceremonial role, an objective that it is not unusual to find being advocated by some merchants in 
Kuwait today. As a result of this apparent threat to the ruling family, however, and following a 
shift in position by the British government, the MaJlis was permanently wound-up by the ruler, 
Shaikh Ahmed, who deployed bedouin troops to close the body down. 
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Appendix 2: Merchant co-option post-1945 
The years following the disbanding of the ma lis in 1939 saw the arrival of significant oil 
revenues. The social compact that had seen the leading merchant families acquiesce in the rule of 
the Al-Sabah was reinforced by the flow of oil that now allowed the ruler to be the dispenser of 
patronage to the merchants. The merchants' interest in political matters would not be eradicated, 
but as long as the rapid development of the country after the Second World War benefited them, a 
de facto understanding was maintained whereby an authoritarian, if benevolent, system of rule 
over domestic affairs was exercised by the ruler. However the gathering Arab nationalist 
consciousness during and after the events of 1938-9 continued, and this could still engender anti- 
British feeling, even after the rapid development of the country in the 1950s. The securing from 
the Kuwaiti government of major contracts for exclusively British companies caused tensions, as 
was admitted to the author by the former deputy political agent in Kuwait (1954-58), Sir John 
Moberly. This compounded the anti-British sentiment expressed in Kuwait during the 1956 Suez 
war. However oil wealth tied the leading merchants so closely to the ruler as disperser of this vital 
"rent" that agitation against the existing political order began to seem unthinkable. A key part of 
this emergent political economy was the land purchase scheme that in the 1940s and 1950s saw 
the Al-Sabah consolidate their new found oil wealth by land speculation as the city expanded and 
plots that had previously been considered worthless desert tracts took on increasing value as 
development of the city rapidly occurred. In a process of calculated royal munificence, the many 
Al-Sabah who were benefiting from this process sold on their land to leading merchants at what 
were effectively "knock-down" prices. This enabled the latter to become excessively wealthy 
from land holdings alone. It is a process that continues to this day and which during the 1960s 
was also a way of extending the web of patronage to the so-called middle class or less privileged 
merchants who were to assert themselves in the national assembly. Furthermore, the Amir's 
exclusive manipulation of oil revenues paid by the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), set up as a 50- 
50 partnership of British Petroleum (BP), and the US company Gulf Oil, enabled significant 
contracts to be given the merchants. Indeed many key merchant family members were also direct 
representatives for British and other companies supplying the expanding Kuwaiti market. 
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Appendix 3: UK and US regional interests pre-1961 
The US's "Eisenhower Doctrine" of March 1957 preceded by one year the Iraq revolution when 
the British were powerless to intervene in one of what at that point was one of two independent 
Hashemite kingdoms that had negotiated with London the removal of British bases. Only a few 
days later, the events in Iraq, where a regime still allied with Britain was bloodily overthrown on 
July 14 th 1958, encouraged both Washington and London to intervene in two countries where 
Nasserite Arab nationalists were strong but did not necessarily constitute an imminent threat to 
the survival of two regimes with whom the US and the UK were allied. US marines landed in 
Lebanon in an operation that although largely Mediterranean-based, had in its naval component 
had seen a cruiser positioned off the Kuwaiti coast. Then shortly afterwards, Jordan, where 
British troops re-entered after having only closed down the British bases two years previously, 
Britain's prime minister Harold MacMillan ordered to airlift in British forces in response to a 
request from Jordan's King Hussein on July 17ffi 1958. 
Throughout almost all of the period following the 1958 overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy, and 
arguably until the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf war, Amman would continue to bandwagon with 
Iraq; plainly Jordan did not share the hostility to Iraq that lay behind Saudi Arabia signing up to 
up to the ALSF alongside the UAR. Kuwait did not need the UK to tell it that the federation 
proposal was unacceptable. The three way federation that had been proposed by Iraq in 1958 had 
preceded the overthrow of the Hashemite regime in Iraq and, although initially strongly 
encouraged by Britain, was soon acknowledged by London to have been something that most 
Kuwait leaders would have found difficult to embrace against domestic and regional opposition 
and residual suspicions of Iraq. Having initially tried to persuade Shaikh Abdullah Salim that 
Kuwait should join the union, British officials recognised that such an unlikely unionist project 
would have put Kuwait under an intolerable strain; not least given the expectation of opposition, 
including from Jabr Al-Ahmed, and, it was believed, the possible abdication by the ruler, 
Abdullah Salim. This in turn, Britain judged, would have brought the danger of some senior 
Kuwaitis inviting Egyptian support, and of Britain having to respond by staging an armed 
intervention in support of Abdullah Mubarrak, the deputy ruler, who was judged "the only shaikh 
who might then co-operate with us. " Abdullah Mubarrak's ambitions for the leadership were 
thwarted by the ruler shortly before independence when Abdullah Salim obliged him to resign. 
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Appendix 4: The 1964/5 Cabinet crisis 
The 1964/5 cabinet crisis, in which the national assembly prevented the formation of a new 
government for more than a month, saw Amir Abdullah Salim come under pressure within the 
ruling family to close the assembly down, or, at the least, act within his constitutional authority to 
suspend it, pending further elections. However Abdullah Salim understood the need to ensure that 
the differing interests and political beliefs that were being played out in the increasingly 
rancorous national assembly, and in public life generally, should as far as possible be managed by 
consensus rather than authoritarian control. The assembly was not a direct shaper of foreign 
policy, however, in the way that some leading merchants had apparently believed, and nor was 
the cabinet crisis liable to greatly influence the political direction of the government, other than to 
weaken the interest of the leading merchants in personal involvement in the political process and 
especially government. The so-called Kuwaiti "plutocrats" or "oligarchs" were not the victim of 
an internecine class war waged by less wealthy merchants, as suggested in some British embassy 
accounts from the period, nor would this have implications for the latter's political influence in 
Kuwait. 
One way in which the leading merchants felt that their interests were being undermined, however, 
was in the government's articulation of a foreign policy line believed to have been influenced by 
the organised and highly vocal 12 MPs who were members of the Kuwaiti branch of the region- 
wide, Movement for Arab Nationalism (KMAN). The pan-Arabism of KMAN was of the kind 
espoused by Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser and was seen by some Kuwaitis as 
potentially damaging to national and business interests. Partly in reaction to this, the senior 
merchant and president of the assembly, Abdul-Aziz Al-Sagr, persuaded Thunayan At-Ghanim 
and four other business confidantes to join the cabinet. In the eyes of the assembly majority this 
was political and business cronyism, and they used the constitutional bar on maintaining business 
interests when in government as the means to oppose the senior merchants' candidature. Prime 
minister Sabah Salim (1963-5) tried to persuade members of KMAN to take up two cabinet posts 
as well, but to no avail. The country's first cabinet crisis took hold as 31 elected MPs rejected the 
cabinet as proposed. Sabah Salim tendered his resignation, which was refused, while internal 
family intriguing at the time of the crisis suggested that the most senior member of the Al-Jabr 
line and future amir, Jabr Al-Ahmed, finance minister (1963-65), might take over premiership 
duties if he could hold on to the financial purse strings. Jabr Al-Ahmed and his half-brother 
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Sabah Al-Ahmed seemed happy to allow Sabah Salim's efforts to shore up his government come 
to nothing, but could not be seen to be acting directly to undermine a government approved by the 
amir. Jabr al-Ali, however, nephew of Sabah Salim, and minister for Islamic guidance, was 
judged by the US as possibly having encouraged the revolt. Notably, KMAN, with whom the two 
senior members of the Al-Jabr line sought to foster links, did not back the revolt of the so-called 
"lesser merchants". 
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Appendix 5: Palestinians in public life 
A leading naturalised Palestinian, Adil Jarrah, was a senior official in the Kuwaiti Foreign 
Ministry throughout the period. Adil Jarrah was also a cousin of the first chairman of the 
Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), Ahmed Shuqairy. The position of ambassador to the US 
throughout the 1960s was occupied by Talat Ghussein, a much respected naturalised Palestinian 
from a senior West Bank family. In addition, Ashraf Lutfi was head of the Amiri Diwan, the 
ruler's "cabinet office" in the early years of independence, until he was replaced by fellow 
Palestinian, Hani Qaddoumi. 
In February 1964, the then Kuwaiti finance minister Shaikh Jabr Al-Ahmed suggested that in 
order for the amirate to provide aid to the newly formed PLO, customs duties should be 
increased, and that all Palestinians living in Kuwait should have a political "tithe" of 5% deducted 
from what were largely government, and therefore generous, salaries. In this way the amirate 
could show its public support for the PLO without burdening the Kuwaiti exchequer and thus 
without reducing the monies available for Kuwaiti nationals. Adil Jarrah was ambitious regarding 
the Palestinian contribution. He argued that the tithe should be 10%, and, like one or two other 
naturalised Palestinians in key government positions, believed that, through its wealth, the 
Kuwaiti Palestinian community could be a bridge to the large but poorer Palestinian communities 
in Lebanon and Jordan. This was not an insurrectionary agenda of the kind pursued elsewhere by 
Palestinians after 1967. Jarrah however believed that Kuwaiti legitimacy in the Arab world could 
be strengthened through the positive contribution of Kuwaiti Palestinians to the officially 
expressed aspiration at the Arab summit that a "Palestinian entity" be established. Jabr Al- 
Ahmed's specific proposals, and Adel Jarrah's development of them, were a pro-active attempt 
by the Kuwait leadership and elite Palestinians in the government service to get out in front of the 
Arab League's expectation of Arab state support for the PLO. However many middle class 
Palestinians in Kuwait feared that it could upset relations with Jordan and Lebanon where 
enthusiasm for the Palestinian entity was more muted. The Kuwaiti leadership did not want 
KMAN to set the pace on how to handle the pro-Egyptian PLO. Shortly afterwards the Kuwaiti 
leadership decided to allow the proposed Palestine Liberation Army (PLA), the PLO's "army", to 
set up training bases in the amirate. The Kuwaiti ministries of defence and interior were 
comfortable with this as the PLA could be carefully watched and kept entirely separate from 
Kuwait's armed forces who played no role whatsoever in the former's activity. 
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Appendix 6: Kuwaiti Arab Nationalist Movement (KMAN) 
The KMAN leader in the 1950s and for much of the 1960s, Jassirn Qitami, was a merchant whose 
elder brother had been killed by the police at the time of the suppression of the Majlis Movement 
in 1939, and, ironically perhaps, had become deputy under chief of police Shaikh Sabah Salim 
(1939-59), until resigning over the clampdown on the disturbances following the 1956 Anglo- 
French Suez invasion. Qitami had also formerly been in business partnership with one of the 
leading families with whom he remained close. Ever the pragmatist, Qitami had moved from 
support for Kuwait's immediate union with the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria founded 
in 1958, to trying to build what he considered to be a constructive opposition, after 
controversially playing a leading part in public demands for reform in 1959, and had not been 
above considering a seat in cabinet in 1964. The Arab nationalism of the kind advocated by 
Qitami and KMAN was typically supported by the less privileged, public sector employed 
Kuwaiti nationals, but was particularly espoused by merchants and small business people, a 
socio-economic profile shared by KMAN MPs themselves. Dr Ahmed Khateeb, who was 
effectively KMAN's deputy leader, was a doctor by training who had served as Amir Abdullah 
Salim's personal physician and who had married into influential circles. He was also a 
businessman who, by 1967, was observed by his US interlocutors as enjoying a very comfortable 
lifestyle. Khateeb was keen to stress to his MAN comrades outside of Kuwait that revolutionary 
aspirations were not appropriate in the amirate. 
In the aftermath of the 1967 war and the consequent radicalisation of much of the MAN 
leadership, its Kuwaiti branch was increasingly judged by the increasingly dominant leftist trend 
within MAN as having too much influence. KMAN was effectively the leader of MAN's 
branches in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia. The "left" MAN leadership trend attacked the 
inherent "reformism" of KMAN, which largely led the parliamentary opposition in Kuwait. At 
the same time Dr Ahmed Khateeb, one of the leading MAN figures when it was 
founded in the 
late 1940s in Lebanon, considered the Marxian ideology being adopted by MAN as inappropriate, 
especially when a MAN conference decided to commit the movement to revolutionary violence 
in all "regional" theatres, including Kuwait. KMAN was to be demoted 
from being the lead 
player in the Gulf leadership, and then in July 1968 MAN decided to replace 
KMAN with a new 
organisation. Dr Khateeb and his organisation favoured a more gradualist path 
to socialism but 
were "replaced" by a less representative organisation committed to revolutionary means. 
The new 
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Kuwaiti branch, which was made up of far less representative leaders, subsequently voted to 
expel the original KMAN leadership as they were judged insufficiently sympathetic with the 
revolutionary ideology that at the same time was seeing the Palestine MAN branch evolve into 
the Marxist-orientated, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) under the leadership 
of Khateeb's original MAN comrade, Dr George Habash. 
In May 1968, the US embassy reported to Washington that Dr Khateeb had agreed that "violence 
is the only solution". This did not however incline the US to think that Khateeb's opposition to 
the revolutionary "solution" in Kuwait was anything other than genuine. Senior AI-Sabah though 
retained their suspicions, even in the less tense environment following national assembly 
elections in 1971 that were markedly fairer than four years earlier. For his part the US 
ambassador was to assess that KMAN had loosened its commitment to Nasserism in the 
aftermath of the 1967 war. The distancing from Nasserism was most acute in the case of Jassim 
Qitami, who, following the post-1967 period of political introspection among nationalists in the 
amirate and the wider region, formed a splinter organisation that in the 1971-75 assembly became 
known as "progressive nationalists". 
The Kuwaiti government had specific concerns about KMAN's historic connection to the leading 
figures in the Palestinian faction, the Popular front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The 
Al-Sabah were also subject to some external pressure over this relationship. From 1968, the 
PFLP, and breakaway groupings, had begun to attract international notoriety for terrorist attacks 
in Europe. The PFLP were definitely outside of what most Kuwaitis, including the leadership, 
viewed as the Palestinian mainstream embodied by Fatah and its leader, Yasser Arafat. The leader 
of the minority Marxist wing of KMAN, Sami Munayyes, took over the editorship of their 
organisation's weekly house journal Al-Talia when it began publishing again in 1968 after a 
banning order earlier in the year. The US argued that that year the paper "spent more time 
defending the PFLP than the (Kuwaiti pan-Arab) nationalists". However, whether it was the 
radical Sami Munayyes or the dominant reformist trend under Ahmed Khateeb, KMAN remained 
out of step with the avowedly revolutionary philosophy of the PFLP, which had patently moved 
beyond Nasserite pan-Arabism. For Ahmed Khateeb, and even Sami Munayyes, the decline of the 
plausibility of pan-Arabism on the old basis had not encouraged a revolutionary commitment to 
11 nationalism in one country" of the kind espoused by the PFLP leader Dr George Habash. While 
the Kuwaiti authorities remained hostile to the PFLP, a perspective encouraged by their links to 
the one and only incident of a hijacking on Kuwaiti soil, they did not think that sympathetic 
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editorials were indicative of an underground conspiracy. Nor for that matter did they decisively 
remove the PFLP presence in the amirate, even after the 1974 hijacking. 
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